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ABSTRACT 
Background: Global HIV resource needs estimates are ever-increasing. There is growing interest in 
creating domestic fiscal space and prioritising the most cost-effective interventions. Concurrently, 
structural drivers and barriers are undermining the efficiency of HIV programmes to deliver on 
ambitious treatment and prevention targets. Yet, limited HIV resources are being channelled to 
interventions addressing these upstream factors. Conventional priority-setting and financing 
frameworks that only consider HIV outcomes and budgets, are further hampering investments in 
structural interventions that tend to be implemented in other sectors, for other objectives. 
Opportunities to factor in synergies with non-HIV investments tend to be missed, due to a lack of 
data on their multiple outcomes; the dominance of single outcome economic evaluation 
frameworks; and weak incentives for joint financing between sectors. The aim of this thesis is to 
develop and explore the application of a novel methodological approach for both fiscal space 
analysis and economic evaluation that considers multiple intervention benefits and multi-sectoral 
payers.  
Methods: The research uses a mixed methods approach, including case studies, econometric 
analysis, economic evaluation, and qualitative interviews, with data from selected countries in sub-
Saharan Africa.   
Results: A ‘co-financing’ approach is developed for factoring non-HIV benefits and payers in HIV 
resource allocation. It is compared to other economic evaluation approaches, and to a unisectoral 
conceptualisation of cost-effectiveness thresholds. This approach is then used to explore the 
potential for creating fiscal space for HIV through co-financing of health system and broader 
development investments. Co-financing is also applied to the economic evaluation of a food 
support intervention for people initiating antiretroviral therapy. Finally, the institutional feasibility 
of adopting a co-financing framework in real-world HIV resource allocation is investigated from the 
perspective of policy-makers in Tanzania.  
Conclusion: Co-financing across sectors and budgets could optimise resource allocation and 
prevent welfare loss, but it will require strong cross-sectoral coordination and institutional 
incentives.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Rationale of the thesis 
In two decades, the HIV epidemic evolved from the 33rd cause of global mortality and morbidity in 
1990 to the fifth cause in 2010 (1). According to UNAIDS, AIDS has claimed 35 million lives, 
orphaned over 17 million children and left 36.7 million people living with HIV (PLHIV) who will 
depend on treatment and care to survive (2-4). The situation is particularly dire in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), where 27.5 million people live with the virus, of which 58% are women (4, 5). In 2015, 
an estimated 1.4 million Africans were newly infected and 800,000 died of AIDS-related causes (4). 
Until recently, the epidemic had reversed hard-won gains in life expectancy in the region and also 
had serious negative economic consequences for affected households (6, 7).     
Since the turn of the century, the global and regional AIDS responses have been dramatically 
stepped up, with the advent of effective treatment and intensive global advocacy for equitable and 
affordable access to HIV services (3). The past fifteen years witnessed an unprecedented increase 
in spending on HIV, with global investments in the response in low and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) multiplying more than six-fold, to about USD 19.1 billion in 2016 (7, 8). An exceptional and 
urgent response called for an exceptional investment, as exemplified by the creation of the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and the US President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Starting from about 300,000 people on antiretroviral therapy (ART) in 
LMICs in 2002, a remarkable 18.2 million were receiving lifesaving treatment by mid-2016 and 1.4 
million infections among infants had been prevented (4, 7).  
Nonetheless, the need continues to outpace the response, with over 18 million PLHIV still not 
receiving treatment, including 70% of children living with HIV; 25% of HIV-positive pregnant women 
in priority African countries not receiving antiretroviral drugs that could eliminate vertical 
transmission; and about 50% of male circumcisions performed of those needed to achieve a public 
health impact in high-burden countries (5, 7). Despite the promise of universal treatment and 
biomedical prevention, the number of new HIV infections remains high, and only 44% of all PLHIV 
are currently virally suppressed (7, 9). Clearly, too many people at risk of and living with HIV are 
being lost at various points along the prevention and treatment cascades (10, 11). There is growing 
recognition of the critical role of structural drivers in shaping the environment in which HIV risk 
occurs, and in constraining the uptake of and adherence to HIV prevention and treatment services 
(10). These structural factors and barriers are impeding the effectiveness of HIV programmes and 
their ability to meet the ambitious global goal of ending AIDS as a public health threat by 2030 (9).  
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Indeed, there is compelling evidence to suggest that HIV risk and service uptake are associated 
with low levels of schooling, poverty, food insecurity, gender-based violence, problematic alcohol 
use, and stigma. For one, education has been increasingly emerging as a protective factor and 
social vaccine for HIV, especially for adolescents and young girls (12-16). Although the relationship 
with wealth is more mixed (17, 18), food poverty and insecurity also appears to be linked to risky 
sexual behaviours among women, and ART non-adherence (19-25). Stigma has been a persistent 
barrier to the use of HIV prevention tools, and continues to hamper HIV testing, linkage and 
retention in care, while evidence on problematic alcohol use reports negative associations with 
treatment outcomes (26-29). Gender inequality and gender-based violence consistently come out 
as key underlying drivers of HIV that further reinforce the negative effects of poverty, poor education 
and access to basic services (30-34). 
As has been found with the broader social determinants of health, investments in other non-health 
sectors that address these structural barriers and drivers may therefore be good HIV investments 
(35-39). The evidence base on the effectiveness of structural interventions for HIV has been 
growing in recent years, and although few have been rigorously evaluated, there are several 
promising models (40-51). Conditional cash transfers to keep girls in school, or educational reforms 
that increase secondary schooling, have been found to have a significant and sizeable impact on 
HIV risk in Malawi, Botswana and Uganda (40, 52-54). There is some evidence that economic 
empowerment interventions for women, such as microfinance loans, could decrease risky sexual 
behaviours and increase HIV service uptake (42, 55, 56). Group sessions and community-based 
models to transform gender norms have reduced intimate partner violence and HIV-related risk 
behaviour among men (48, 49). Social protection programmes and in-kind support that address 
poor livelihoods, malnutrition and food insecurity can improve effective ART coverage and levels 
of viral suppression (22, 57-60). Other fiscal interventions, such as alcohol taxation, may generate 
revenues while impacting on HIV at the same time (61).  
However, despite the growing evidence of the important role of structural factors in driving HIV 
transmission and constraining service scale-up, very limited HIV resources are being channelled 
to effective interventions addressing these issues (62-65). Some even argue that there has been 
an overemphasis on the need for a multi-sectoral response for HIV that has hampered a more 
prioritised approach, focused on cost-effective interventions with HIV endpoints (65, 66). In this 
discourse, structural interventions that address distal determinants of HIV risk and service use, are 
unlikely to compare favourably to interventions tackling more proximal determinants, if only valued 
for their HIV outcomes. Indeed, when HIV budgets are being optimised, the focus is usually on 
maximising HIV impact, which implies that non-HIV outcomes are largely ignored and interventions 
with multi-sectoral benefits thereby undervalued and under-prioritised (67, 68). Besides the limited 
availability of trial data on the effectiveness of such interventions for HIV, it is likely that these 
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prevailing priority-setting frameworks are further hampering investments in structural interventions, 
despite their likely HIV pay-offs (69, 70). 
Indeed, standard economic evaluation methods that are used tend to be confined to the ‘HIV-only’ 
domain. For example, increased secondary schooling or a cash transfer to keep girls in school 
would appear expensive and not good value-for-HIV-money, if their education benefits were not 
factored into the financing decision (52, 53). The same is true for public health interventions with 
multi-sectoral impacts and health system strengthening interventions with multiple disease impacts 
(71-73).This reflects a lack of adequate economic analysis methods to evaluate the value for money 
of such upstream interventions.  
Moreover, this is compounded by an inadequate financing framework that does not consider non-
HIV programmes when estimating the HIV resource envelope. The interpretation of a multi-sectoral 
HIV response has been quite narrow and largely defined in practice as implementing traditional 
HIV interventions (such as condom distribution, behaviour change, treatment and care) in non-
health sectors (74). Interventions with non-HIV primary objectives are not generally considered to 
merit HIV resources (65), therefore current approaches do not look beyond the traditional HIV 
budget, and overlook potential financing from cross-sectoral synergies.  
One of the approaches used to estimate resource envelopes and assess the extent to which it is 
desirable for countries to fund HIV, without damaging other developmental or economic objectives, 
is to apply the concept of fiscal space. Fiscal space is defined as the additional budgetary room 
available to invest in a specific objective without compromising fiscal sustainability (75). The 
potential sources of fiscal space naturally vary from country to country, given their different 
economic fundamentals and governance structures (76, 77). To date, fiscal space analyses have 
been conducted for health in general (78-81) and for HIV in particular (82-85). These studies have 
tended to be narrow in their definition of what can be considered expenditures to achieve health or 
HIV objectives, thereby ignoring a range of investments that could be leveraged beyond the 
traditional sector or vertical programme boundaries (75, 86). Moreover, existing analyses have 
underestimated (or discarded) other non-financial resource constraints and limitations in absorptive 
capacity, which seriously hamper effective fiscal space (87, 88). Yet, if the HIV response does not 
consider broader development finance aims, then creating more fiscal space for HIV-specific 
interventions may crowd out investments in these other areas (89).  
This is of concern, since such interventions represent an opportunity to capitalise on existing non-
HIV investments. They also come with clear incentives for Ministries of Finance, as they generate 
‘multiple bangs for the same buck’, and minimise the risk associated with the uncertainty 
surrounding intervention impact (90). Similarly, opportunities are arguably being missed to invest 
in structural health system strengthening, rather than short-term solutions to structural constraints 
(36, 51, 91-107). This could lead to a zero-sum game where resources allocated to interventions 
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with non-HIV primary objectives are effectively foregone HIV resources, thereby creating 
inefficiencies by hampering synergistic investments.   
Given the current financing landscape and the growing costs of the HV response, efficiencies are 
acutely needed. Indeed, the resource need estimates of responding to the epidemic have been 
mounting with the roll-out of treatment and the growing arsenal of HIV interventions (67). In its Fast 
Track strategy launched in 2014, UNAIDS underlined the imperative of frontloading investments to 
control the epidemic by 2020, at the risk of seeing incidence and costs rise thereafter (68, 108). Its 
estimates of global resources needed in 2020 range between USD 26 and USD 32 billion (67, 108-
110), which is around one-fifth of the USD 143 billion disbursed by OECD countries in 2016 as 
official development assistance (111). South Africa’s new national plan for HIV/Tuberculosis/STIs 
alone has been costed at USD16 billion (2017-2022) (112). The cost to meet the need outstrips the 
domestic resources available to many countries and is likely to keep increasing, especially in 
countries where the ‘tipping point’ or ‘AIDS transition’ has not yet been met – i.e. the number of 
new infections continues to outweigh the number newly initiated on ART (113).  
An analysis by the World Bank likened the commitments to implementing national HIV strategic 
plans to fiscal quasi-liabilities that would indebt governments to continue providing services – akin 
to the European pension debt (114). These estimated fiscal ‘quasi-liabilities’ incurred by HIV 
programmes until 2030 ranged from a non-negligible 37% of GDP in South Africa to a striking 293% 
of GDP in Swaziland (115). Given this so-called ‘treatment mortgage’, it is becoming increasingly 
evident that more effective prevention is needed to ensure that future treatment can be sustained 
(113). This would also minimise the risk to affected countries of crippling their economies by 
crowding out other meritorious public investments due to accumulated entitlements (89, 94, 115, 
116). Indeed, most of these quasi-liabilities are attributable to treatment costs, which are relatively 
‘harder’ commitments to keeping people alive, that risk squeezing out the more discretionary-type 
investments in prevention, which are already remarkably low in most affected countries (as low as 
10%) (110, 117, 118). 
To date, the funding gap in much of SSA has been largely filled by external funds from bilateral and 
multilateral donors, which have accounted for 27% to 98% of national HIV spending (115, 118), 
and have partially substituting out-of-pocket expenditures (97, 119). However, development 
assistance for health and for HIV has flat-lined over the past 5 years (120, 121) and ‘HIV fatigue’ is 
reducing the policy space available at the donor level to single out HIV programmes (83, 89, 94, 
122-124). A key future source of financing will have to be HIV-affected countries themselves (125, 
126), many of which have been experiencing robust economic growth (127). These countries are 
now expected to take on their ‘shared responsibility’ and shoulder more and more of the growing 
costs of ART for current and future PLHIV, as well as continue to invest in prevention (128). The 
latest estimates suggest that domestic HIV financing increased steadily from USD 2.1 billion in 
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2000 to USD 6.6 billion in 2012, of which a large share was spent by African governments (47%) 
(5, 125, 129). Yet, for low-income and lower middle-income countries, it will remain extremely 
difficult to take on this fiscal burden from domestic sources alone in the near future (129). 
At the same time, the international community has embraced a new development agenda with 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), of which only one is focussed on health (130, 131) – in 
stark contrast to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) where 3 of the 8 goals were health-
related. Governments have a growing set of priorities that are competing for scarce resources, 
including climate change mitigation, food production, infrastructure development, education, 
gender equality, and multiple communicable and non-communicable disease burdens, among 
many others. In this context, it will be increasingly challenging to make the case for increased HIV-
specific public resources going forward, especially given the perception that the HIV response has 
been over-funded and received a disproportionate share of total health expenditures (132-135). 
However, greater investments in other health and development areas do not necessarily mean 
disinvestment in HIV objectives, but they do make it all the more important to leverage these non-
HIV investments. There may also be scope to optimise specific complementarities between existing 
health or development programmes for HIV impact (136). For example, while microfinance alone 
may have an unclear effect on HIV-related risk behaviour and service utilisation, combining 
microfinance with a gender and HIV training component could enable the realisation of its HIV 
potential (44-46). 
To overcome the sub-optimal investments in these types of interventions and recognise their 
mutual benefits across sectors and budgetary authorities, some high-income countries have 
experimented with joint budgeting or co-financing models. These have involved pooling health and 
social care budgets, with mixed results and significant institutional challenges (137, 138).  
While such investments and their associated economic arguments are particularly potent, 
opportunities for co-investments tend to be missed due, among others reasons, to a lack of data 
on their multiple benefits and value for money from a societal perspective; the dominance of single 
outcome cost-effectiveness frameworks used in health economic evaluation; and weak 
mechanisms for co-financing between sectors and health programmes, as prevailing institutional 
and budgeting arrangements disincentivise cross-sectoral arithmetic (53, 139, 140). 
Methodological developments are therefore required to fully assess the economic value of 
structural interventions and the available fiscal space for HIV in a way that considers the 
interactions between sectors and the creation (or restriction) of fiscal space through health systems 
and broader development investments. Moreover, a better understanding of the institutional 
incentives that may support or hamper intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral investments could inform 
policy recommendations to address these potential inefficiencies.  
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1.2 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this thesis was to develop and explore the application of a novel methodological 
approach for both economic evaluation and fiscal space analysis that considers multiple 
intervention benefits and multi-sectoral payers, in the context of HIV. 
To achieve this aim, the study sought to meet the following specific objectives:  
1. To develop a methodological approach – ‘co-financing’ – for factoring in non-HIV benefits 
and non-HIV payers in the decision rules of resource allocation; 
2. To explore the potential of creating fiscal space for HIV across sub-Saharan Africa, 
incorporating the value of co-financing in health system strengthening and broader 
development investments; 
3. To apply the co-financing approach by assessing the benefits and potential of co-financing 
of a food support intervention in various country settings; 
4. To understand in practice the institutional barriers, enablers and (dis)incentives to adopting 
a co-financing framework in HIV financing and priority-setting.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis starts with a general literature review, followed by a description of the overall study 
design and methods. Next, there are five results chapters, and a final discussion. Each of the results 
chapters follow a paper-style format, with their own methods and discussion sections. Some also 
have more detailed technical appendices, which can be found at the end of the thesis.  
The next chapter presents an overview of the literature on public resource allocation across sectors, 
fiscal space and economic evaluation of interventions with multi-sectoral outcomes, as well as the 
literature around inter-sectoral governance, joint budgeting and co-financing models for upstream 
programmes. This chapter seeks to frame the study in the context of the most relevant strands of 
literature and highlight the existing gaps. Chapter 3 goes on to describe the study design and 
justification for the choice of mixed methods adopted for each objective. 
Chapter 4 is a methodological paper in which a novel co-financing approach is proposed and 
supported with an empirical example of a case study from Malawi. In Chapter 5, the approach is 
further developed in terms of conceptualising cost-effectiveness thresholds from a multi-sectoral 
perspective, using a stylised two-sector model for health and education.  
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Chapter 6 reports on an adapted fiscal space analysis for HIV in 14 sub-Saharan African countries 
that incorporates co-financing as a potential source of fiscal space and explores the implications of 
effective non-HIV investments for the HIV resource envelope.  
Chapter 7 presents an application of co-financing as an analytical technique in economic 
evaluation. It assesses the economic returns of a food assistance intervention for people initiating 
ART in 5 different country settings in sub-Saharan Africa, based on its HIV and food security 
impacts.    
Chapter 8 explores the institutional feasibility of a co-financing model and mechanism, and seeks 
to identify the enablers and barriers to the adoption of this potentially efficiency-enhancing 
approach through a series of in-depth interviews with decision-makers in Tanzania at the national 
level.  
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises the main findings of the thesis, and reflects on its limitations and 
key contributions to the literature. It also identifies policy implications and proposes avenues for 
future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The aim of the literature review was to identify and appraise the methods for assessing and 
leveraging financing for structural HIV interventions, with a particular focus on broader health 
and development resources and efficiency gains from cross-sectoral synergies.  
There are two distinct steps in the allocation of public resources that this thesis was particularly 
interested in. The first is the allocation of the total public budget to various sectors of the 
economy and of government, and the second is the allocation of those government sector 
budgets to specific interventions. The literature review therefore starts with the concept of fiscal 
space, as an approach to estimate the resource envelope, and its applications for HIV and 
health. This is followed by a review of methods to guide sectoral resource allocation processes 
and financing decisions, with a focus on health. Finally, the review considers the evidence of 
real-world experiences with institutional arrangements that encourage cross-sectoral financing, 
including their feasibility and performance.   
Based on the rationale and objectives of this thesis, three separate reviews were conducted to 
answer the following questions:  
 What are the methods used to estimate the resource envelope or fiscal space for HIV 
or health, and to what extent do they build in health-producing investments in other 
sectors?   
 What are the available methods to economically evaluate interventions with multiple 
benefits across sectors/payers, and are they being applied in health?  
 What are current approaches to govern and finance programmes requiring cross-
sectoral coordination and investments?  
For each area, the review consisted of a combined approach with a review of key reference 
texts or existing reviews on the topic; and an online literature search of selected electronic 
databases, and relevant authoritative websites. Both peer-reviewed and grey literature were 
considered to minimise publication bias. The bibliographies of identified publications were 
screened and experts were consulted to ensure that no key studies or texts had been omitted. 
Details on the search terms and inclusion/exclusion criteria of each search are described below.  
This chapter is structured along the lines of the three reviews, starting with a summary of the 
literature on estimating fiscal space and HIV financing; followed by the methods for the 
economic evaluation of interventions with multi-sectoral benefits; and the institutional and 
financing responses to coordinate and implement such health-related interventions. The 
chapter ends with a summary of the three bodies of literature and key gaps that this study 
sought to contribute to.   
Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
20 
 
2.1 Resource Envelope and Fiscal Space 
For the search related to existing methods for the estimation of the HIV resource envelope, 
three electronic databases were searched (Pubmed, Econlit, GoogleScholar) with terms related 
to ‘HIV’, ‘AIDS’ or ‘health’; and ‘fiscal space’, ‘financing’, ‘funding’, ‘spending’, or ‘expenditures’ 
in the title.  In addition, websites of the following organisations were screened: the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank, Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UNAIDS, Overseas Development Institute, 
Kaiser Family Foundation, as well as abstracts from the International AIDS Conferences and 
the International AIDS Economics Network conferences. There was no geographic, publication 
date or language restriction, but the search was conducted in English. Publications were 
retained if they presented or applied methods to prospectively or retrospectively estimate the 
fiscal space or funding availability for HIV programmes in particular, or health in general. 
The following key frameworks and approaches were identified: Heller’s work on fiscal space for 
health in LMICs (1, 2); the World Bank’s framework and publications on fiscal space for health 
and HIV (3, 4); and the WHO’s background papers for the 2010 World Health Report on health 
systems financing (5, 6). Through further bibliographic searches, selected resources on 
estimating general fiscal space were also consulted to provide a broader framing and explore 
how cross-sectoral spill overs were taken into account. These included publications by the IMF 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the context of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) scale-up (7, 8). Although there is a case to be made against 
sector-specific analyses of public financing sources, precisely because of the interactions 
across sectors and the need for flexible fiscal policies, the reality is that the current HIV and 
health financing architecture in LMICs is characterised by separate funding streams and budget 
constraints, which has led sectors to explore financing options in isolation from one another.      
2.1.1 Fiscal space definitions  
The fiscal doctrine in Western countries shifted after the Second World War from the balanced 
budget norm, whereby public expenditures were expected to match revenues, to active demand 
management, which warranted public sector borrowing to control aggregate demand (9). 
Together with the emergence of the welfare state, this confronted governments with increasing 
demands for public spending (9, 10). Low and middle-income countries are now faced with 
similarly high demands, coupled with households’ limited capacity to cope with risk. As these 
economies grow, demand for public spending and the expansion of entitlements increase – 
also known as Wagner’s law (9). All governments therefore routinely deal with the gap between 
projected revenues and expenditures, and how to fill it in the short and long run by creating 
‘fiscal space’ (8). 
The term ‘fiscal space’ is evolving and continues to be defined differently in the literature (11). 
Heller (2005) framed it as “the availability of budgetary room that allows a government to 
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provide resources for a desired purpose without any prejudice to the sustainability of a 
government’s financial position” (1). Most definitions highlight the aspect of ‘room’ or ‘space’ in 
government resources, subject to maintaining ‘fiscal solvency’ or ‘sustainability’ (8, 9, 12).  
The former points to the incremental nature of the concept (9), which reflects the reality of 
budgeting processes (13, 14). Although in theory, making resource allocation decisions for the 
total government budget at one point in time, based on the expected benefits of various 
investment options, may be more optimal; in practice, the largest share of resources have 
already been pre-committed in previous budgeting sessions and only newly available resources 
are being considered for allocation. Ambitious reforms to move away from this basis have 
encountered challenges, including programme budgeting (that breaks expenditures down by 
programme), or zero-based budgeting (that requires all expenditures to be justified for every 
new budgeting period) (9, 15).   
The second aspect of fiscal sustainability requires that the additional room for spending is in 
line with the government’s capacity (at least in the future) to continue financing its desired 
programmes, to service its debt obligations (including from borrowing) and to ensure its 
solvency (measured as the ratio of debt to GDP) (8). The IMF highlights that this will require: 
(i) a judgement of whether higher expenditure in the short-term, and any associated future 
expenditures, can be financed from current and future revenues; (ii) due attention is given to 
medium-term consequences of the spending for which fiscal space is created in a given year; 
(iii) any consideration of fiscal space must (at least) be made in the context of a medium-term 
expenditure framework that considers government’s expenditure priorities comprehensively (8).  
The World Bank and the IMF include an additional condition for fiscal space called 
‘macroeconomic space’, whereby government spending can be increased without 
compromising macroeconomic stability (11). This prevailing approach has been criticised for 
conceptualising fiscal space only in residual terms and considering only short-term implications, 
which largely ignore the dynamic supply-side effects and developmental implications of higher 
government spending (16). For example, after the MDGs were set, there was concern about 
how large inflows of external aid would affect macroeconomic stability. This stemmed from the 
risk of the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’, whereby a large inflow of foreign currency was expected 
to lead to an appreciation of the local currency and thereby negatively affect exports and 
economic growth. However, the empirical evidence supporting the aid-induced Dutch Disease 
theory is inconclusive (11, 17, 18).  
Fiscal space is by definition limited to public financing and therefore does not reflect the total 
resources available in a country for specific meritorious investments. Nonetheless, the focus 
on public resources is justified by the increased demand for and redistributive function of public 
spending (9), and the perceived complementary role of private investment (11). While the fiscal 
space concept is not particularly new, the term itself emerged quite recently in the context of 
low and middle-income countries and resurfaced in industrialised countries after the economic 
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crisis in 2008 (9, 15). It provides a useful framework to ensure that a comprehensive fiscal 
perspective is adopted and that linkages and feedbacks between options are duly considered 
when resources are allocated between various investment options (7). 
2.1.2 Potential Sources of Fiscal space  
There appears to be a relatively homogenous understanding of the potential sources for 
creating fiscal space at an aggregate national level and in the health, education, social 
protection and infrastructure sectors (1, 3, 19-21). According to a framework for OECD 
countries, the overall volume of fiscal space depends on: (i) national economic performance, 
(ii) the propensity of a government to tax; (iii) the propensity of a government to borrow; and 
(iv) the extent to which existing programmes claim incremental resources (sticky programmes 
and entitlements) (9). The latter implies that if the government’s budget is committed to pre-
existing liabilities, as may become the case with HIV treatment programmes, for example, there 
will be more limited (and potentially even negative) fiscal space in future budgets (8, 15).   
In the context of the additional financing needs required in low and middle-income countries to 
meet the MDGs, the following options were considered central: (i) development aid and debt 
relief; (ii) domestic revenue mobilisation through improved tax administration; (iii) deficit 
financing through domestic and external borrowing; and (iv) reprioritisation and raising 
efficiency of expenditures (7, 16). The 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for 
development reiterates these financing sources for the ambitious Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), and in particular, the need for increased domestic financing from strengthened 
tax efforts and innovative public and private financing sources (22).  
In addition, several studies have explored the fiscal space available in specific countries for 
sector-specific investments. The IMF and the World Bank developed a framework for creating 
and assessing the potential availability of fiscal space for health, which includes: (i) conducive 
macroeconomic conditions, namely GDP growth and tax revenue; (ii) re-prioritisation of health 
within the government budget; (iii) earmarked resources for health, such as user fees, 
insurance premiums, earmarked taxes; (iv) health sector-specific grants/ foreign aid; and (v) 
efficiency gains (1, 3). The application of this assessment framework highlighted large variation 
in the potential of different sources across countries, given different economic fundamentals, 
political contexts and health system performance (3). Common findings across countries 
indicated that even where there was potential to create fiscal space from conducive 
macroeconomic conditions, this would only translate into effective fiscal space for health over 
time if the sector was more prioritised in the government budget and addressed its inefficiencies 
and absorptive capacity constraints (3). Optimising the use of existing resources appears 
critical, given that an estimated 20-40% of global resources dedicated to health are wasted (6). 
Earmarked development assistance for health remains an important source of fiscal space in 
many LMICs, but there are question marks regarding the extent to which it has truly been 
additional, or rather displaced government financing (23, 24).  
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In general, there is an implicit distinction between sources that are within the health sector’s 
control, including earmarked revenues, grants and efficiencies; and those that are beyond its 
control, such as economic growth, government revenue generation and borrowing. The former 
are considered more feasible in that they are less dependent on broader economic conditions 
and the health sector’s political capital (3). Indeed, while earmarked revenue and efficiency 
measures tend to be underemphasised at the aggregate level (11), they feature quite highly in 
sector-specific approaches (3, 25-27). Similarly, analyses within the sector envelope tend to 
explore various revenue streams on the one hand, and options to free up existing resources 
and reinvest them, on the other (3, 25, 28).  
Although fiscal space can be viewed as a positive concept, and an economic variable that can 
be objectively measured, its application tends to require a composite approach that combines 
empirical observations and normative judgements (7). Indeed, estimating the volume of fiscal 
space from improved revenue generation, for example, requires the use of some benchmark 
or norm of what is considered an optimal or feasible level of government revenue compared to 
national income. Likewise, for sector-specific fiscal space, the potential from reprioritisation 
requires a normative judgment of how much a government should be prioritising investments 
in one sector over another. For example, the Abuja target whereby African governments 
committed to allocate 15% of their national budgets to health has become a normative threshold 
that was initially derived from the upper limit found in empirical data (3, 29). 
WHO suggests that fiscal space analyses for health can serve a number of purposes, including 
as an advocacy tool to make the case for greater health prioritisation (30). Another use would 
be to explore the fiscal sustainability of alternative health reform packages, to ensure their 
current and future costs could be covered by current and future revenue streams (5, 6).  
2.1.3 HIV Financing and Fiscal space 
In the HIV arena, the unprecedented increase in external financing in the early 2000s limited 
the focus on budgetary fiscal space. More recently, a number of analyses have been conducted 
projecting the long-term financing needs of sustained HIV responses and these programmes’ 
financial sustainability, especially in low and lower middle-income countries (4, 31-35). 
Generally, studies have estimated high gaps in low-income countries, such as Malawi, that 
cannot feasibly be filled through conventional domestic sources of financing (25), calling for 
more external resources (32). In terms of applying the fiscal space lens to HIV, few studies 
have done this, and even then, the focus has been on specific sources of fiscal space, rather 
than a comprehensive appraisal of available options.  
Economic growth and the reprioritisation of health in national expenditures were considered in 
the aids2031 project, both for domestic and donor resources (36). Other studies have 
mentioned the potential of borrowing for certain countries (such as Botswana); improved 
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taxation and total government revenue generation; efficiency gains through more allocative 
efficiency, as well as reductions in leakages from poor governance (25, 28).  
More recently, Resch and colleagues also highlighted the potential fiscal space for HIV from 
increasing the prioritisation of health in the national budget, as per the Abuja target of 15%, and 
the reprioritisation of HIV in the health budget (37). For the latter, they suggested that this share 
should be equivalent to at least half the relative HIV burden in a country’s total burden of 
disease, and found significant potential to increase public HIV spending in this manner, 
although they did not explore the opportunity costs from disinvestments in other health 
programmes (37). Galarraga and colleagues (2013) developed a country classification 
framework to serve as a normative basis for establishing how much low and middle-income 
countries should contribute for the implementation of their HIV programmes, based on a “peer 
approach” (i.e. how much others are paying) (38). This framework could improve the efficiency 
of allocations, partly by ensuring that donor funds are additional to domestic funding rather than 
fungible (39, 40).  
Other studies documented how certain innovative financing approaches were being tapped at 
the country level, in particular HIV-specific domestic taxation (41), such as the 3% AIDS levy 
applied to government departments in Zimbabwe (42, 43), despite the risk that they reduce the 
flexibility of fiscal policy (and are therefore unattractive to ministries of finance) and may not be 
additional resources as other budget allocations to HIV may be reduced proportionately (30). 
Some countries have also leveraged private sector HIV programmes, especially in the 
workplace (44), tapping risk-pooling mechanisms and using debt conversion schemes 
(Debt2health) (41, 45).  
Finally, the UNAIDS investment framework highlighted the potential of creating fiscal space 
through allocative and technical efficiency gains (46), which respectively refer to the production 
of the right mix of interventions for maximum health gain, and the use of the least costly mix of 
inputs for a given level of health outcome (47). Schwartlander et al noted a discrepancy 
between the sources of new infections and the targeting of prevention programme resources, 
as have others (46, 48, 49), and large variations in unit costs between service providers (50-
52). Using data envelopment analysis methods, Zeng et al (2012) found that in 68 low and 
middle-income countries, the average technical efficiency of implementing national HIV 
programmes was moderate (~50%), suggesting room for improvement (53). In a subsequent 
study, the fiscal space implications of these potential efficiency gains were incorporated into 
HIV resource needs estimates, demonstrating that with maximal efficiencies the annual 
resource needs in 45 countries would drop to USD 6.3 billion instead of the UNAIDS USD 13.5 
billion projection (54). The main options being considered and in some cases tested to reap 
technical efficiency gains are programme scale-up, service integration and task-shifting (55, 
56). In line with the broader aid effectiveness agenda, studies have indicated that donor 
harmonisation and alignment to government priorities and systems could generate further gains 
through greater allocative efficiency and reduced transaction costs (57-60).  
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Interest in analysing and estimating the fiscal space for HIV programmes has increased, but 
existing studies have each limited their analyses to specific sources, and the prevailing sub-
sector approach has excluded revenues for or efficiencies from investments beyond the 
boundaries of the HIV programme or the health sector. In fact, some methods have further 
isolated HIV fiscal space from fiscal space for health, with the inclusion of HIV prioritisation 
within the health budget as an additional lever (37).  
2.1.4 Limitations of the fiscal space framework for HIV 
There are a number of weaknesses in the framework used to assess sector-specific fiscal 
space in particular. Firstly, fiscal space analyses tend to be one-directional, with no or limited 
consideration of the feedback loops through which higher government spending could have 
supply-side effects, such as relaxing key bottlenecks or creating additional productive capacity 
(8), leading to economic growth and thus additional fiscal space in the medium to long run. 
Spending now could also offset potential costs and entitlements in the future (7, 16, 61). 
Although the report to the Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF recognised that 
“the sustainability of policies to create fiscal space is a function of what the fiscal space is used 
for”, Roy et al (2007) remark that the focus is still on short-term macroeconomic stability, 
whereby the short-term acts as a binding constraint on the long-term (16). To address this, 
sophisticated dynamic general equilibrium models have been developed to incorporate the 
macroeconomic impacts of scaled-up government development and health spending (3, 62, 
63). However these models are not commonly used for sector-specific fiscal space 
assessments, and tend to be viewed by policy-makers as black boxes (64).   
A second limitation is that resources spent in other sectors with different primary objectives are 
not considered relevant for the target sector’s fiscal space. Heller (2005) highlights that fiscal 
space cannot be viewed solely within the boundaries of a specific sector given the cross-
sectoral and intertemporal implications of government expenditures (1, 8). High spending in 
one sector can also have ripple effects in others, through public sector-wide demands for higher 
wages following salary top-up in HIV/health programmes, for example (8, 65, 66). Moreover, 
evidence of aid fungibility could imply that the additional fiscal space created by external 
development assistance is more limited, and therefore its contribution to fiscal space for health 
will depend on what the displaced government funding is reallocated to, and how those 
investments impact on health outcomes (67). Yet current assessments do not incorporate such 
non-primary sector spending, largely reflecting the exclusion of cross-sectoral synergies from 
resource allocation frameworks. As discussed below, this is of concern to the HIV response, 
given the multiple impacts of non-HIV interventions on HIV outcomes and vice-versa.  
A third limitation is the apparent disconnect from the issue of absorptive capacity, which 
constrains effective fiscal space. Systemic bottlenecks and weak capacity are mentioned as a 
key area to use fiscal space to invest in, but they are not considered to be determinants of 
effective fiscal space (2). The focus in the development and public finance literature tends to 
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be on budget management and revenue mobilisation capacity, not the other binding resource 
constraints in sectors like health (11, 61). A country’s ability to create effective fiscal space for 
HIV or health more broadly is closely related to its absorptive capacity, which depends on 
factors such as the availability of skilled human resources, physical resources (infrastructure) 
and good governance (68, 69). Low absorptive capacity and the annual under-spending of 
health budgets in many low-income-countries has been thought to explain the reluctance of 
ministries of finance to allocate more resources to health and the channelling of development 
assistance through vertical programmes. Given other structural binding constraints, large 
increases in funding may not be enough to ensure programme scale-up (68, 70). 
The focus of this research is on the second and third limitations, namely whether and to what 
extent complementary investments in broader development programmes and health system 
strengthening could represent potential sources of fiscal space for a specific programme area 
like HIV, and how this could be measured and incorporated in current fiscal space assessment 
methods.  
 
2.2 Resource allocation and economic evaluation of interventions with multi-
sectoral outcomes 
For the search on economic evaluation methods for interventions with multi-sectoral benefits, 
the review started from standard health economic evaluation textbooks and guidance, namely 
Drummond et al (2005), the International Decision Support Initiative’s Reference Case for 
economic evaluation in global health  and the first and second US panel on cost-effectiveness 
analysis for health and medicine (7-9, 71). This was supplemented with an electronic database 
search of three databases (Pubmed, Econlit, Googlescholar) combining ‘economic evaluation’, 
‘cost-effectiveness’, ‘cost-consequence’, ‘cost-benefit’, ‘return on investment’ or ‘societal 
perspective’; and ‘public health’, ‘non-health intervention’, ‘health promotion’, ‘multi-sectoral’, 
‘inter-sectoral’, ‘cross-sectoral’, or ‘non-health outcomes’ in title searches. There was no 
geographic or publication date restriction, but only publications in English, French or Dutch 
were considered. Publications were included if they reviewed methods or methodological 
challenges in the economic evaluation of health-related interventions with non-health 
outcomes, or presented new methodological approaches.  
This section summarises the available approaches to assessing the economic value of 
investments in non-HIV interventions, which can be sub-divided into approaches that are 
embedded in a welfarist theoretical framework, and those that pertain to the extra-welfarist 
domain, as described below (72, 73).  
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2.2.1 Efficient Resource allocation and Welfarist theory 
Public policy and finance are underpinned, at least in part, by the theoretical framework of 
welfare economics, whereby resource allocation is to be determined by the optimisation of a 
social welfare function (74). Social welfare is typically defined as a function of individual utility 
derived from the consumption of goods and services, and could be maximised in aggregate 
terms following utilitarian principles, or maximised for the least well-off individual following 
prioritarianism and the Rawlsian principle of social justice (75, 76). Welfare economics aims to 
provide a coherent ethical framework to ascertain which states of an economy are more socially 
desirable than others (76). It is driven by the concept of Pareto-efficiency, whereby a resource 
distribution is considered optimal when it is not possible to make anyone better off without 
making someone else worse off (77). Under competitive market conditions, individuals would 
identify Pareto improvements and engage in voluntary trade until the economy would be 
expected to reach a general Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Even with market failures, public 
planners could use this efficient allocation to derive optimal taxation and subsidisation policies 
(78).  
There are four central tenets of neo-classical welfare economics (72). The first is the principle 
of utility, as the end that individuals seek to maximise, and a reflection of the satisfaction of their 
preferences. The second is the principle of individual sovereignty and the idea that individuals 
are the best and only judges of their welfare. Thirdly, it is assumed that utility can only be 
derived as a consequence of the outcomes of consumption and not from the process or the 
capability, also known as consequentialism. Fourthly, welfarism and the Pareto principle define 
the social desirability of any reallocation of resources based on the utility levels attained, as 
described above (72). Importantly, welfare economics makes no value judgment about the 
initial allocation or distribution of resources and only considers the desirability of reallocations 
(74).    
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been developed as a tool to guide such allocations (79). 
Indeed, CBA is rooted in welfare economics and the more realistic and less-restrictive potential 
Pareto-improvement criterion, as it posits that a programme is welfare-enhancing if the benefits 
exceed the costs and thus the gainers would potentially be willing to compensate the losers, 
bringing the equilibrium closer to the Pareto-optimum (80). Neo-classical welfare economics 
avoids interpersonal comparisons of welfare and utility, since individuals’ utilities can strictly 
speaking only be ranked, and not measured cardinally (81). The potential compensation 
criterion underlying CBA, however, implies that utility across individuals can be valued and 
aggregated (82). 
A key characteristic of CBA is that it assumes that the budget constraint is endogenous, rather 
than exogenously fixed (83). Therefore, in theory, decisions about the size of the relative public 
resource envelope for each sector would be determined through some form of CBA that seeks 
to optimise allocative efficiency. Once public planners have decided how much of each sector’s 
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public goods and services would be optimal to produce to maximise social welfare, decisions 
at the sectoral level would be expected to be made from a technical efficiency perspective. This 
would imply that they should seek to produce their intermediate outputs (sector-specific goods 
and services) with the fewest resource inputs. While sectoral allocations would need to satisfy 
the condition of general Pareto-equilibrium, allocations of sector budgets to different 
interventions would only involve partial equilibrium analyses.   
2.2.2 Economic evaluation methods for interventions with multi-sectoral outcomes 
Evidence from economic evaluations is meant to inform the operational prioritization of 
interventions representing the best value for money, based on the comparison of the costs and 
consequences of different intervention options. Different types of economic evaluation methods 
exist, each responding to specific objectives and of relevance to different levels of decision-
makers (see Table 2.1) (84, 85). There is general consensus in international guidance 
documents that non-health outcomes should be taken into account in these analyses to reflect 
a full societal perspective (86, 87).  
Conventional guidance on evaluating interventions with multi-sectoral outcomes has been to 
conduct a CBA (80). This would require estimating all the direct and indirect economic costs of 
alternative intervention options on the one hand, and their benefits on the other. All benefits, 
regardless of which sector they fall in, would then need to be translated into monetary values, 
based on individuals’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for each of them (88). Conceptually, this is 
measured as the increase or decrease in individual wealth that has an equivalent effect on the 
individual’s wellbeing, as the change in circumstance resulting from the intervention. This 
individual WTP can be for the consumption of a good or service, the probability of experiencing 
morbidity from a specific disease, or any other change that is in the individual’s welfare function 
(89).  
These WTP values can be measured from market transactions or observed behaviours, 
following Samuelson’s revealed preference approach, whereby individuals’ choices to consume 
certain goods and services reveals their marginal valuation of each (90). Alternatively, stated 
preference methods can also be used to elicit and derive marginal utility gained from the 
consumption of goods or services that produce health, as a measure of individual WTP for 
health vis-à-vis other consumption options (78, 91).  
CBA provides a method to summarise information about intervention consequences and their 
likely magnitude (89). Although the major advantage of its monetised outcome is its ability to 
incorporate a range of cross-sectoral benefits, its major limitation is its measure of outcome as 
utility alone. Following Sen’s seminal work and critique of utility as social welfare, there is a 
growing literature and area of research on redefining social welfare to include procedural utility 
(in addition to utility derived from consumption), as well as broader measures of wellbeing, 
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social benefits and capabilities (72, 73, 92, 93-96). Such measures could be used to value 
interventions and capture their multi-sectoral outcomes more holistically.  
Another related critique of CBA and welfarism is that they do not adequately reflect the decision-
maker’s perspective and societal objectives, which tend to recognise the existence of merit 
goods or basic goods that ought to be subsidised by the state or allocated under more 
egalitarian principles, rather than relying on utilitarianism and potential Pareto improvements 
(72, 97-99). An extra-welfarist framework has therefore been developed to better reflect the 
evaluative space and principles of resource allocation in health care. It is characterised by a 
rejection of utility as the sole measure of social welfare, and Paretian indifference to different 
distributions of wealth, as well as a departure from the principles of individual sovereignty (72). 
In extra-welfarism, health is the maximand of social decision-makers, and interpersonal 
comparisons are possible and indeed central to resource allocation decisions (72, 100).  
This extra-welfarist framework is widely considered to be the foundation of most applications of 
economic evaluation in health (73). The health sector and HIV sub-sector tend to use cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) or cost-utility analysis (CUA) in decision models (101). While the 
former considers natural units as its measure of outcome, such as HIV infections averted or 
AIDS-related deaths averted, the latter uses a summary measure of health that captures both 
quantity and quality of life, namely Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) gained or Disability-
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) averted. It is worth noting that despite this clear distinction, cost-
effectiveness analysis is often used to refer to both CEA and CUA.       
Depending on the approach adopted, the cost-effectiveness ratio (CER) estimated through an 
economic evaluation is compared to the next best use of resources or a normative benchmark 
to guide the resource allocation decision. The normative benchmark approach assigns a 
threshold, or ceiling ratio, that defines acceptability (102). Such thresholds are used to 
determine whether an intervention or programme is good value for money and whether it is 
worth funding. The principal thresholds that have been in use are for cost-utility ratios, namely 
the cost per DALY averted or QALY gained, and are either rather arbitrary or based on a human 
capital approach that reflects averted productivity losses (103-109). Normative World Bank and 
WHO thresholds, expressed as a function of national income, have tended to be used as 
benchmarks in the HIV arena (110, 111), as an indicator of budget holders’ WTP for 
interventions (106, 112).  
There has been substantial scholarly debate about what this threshold represents, and much 
of it stems from the different theoretical frameworks of CBA and CEA. There is a growing 
consensus that it is an empirical measure of supply-side opportunity cost, and therefore needs 
to be estimated by measuring how much health gain the health budget is currently achieving at 
the margin (72, 100, 113, 114). If interventions were perfectly divisible, had constant returns to 
scale, and were ranked by their cost-effectiveness ratio, the most cost-effective interventions 
should be prioritised and implemented until the health budget was exhausted – this is the so-
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called league table approach. In this case, the cost-effectiveness ratio of the last implemented 
intervention would be the cost-effectiveness threshold, or the shadow price of the health budget 
constraint (113, 115). This measure of opportunity cost also reflects the valuation of health 
outcomes that is implied by the current allocation of resources.    
Table 2.1. Economic evaluation methods, decision rules and implications for interventions with 
multi-sectoral outcomes 
Method  Outcome 
unit  
Implications for interventions 
with multi-sectoral outcomes 
Decision rule(s) 
Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA)  
Monetised 
outcome  
Benefits from all sectors can be 
accounted for and monetised  
Every intervention option 
where Benefits > Costs  (or 
Benefit-Cost Ratio>1)  
In a ranking, interventions 
with the largest net benefit 
should be prioritised 
Cost-
Effectiveness 
Analysis (CEA)  
Natural unit 
e.g. HIV 
infection 
averted or 
AIDS death 
averted 
Considers variations in 
effectiveness between intervention 
options 
But single outcome analysis 
impedes the incorporation of 
multiple outcomes within HIV 
(treatment and prevention 
interventions cannot be compared) 
and beyond HIV 
Intervention with the lowest 
cost-effectiveness ratio 
(CER) 
Rank interventions from 
lowest to highest CER in a 
league table and allocate 
fixed budget starting from 
the lowest CER until the 
budget is spent 
Cost-Utility 
Analysis (CUA)  
Disability-
Adjusted Life 
Year (DALY) 
 
Quality-
Adjusted Life 
Year (QALY) 
Allows for HIV-wide and health 
sector wide comparisons 
But single health outcome makes it 
difficult to take non-health 
outcomes into account  
Intervention(s) with the 
lowest CERs and league 
tables (see above)  
Below $25-150/DALY 
averted in LICs and $100-
500/DALY in MICs (World 
Bank) 
Below 1x or 3x GDP/capita 
per DALY averted (WHO) 
Supply-side empirical cost-
effectiveness threshold 
Cost-
Consequence 
Analysis (CCA) 
Multiple 
natural units  
Used to present multiple outcomes, 
where CBA is not feasible 
Does not combine measures of 
benefit into a single measure so 
cannot be used to rank  
No rule  
 
The literature highlights several limitations of CEA methods for interventions with multiple and 
cross-sectoral costs and consequences, including public health interventions and health-
producing interventions outside the health care sector (85, 96, 116-120). First and foremost, 
CEA does not enable non-health outcomes both within and beyond the health domain to be 
measured and valued (116). Similarly, costs incurred by other sectors are not typically taken 
into account, which may be important when investments or disinvestments in a public health 
intervention increase the need for education, social care or criminal justice expenditures, for 
example (121, 122). Secondly, many of these interventions are difficult to evaluate in a 
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randomised controlled trial setting, or have long-term benefits that cannot be captured in a trial 
context, leading to concerns around attribution of effects (116). This is further heightened when 
considering the costs and challenges of conducting inter-sectoral evaluations with multiple 
endpoints (123). Finally, CEA is primarily concerned with evaluating the efficiency of alternative 
investments, and does not directly consider equity objectives in its constrained optimisation 
paradigm (116, 124).  
An alternative to CEA that seeks to address the limitations of focussing on a single outcome 
and a single policy objective (i.e. efficiency) is cost-consequence analysis (CCA), whereby all 
costs and outcomes of alternative interventions are presented separately for the decision-
maker’s consideration (80). Indeed, several current guidance for health economic evaluation 
recommend CCA approaches in reporting, whereby the non-health costs and effects are to be 
disaggregated by sector of the economy or payer. This so-called ‘disaggregated societal 
perspective’ is the seventh principle of the International Decision Support Initiative’s Reference 
Case for economic evaluation in global health (71). In England and Wales, the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence’s (NICE) guidance for local authorities also explicitly refers to 
CCA to guide decisions at this level, in part because it captures spill over effects on other areas 
of local government responsibility (125). Recently, the second US panel’s recommendations on 
cost-effectiveness analysis in health and medicine even recommended the standard reporting 
of two reference cases for every economic evaluation: one from a health care sector 
perspective and one from a broader societal perspective, with the use of an impact inventory 
to comprehensively report consequences beyond the formal health care sector (126). However, 
even with impact inventories for interventions across sectors, there is very limited guidance on 
which inter-sectoral costs and benefits to include (122), and more importantly on how a health 
payer should value non-health effects, as part of its decision on how to allocate its resources 
most efficiently.  
Besides taking the single outcome framework of CBA or disaggregated CCA, another approach 
has been proposed by Claxton and colleagues, whereby an intervention is worth funding if other 
sectors could compensate the implementing sector for their benefits or be compensated for 
their costs (127). This sits within an extra-welfarist framework, as the authors argue that a 
welfarist societal perspective would not be sufficient for the evaluation of interventions with 
multiple objectives and impacts on multiple constraints beyond the health sector. The latter 
reflects a situation where a single public payer can set its budget and allocate resources within 
it, based on the societal returns of intervention options. This implies an endogenous budget 
constraint. However, in practice, most decision-makers are faced with an exogenous fixed 
budget constraint, and are only mandated to allocate it within their sector, and not across 
sectors.  
The approach therefore values the outcomes in each sector by the shadow prices of the 
sector’s budget constraint, and provides a clear decision rule for health and non-health payers. 
The strength of this approach is that it reflects the distinct evaluative spaces of each sector and 
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its respective budget, and it is potentially a practical way of evaluating investments in 
interventions with multi-sectoral costs and benefits, without going down the route of complex 
mathematical programming to maximise multiple objectives, subject to multiple budget 
constraints (127). However, Claxton and colleagues suggest that it would be infeasible to 
operate such inter-sectoral transfers in real-world resource allocation, and that they may have 
high transaction costs. Their proposed compensation is therefore more of a hypothetical or 
potential compensation test, rather than the basis for an actual decision for cross-sectoral 
financing.  
One limitation of this approach is that it assumes that the current allocation of resources to each 
sector is optimal, or at least that it is fixed and cannot be changed. Since the shadow price, or 
the valuation of each unit of outcome, is a function of the sector’s current budget constraint, 
this directly influences the financing decision. Another implicit assumption of the potential 
compensation test is that although each sector is aiming to optimise its sector-specific objective 
(e.g. health gain or education gain), it would also value spill overs on other sectors’ objectives, 
as much as the other sectors do, and would factor them into its funding decision. For example, 
this would mean that a health payer would value education outcomes as much as the education 
payer’s current marginal productivity (and thus revealed WTP for a unit of education outcome). 
This health payer would therefore be willing to internalise education externalities, even at the 
expense of its own health objectives.    
In practice, the most applied approaches in the HIV field have been CEA and CUA (111, 128-
130). A bibliometric review of economic evaluations in global health reported that the majority 
of studies in low and lower-middle-income countries were for HIV interventions, and just under 
half of the studies from these countries were CEA and a nearly equivalent amount were CUA 
(131). The application of CBA methods has been rare (89), with the notable exception of the 
work commissioned by the Copenhagen Consensus Centre in 2011 to assess the benefit-cost 
ratios of a range of prevention, treatment and structural HIV interventions (132). However, no 
applications have been found to date of Claxton et al’s compensation test approach. 
In summary, CBA is the most commonly recommended approach for interventions with multi-
sectoral outcomes, but it is also the least used, due to its different theoretical framework and 
critiqued outcome measure. CEA and CUA are preferred in health and in HIV, despite the 
recognised limitation of their decision rules based on single-outcome analysis frameworks and 
their concomitant undervaluation of interventions with multiple cross-sectoral outcomes (119, 
120). A theoretical approach has been proposed to deal more pragmatically with multiple 
decision-makers in health and non-health sectors, with their own fixed budget constraints and 
separate objective functions, but despite its more accepted extra-welfarist basis, it has not been 
applied. For such an approach to be used, an even more realistic approach is needed that 
recognises the separate evaluative spaces of each sectoral decision-maker and does not 
impose non-health sector objectives on health payers.  
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2.3 Inter-sectoral governance and financing mechanisms for health 
For the literature search relating to cross-sectoral governance structures and financing 
mechanisms for health, the WHO website and two electronic databases were searched 
(Pubmed, Google Scholar) with the following search terms: ‘social determinants of health’, 
‘health promotion’, ‘primary health care’, ‘HIV’, ‘AIDS’; and ‘inter-sectoral’, ‘cross-sectoral’, 
‘multi-sectoral’, ‘interdisciplinary’; and ‘health in all policies’, ‘mainstreaming’, ‘governance’, 
‘whole of government’ and ‘joined up government’, ‘co-financing’, ‘joint budgeting’, ‘pooled 
budgets’. There was no geographic or publication date restriction, but only publications in 
English, French or Dutch were considered. Publications were included if they reviewed, 
described or evaluated governance or financing mechanisms to coordinate action on health 
across sectors.  
There is broad recognition in public health of the need for multi-sectoral action to address the 
social determinants of health (118, 133). The World Health Organisation and governments 
acknowledge the fact that the health sector alone cannot change lifestyles, gender and socio-
economic inequalities, or working and environmental conditions that shape health-related 
behaviours and outcomes (134, 135). Several policies in non-health sectors are likely to have 
health impacts and implications for health care use, just as public health interventions can have 
downstream socio-economic impacts. Yet the institutional frameworks and siloed nature of 
government sectors make it problematic to assume that non-health sectors will consider the 
externalities of their policies and programmes on health, and vice versa (118). In response to 
these challenges, policy responses have been devised to facilitate inter-sectoral approaches 
that incentivise non-health sectors to internalise health externalities, mainly in the form of 
governance arrangements and coordination structures. Some also extend this stewardship and 
coordination function to include a financing function with specific financing mechanisms (118). 
This section summarises the literature on approaches to govern and resource interventions 
requiring inter-sectoral action for health.   
2.3.1 Governance mechanisms for inter-sectoral collaboration 
Several terms have been used to describe inter-sectoral governance frameworks, including 
joined-up government and whole-of-government approaches, which are increasingly popular 
and reflect a growing understanding of the complexity and interconnectedness of many policy 
issues. The rationale underpinning these frameworks is fundamentally about policy coherence, 
and optimising service delivery efficiency through integration (118, 136, 137).  
In health, the underlying principle has been labelled as ‘health in all policies’ (HiAP) and can be 
defined as a policy practice of integrating or internalizing health in other policies that influence 
the social determinants of health. Indeed, following this approach, policy-makers are expected 
to consider health in the development, implementation and evaluation of policies outside the 
traditional health sector. The 2010 Adelaide Statement on Health in all Policies described it as 
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“shared governance for health and well-being” (135). In the HIV field, it is similar to the principle 
of mainstreaming (138), which UNAIDS has defined as “a process that enables development 
actors to address the causes and effects of AIDS in an effective and sustained manner, through 
both their usual work and within their workplace” (139). Although the HIV response 
distinguishes between an internal organisational response to HIV in the workplace, and an 
external programmatic response in the development sector’s ‘core business’, the latter is most 
relevant to this thesis.  
This HiAP approach essentially serves as a strategy to ensure that non-health sectors take on 
a health mandate and therefore include health objectives in their decision-making. From an 
economic perspective, this would imply that these payers allocate their resources in such a way 
as to optimise their own objective, as well as a health objective (140). To ensure this happens, 
institutions and incentives need to be aligned. As put forward in the Adelaide statement: “to 
harness health and well-being, governments need institutionalized processes which value 
cross-sector problem solving and address power imbalances. This includes providing the 
leadership, mandate, incentives, budgetary commitment and sustainable mechanisms that 
support government agencies to work collaboratively on integrated solutions.” (135)  
Most of the literature and experiences with HiAP has originated within the field of health 
promotion, which has been geared towards enabling and incentivising individuals to pursue 
health-promoting behaviours and be more effective producers of health (118, 141, 142), with 
due recognition of the non-health care inputs that go into this production function (143).  
Governance tools that foster coherence, collaboration and partnership can be classified into 
four categories: those related to structures; processes; financing; and mandates (144). A review 
conducted for the WHO European Region indicated that HiAP has primarily manifested through 
a number of governance structures at five different levels (118): 
 Government-level: cabinet committees and secretariats represent the highest decision-
making bodies of government, and have been used to facilitate interdepartmental 
dialogues on health issues or to include health considerations in other policy decisions. 
Despite their confidential nature, anecdotal evidence suggests that they may be key to 
enable and mandate interdepartmental cooperation on issues of high political 
importance.  
 Parliament-level: parliamentary committees around health issues can be effective at 
enhancing the prioritisation of an issue and sustained pressure for action to be taken, 
as observed with the scrutiny processes around the health inequalities agenda in 
England through the House of Commons Health (Select) Committee in 2009 and the 
Auditor-General’s report to the Victorian Parliament in Australia in 2007, for example.  
 Bureaucratic-level (civil service): At this level, ministry mergers or mega-ministries have 
led to formal re-structuring in order to re-align institutional objectives for cross-sectoral 
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planning and programming. Also, inter-departmental committees have been formed as 
a bureaucratic mechanism to convene different departments around a shared priority. 
In national HIV responses, several affected countries established National AIDS 
Coordinating Authorities (NACAs) to coordinate their national HIV responses and 
elevated them to the supra-ministerial level under the executive office of the president 
or prime minister (145). These have performed relatively well, but they have lacked the 
incentives to hold other sectors to account in their commitment to mainstream HIV in 
their own policies and programmes (146).    
 Engagement beyond government: public engagement, stakeholder engagement and 
industry engagement have mobilised support and resources for collaborative action by 
government and non-governmental actors on cross-sectoral health issues. Broad 
stakeholder and civil society engagement has been a key tenet of the multi-sectoral 
HIV governance structure, largely promoted and imposed by international donors in 
LMICs, through the World Bank Multi-sectoral AIDS Programme (MAP) and the Global 
Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) among others (147, 148). These 
mechanisms have been more effective at involving non-state actors in HIV responses, 
while the participation of non-health government departments has remained limited 
(146, 149).  
 Managing funding arrangements: joint budgeting or delegated financing mechanisms 
are governance structures that organise the resources of inter-sectoral action and can 
serve as an incentive or vehicle for joint action. These will be discussed in detail below.  
Overall, the literature on the effectiveness of inter-sectoral governance structures for health is 
scant but growing, along with policy-makers’ experimentation with governance structures that 
can prompt or sustain inter-sectoral action (118, 150-156). Lessons learned to date reflect the 
need for multi-level mechanisms and the importance of strong leadership and political will, 
which may be triggered by a compelling framing of the immediacy of the problem at hand (118, 
136, 140, 150). This echoes the experience in the AIDS response, which was able to garner 
global political attention and commitment to multi-sectoral action when it was tabled at the 
United Nations as a security issue (157). While government and parliament level mechanisms 
may have more political clout and authority to drive such agendas, they may not systematically 
take on health issues or inter-sectoral action for HIV, which is where mechanisms to engage 
the public and other stakeholders for advocacy would be important (145, 156).  
The most common inter-sectoral governance structure for health and HIV has been inter-
sectoral planning and coordination committees, but these have typically lacked strategies for 
accountability, monitoring and evaluation, and resourcing (158). Moreover, they have had 
limited political influence, power and incentives to effect systemic changes (146, 150). There is 
a potential misuse of the inter-sectoral argument if the governance structures are divorced from 
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the underlying motivation, values and power relations, thereby formalising a shallow consensus 
of partnership (137, 159, 160). 
The next section reviews financing mechanisms that have been explored and tested, as a 
means to incentivise and organise inter-sectoral actors for joint action for health.  
2.3.2 Financing mechanisms for inter-sectoral collaboration 
In addition to governance structures, processes and mandates, the financing tool or function 
has been found to be critical for HiAP initiatives. Indeed, once political will for inter-sectoral 
action is in place, the availability of resources can be pivotal, and the availability of multiple 
sources of funding may be particularly beneficial if it increases participation across government 
(140). To deal with the inefficiencies, fragmentation and missed opportunities of vertical funding 
silos, examples can be found particularly in high-income countries where sectors have been 
co-financing integrated care and health promotion interventions that aim to generate multiple 
cross-sectoral benefits. These financing mechanisms can be categorised as joint budgeting or 
delegated financing. 
Joint budgeting mechanisms have been developed in Australia, Canada, England, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, whereby budgets across government departments or tiers are 
shared or integrated to address shared goals (161). These can be either voluntary or 
mandatory, and may be one-off initiatives or long-term processes of organisational change. 
Joint budgeting can take various forms (118):  
 Budget alignment, whereby one budgetary authority manages multiple budgets for 
agreed goals; 
 Dedicated joint funds that multiple departments contribute for specific joint activities;  
 Joint-post funding whereby a position funded by multiple departments with cross-
sectoral responsibilities;  
 Fully integrated budgets whereby resources and workforce come together under one 
‘host’ department; and  
 Policy-orientated funding whereby resources are allocated by a central or local 
authority to policy areas rather than to sectors  
These initiatives have tended to focus on easily identifiable beneficiary groups that require more 
than health care for their well-being and would benefit form a continuum of social services, 
including social care, education, housing and employment (123, 162-167). Well-documented 
examples from Sweden include a rehabilitation programme for people with musculoskeletal 
disorder, an elderly safety promotion programme and a diabetes prevention programme (163-
165, 168). These were evaluated in the context of Sweden’s trial legislation in 1994, allowing 
social insurance, social welfare and health care services to pool budgets under joint political 
steering. In their evaluation, Hultberg and colleagues found positive results on the perceived 
quality of interdisciplinary and inter-organisational collaboration in the co-financing model, but 
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no positive impacts on patient outcomes, such as number of sick days taken by people with 
musculoskeletal disorders, or health care costs, since patients in the intervention sites had 
significantly more contacts with physiotherapists and physicians than those in the control sites 
(162, 166).  
In the UK, joint budgeting has been undertaken for health and social care services for older 
people, and for health, education and social services for children that were jointly managed by 
NHS primary care trusts and local councils (169, 170). The latter were perceived to improve 
the efficiency of services and care pathways (169). In New Zealand, regulation was put in place 
to allow for joint budgeting of ‘clustering projects’, with some evidence of success when pooling 
resources from local health boards, nutrition agencies, NGOs and the fitness and food industry 
to promote healthy lifestyles (161).  
Another financing model is delegated financing, which has been primarily implemented through 
health promotion foundations, which are statutory bodies with long-term and recurrent public 
resources dedicated to funding cross-sectoral health promotion programmes. Initially 
established in Australia from a dedicated tobacco tax, this model was replicated in Austria and 
Switzerland, tapping various funding sources, such as an additional levy on top of compulsory 
health insurance premiums or a dedicated sum from sales-tax revenue (171). The institutional 
challenges encountered related to the implications of statutory bodies on government 
stewardship, and the perceived free-rider problem that has been found to hinder co-financing 
mechanisms (171). 
Overall, there is to date limited evidence on the effectiveness of such co-financing 
arrangements on health and other outcomes, besides an experience with transport safety in 
the UK where casualty rates were significantly reduced (118). Since their effect on costs is also 
unclear, the cost-effectiveness of these mechanisms remains uncertain. However, there is 
some evidence of impact on process measures and greater potential at local levels of 
government (161). Also, while health promotion typically receives very minimal funding, there 
is some indication that co-financing mechanisms may have mobilised additional resources 
(171).  
The evidence base suggests that the factors that facilitate the success of these schemes is the 
establishment of regulatory and legislative frameworks providing incentives and allowing 
budget-sharing. Clear accountability for actions is critical, as is the identification of specific 
benefits for all participating sectors through win-win strategies (161, 172). When considering 
the importance of economic evidence and arguments for inter-sectoral coordination, 
Drummond and Stoddart (1995) also suggested that inter-sectoral economic evaluations could 
increase awareness among decision-makers of the non-health sector alternatives and their 
marginal benefits for health (123). However, they also highlighted that these analyses were 
unlikely to provide a “complete technical solution”, given institutional cooperation challenges. 
Indeed, the institutional barriers or disincentives to engage in cross-sectoral co-financing can 
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stem from a lack of trust among sectoral actors, an imbalance in financial contributions, and 
fear of loss of autonomy or budget control (140, 150, 161, 173). 
 
2.4 Summary of Research Gaps 
The literature review identified a number of gaps, which this thesis sought to address.  
First, in a time of resource constraints and competition between sectors for scare public 
resources, there are surprisingly few theoretical and empirical analyses of how investments in 
non-HIV sectors or interventions could contribute to HIV outcomes and therefore be a financing 
source to leverage more efficiently. Indeed, standard fiscal space analyses that seek to 
estimate the resource envelope for HIV objectives, pay little attention to the value of health 
system strengthening and broader development interventions. New methods or methodological 
adaptations of sector-specific fiscal space analysis are required that consider and build in non-
HIV and non-health sector investments, where these are expected to have downstream benefits 
for HIV. The HIV value of effective investments in such programmes would need to be 
quantified and compared to other sources of fiscal space for HIV, to gauge the relative size of 
efficiency gains from non-HIV investments.  
Secondly, most critiques of the use of existing single outcome economic evaluation frameworks 
for complex or structural interventions focus on how value is measured (96, 119, 174), rather 
than how costs are apportioned and factored into the equation underlying prioritisation. The 
approach this research sought to investigate further was how the costs of these interventions 
could be shared across benefiting sectors, and such co-financing were genuinely – not 
hypothetically – considered in each sector’s decision frame (175). There is need for the 
empirical application of the analytical compensation approach to an implemented intervention, 
as well as further methodological development to position it as a cross-sectoral financing 
mechanism.  
Finally, although it is recognised that resource allocation decisions are political and cross-
sectoral investments institutionally challenging, there is limited empirical evidence on the 
incentives and barriers that prevent greater cross-sectoral collaboration in the context of HIV, 
especially in low and middle-income countries. It is therefore difficult to determine how likely 
they are to impede the feasibility of a potentially efficiency-enhancing approach, and through 
what mechanisms these could be overcome.  
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CHAPTER 3 METHODS 
 
3.1 Study Approach 
The overall aim of this thesis was to develop and explore the application of a novel method for 
the economic evaluation and fiscal space analysis of interventions with multiple benefits across 
multi-sectoral payers, in the context of HIV. The specific objectives to meet this overarching 
aim involved the development of the method on the one hand, and the demonstration of its 
applicability on the other.  
Based on the gaps identified in the literature review in Chapter 2, the focus of the study was to 
further develop and extend existing methods in fiscal space analysis and economic evaluation. 
Building on theoretical work accounting for cross-sectoral transfers in resource allocation, the 
method development required an empirical proof-of-concept and stylised examples to illustrate 
the methodological extensions proposed and to demonstrate the efficiency gains and relevance 
of the approach for the economic evaluation and financing of existing structural interventions 
for health in general, and HIV in particular. The choice of methods for this component was 
therefore derived from the economic methods in use.   
The applicability of the proposed approach was subsequently explored in terms of its analytical 
applicability, as well as its institutional feasibility as a financing mechanism. The former was 
demonstrated by conducting extended fiscal space analyses and cross-sectoral co-financing 
analyses with empirical data. The latter was investigated by eliciting and analysing the 
perspectives of decision-makers. 
The study adopted a mixed methods approach to meet the overall study aim, including both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. Mixed methods research has been 
defined as: “research in which the investigator collects and analyses data, integrates the 
findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods 
in a single study or a program of inquiry” (1). Although there are weaknesses to mixed methods 
approaches related to the rigour with which they are applied and their differing epistemological 
paradigms (2, 3), they are also recognized and valued for providing more comprehensive 
analyses that further interrogate, verify and validate data (4, 5). In this thesis, quantitative or 
qualitative methods were selected depending on the specific research objective, and based on 
which method was best suited to address the question at hand. The methods were then 
considered as complementary and integrated at the interpretation stage, when examining the 
analytical application and feasibility of cross-sectoral and cross-budget co-financing (6).  
Fully recognising that there is substantial variation between countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and their HIV epidemics, economic fundamentals, fiscal burdens and ability or options 
to generate resources for HIV, the study included both cross-country analyses and specific 
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country case studies focusing on Tanzania and Malawi. The strength of cross-country analyses 
is their ability to provide statistical power in investigating and quantifying the relationships 
between macro-level factors, such as public HIV spending and national fiscal indicators 
amendable to policy change (7). They are also useful to illustrate in quantitative terms how 
different characteristics between countries influence financing outcomes, including how 
countries with different types of HIV epidemics or levels of economic development will value 
the co-financing potential of structural interventions differently. However, the main limitation of 
such cross-country analyses and comparisons is their implicit assumption of structural 
homogeneity, and their lack of depth and contextualisation (8, 9). Case studies, on the other 
hand, may yield deeper insights and highly context-specific findings, but therefore lack 
generalisability (10), even though it has been argued that they can provide conceptual rather 
than statistical generalisability (11-13). Again, the selection of either approach was based on 
its ability to meet each study objective (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 Summary Methods 
Objectives Chapters Methods 
1. To develop a methodological approach – ‘co-
financing’ – for factoring in non-HIV benefits 
and non-HIV payers in the decision rules of 
resource allocation. 
4 Case study with trial-based 
economic evaluation modelling  
5 Literature review with stylised 
example 
2. To explore the potential of creating fiscal 
space for HIV across sub-Saharan Africa, 
incorporating the value of co-financing in 
health system strengthening and broader 
development investments. 
6 Expanded fiscal space analysis 
Cross-sectional econometric 
analysis 
3. To apply the co-financing approach by 
assessing the benefits and potential of co-
financing of a food support intervention in 
various country settings. 
7 Model-based economic 
evaluation in multiple settings 
4. To understand in practice the institutional 
barriers, enablers and (dis)incentives to 
adopting a co-financing framework in HIV 
financing and priority-setting.  
8 Qualitative case study with in-
depth interviews 
 
The details of the methods adopted are presented in each of the five results chapters (Chapters 
4-8) and in three accompanying technical appendices. This section provides an overview of 
these methods, their strengths and limitations. It starts by describing the study context, followed 
by a description of the conceptual framework that underpins the methodological approach. 
Next, the methods used to achieve each objective are covered. Finally, the ethical 
considerations and funding sources are presented.   
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3.2 Study Context 
 The analyses in this thesis focused on sub-Saharan Africa, as the region most affected by the 
HIV epidemic, combined with high levels of poverty and several development challenges. 
Eastern and Southern Africa is home to 19 million PLHIV – about half the global burden, and 
had an estimated 960,000 new HIV infections in 2015. It is also the region that has led the most 
rapid increase in ART coverage from 24% in 2010 to 54% in 2015 (14). There is significant 
variation in the size and types of epidemics across and within these countries. Similarly, 
countries differ in their level of economic development, with a mix of low, lower-middle and 
upper-middle income countries, their systems and quality of governance, and their dependence 
on external financing (15, 16). The cross-country analyses considered the 14 countries (or a 
sub-set) in SSA with the largest HIV burdens in absolute numbers of PLHIV, as well as all 
hyperendemic countries (>15% prevalence), given the fiscal pressure to increase and optimise 
HIV spending alongside many development priorities.  
The country-specific work concentrated on low-income countries with generalised HIV 
epidemics, namely Malawi and Tanzania. Malawi is a small densely-populated land-locked 
country. Two thirds of its population lives below the national poverty line (17). It is further 
characterised by rapid population growth, high rates of maternal and child mortality, as well as 
high levels of malnutrition (47% of children under the age of five are chronically malnourished) 
(18). The large majority (85%) of Malawians lives in rural areas and relies on subsistence 
farming for their livelihoods (18). Diminishing plot sizes, depleted soils, erratic rainfall and the 
high prevalence of HIV, malaria and TB are all of critical concern (18). The country’s adult HIV 
prevalence rate of 10.8% has stabilised with the roll-out of ART, but incidence remains high 
and adolescent girls appear to be at particularly high risk (14). With a high aid dependency in 
general and in the HIV response in particular – 98% external financing (19), Malawi’s options 
for domestic financing are more limited, but also urgently needed for the sustainability of the 
response.     
Tanzania was selected for a more detailed analysis in this study, given its economic context 
and natural gas-related growth prospects, its generalised HIV epidemic and high levels of aid 
dependence (15, 20). It has an agriculture-driven economy, and about a third of those employed 
live below the poverty line, indicating low productivity and a lack of decent work (21). HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis, and increasingly non-communicable diseases, contribute to an 
average life expectancy at birth of 61 years, with high rates of infant, child and maternal 
mortality (20). Malnutrition is the single biggest contributor to child mortality, with about 35% 
stunting among under-fives (20). Although primary school attendance is high (just over 80%), 
attendance drops dramatically to below 25% for secondary school (22). An estimated 5% of 
adults are living with HIV, or 1.6 million Tanzanians (21). However, only half of those in need 
of HIV services are being reached (21). The last multi-sectoral Public Expenditure Review  
reported that 97% of actual spending on HIV was financed by development partners, mostly 
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off-budget (23). The financial sustainability of the national HIV programme, and in particular the 
treatment programme component that claimed 59% of total spending, is a serious concern (23).  
 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework adopted in this research is a combination of a sector-specific 
resource allocation framework, and a multiple objective, cross-sectoral approach to allocative 
efficiency. This section starts by providing a typology of the interventions and investments being 
considered, followed by a description of the economic concepts underlying the proposed 
approach to financing and economic evaluation. The premise is that cross-sectoral and cross-
budget investments could lead to a more efficient allocation of resources as they could enable 
(i) positive externalities to be internalised, thereby minimising welfare loss; (ii) systemic 
constraints in the health sector to be addressed and generate the complementary inputs 
required to deliver HIV services; and (iii) complementary HIV and non-HIV service outputs to 
be produced and used to optimise individual health production functions. 
3.3.1 Intervention typology 
There are different types of structural interventions with multi-sectoral benefits that reflect 
distinct financing decision frames. As depicted in  
Figure 3.1, interventions with both HIV and non-HIV impacts can be grouped into three 
categories, based on what their primary objectives are, and how they relate to basic HIV 
programme activities. While the latter include biomedical and behavioural interventions that 
directly impact on HIV transmission, morbidity or mortality, other intervention components could 
indirectly contribute to these outcomes, either as part of HIV service packages or in combination 
with non-HIV services (24, 25). Interventions that are delivered within HIV service platforms are 
likely to be assessed and financed differently than interventions delivered through non-HIV 
implementers in broader development programmes. In this conceptualisation, it is assumed 
that each payer has one sector-specific objective, and optimises its resources to maximise the 
achievement of this objective.   
The first category includes structural intervention components that are added on to existing HIV 
programmatic platforms (HIV+) to address structural barriers and thereby enhance the 
effectiveness of the basic HIV programme. An example would be transformative community 
mobilisation and empowerment activities for female sex workers, which would be included in 
the HIV programme for this population group, in order to prevent their exposure to violence and 
criminalisation, and enable them to adopt protective behaviours (26, 27). If such an intervention 
demonstrates an incremental effect over and above the basic HIV programme, it would be 
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viewed as being within the remit of the HIV budget, and evaluated against other potential uses 
of HIV resources.  
The second category comprises HIV-specific intervention components that are added on to 
development programmatic platforms (DEV+), such as an HIV and gender training component 
for microfinance beneficiaries (28). Similarly to the HIV+ category, the incremental costs of 
these interventions would most likely have to be funded by the HIV budget.  
That being said, many of these add-on components that address structural drivers have multiple 
objectives, in addition to HIV prevention or treatment. Indeed, both HIV+ and DEV+ 
components tend to involve multi-sector activities that aim to achieve multi-sectoral outcomes. 
For example, there are several promising integrated models for HIV and intimate partner 
violence (IPV) prevention (29, 30). In Uganda, a model that combined standard of care HIV 
services with a community mobilisation intervention to change IPV social norms and 
behaviours, and a screening and brief intervention to promote safe HIV disclosure and risk 
reduction in women, reported significant reductions in HIV incidence and past-year experience 
of physical IPV (29).  
Based on this incremental effectiveness, the HIV payer could decide whether to fund the 
intervention costs, by comparing its incremental cost-effectiveness to other HIV intervention 
options. If it is more cost-effective than the payer’s alternative, it could be sufficient to evaluate 
it within this single-outcome decision frame, as this would still lead to an efficiency-enhancing 
financing decision. However, if it is not cost-effective from this perspective, another approach 
may be required. Since both outcomes are intrinsically valued as the primary goals of multiple 
payers, the funding decision would need to consider these different payers and their alternative 
investments to achieve those same outcomes. This is where cross-sectoral economic 
evaluation and financing approaches will be important.   
Some DEV+ interventions could also take the form of strategies to leverage new entry points 
for providing HIV prevention, care and support services, in light of health system constraints. 
Using non-health system entry points to target specific populations is not new in health 
promotion: schools have often been used to reach children with various health campaigns and 
interventions, such as sexual education, de-worming, vitamin A supplementation, immunisation 
and mass drug distribution, for example (31). It has been less common for clinical services to 
be provided outside the health system, because these have more asset specificity (requiring 
specialised medical labour inputs and equipment), but even for non-clinical services, the HIV 
response has more often created new structures for its services, as evidence by the 
mushrooming of community-based HIV organisations in many affected countries (32). 
However, efforts are increasingly being made to integrate other services into existing HIV 
structures (33). Again, for such integrated activities and investments to be adequately evaluated 
from an economic perspective, their multiple financing streams would need to be 
acknowledged.  
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Figure 3.1 Typology of structural HIV interventions with multi-sectoral benefits and payers 
 
Source: Author 
The third category of structural HIV interventions would be a development programme without 
HIV-specific components, but with demonstrated HIV impact (DEV). This could be expanded 
secondary schooling, cash transfers or other social protection interventions for poor and 
vulnerable households (34, 35). It could also be a horizontal health system strengthening 
intervention, such as basic training of health professionals and infrastructure development, with 
downstream benefits for the HIV programme.  
The financing decision frame for these interventions may require some form of cost-sharing 
between the HIV budget and the budgets of other benefitting (sub-)sectors, if they are not fully 
funded or implemented at scale by the primary implementing sector. This could involve cross-
sectoral transfers of resources ex ante through reallocation of the overall budget between 
sectors, or transfers through a co-financing mechanism ex post.   
3.3.2 Internalising Positive Externalities of Investments 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that through the price mechanism, the market will lead 
to the most efficient allocation of resources, except when there is a market failure (36). 
Externalities are one such market failure that occur when certain costs or benefits are not borne 
by or do not accrue to the individual that decides how much of a good to consume (37). Typical 
examples of positive externalities are education or immunisation, where the marginal private 
benefit accrued to an individual is inferior to the potential marginal social benefit from that 
specific individual investing in her/his education or getting immunised. Therefore, the market is 
likely to lead to the under-consumption of goods with positive externalities – known as a welfare 
loss (36). The opposite is true for goods and services with negative externalities, which would 
be overconsumed or overproduced in a market economy.     
The theory can be extended to nonmarket or government failure and is known as ‘derived 
externalities’ (see Figure 3.2) (38). Silo budgeting and parallel or externally-determined funding 
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channels generate a situation in which sector-specific budget holders may undervalue 
investments with multi-sectoral outcomes, even though they have higher marginal social 
benefits. Such a systemic problem limits the ability of a government to implement an efficient 
solution. 
The conventional solution to externalities is to internalise them through government 
intervention, either with Pigouvian taxation (for negative externalities) or corrective 
subsidisation (for positive externalities) (37). It is also argued that if an externality can be traded 
(implying property rights) and there are no transaction costs, bargaining can lead to an efficient 
allocation – known as the Coase theorem (39). Although these approaches are not directly 
replicable for public resource allocations and public service production, central government 
could increase its allocation to a sector line ministry to stimulate higher production of a specific 
intervention with broader social benefits; or allow for a cross-sectoral transfer to be used as a 
mechanism to correct for this allocative inefficiency. Other sectors would effectively subsidise 
the implementing sector for the amount of MBSocial* - MBSectorCS, enabling a socially optimal level 
of service delivery. 
Figure 3.2 Derived positive externalities 
 
Source: Author 
3.3.3 Efficiency gains from investing in complementary inputs 
Another way to think about such cross-sectoral transfers is as investments in complementary 
production inputs to optimise the production of health outputs and health gain. In 
microeconomic theory, production functions are characterised by a combination of 
complementary inputs that are used to produce a final good or service (36). In terms of HIV 
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service production, antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) and nurses function as complementary inputs 
required to provide antiretroviral treatment and care to a person living with HIV (PLHIV), for 
example, whereas other inputs can be substitutes (such as nurses and doctors; or a clinic and 
a mobile truck offering testing and counselling). The unavailability or low quality of one 
complementary input can act as a binding constraint on the optimal production of HIV services.  
Put differently, increased financing to increase the supply of one complement, ceteris paribus, 
may not necessarily increase the level of output. In this case, this investment would be an 
inefficiency and a form of waste, from an economic perspective. However, in the long run, 
complements may become substitutes for each other, as technology changes, and even in the 
short run, there is likely to be some degree of substitution between imperfect complements, 
depending on the malleability of capital and adaptability of labour (40-42). With imperfect 
complements, continued investment in one HIV-specific input is likely to have very low marginal 
returns, whereas partly redirecting such investments to the complement could yield higher 
marginal returns.  
Just as supply-side input levels can constrain HIV service coverage and thus the absorptive 
capacity of HIV financing, demand-side constraints and social factors could further constrain 
the efficiency of HIV investments, since these also function as enabling complements. The 
provision of ART care to PLHIV may not translate into effective treatment outcomes and 
reduced morbidity and mortality if it is not combined with other complements to enable retention 
in care and adherence, such as non-stigmatising social norms, or nutritious food (see Figure 
3.3). Efficiency gains could therefore be sought by achieving the right mix of outputs required 
from different sectoral service providers, to produce ultimate HIV outcomes.  
Figure 3.3 Perfect complements 
 
Source: Author 
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This demand-side conceptualisation also relates to the Grossman health production model, in 
which health is both demanded and produced by consumers (43). The model defines health as 
a durable capital stock that an individual inherits at birth and that depreciates with age. 
Individuals can invest in their health stock through their consumption of health care and other 
health-promoting or health-damaging commodities. Health care is therefore one input in the 
individual or household’s health production function, along with education and time spent on 
market and non-market activities, among others.   
The example of the combined microfinance and gender/HIV training intervention (IMAGE) 
illustrates the synergistic effects of complementary service outputs, or individual health 
production inputs. Indeed, findings from a cluster randomised controlled trial of this intervention 
model in rural South Africa suggested that the HIV-related outcome of reduced intimate partner 
violence, as well as increased reported condom use, partner communication and uptake of HIV 
testing, were achieved through a combination of enabling factors, namely economic 
empowerment (income effect); gender-equitable attitudes (self-efficacy effect); and HIV 
information (knowledge effect) (28, 44, 45).  
In practice, each of these is an output targeted by separate programmes implemented in 
different sectors. The HIV outcome may be maximised where these outputs are simultaneously 
achieved among the same individuals or communities (see Figure 3.4). In some settings with 
low levels of poverty and with gender-equitable norms, the only intervention required may be 
an HIV information-education-communication campaign, while in others there may be need for 
distinct or combined interventions.  
Figure 3.4 Example of complementary outputs to generate HIV outcomes 
 
Source: Author 
There are two options to realise these efficiency gains and maximise the area of overlap. The 
first would be to increase public spending in other non-HIV areas simultaneously through re-
prioritisation of livelihood programmes and gender-transformative programmes in the national 
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budget (or reduce wasteful spending on HIV until other sector complements are being invested 
in – minimising inputs for given output). The second option would be to ensure that spending 
in those non-HIV areas is HIV-optimal and the existing beneficiaries of those programmes are 
the ones targeted with HIV-specific intervention components, like behaviour change 
(maximising output for given input). By overlaying services in this way, both complements are 
generated and present to produce the outcome of interest. The potential for efficiency gains will 
depend on the impact of interventions in other sectors on HIV outcomes (partly reflecting the 
strength of relationship between social determinants and HIV incidence, service uptake and 
adherence); and the unused capacity in the other sector that could absorb additional resources.    
 
3.4 Development of Methodological Cross-sectoral Co-financing Approach 
Design 
To meet the first objective of developing a methodological approach for factoring in non-HIV 
benefits and non-HIV payers in the decision rules of HIV resource allocation, an initial review 
of the literature was conducted on various health and HIV economic evaluation and resource 
allocation approaches, as well as prevailing decision rules. As summarised in Chapter 2, the 
review revealed that investment decisions for HIV are conventionally informed by cost-
effectiveness analyses (CEA), while cost-benefit analysis (CBA) are rarely used, which could 
potentially result in sub-optimal investment choices for interventions with multiple forms of 
benefit (46-52). However, an alternative decision approach has been proposed by Claxton et 
al (53) to overcome the challenge posed by such interventions, where CBA is not feasible. This 
work was used as a theoretical starting point. Since the authors had provided a theoretical and 
mathematical proof of the multiple objective and multiple constraint optimisation problem at 
hand, and demonstrated how decision rules based on hypothetical cross-sectoral 
compensation could provide a second-best solution to the mathematical programming problem, 
the required extension to this methodology was for an adaptation that would overcome the 
limitation of ascribing non-health objectives to health payers, as well as an empirical application 
of the method to the evaluation of an existing intervention. 
The approach was adapted to use CEA-based thresholds for actual, not hypothetical, 
compensation through a co-financing mechanism if the sum of each sector’s WTP for its 
specific benefits was greater than the intervention’s cost, but no single sector was willing to pay 
the full implementation cost. By building in the need for actual cross-budget transfers, the 
proposed approach is less prescriptive and demanding of what the health payer should value 
in its decision-making, beyond health gain.  
To test this approach, its financing outcome was compared to the outcome from a socially 
optimal CBA approach and the status quo silo CEA approach, estimating the welfare loss from 
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each outcome, as compared to the net benefit estimated from the CBA. Under this study 
component, three options were further explored for determining the HIV share in the co-
financing scenario, recognising the different evaluative spaces and economic evaluation tools 
used by different payers and sectors and the potential of payers to game with their WTP and 
possibly free-ride, if others are willing to cover the costs of the intervention (54).   
From this proof-of-concept, it became clear that the decision rules and estimation or elicitation 
of cost-effectiveness thresholds was critical and needed further theoretical elaboration in the 
context of new health economic evaluation guidance that called for disaggregated societal 
perspectives, without specifications on how non-health consequences were to be valued (55, 
56), and the emerging debate around what WTP thresholds represent: a supply-side measure 
of marginal productivity, or a demand-side measure of the consumption value of health (57-60). 
Taking the decision-maker’s perspective and the view that WTP thresholds are cost-
effectiveness thresholds that measure the opportunity cost to a health payer of investing in an 
intervention, the co-financing approach required further elaboration and framing of these 
measures from a multi-sectoral perspective, rather than the standard unisectoral approach. 
Since the objective was to provide a proof-of-concept, a stylised two-sector model was 
developed and used to illustrate the potential losses to the health and education sectors from 
not considering a co-financing mechanism – or cross-sectoral transfer, when conceptualising 
and measuring their respective cost-effectiveness thresholds.  
Data sources 
To illustrate this theoretical co-financing approach and assess its potential to generate 
efficiency gains, a case study was used of a cash transfer trial in Malawi. Published secondary 
cost and outcome data were collected from this cluster randomised controlled trial implemented 
by the World Bank from January 2008 to December 2009 (61). All never-married girls aged 13-
22 in a random sample of 176 enumeration areas in the rural district of Zomba were invited to 
take part in the trial. Of these, 3,796 were enrolled at baseline, with 1,225 randomised to the 
treatment group and offered monthly cash transfers. The majority (789) were already in school 
at baseline while the others had dropped out of school (436). Among the baseline schoolgirls, 
506 were randomised to a conditional arm, whereby their receipt of the monthly cash transfer 
was dependent on their 80% school attendance. The unconditional arm received the cash 
regardless of attendance.  
The results of the trial were reported in several reports and academic papers, with evidence of 
statistically significant impacts on prevalent HIV, prevalent HSV-2, school enrolment, English 
test scores, school drop-out rates, pregnancy rates and depression (61-64). The costing of the 
intervention was a financial costing from the provider’s perspective, and was sourced directly 
from the authors both for the trial scenario and a hypothetical scale-up scenario, which 
assumed lower administrative costs (25, 65).   
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Data analysis 
In the case study, three financing approaches were modelled. In the first approach, HIV and 
non-HIV budget holders participated in a cross-sectoral CBA and funded the intervention if the 
benefits outweighed the costs. In the second silo approach, each budget holder considered the 
cost-effectiveness of the intervention in terms of their own objectives, and funded the 
intervention if its cost per sector-specific unit of outcome was below the sector-specific WTP 
threshold. In the third co-financing approach, budget holders used CEA to determine how much 
they would be willing to contribute towards the intervention, provided that other sectors were 
willing to pay for the remaining costs.  
To estimate how much each sector would be willing to pay for the intervention, the first step 
was to determine which (sub-)sectors would have a vested interest in the intervention. Given 
its benefits, the HIV budget holder, the sexual and reproductive health budget holder, the 
mental health budget holder and the education budget holder were considered as potential 
payers. The health budget was divided into sub-budgets to reflect the reality of multiple funding 
streams for different health programmes. In particular, the HIV budget is quite distinct and 
heavily donor-funded, which is why it was analysed separately from the health budget that 
would cover other sexual and reproductive health programmes and mental health (60, 66). Trial 
outcomes were modelled through to what each payer’s primary outcome measure(s) was 
expected to be. For example, all health outcomes were modelled through to DALYs using 
standard formulae.  
The maximum contribution each (sub-)sector would be willing to make towards the intervention 
was then calculated as the impact per sector multiplied by its WTP threshold for that outcome 
unit. For example, for health outcomes, the maximum contribution was the number of DALYs 
averted multiplied by GDP per capita – the normative WHO WTP threshold at the time (67). 
However, since no established normative cost-effectiveness thresholds were identified for the 
education sector, the highest incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) per education 
outcome found in previous economic evaluations in sub-Saharan Africa was used as a positive 
or revealed threshold (68-71). All the ICERs were adjusted to 2009 USD using the United States 
inflation rates and adjusted to Malawi using the ratio of the ICER to the 2009 GDP per capita 
of the country in which the intervention was implemented (72). 
In the methodological case on the importance of taking a multi-sectoral perspective when 
conceptualising cost-effectiveness thresholds (CET) as decision rules, the analysis drew on 
Culyer’s bookshelf metaphor that illustrates efficient health budget priority-setting of ranking 
health interventions by their productivity and funding the most efficient ones until the budget is 
exhausted (57). In this case, the ICER of the last funded intervention is the CET of the health 
budget. Whereas Culyer’s bookshelf only considers a single health outcome, the multi-sectoral 
extension proposed also considers another ‘education’ bookshelf, and explores with stylised 
examples how an intervention with both education and health benefits may be undervalued in 
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each bookshelf, and how this would change if cross-sectoral co-financing were possible and 
the costs borne by each sector reduced.  
 
3.5 Adaptation of Fiscal Space Analysis 
Design 
To explore the potential of creating fiscal space for HIV across sub-Saharan Africa, by 
incorporating the value of co-financing for investments in health system strengthening and 
broader development programmes, and ascertain how this would compare to traditional fiscal 
levers, this study component drew on a combination of the basic fiscal space framework, a 
health systems constraints framework and the concept of cross-sectoral co-financing 
developed under the first objective of this research.  
Figure 3.5 summarises the specific conceptual framework adopted. Fiscal space is 
conceptualised as additional funding that can be secured from various sources for the 
achievement of a specific objective, in this case reduced HIV morbidity and mortality. As 
illustrated in the left part of the figure, total government expenditure is a function of total 
revenues and interest payments on previous borrowing (73):   
Gt = f (Tt, Bt, Et, Ot, rtBt-1) 
Where Gt is government non-interest expenditure in time t; Tt is taxes, fees, and other 
government revenues, including those arising from seigniorage (inflationary finance); Bt is total 
government borrowing (domestic and foreign, net of use of deposits); Et is external grants; Ot 
is other sources of funds, such as sale of assets; and rtBt-1 is non-discretionary debt interest 
payments. Increasing the various sources of revenue could therefore increase the fiscal space 
for HIV, ceteris paribus.  
At its minimum, sector-specific fiscal space for the health sector, for example, is a fraction (k) 
of total government expenditures (Ht = k Gt). Much of the focus of fiscal space analyses has 
been on maximising total revenues, sector-specific revenues (through earmarked grants or 
taxes for example) and the relative allocation of the budget. This conceptual framework 
considers that beyond these sources, further fiscal space could be generated for HIV by 
investments in other sector interventions that contribute to HIV outcomes, but are not accounted 
for as HIV-related investments, as depicted by the shaded red arrows in Figure 3.5.  
Based on the concept that health outcomes result from various social, economic and 
environmental factors, in addition to health care delivery (74), we consider that fiscal space for 
HIV - or government expenditures that contribute to HIV outcomes – is likely to include an HIV-
Chapter 3 – Methods 
64 
 
specific budget as well as a fraction of health system expenditures (HS) and expenditures in 
other socio-economic sectors (SE):   
HIVFSt = HIVt + ß Ht + µ SEt 
Rather than focus on the HIV budgetary expenditures alone, the approach taken incorporates 
these HIV-allocable fractions in other sectors and consider how the HIV-specific budget (HIVt) 
could be used to crowd these in and fully leverage them, as depicted by the unshaded red 
arrows in Figure 3.5.  
For our study, this required investigating the relationship between fiscal policies, health system 
constraints and demand-side socio-economic factors, and public HIV financing. The three 
questions of interest were: (i) do health system constraints and poor socio-economic factors 
limit the production of HIV service outputs?; (ii) If so, what is the economic value to the HIV 
programme of more effective public investments in addressing these binding constraints?; and 
finally, (iii) how does this efficiency gain from non-HIV investments compare to traditional 
sources of fiscal space?   
To examine the influence of health system and development factors on fiscal space for HIV, an 
econometric analysis was conducted with a global cross-sectional dataset. Past public HIV 
spending was selected as a proxy measure of fiscal space, and a cross-sectional design was 
adopted in the absence of panel data for this primary variable (75).  
First, a ‘fiscal’ model was specified to explore the extent to which different fiscal space sources 
had been effectively tapped to generate additional public resources for HIV programmes. Next, 
a second HIV service ‘coverage’ model was specified to examine whether and how much 
improved health system performance and social sector outcomes would result in efficiency 
gains in HIV service coverage. The models were then used to quantify the potential fiscal space 
from various sources using a peer approach for 14 selected SSA countries (76). The potential 
increase of a specific source of financing to a normative threshold or mean/median by income 
category was entered into the estimated model for each country to compute the potential 
increase in spending. For the health system and non-health factors, efficiency gains were 
estimated as the increase in spending that would be required to reach the same level of HIV 
service coverage, as would be achieved if non-HIV normative targets were met through 
effective investments in other sectors. 
Data sources 
Most recent publicly available global data between 2008 and 2012 was collected from reliable 
online databases, namely the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, UNAIDS Aidsinfo, 
the WHO Global Health Expenditures Database, the IMF country reports on macroeconomic 
and fiscal performance, the UNESCO education statistics, the UN population statistics and the 
OECD-DAC/CRS database on aid disbursements.  
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Figure 3.5 Sector-specific Fiscal Space Framework with Cross-sectoral Spill overs 
 
Source: Author
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Data analysis 
For HIV service coverage, the theoretical model was a standard economic Cobb-Douglas 
production function for the technological relationship between HIV programme output and factor 
inputs (77), namely:   
Y = A Lβ Kα 
Where Y is total HIV service outputs (production), L is labour inputs (health personnel), K is capital 
input (HIV spending), A is total factor productivity, and α and β are the output elasticities of capital 
and labour.    
To illustrate the co-financing method, the analysis focused on the production of Prevention of 
Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) screening services, using selected HIV-specific and non-
HIV inputs. These choices were largely driven by data availability, as well as the health system 
constraints framework developed by Hanson et al (78). The latter describes the constraints of 
scaling up priority health interventions and distinguishes between five levels of constraints, starting 
with the community and household level (i.e. the demand side), followed by a health service 
delivery level and a health sector governance level of constraints (i.e. the supply side); and finally 
broader public sector and environmental levels of constraints. Ranson et al use this framework to 
develop a typology of countries, using empirical data (79). The analysis built on the indicators they 
selected to include for each level of constraint, as well as previous work on health worker density 
and health service coverage (80), to construct the model.  
At the service delivery level, there are several inputs that interact as complements. It is therefore 
clear that if the HIV budget holder only allocates resources to supply ARVs to heath facilities, 
without investing in the complementary human or physical resources at the point of service, the 
latter will limit the number of services effectively provided. With an increasing reliance on provider-
initiated HIV testing and counselling and the importance of antenatal care services as an entry point 
into ART and PMTCT services, it is clear that the demand and therefore scale up of core HIV 
services depends on the capacity of other health services in the health system. There is evidence 
that the availability of qualified medical personnel is particularly critical for effective maternal health 
services and outcomes (81, 82). A measure of health worker density was therefore selected as a 
non-HIV policy lever that could enable increased HIV (PMTCT) programme efficiency, among 
others. The other two non-HIV areas of investment explored were female education and food 
insecurity, given their expected and identified role in the uptake of maternal health and PMTCT 
services (83).   
In the specified model, the dependent variable was PMTCT screening coverage, namely the 
proportion of pregnant women tested for HIV (from the UNAIDS Aidsinfo database). The 
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explanatory variables of interest were financial HIV inputs (total HIV spending per PLHIV) and 
human resource inputs (nurse density). Demand-side inputs or constraints were also considered, 
namely female education (adult female literacy) and food insecurity (proportion of people 
malnourished in the total population) (78, 80). Additionally, we controlled for GDP per capita (84), 
disease burden (adult HIV prevalence), and environmental factors that may affect accessibility and 
efficiency, namely urbanisation rate and governance (control of corruption) (78, 79).  
All independent variables were transformed into natural logarithms in the estimated regression 
equation, in line with the exponential Cobb-Douglas function. Since the dependent variable was 
bounded (0-100 %), a generalised linear model was used, with logit link function (85) and the 
binomial family. The censored Tobit model was also used to test the robustness of the linear 
approximation. 
Besides the specification issues, one major limitation of this model was the use of total HIV 
spending instead of PMTCT spending, due to data availability. The latter would have been a more 
accurate reflection of the production function. However, if a relatively constant proportion of PMTCT 
spending in total spending is assumed, the modelled relationship would still hold.  
In terms of PMTCT screening, one could think of HIV testing kits (captured by HIV spending) and 
nurses being complementary inputs required to provide screening services to pregnant women 
(80). Based on this, the analysis considered that increasing one of the HIV or non-HIV inputs in the 
production function could increase HIV service production, as suggested by the model. Thus, the 
model was used to estimate how much more PMTCT screening coverage could be achieved if 
countries were to reach the WHO minimum norm of having 2.3 health workers per 1000 population 
(86), and then to estimate how much more a country would have had to spend from the HIV budget 
to achieve that same increase – as a measure of potential HIV budget saving (see Appendix 2, 
Table S14). In economic terms, the rate of technical substitution between labour and financial 
inputs was calculated, to get to a monetary valuation of reaching the norm of health worker density, 
for the HIV budget constraint (87). This monetary value is equivalent to the extra HIV spending that 
would be required to reach the same level of PMTCT screening coverage (a proxy of HIV service 
outputs), as would have been achieved from increasing the number of health workers to the norm 
(through another budget). That percentage increase in total spending was then applied to the public 
HIV spending figure. 
Similarly, a reduction in undernourishment to the MDG target of 11.7% (half of 1990 level in 
developing countries of 23.4%)(88) was applied to explore how this could produce HIV pay-offs in 
terms of increased PMTCT screening coverage. The same approach was used to estimate how 
much extra HIV spending would have been required to get the same increase (see Appendix 2, 
Table S15). The details of the mathematical formulas are presented in Appendix 2, section 6.   
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3.6 Application of Co-financing Analysis for Food Assistance Intervention 
Design 
To delve deeper into the potential of co-financing analysis as an economic evaluation method, a 
specific structural HIV intervention was selected as an application case study. The intervention was 
a 6-month food assistance intervention for food-insecure people initiating ART. Primary cost data 
and secondary outcome data were collected from a trial in Tanzania (89, 90). Using these data and 
complementary regional data, national co-financing scenarios were analysed to assess the cost-
effectiveness for the HIV programme, the HIV budget impact and affordability of a scaled-up 
national co-financed programme in five high burden countries in SSA: Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho and South Africa. These countries were selected purposively to reflect a mix of profiles, in 
terms of HIV burden, income and food insecurity levels.   
A Markov model was developed to estimate the costs and outcomes of providing food assistance 
to these patients during their first 6 months on ART, compared to a ‘standard of care’ base case. 
The analysis adopted both a health care provider perspective, and a broader multi-sectoral 
perspective to capture the non-health consequences of the intervention following a co-financing 
approach. The latter involved modelling a scenario in which the HIV outcomes and potential food 
security outcomes of the intervention were taken into account, and valued by an HIV payer and 
food security or social protection payer, respectively. The primary model outcomes were a cost per 
Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) averted, and a benefit-cost ratio (BCR). The time horizon of 
the study was the lifetime of the cohort of patients initiating ART. 
The Afya study in Tanzania  
Both the HIV impact and cost data were sourced from the Afya study (89) - an individually 
randomised controlled trial conducted by the University of California, Berkeley and the Ministry of 
Health & Social Welfare in the Shinyanga region in Tanzania (89). It assessed three delivery 
models for short-term food and nutrition support for PLHIV: nutrition assessment and counselling 
(NAC) alone (the standard of care); NAC plus cash transfers; and NAC plus food assistance. In the 
latter group, food-insecure patients received a standard household food ration, including whole 
maize meal (12 kg), groundnuts (3kg) and beans (3kg), with a financial value of approximately USD 
11 per month. The study compared the effect of the combined NAC and food or cash assistance 
(both arms) versus NAC alone, on retention in care and ART adherence. The intervention was 
provided from December 2013 to February 2016, with 345 participants enrolled in the food basket 
arm (90). At 6 months follow-up, both the food basket and cash transfer were found to have 
significant effects on retention in care and treatment adherence, measured as the proportion of 
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patients with medication possession ratio ≥95% during the 0-6 month interval (90). These effects 
were not sustained at 12 months for the food basket arm.   
Cost Analysis 
An economic costing of the trial was conducted as part of this research, in order to compare the 
outcome and cost data in a co-financing analysis. A combination of standard step-down and 
ingredients costing was used to estimate the economic costs of providing the food basket (72). 
Only the provider intervention costs were considered in this analysis, since the indirect provider 
costs at the health facility level from increased health service utilisation are included elsewhere in 
the modelling. Costs incurred by patients, such as transport or foregone productivity, were not 
included in the analysis, given that they would not be expected to fall on the health care budget 
(55).  
Cost data were collected at the 3 Afya trial sites, namely Shinyanga Regional Hospital, Kahama 
District Hospital and Kambarage Health Centre, as well as from the research team at the University 
of California, Berkeley and at the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Data was collected in 
August-September 2015 for the start-up period (1 January 2013 to 30 November 2013) and in 
March 2016 for the intervention period (1 December 2013 till 29 February 2016).  
Costs were categorised as recurrent and capital costs. Capital costs were annuitized using a 
discount rate of 3%. Input prices were obtained from the project, health facilities and regional office 
financial records, as well as local suppliers. Costs were estimated in Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) and 
then converted into 2015 USD, using weighted average annual Bank of Tanzania Interbank Foreign 
exchange rates, and the United States GDP deflator for costs incurred in 2013 and 2014.  
Research costs were excluded in both the start-up and implementation phases. To be conservative, 
start-up costs were included in full in total intervention costs, as it was not possible to determine 
whether and which of these costs would yield benefits beyond the duration of the study.  
All project overhead and intervention costs were allocated based on estimated use for the following 
activities: project administration and management; research; client identification; monitoring 
conditionality; cash transfer; and food basket. Overhead costs were allocated using step-down 
allocation to support cost centres, and then to the final cost centres, namely the Food basket or the 
Cash transfer. Staff time allocation between activities was estimated from a combination of self-
assessments, interviews and time sheets, and used to allocate overheads. The proportion of 
beneficiaries receiving food baskets was used to allocate the support costs of client identification 
and conditionality monitoring. The unit cost was estimated as a cost per patient enrolled to receive 
the food basket for 6 months.     
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Co-financing analysis  
The co-financing scenario (or ‘multi-sectoral perspective’) involved modelling the non-health impact 
of the intervention. However, the evidence base on the broader welfare effects of food assistance 
(e.g. on labour productivity, nutrition) is scant (91) and only one recent study was identified from 
Honduras with a demonstrated effect of food assistance on severe food insecurity among 
established ART patients (92). The implications of this potential effect on food security were 
explored by modelling what would happen if part of the incremental costs of the intervention were 
covered by a social protection budget based on this benefit, based on the co-financing approach 
developed under objective 1. The social protection sector’s or payer’s revealed WTP per averted 
case of severe household food insecurity was derived from studies on the cost and impact of a 
cash transfer programme on severe food insecurity in Zambia (93, 94).     
Univariate and probabilistic sensitivity analyses (PSA) were conducted to explore the sensitivity of 
the results to various parameter and distributional assumptions (see Chapter 7 and Appendix 3). 
Based on data from the Spectrum model on the estimated number of people initiating ART per year 
from 2016 to 2020 in the five countries (95), an estimate of severely food-insecure patients who 
would be eligible for food assistance was derived and used to model national budget impact, HIV 
impact (in terms of DALYs averted) and cases of severe food insecurity averted until 2030.  
One of the major methodological limitations in this applied co-financing analysis is the use of the 
cost-effectiveness ratios from implemented non-HIV programmes as a proxy measure of revealed 
WTP or of the cost-effectiveness threshold of the non-HIV budget constraint. In this case, the cost 
per household case of severe food insecurity averted through an implemented cash transfer 
programme was assumed to reflect the alternative investment, or opportunity cost, to the social 
protection payer. Moreover, it was extrapolated from one programme in Zambia to all remaining 
countries. For more optimal decisions, the estimation of local sector-specific cost-effectiveness 
thresholds would be required.  
 
3.7 Qualitative Analysis on Institutional Feasibility 
Design 
For a better understanding of the institutional feasibility, incentives and disincentives to adopting a 
co-financing framework in HIV financing and priority-setting, there was a need to gain insights and 
elicit the perspectives of decision-makers who would actually be the ones to decide whether or not 
to contribute towards cross-sectoral programmes. In the absence of initiatives to operationalise co-
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financing mechanisms in low and middle-income countries, qualitative interviews with decision-
makers were considered the most appropriate method for an initial assessment of the acceptability 
and feasibility of the approach (13).  
The theoretical underpinnings of this study component remain rooted in the positivist discipline of 
health economics, with insights from political economy theories (96). Although there is likely an 
objective reality of how resources are allocated, it was acknowledged that the interaction between 
the researcher and the decision-makers would allow for a joint construction, or co-production and 
interpretation of the institutional feasibility of applying this relatively novel approach to public 
financing (97). This methodological choice is not without its limitations, given the potential response 
and desirability bias, which may overplay the institutional feasibility of the approach (13).   
To ground the interviews in a national context and reality, deepen the joint analysis and minimise 
hypothetical discussions, Tanzania was selected as a case study. This study component focused 
on the Tanzanian national cash transfer programme (TASAF) as a tangible example to explore for 
co-financing (98), and drew in the two case studies of cash transfer interventions with empirical 
evidence of multi-sectoral HIV and non-HIV impacts in Tanzania and Malawi (61, 90), analysed 
under objectives 1 and 3.  
The main limitation of this case study approach with qualitative interviews was its context-specific 
nature and lack of generalisability (10). However, it is also by providing context and localising the 
potential co-financing decisions in a real-world context that the analysis is most relevant (11). 
Moreover, many of the international organisations involved in financing health and development 
programmes in Tanzania are also operating in other LMIC, and their institutional incentive 
structures are likely to be similar.    
Data generation 
Data collection started from a rapid mapping of the main payers (budgetary authorities) in Tanzania 
for a scaled-up cash transfer intervention. Policy-makers were purposively selected on the basis of 
their positions and involvement in planning and resource allocation, and sector coordination in the 
HIV, health, social protection and food security sectors. Primary data was then collected using 
qualitative methods in the form of key informant interviews with 20 policy-makers, programme 
managers and budget holders at the national level, both in government and among key 
development partners.  
The interview guide explored the principles used in resource allocation and their application to 
cross-sectoral programmes, as well as the perceived institutional feasibility of a co-financing 
approach. Specifically, it started by investigating how the planning and priority-setting within the 
remit of the respondent had been done for the current medium-term plan and annual budgeting 
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cycle; what criteria were considered; what outcomes/objectives were being optimised; and what 
constraints each decision-maker faced. Next, a set of questions were designed to determine each 
sector’s opportunity cost, by eliciting decision-maker’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for key sectoral 
outcomes. Finally, the topic guide re-introduced co-financing with the TASAF example, and 
evidence of the programme’s and other cash transfer interventions’ multi-sectoral impacts. It then 
explored respondents’ perceptions on the benefits, risks, barriers, enablers, and potential 
mechanisms for implementing cross-budget co-financing.  
A document review was also conducted in preparation for the interviews to enable more informed 
discussions around national planning and priority-setting. 
Data analysis 
The interview transcripts and the researcher’s interview and post-interview notes formed the basis 
for the analysis, while data from the documents reviewed were used to support and validate the 
issues that emerged. Principles of grounded theory were applied (99). First, the researcher read 
through all the interviews to identify high-level general themes. Second, each interview transcript 
and the interview notes were coded using a mixed deductive and inductive approach to identify key 
concepts and new ideas (100). Third, the data was organised into groups of ideas or categories 
that were more generalizable. To evaluate the institutional feasibility of co-financing, the analysis 
considered how these categories related to the assumptions of co-financing, and where they did 
not, further investigation went into determining to what extent co-financing could be applied within 
the existing resource allocation processes. The analysis was conducted in NVivo 10. 
 
3.8 Ethics Approvals 
Ethical approval for the overall study was sought and obtained from the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine Research Ethics Committee (No. 9600). Additional ethical approval for the 
study components conducted in Tanzania were sought and obtained from the Tanzanian National 
Institute of Medical Research (No. NIMR/HQ/R.8a/Vol.IX/1631), the Tanzanian Commission for 
Science and Technology (No. 2015-180-NA-2015-236) and the Institutional Review Board of the 
University of California, Berkeley (No. 2013-07-5442).  
Study participants were provided with a study information sheet, which included an explanation of 
the purpose of the study and the terms of the participant’s consent. Participation was completely 
voluntary and formalised by the respondent’s signature of a consent form.  
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3.9 Funding Sources 
The research underpinning this thesis was funded by the following three research programmes and 
grants:  
 The UKaid-funded STRIVE Research Programme Consortium on ‘Tackling the Structural 
Drivers of HIV’, led by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.  
 A research programme entitled ‘RethinkHIV’ on the fiscal burden of and fiscal space for 
HIV programmes in sub-Saharan Africa, involving the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, Imperial College, Harvard School of Public Health and Oxford 
University, with funding from the Rush Foundation. 
 A research grant funded by the World Food Programme for the analysis of the economic 
returns of investing in food assistance for people initiating ART.  
  
Chapter 3 – Methods 
74 
 
References 
1. Tashakkori A, Creswell JW. The new era of mixed methods. Journal of Mixed Methods 
Research. 2007;1(1):3-7. 
2. O'Cathain A, Murphy E, Nicholl J. The quality of mixed methods studies in health services 
research. J Health Serv Res Policy. 2008;13(2):92-8. 
3. Giddings LS, Grant BM. A Trojan horse for positivism?: a critique of mixed methods 
research. ANS Advances in Nursing Science. 2007;30(1):52-60. 
4. Curry LA, Nembhard IM, Bradley EH. Qualitative and mixed methods provide unique 
contributions to outcomes research. Circulation. 2009;119(10):1442-52. 
5. Creswell JW. Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches: 
Sage publications; 2013. 
6. Sandelowski M. Combining qualitative and quantitative sampling, data collection, and 
analysis techniques in mixed-method studies. Research in Nursing & Health. 2000;23(3):246-55. 
7. Forde I, Morgan D, Klazinga NS. Resolving the challenges in the international comparison 
of health systems: The must do's and the trade-offs. Health Policy. 2013;112(1):4-8. 
8. Cacace M, Ettelt S, Mays N, Nolte E. Assessing quality in cross-country comparisons of 
health systems and policies: Towards a set of generic quality criteria. Health Policy. 
2013;112(1):156-62. 
9. Miller SM. A note on cross-country growth regressions. Applied Economics. 
1996;28(8):1019-26. 
10. Yin RK. Case study research: Design and methods: Sage publications; 2013. 
11. Gerring J. What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? American Political Science 
Review. 2004;98(2):341-54. 
12. Green J, Thorogood N. Qualitative methods for health research: Sage; 2013. 
13. Walt G, Shiffman J, Schneider H, Murray SF, Brugha R, Gilson L. 'Doing' health policy 
analysis: methodological and conceptual reflections and challenges. Health Policy and Planning. 
2008;23(5):308-17. 
14. UNAIDS. Global AIDS Update. Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS), 2016. 
15. IMF. Regional Economic Outlook - Sub-Saharan Africa: Building Momentum in a Multi-
speed World. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund; 2013. 
16. Pring C. People and corruption: Africa survey 2015 – Global Corruption Barometer. Berlin: 
Transparency International, 2015. 
Chapter 3 – Methods 
75 
 
17. Government of Malawi. 2010 Malawi Millennium Development Goals Report. In: Ministry 
of Development Planning and Cooperation, editor. Lilongwe, Malawi2010. 
18. Government of Malawi. Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II: 2011-2016. Lilongwe, 
Malawi: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 2011. 
19. NAC & UNAIDS. Draft National AIDS Spending Assessment 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. 
Lilongwe, Malawi: National AIDS Commission. 2010. 
20. Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. National Five Year Development Plan 
(2016/17-2021/22): Nurturing Industrialisation for Economic Transformation and Human 
Development. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 2016. 
21. Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. Tanzania Third National Multi-sectoral 
Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS (2013/14-2017/18). Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Tanzania 
Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS). 2013. 
22. UNICEF. The state of the world’s children 2015: Reimagine the future: Innovation for every 
child. New York: UNICEF, 2015. 
23. Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS). Public Expenditure Review 2011, HIV and 
AIDS. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: TACAIDS, 2012. 
24. Schwartlander B, Stover J, Hallett T, Atun R, Avila C, Gouws E, et al. Towards an improved 
investment approach for an effective response to HIV/AIDS. The Lancet. 2011;377(9782):2031-41. 
25. Remme M, Siapka M, Vassall A, Heise L, Jacobi J, Ahumada C, et al. The cost and cost-
effectiveness of gender-responsive interventions for HIV: a systematic review. Journal of the 
International AIDS Society. 2014;17:19228. 
26. Vassall A, Chandrashekar S, Pickles M, Beattie TS, Shetty G, Bhattacharjee P, et al. 
Community mobilisation and empowerment interventions as part of HIV prevention for female sex 
workers in Southern India: a cost-effectiveness analysis. PloS One. 2014;9(10):e110562. 
27. Beattie TS, Bhattacharjee P, Isac S, Mohan HL, Simic-Lawson M, Ramesh BM, et al. 
Declines in violence and police arrest among female sex workers in Karnataka state, south India, 
following a comprehensive HIV prevention programme. Journal of the International AIDS Society. 
2015;18:20079. 
28. Kim J, Ferrari G, Abramsky T, Watts C, Hargreaves J, Morison L, et al. Assessing the 
incremental effects of combining economic and health interventions: the IMAGE study in South 
Africa. Bulletin of the World Health Organization. 2009;87(11):824-32. 
29. Wagman JA, Gray RH, Campbell JC, Thoma M, Ndyanabo A, Ssekasanvu J, et al. 
Effectiveness of an integrated intimate partner violence and HIV prevention intervention in Rakai, 
Uganda: analysis of an intervention in an existing cluster randomised cohort. Lancet Global Health. 
2015;3(1):e23-33. 
Chapter 3 – Methods 
76 
 
30. Abramsky T, Devries K, Kiss L, Nakuti J, Kyegombe N, Starmann E, et al. Findings from 
the SASA! Study: a cluster randomized controlled trial to assess the impact of a community 
mobilization intervention to prevent violence against women and reduce HIV risk in Kampala, 
Uganda. BMC Med. 2014;12(1):122. 
31. Bundy D, Shaeffer S, Jukes M, Beegle K, Gillespie A, Drake L, et al. School-based Health 
and Nutrition Programs. In: Jamison DT, Breman JG, Measham AR, Alleyne G, Claeson M, Evans 
DB, et al., editors. Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries. Washington (DC): World 
Bank 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank Group.; 2006. 
32. Rodriguez-Garcia R, Wilson D, York N, Low C, N'Jie N, Bonnel R. Evaluation of the 
community response to HIV and AIDS: learning from a portfolio approach. AIDS care. 2013;25 
Suppl 1:S7-19. 
33. Piot P, Abdool Karim SS, Hecht R, Legido-Quigley H, Buse K, Stover J, et al. Defeating 
AIDS--advancing global health. The Lancet. 2015;386(9989):171-218. 
34. Remme M, Vassall A, Lutz B, Watts C. Paying girls to stay in school: a good return on HIV 
investment? The Lancet. 2012;379(9832):2150. 
35. Remme M, Watts C, Heise L, Vassall A. Secondary schooling might be as good an HIV 
investment as male circumcision. Lancet Global Health. 2015;3(10):e591. 
36. Perloff JM. Microeconomics. Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley; 2001. 
37. Pigou AC. The economics of welfare: Transaction Publishers; 1924. 
38. Wolf C. A theory of nonmarket failure: framework for implementation analysis. Journal of 
Law and Economics. 1979:107-39. 
39. Coase RH. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics. 1960;3:1. 
40. Boucekkine R, De La Croix D, Licandro O. Vintage capital growth theory: Three 
breakthroughs. Emerald Group Publishing Limited; 2011. 
41. Jovanovic B, Yatsenko Y. Investment in vintage capital. Journal of Economic Theory. 
2012;147(2):551-69. 
42. Jacoby HD, Wing IS. Adjustment time, capital malleability and policy cost. The Energy 
Journal. 1999:73-92. 
43. Grossman M. On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. Journal of 
Political economy. 1972;80(2):223-55. 
44. Pronyk PM, Hargreaves JR, Kim JC, Morison LA, Phetla G, Watts C, et al. Effect of a 
structural intervention for the prevention of intimate-partner violence and HIV in rural South Africa: 
a cluster randomised trial. The Lancet. 2006;368(9551):1973-83. 
Chapter 3 – Methods 
77 
 
45. Pronyk PM, Kim JC, Abramsky T, Phetla G, Hargreaves JR, Morison LA, et al. A combined 
microfinance and training intervention can reduce HIV risk behaviour in young female participants. 
AIDS. 2008;22(13):1659-65. 
46. Weatherly H, Drummond M, Claxton K, Cookson R, Ferguson B, Godfrey C, et al. Methods 
for assessing the cost-effectiveness of public health interventions: key challenges and 
recommendations. Health Policy. 2009;93(2-3):85-92. 
47. WHO. Intersectoral Governance for Health in All Policies. McQueen D, Wismar M, Lin V, 
Jones C, Davies M, editors: WHO, on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and 
Policies; 2012. 
48. Forsythe S, Stover J, Bollinger L. The past, present and future of HIV, AIDS and resource 
allocation. BMC Public Health. 2009;9 Suppl 1:S4. 
49. Lasry A, Richter A, Lutscher F. Recommendations for increasing the use of HIV/AIDS 
resource allocation models. BMC Public Health. 2009;9 Suppl 1:S8. 
50. Moatti JP, Marlink R, Luchini S, Kazatchkine M. Universal access to HIV treatment in 
developing countries: going beyond the misinterpretations of the 'cost-effectiveness' algorithm. 
AIDS. 2008;22 Suppl 1:S59-66. 
51. Stillwaggon E. Complexity, cofactors, and the failure of AIDS policy in Africa. Journal of the 
International AIDS Society. 2009;12:12. 
52. Drummond M, Stoddart G. Assessment of health producing measures across different 
sectors. Health Policy. 1995;33(3):219-31. 
53. Claxton K, Sculpher M, Culyer A. Mark versus Luke? Appropriate methods for the 
evaluation of public health interventions. CHE Research Paper 312007. 
54. Camerer C. Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. New York, 
Princeton: Russell Sage Foundation & Princeton University Press; 2003. 
55. Wilkinson T, Sculpher MJ, Claxton K, Revill P, Briggs A, Cairns JA, et al. The International 
Decision Support Initiative Reference Case for Economic Evaluation: An Aid to Thought. Value in 
Health. 2016;19(8):921-8. 
56. Sanders GD, Neumann PJ, Basu A, Brock DW, Feeny D, Krahn M, et al. 
Recommendations for conduct, methodological practices, and reporting of cost-effectiveness 
analyses: second panel on cost-effectiveness in health and medicine. Journal of the American 
Medical Association. 2016;316(10):1093-103. 
57. Culyer AJ. Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds in Health Care: A Bookshelf Guide to their 
Meaning and Use. CHE Research Paper 121. 2015. 
58. Bertram MY, Lauer JA, De Joncheere K, Edejer T, Hutubessy R, Kieny M-P, et al. Cost–
effectiveness thresholds: pros and cons. Bulletin of the World Health Organization. 2016. 
Chapter 3 – Methods 
78 
 
59. Marseille E, Larson B, Kazi DS, Kahn JG, Rosen S. Thresholds for the cost-effectiveness 
of interventions: alternative approaches. Bulletin of the World Health Organization. 2015;93(2):118-
24. 
60. Revill P, Walker S, Madan J, Ciaranello A, Mwase T, Gibb DM, et al. Using cost-
effectiveness thresholds to determine value for money in low-and middle-income country 
healthcare systems: Are current international norms fit for purpose? CHE Research Paper 121. 
2014. 
61. Baird SJ, Garfein RS, McIntosh CT, Ozler B. Effect of a cash transfer programme for 
schooling on prevalence of HIV and herpes simplex type 2 in Malawi: a cluster randomised trial. 
The Lancet. 2012;379(9823):1320-9. 
62. Baird S, Chirwa E, McIntosh C, Ozler B. The short-term impacts of a schooling conditional 
cash transfer program on the sexual behavior of young women. Health Economics. 2010;19 
Suppl:55-68. 
63. Baird SJ, McIntosh CT, Ozler B. Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer 
Experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2011;126(4):1709-53. 
64. Ozler B. Unpacking the Impacts of a Randomized CCT program in Malawi: World Bank. 
Available from: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SAFETYNETSANDTRANSFERS/Resources/281945-
1131468287118/1876750-1231881410497/Ozler-SIHR_DC_090112.pdf. 
65. Ozler B. Personal communication. Remme M. 2012. 
66. Martinez Alvarez M, Borghi J, Acharya A, Vassall A. Is Development Assistance for Health 
fungible? Findings from a mixed methods case study in Tanzania. Social Science & Medicine. 
2016;159:161-9. 
67. Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. Macroeconomics and health: investing in 
health for economic development. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2001. 
68. Sava AS, Zugravu BG. Cost-Benefit Analysis in Education. Recent Developments and 
Further Challenges. Industrial Revolutions, from the Globalization and Post-Globalization 
Perspective, Vol Iv. 2009:577-85. 
69. Hummel-Rossi B, Ashdown J. The state of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses in 
education. Review of Educational Research. 2002;72(1):1-30. 
70. Levin HM. Waiting for Godot: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Education. In: Light R, editor. 
Evaluation Findings that Surprise. San Francisco: Jossey Bass; 2002. 
71. Dhaliwal I, Duflo E, Glennester R, Tulloch C. Comparative Cost-Effectiveness Analysis to 
Inform Policy in Developing Countries: A General Framework with Applications for Education. Abdul 
Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), 2011. 
Chapter 3 – Methods 
79 
 
72. Vassall A, Sweeney S, Kahn J, Gomez G, Bollinger L, Marseille E, et al. Reference Case 
for Estimating the Costs of Global Health Services and Interventions. Global Health Cost 
Consortium, 2017. 
73. Brun J-F, Chambas G, Combes J-L, Dulbecco P, Gastambide A, Guerineau S, et al. Fiscal 
Space in Developing Countries - Concept Paper. Commissioned by the Povery Group of the United 
Nations Development Programme's Bureau for Development policy, 2006. 
74. Kim JY, Farmer P, Porter ME. Redefining global health-care delivery. The Lancet. 2013. 
75. Xu K, Saksena P, Holly A. The determinants of health expenditure: A Country-level Panel 
Data Analysis. Results for Development Institute, 2011. 
76. Galarraga O, Wirtz VJ, Santa-Ana-Tellez Y, Korenromp EL. Financing HIV Programming: 
How Much Should Low- And Middle-Income Countries and their Donors Pay? PloS One. 
2013;8(7):e67565. 
77. Cobb CW, Douglas PH. A theory of production. The American Economic Review. 
1928:139-65. 
78. Hanson K, Ranson MK, Oliveira-Cruz V, Mills A. Expanding access to priority health 
interventions: a framework for understanding the constraints to scaling-up. Journal of International 
Development. 2003;15(1):1-14. 
79. Ranson MK, Hanson K, Oliveira-Cruz V, Mills A. Constraints to expanding access to health 
interventions: an empirical analysis and country typology. Journal of International Development. 
2003;15(1):15-39. 
80. Anand S, Barnighausen T. Health workers and vaccination coverage in developing 
countries: an econometric analysis. The Lancet. 2007;369(9569):1277-85. 
81. Anand S, Barnighausen T. Human resources and health outcomes: cross-country 
econometric study. The Lancet. 2004;364(9445):1603-9. 
82. Countdown Working Group on Health Policy and Health Systems. Assessment of the 
health system and policy environment as a critical complement to tracking intervention coverage 
for maternal, newborn, and child health. The Lancet.371(9620):1284-93. 
83. hIarlaithe MO, Grede N, de Pee S, Bloem M. Economic and social factors are some of the 
most common barriers preventing women from accessing maternal and newborn child health 
(MNCH) and prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) services: a literature review. 
AIDS and Behavior. 2014;18 Suppl 5:S516-30. 
84. Bokhari FA, Gai Y, Gottret P. Government health expenditures and health outcomes. 
Health Economics. 2007;16(3):257-73. 
85. Fan VY, Savedoff WD. The health financing transition: a conceptual framework and 
empirical evidence. Social Science & Medicine. 2014;105:112-21. 
Chapter 3 – Methods 
80 
 
86. Speybroeck N, Kinfu Y, Dal Poz MR, Evans DB. Reassessing the relationship between 
human resources for health, intervention coverage and health outcomes. Geneva, World Health 
Organization; 2006. 
87. Powdthavee N, van den Berg B. Putting different price tags on the same health condition: 
Re-evaluating the well-being valuation approach. Journal of Health Economics. 2011;30(5):1032-
43. 
88. FAO, IFAD, WFP. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2014. Strengthening the 
enabling environment for food security and nutrition. Rome: FAO. 2014. 
89. McCoy SI, Njau PF, Czaicki NL, Kadiyala S, Jewell NP, Dow WH, et al. Rationale and 
design of a randomized study of short-term food and cash assistance to improve adherence to 
antiretroviral therapy among food insecure HIV-infected adults in Tanzania. BMC Infect Dis. 
2015;15:490. 
90. McCoy S, Njau P, Fahey C, Kapologwe N, Kadiyala S, Jewell N, et al. Cash versus food 
assistance to improve adherence to antiretroviral therapy among HIV-infected adults in Tanzania: 
a randomized trial. AIDS. 2017;31(6):815-25. 
91. Tirivayi N, Groot W. Health and welfare effects of integrating AIDS treatment with food 
assistance in resource constrained settings: a systematic review of theory and evidence. Social 
Science & Medicine (1982). 2011;73(5):685-92. 
92. Palar K, Derose KP, Linnemayr S, Smith A, Farias H, Wagner G, et al. Impact of food 
support on food security and body weight among HIV antiretroviral therapy recipients in Honduras: 
a pilot intervention trial. AIDS care. 2015;27(4):409-15. 
93. Chiwele DK. Assessing Administrative Capacity and Costs of Cash Transfer Schemes in 
Zambia. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 2010. 
94. Seidenfeld D, Handa S, Tembo G, Michelo S, Harland Scott C, Prencipe L. The impact of 
an unconditional cash transfer on food security and nutrition: the Zambia child grant programme. 
2014. 
95. Avenir Health. Spectrum  [cited 2016 16 June 2016]. Available from: 
http://www.avenirhealth.org/software-spectrum.php. 
96. Goddard M, Hauck K, Preker A, Smith PC. Priority setting in health–a political economy 
perspective. Health Economics, Policy and Law. 2006;1(01):79-90. 
97. Maxwell J. Understanding and validity in qualitative research. Harvard Educational Review. 
1992;62(3):279-301. 
98. Evans DK, Hausladen S, Kosec K, Rees N. Community-based conditional cash transfers 
in Tanzania. Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2014. 
Chapter 3 – Methods 
81 
 
99. Corbin JM, Strauss AL. Basics of qualitative research : techniques and procedures for 
developing grounded theory. 2015. 
100. Kvale S. InterViews : an introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications; 2009. 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
   
Chapter 4 – Financing Structural Interventions 
 
83 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 Financing structural interventions: going 
beyond HIV-only value for money assessments 
 
4.1 Introduction 
HIV/AIDS is one of the leading global causes of morbidity and mortality globally (1). Despite 
substantial successes, high rates of new infections and AIDS deaths persist. Structural factors 
– including poverty and limited livelihood options, stigma and discrimination, gender inequality 
and violence, among others – help drive and sustain the epidemic, as well as undermine the 
effectiveness of proven HIV interventions (2). There is, therefore, renewed interest in 
interventions that seek to address such factors (2, 3) through an expanding range of structural 
interventions, both to modify the broader socio-economic environment that shapes HIV risk, as 
well as to enhance the uptake and effectiveness of core HIV prevention and treatment services 
(4-6). Although evidence of the effectiveness of these interventions is limited, a few rigorous 
studies have demonstrated the potential of enhanced microfinance or cash transfer schemes 
to reduce HIV-related risk factors and ultimately HIV infections, while simultaneously improving 
other development indicators (7, 8).         
The changing HIV funding landscape makes the argument for investments in structural 
interventions all the more compelling. After a decade of unprecedented investments, external 
HIV financing is flat-lining, while domestic resources are increasingly expected to sustain and 
scale up national responses (9-12). This shift is framed as an opportunity for more ‘shared 
global responsibility’ and a more prioritised investment approach (13, 14). No longer insulated 
by earmarked external funding (15), HIV programmes in resource-limited settings will 
increasingly compete with other health and development priorities for resources. In this context, 
structural interventions with multiple outcomes could become more attractive. Rather than 
displacing financing to other sectors, HIV funds that support structural approaches could 
leverage such resources, catalysing synergistic investments across health and development 
sectors, as promoted by the HIV investment framework and several other policy agendas and 
academic works (3, 13, 16-22). 
Despite the potential of structural interventions, there is a risk that they will not be prioritised 
within HIV programme resources, given the perception that they are beyond the remit of the 
HIV ‘sector’ (23-25). This concern is compounded by the fact that, conventionally, investment 
decisions for HIV are expected to be informed by cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA) (26-29). 
These compare the costs of HIV programmes with their direct HIV outcomes only, such as HIV 
infections averted or life years saved. CEA typically does not factor in the multitude of health 
co-factors or co-morbidities that are known to influence the complexity of HIV transmission, nor 
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does it incorporate complementarities between interventions and positive spill overs (30). The 
alternative and more comprehensive approach is cost-benefit analysis (CBA), embedded in 
welfare economics, which is concerned with whether social benefits generated by an 
intervention outweigh its costs. Both social benefits and costs are measured in monetary units. 
This approach is very rarely used in HIV priority-setting discussions (31, 32). However, the use 
of cost-effectiveness rather than cost-benefit analyses could potentially result in sub-optimal 
investment choices for interventions with multiple forms of benefit (33). In economic terms, this 
would represent a ‘welfare loss’. Current budgeting arrangements further promote this silo 
approach, as they rarely encourage sectors to explicitly factor in the costs and benefits of their 
resource allocation decisions to other sectors (34-38).   
Given the multiple interactions between HIV outcomes and broader health and development 
interventions, allocating HIV resources on the basis of HIV cost-effectiveness alone may not 
be optimal. To investigate this hypothesis, we examine the consequences of alternative 
approaches to resource allocation and financing, based on a case study. Our analysis seeks 
more specifically to explore: (i) the extent to which the current approach – using HIV-focussed 
cost-effectiveness decision rules – could lead to sub-optimal HIV financing decisions; and (ii) 
whether there may be different ways in which the HIV sector could co-finance structural 
interventions.  
 
4.2 Methods 
Intervention modelled 
We used data from the Zomba cash transfer trial in Malawi, which provides proof-of-concept 
that altering socio-economic contexts can be an effective strategy to prevent HIV. The cash 
transfer was provided between 2008 and 2009 to 1,225 girls (ages 13-22) and their households, 
with payments being conditional upon school attendance for a sub-sample of 506 girls. At 18 
months follow-up, HIV prevalence among schoolgirls in the intervention and control groups was 
compared, suggesting an adjusted reduction in prevalent HIV of 64% among those who were 
already in school at baseline (Adjusted Odds Ratio= 0.36, 95% CI 0.14–0.91) (7). Additionally, 
significant reductions in prevalent Herpes Simplex Virus type 2 (HSV-2), school drop-out, teen 
pregnancy and depression were observed, as well as improvements in school enrolment, 
attendance and English test scores (7, 39-41). 
Estimating impact and costs 
Although we did not aim to conduct a detailed economic evaluation of this intervention, we 
nevertheless needed to estimate its costs and impacts to illustrate the different financing 
approaches. The incremental impact for key indicators was calculated from the post-trial 
difference between intervention and control groups, multiplied by the number of girls in the 
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impacted (sub-)group. We then translated the units of health outcomes into Disability-Adjusted 
Life Years (DALYs) averted, using standard formulae for HIV and estimates from the literature 
for the other health outcomes (see Appendix 1). Baird and colleagues estimated that in a non-
trial setting and at scale the intervention could be implemented at an incremental financial 
provider cost of USD 90 per beneficiary (7, 42). All costs were adjusted to 2009 USD.  
Different approaches to deciding whether to finance the intervention  
We compared the application of three approaches for deciding whether to finance a structural 
intervention to keep adolescent girls in school. In the first approach, HIV and non-HIV budget 
holders conduct a joint cross-sectoral CBA and fund the intervention if the benefits outweigh 
the costs. This should lead to the most efficient allocation across sectors. In the second silo 
approach, each budget holder considers the cost-effectiveness of the intervention in terms of 
their own objectives and funds the intervention based on their sector-specific thresholds of what 
is cost-effective or not. In the third co-financing approach, budget holders use CEA to determine 
how much they would be willing to contribute towards the intervention, assuming that other 
sectors cover the remaining implementation costs. In detail: 
1. Cross-sectoral CBA 
In the CBA approach, the decision rule is simple: investing in an intervention with a net benefit 
is efficient. In addition to HIV benefits, education and other health benefits were included and 
converted into monetary units. To estimate these, we used long-term benefit-to-cost ratios 
found in the literature on conditional cash transfers for school girls in developing countries (43). 
These estimate a range from 3.5 to 26 of benefits to costs achieved through increased future 
earnings and reduced future child mortality (43). HIV benefits were monetised by valuing HIV 
DALYs at USD 1,000 (in line with the other health benefits) (44) and discounted lifetime costs 
of antiretroviral therapy (ART) from South Africa (45) were partly adjusted to estimate cost 
savings from each HIV infection averted.  
2. Silo approach 
The silo approach requires the use of incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). These are 
estimated when an intervention costs and achieves more than the status quo - as the ratio of 
the additional costs to the additional benefit. The decision rule is then based on comparing this 
ICER to a standard cost-effectiveness threshold, or willingness to pay (WTP), per HIV outcome 
(46). The World Health Organisation (WHO) has set this WTP threshold at a cost per DALY 
averted below Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (47-49). This is primarily derived from 
a human capital approach, whereby a year of life is valued as an individual’s economic 
productivity (50). While there are a range of other approaches (46), the WHO benchmark was 
taken as it is commonly used in economic evaluations of HIV interventions (29, 51, 52). 
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For the case study, the maximum contribution each (sub-)sector would be willing to make 
towards the intervention was calculated as the impact per sector multiplied by its WTP threshold 
for that outcome unit. For example, for health outcomes the maximum contribution was the 
number of DALYs averted multiplied by GDP per capita (WHO threshold). Since we did not find 
established cost-effectiveness thresholds in education (53-56), the highest ICER per education 
outcome found in previous economic evaluations in sub-Saharan Africa (57) was used as the 
threshold. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the HIV budget holder would fully fund intervention A, which averts 
a quantity QA of HIV-related DALYs at a total cost of CA, and therefore has an ICER below the 
threshold (RT). Conversely, the ICER of intervention B is above the threshold, meaning that, 
from an HIV perspective, B would not be considered for investment.  
3. Co-financing approach 
Claxton and colleagues propose an alternative decision approach to overcome the challenge 
posed by interventions with cross-sectoral costs and impacts, where CBA is not feasible – 
coined the ‘compensation test’ (36). If other sectors can compensate the implementing sector 
for its surplus (or net) cost (i.e. the cost over and above the value of the benefits to the 
implementer), then the intervention should be funded. Our approach is slightly different in that 
we propose to use CEA-based thresholds and to have actual, not hypothetical, compensation 
through a co-financing mechanism if the sum of each sector’s WTP for its specific benefits is 
greater than the intervention’s cost, but no single sector is willing to pay the full implementation 
cost. Whereas CBA approaches tend to capture multiple long-term economic benefits, the CEA-
based approaches often relate more to immediate intervention outcomes (58), which is likely to 
be closer to financing decisions in practice. Similar to intervention B in Figure 4.1, this would 
amount to the HIV sector financing up to CT, as long as other sectors contribute CB-CT to enable 
implementation.  
Welfare loss 
We then compare the silo and co-financing approaches by estimating the welfare loss in relation 
to the allocation obtained under the optimal cross-sectoral CBA approach. This was estimated 
as the net benefit foregone by not implementing an efficient intervention. The assumption is 
that the alternative use of resources for each sector is to do nothing.  
Approaches to determine the HIV share 
In principle, the share the HIV sector could be willing to pay would be equivalent to its threshold 
(maximum WTP). However, in cases where benefits substantially outweigh costs, it may be 
possible to invest less HIV funds. In this case, the HIV sector could establish its minimum WTP 
as the residual amount that other sectors would not cover, i.e. total costs minus the sum of 
other sectors’ WTP, as long as this is below CT.  
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Another approach would be for the HIV sector to pay its ‘fair share’ of the costs, based on the 
share of HIV benefits (and treatment cost savings) in total benefits estimated by the cross-
sectoral CBA (59). We estimate shares with these three approaches.  
Sensitivity analyses 
Given that the case study is merely illustrative of various financing approaches, we explore how 
our results are dependent on changes in intervention cost, monetary valuation of an HIV DALY, 
WTP thresholds applied and the use of the intervention’s weighted effect on the HIV/STI and 
reproductive health indicators. 
Further details on all the parameters used and a technical description of methods can be found 
in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 4.1 Cost-effectiveness threshold from the HIV budget holder’s perspective 
 
Source: Authors 
HIV DALYs averted
Total 
Intervention 
Costs
Threshold, RT
(Cost per DALY averted = GDP/ capita)
x B
x A
CB
CA
CT
QB QA
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4.3 Results 
As summarised in Table 4.1, we estimate that the intervention averted an estimated 208 DALYs 
by averting 6 HIV infections, 19 HSV-2 infections, 10 teen pregnancies and 46 depression 
cases. In terms of education objectives, the intervention led to 193 baseline drop-outs re-
enrolling in school, 77 additional years of school attendance and 24 drop-outs averted. 
Educational attainment was also improved among baseline school girls (conditional arm).    
The 18-month intervention targeting 1,225 beneficiaries cost an estimated USD 110,250 (see 
Table 4.2). Discounted treatment costs saved from the prevented HIV infections are about USD 
35,966. We estimate a benefit-cost ratio of 6.4. In the cross-sectoral CBA approach, this 
intervention would therefore be financed, generating a long-term net benefit of USD 404,088. 
In all the sensitivity analyses, the intervention would be funded. 
Table 4.3 presents the WTP estimates from converting the short-term trial outcomes into total 
WTP per sub-sector. We find that the HIV sector would be willing to pay USD 31,732 for this 
intervention, while the other health sub-sectors would contribute USD 66,621 and the education 
sector USD 62,393. 
With the silo approach, where sectors budget in isolation without considering other sectors’ 
benefits, none of the (sub-)sectors would be willing to fund the intervention. The welfare loss 
(or discounted net benefit forgone) is USD 404,088. However, with the co-financing approach, 
the sum of each sub-sector’s maximum contributions would be greater than the full 
implementation cost. The intervention would therefore be funded, generating the long-term net 
benefit and no welfare loss.  
The sensitivity analyses in Table 4.3 clearly show that financing outcomes for the silo and co-
financing approaches are very sensitive to the total intervention cost and the WTP thresholds 
per sector. In the higher cost scenario, the intervention would no longer be attractive, even with 
co-financing. If the health threshold was increased to WHO’s upper bound (three times 
GDP/capita), the non-HIV health sector would fund the intervention. The likelihood that the 
intervention would be financed will also be greatly influenced by the education sector’s WTP. 
By assuming the lowest ICER in the education literature as the opportunity cost of the 
investment, such a scheme would not be considered, even with co-financing. Using the 
weighted intervention effect, the HIV budget holder would be willing to cover up to 68% of the 
costs. 
From an HIV perspective, we find that the HIV sector’s share would be at most 29% in the co-
financing scenario (range: 12%-86%). However, given the other sectors’ contributions, the HIV 
budget may not need to be tapped at all, as there would be no financing gap left by other 
sectors.  
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With the ‘fair share’ approach (Table 4.2), we estimated total long-term benefits and cost 
savings of USD 514,338, of which 25% were HIV-related (range: 4%-57%). By apportioning 
intervention costs using this figure, we find that the HIV share would be about USD 27,773. 
This represents a cost per HIV DALY averted of USD 297 - just below WHO’s threshold. 
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Table 4.1 Short-term outcomes of the Zomba cash transfer trial 
(Sub-) Sector  Outcome  Impacted group (n) 
Post-trial difference  
intervention / control 
group 
Source 
Total 
impact  
Total 
DALYs 
averted 
HIV  HIV infections averted  Baseline schoolgirls (789) -0.70% (7) 6 94 
Education Drop-outs re-enrolled Baseline drop-outs (436) 44.3% (7) 193 
n.a. 
Drop-outs averted  Baseline schoolgirls (789) -3.1% (39) 24 
School attendance 
(additional years)  Baseline schoolgirls conditional 
arm (506) 
10.1% change in full 
attendance (1.5 yrs) 
(41) 77* 
English test scores 
(0.1 SD gains)  
0.14 above mean 
(regression coefficient) 
(41) 708 
Sexual & 
Reproductive 
Health  
HSV-2 infections 
averted  
Baseline schoolgirls (789) -2.37% (7) 19 1.1 
Teen pregnancies 
averted  
Baseline schoolgirls 
unconditional arm (283) 
-3.48% (7) 10 39 
Mental Health Cases of depression 
averted  
Baseline school girls (789) -5.80% (40) 46 157 
 
* 51 additional full years of schooling in conditional arm (506*0.902-506*0.801) over 18 months of implementation (1.5 years) = 77 additional years of schooling 
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Table 4.2 Long-term Cross-sectoral Cost-Benefit Analysis approach 
 
Base case 
scenario 
Sensitivity analyses 
Higher  
intervention 
costs 
($275,625) 
GDP/capita 
valuation of HIV 
DALY 
Higher valuation 
of HIV DALY 
Higher BCR non-
HIV 
Net intervention costs 74,284 239,659 74,284 74,284 74,284 
 Implementation costs 110,250     275,625  110,250          110,250        110,250  
  HIV treatment savings^ 35,966 35,966 35,966 35,966 35,966 
Net intervention benefits 478,373 
1,055,531 416,503 852,773 2,973,330 
 HIV infections and DALYs averted 93,600   93,600 31,730 468,000         93,600  
  
Long-term benefits to education and 
health (excl. HIV)* 
384,773  961,931  384,773         384,773      2,879,730  
Benefit-cost ratio (overall) 6.4        4.4  5.6               11.5           40.0  
 HIV only 1.3     0.4  0.4               6.3             1.3  
 Health and education only* 3.5          3.5  3.5               3.5            26.1  
Net Benefit 404,088 815,872 342,218 778,488 2,899,046 
HIV benefits and cost savings in total 
benefits (%) 
25% 12% 15% 57% 4% 
HIV sector's 'fair share' (USD) 27,773       32,718  16,495    62,518           4,747  
  Cost per HIV DALY equivalent (USD) 297 350 176 668 51 
* Based on benefit-cost ratio estimated by King et al (2007) for a conditional cash transfer scheme to keep girls in school. i.e. 3.5 – 26 (see Appendix 1 for more 
detail). 
^ Discounted lifetime ART costs per person have been estimated at 2002 USD 9,435 (Cleary et al., 2006) or 2009 USD 11,303: 50% of these costs were 
considered drug-related and therefore internationally comparable (not adjusted) and the other 50% were adjusted from the ratio of Malawi's GDP/capita to 
South Africa's GDP/capita. 
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Table 4.3 Willingness to pay for the Zomba cash transfer intervention per (sub-) sector with the Silo approach and the Co-financing approach 
    % of total programme costs 
(Sub-) 
Sector 
Outcome metric 
WTP 
per unit 
(USD) 
Total 
WTP 
(USD) 
Base case 
Higher  
intervention 
costs (USD 
275,625) 
3xGDP/ cap 
health 
threshold 
Lowest CER  
for education 
threshold 
Weighted HIV 
and SRH 
effects* 
HIV 
DALYs from HIV 
infections averted 
339† 31,732 29% 12% 86% 29% 68% 
Education Drop-outs re-enrolled 220†† 42,620 39% 15% 39% 3% 39% 
 Drop-outs averted 204
†† 4,920 4% 2% 4% 4% 4% 
 School attendance 163
†† 12,521 11% 5% 11% 0.3% 11% 
 Test scores 3.30
†† 2,333 2% 1% 2% 1% 2% 
Education sub-total  62,393 57% 23% 57% 8% 57% 
Sexual & 
reproductive 
health 
DALYs from HSV-2 
infections averted 
339† 380 0.3% 0.1% 1% 0.3% 0.3% 
DALYs from teen 
pregnancies averted 
339† 13,062 12% 5% 36% 12% 10% 
Mental health 
DALYs from cases of 
depression averted 
339† 53,179 48% 19% 145% 48% 48% 
Other health sub-total 
 66,621 60% 24% 181% 60% 58% 
Total potential contributions 160,747 146% 41% 324% 97% 183% 
Funding 
outcome 
Silo approach 66,621 Not funded Not funded Funded Not funded Not funded 
Co-financing approach 160,747 Funded Not funded Funded Not funded Funded 
† Malawi’s GDP per capita for 2009. Source: World Development Indicators. 
††See Appendix 1. 
*Weighted percentages estimated by Baird et al (2012) for HIV prevalence, HSV-2 prevalence and pregnancies, to account for variation in the probability of 
inclusion in the study according to age and stratum. 
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4.4 Discussion 
This study explored financing outcomes for a structural HIV intervention, based on different 
decision approaches. We find that allocatively efficient structural interventions may be less 
likely to be prioritised, financed and taken to scale where sectors evaluate their options in 
isolation. Existing approaches for assessing the value for money of interventions with multiple 
outcomes seek to internalise the external benefits, thereby broadening to a societal perspective 
(35, 36, 60), but are not at present extensively used in resource allocation by HIV decision-
makers. A co-financing approach, on the other hand, also minimises welfare loss and could 
potentially be incorporated in a sector budgeting perspective. Decision rules based on cost-
effectiveness thresholds could still support this approach as a potential method to explore the 
range of contributions from different sector budgets.     
Our findings suggest that co-financing would be worth considering for programmes that are 
relatively low-cost, but for which no sector is willing or able to finance the full costs. It may also 
only work if WTP thresholds from each sector’s perspective are clearly defined and are solely 
based on their own objectives. For example, if measures of HIV outcomes are used that include 
wider social benefits (not just welfare gains from disability) there may be the risk of double-
counting benefits. Whilst WTP for DALYs is relatively well-defined, we were not able to identify 
similar international WTP thresholds for the education sector – and thus may overestimate the 
education sector’s WTP. That being said, several potential poverty reduction and gender equity 
benefits from such an intervention were not measured by the trial and could have offset this 
effect.    
It should also be noted that the use of normative cost-effectiveness thresholds as decision rules 
in health has been questioned (29, 46) and even WHO’s lower threshold is perceived as being 
too high to serve as a useful decision rule in many low and middle-income settings. Nationally-
determined thresholds could overcome this.  
Another concern is that these thresholds may not reflect sectors’ budget constraints. However, 
in this case, affordability may not be a major issue. Based on a previous analysis, the annual 
cost of this cash transfer scheme targeting all poor girls in Malawi currently in secondary school 
(44) would be about USD 3.2 million. The education sector’s maximum share of  57% or USD 
1.8 million, would represent 0.8% of the national education budget in 2011/12, while the health 
sector’s share (USD 1.9 million) would be 0.9% of the health budget (61). Although not 
necessarily required, the HIV sector’s maximum share of 29% or USD 928,000 would claim 
1.2% of the national HIV budget (61). Clearly, what is important is the relative effectiveness of 
investing these amounts in the next best HIV, health or education programme, but the 
investment as such does not appear unsustainable.   
Using a co-financing approach has implications for the design of HIV interventions, because 
certain elements could be particularly critical to specific sector objectives and thus important 
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for the financial viability of the intervention – even when not directly beneficial for HIV itself. For 
example, removing the conditionality of the cash transfer may reduce the cost of the 
intervention (62), without impacting HIV outcomes, but may affect educational outcomes, 
making it less attractive for the education sector and therefore less likely to be co-financed.  
Co-financing may provide an opportunity to realise development synergies, but it will require 
effective cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms for planning, implementation and financing. 
These may entail transaction costs that could influence the cost-benefit equation. There are 
several possible ways to achieve this. The first-best (and more efficient) approach would be for 
budget allocations to structural interventions to be incorporated at a centralised Ministry of 
Finance/Treasury level, before budgets are allocated to sectors. This may be possible as part 
of joint public expenditure planning processes (e.g. Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks), 
but in practice may fall through the gaps given their complexity. A second-best scenario could 
involve setting up a basket funding mechanism, whereby other sectors become donors of a 
programme that would be implemented by a single line ministry. Some examples of such joint 
budgeting initiatives for health and social care can be found in high-income countries (63-65), 
generally targeting specific patient groups or broader health promotion efforts. In countries 
where donor funds are important, this could also be a mechanism by which multilateral or 
bilateral aid earmarked for HIV is channelled towards structural approaches. National AIDS 
Coordinating Authorities operating as supra-ministerial and cross-sectoral coordination bodies 
in several countries, could play a key role in facilitating such processes and serving as an 
example for other cross-sectoral issues (66).  
In our analysis, we modelled the share from the HIV budget, assuming that different sectors 
adopt a co-operative stance. If sectors are more combative, negotiation could lead to them 
understating their WTP to let others cover the costs, leading to unfunded or underfunded 
interventions – akin to a coordination game like “chicken” in game theory. This may be 
exacerbated where other sectors consider that the HIV response has received a 
disproportionate amount of external financing (23). Other governance challenges are to be 
expected related to the feasibility of sector line ministries and sector-orientated donors agreeing 
to pool budgets, since this would imply a loss of control for some. 
Whichever institutional approach is adopted, the co-financing approach is likely to be data-
hungry, since evidence of impact across sectors is required. Findings will also depend on which 
benefits are evaluated and modelled, as the fewer benefits considered, the higher the HIV 
share. As a starting point, interdisciplinary evaluation approaches, building on an evidence-
based theory of change could be a way to ensure that the most plausible benefits are captured. 
Another concern is that ICERs fail to capture disparities in health gains between different 
groups and using them as decision rules therefore excludes equity objectives from the equation. 
This could potentially be mitigated by considering extended ICERs (67). 
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Finally, it should be noted that economic evaluation is only one input (at best) in the inherently 
political process of priority-setting. Several other factors influence financing decisions, such as 
affordability, historical budgets, equity, etc (23). These may be increased when decision-
making covers multiple sectors. Although efforts have been made to improve decision 
modelling to factor in a wider range of criteria (68-70), to date, the process by which value for 
money data and other factors are translated into resource allocation remains a black box. In a 
recent prioritisation exercise based on CBA studies of 17 HIV interventions in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the same cash transfer intervention was ranked third by African Civil Society, fifth by 
American students and tenth by a panel of economic Nobel laureates (71). This illustrates how 
the same economic data can lead to quite heterogeneous financing decisions, underlining the 
need for a transparent deliberative process, whereby value judgements are made explicit and 
resource allocation is a weighted reflection of societal preferences (72).    
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In the new constrained economic climate, sustainable financing for HIV responses is urgently 
needed. Alongside the conventional sources of public financing(73), co-financing of structural 
interventions could potentially be an additional avenue that has not been sufficiently explored. 
Otherwise, structural interventions may be under-funded and their cross-sectoral benefits 
foregone. Co-financing provides an opportunity to avoid the current zero-sum nature of silo 
approaches to budgeting, whereby HIV’s gain is another sector’s loss. Instead, some structural 
approaches have the potential to result in a ‘win-win’ situation in which multiple HIV, health and 
development objectives are achieved simultaneously. Embedding HIV responses into broader 
national priorities would further encourage domestic ownership and sustainability. 
Therefore, we suggest that HIV programmes actively seek opportunities to co-finance 
development efforts that have been shown to produce direct HIV benefits, with the magnitude 
of the benefits informing the resources invested. This would help realise the promise of 
development synergies, accelerate progress across the Millennium Development Goals and 
shape new models of governance and financing in the post-2015 era. 
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CHAPTER 5 Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds in Global Health: 
Taking a Multi-sectoral Perspective 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Health policymakers across the globe are facing difficult financing decisions having to balance 
a large unmet and rising demand for health services, costly new drugs and technologies, 
ambitious international guidelines; and severely constrained health budgets (1). To aid these 
decisions, a threshold is sometimes used to determine which interventions are cost-effective 
and should therefore be included in a prioritised package of health interventions (2). For over a 
decade, the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health and the World Health Organisation’s 
suggested threshold of one to three times a country’s GDP per capita per disability-adjusted 
life year (DALY) averted was accepted without much debate, or theoretical basis (3, 4). 
However, there is now a general consensus that these thresholds may not reflect the real 
opportunity costs of investing in an intervention and that their application may cost lives (5-8).  
There have been recent efforts to provide clarification on what the threshold should represent, 
rooted in different economic traditions (6, 9, 10). In a welfarist framework that accepts that the 
individual knows what is best and where aggregate individual utility is the maximand of public 
policy, a threshold could be derived from the marginal utility gained from the consumption of 
goods or services that produce health (7, 11). This demand-side concept may be utilised, 
alongside other criteria, to set the ‘health’ budget, in relation to other uses of public resources. 
Decisions of how to then spend a constrained health budget can be better guided by an extra-
welfarist framework, in which ‘health’ in itself is intrinsically valued and health maximisation is 
the decision maker’s objective (12, 13). The decision rule to allocate resources to a specific 
intervention is then based on a supply-side threshold that reflects the marginal productivity of 
the health system (9, 14, 15).  
This conventional approach that underpins many health economic evaluations often focuses 
on a single sectoral payer that seeks to maximise health, typically through interventions 
delivered by the health care system. This approach risks missing two critical issues: firstly, 
multiple ‘sectors’ contribute to the production of health, and secondly, some of the goods and 
services produced by the ‘health sector’ – or the health care system, have multiple benefits 
besides health (16, 17). There is a solid and growing body of evidence on the social 
determinants of health, which include poverty, education, gender inequity, housing and 
transport, among many others (18-21). In fact, some argue that population health is largely or 
even primarily impacted by interventions in other sectors with other payers, who are arguably 
not aiming to maximise health (22, 23). In the new global development agenda, these structural 
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determinants have come to the forefront, with 17 sustainable development goals that explicitly 
seek to tackle socio-economic inequalities and environmental factors hampering human 
development (24, 25). Global health programmes will increasingly have to compete for 
resources with these upstream non-health programmes, but could also stand to greatly benefit 
from their spill over health outcomes. Similarly, public health interventions targeting populations 
or communities, rather than individuals, typically have wide-ranging cross-sectoral impacts and 
cost implications. The spill over benefits of these interventions have gained prominence and 
helped to make the case for greater investments (17, 26, 27).  
There are currently a number of ways to deal with the economic evaluation of interventions with 
multi-sectoral outcomes (17, 28-30). The first is the adoption of a welfarist cost-benefit 
approach that monetises outcomes. Analysts grappling with this in the fields of social care and 
environmental economics are leaning towards this option (29, 31). Yet the contentious step of 
attaching a monetary value to life, health and other social outcomes is part of what led to the 
development of and health decision-makers’ preference for an extra-welfarist framework (14). 
Within the extra-welfarist evaluation perspective, two approaches exist that allow those in the 
health sector to incorporate non-health consequences in their decision space. Most commonly, 
costs are weighed against (a) composite outcome measures that incorporate broader 
capabilities; or (b) multiple consecutive outcome measures, with cost-consequence 
approaches (28, 32).  
Several current guidance documents also stipulate a variation of the latter approach, whereby 
the non-health costs and effects of interventions are to be reported and disaggregated by sector 
of the economy or payer – including the Gates Reference Case for economic evaluation in 
global health, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence’s (NICE) guidance for local 
government decisions in England and Wales, and the second US panel’s recommendations on 
cost-effectiveness analysis in health and medicine (33-36). The latter has even recommended 
the standard reporting of two reference cases for every economic evaluation: one from a health 
care sector perspective and one from a broader societal perspective, with the use of an impact 
inventory to comprehensively report consequences beyond the formal health care sector (36). 
Following the same logic, evaluations of non-health interventions should similarly consider non-
negligible health consequences. However, even with impact inventories for interventions across 
sectors, current guidance remains silent on how a health payer should value consequences 
outside the sector, in order to decide on the most judicious allocation of its resources. 
Although the second US panel “recommends that analysts should attempt to quantify and value 
non-health consequences”, it also acknowledges that “there are no widely agreed upon 
methods” for this and it remains unclear how to apply an ‘opportunity cost’ based threshold to 
non-health impacts in order to support investment decisions (36). In the UK, NICE guidance 
further points out the lack of a standard method to apportion costs when more than one 
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government department or local government is involved in delivering an intervention or is 
reaping its benefits (34, 37).  
In this paper, we examine how efficient current cost-effectiveness thresholds are in dealing with 
interventions with multi-sectoral outcomes, implemented within and outside the health sector, 
and how this could be improved. We propose an approach that retains the extra-welfarist 
perspective (that may also apply to payers in other social sectors) and the principle of 
opportunity cost to maximise each sector’s objectives, recognising that each sector has its own 
budget constraint and real opportunity cost. We start by illustrating how the current thresholds 
could result in health losses, before proposing a potentially more optimal second best approach. 
We then discuss some of the associated measurement and application challenges, and 
highlight areas for future research.   
 
5.2 Approaches to resource allocation: What are the consequences of a 
unisectoral approach?  
Culyer (2015) has recently proposed a bookshelf metaphor to resource allocation in health, 
whereby each book represents a health care intervention (see Figure 5.1) (38). The height of 
the book indicates its effectiveness in terms of health benefit, and its thickness captures its total 
cost. These books can be ranked in order of their height, from left to right, and included in a 
national health care package up to the point where the health budget is exhausted – similarly 
to the league table approach (3, 5). The last intervention to be included therefore represents a 
threshold, th, of health productivity per unit of expenditure, or the inverse of the common cost-
effectiveness ratio. It is the least productive intervention provided and any intervention that 
would be considered to be added to the package, would have to be at least as productive in 
order to avoid a loss of population health. The threshold is a direct function of the productivity 
of health interventions and the size of the health budget.  
If such a unisectoral approach is to achieve health maximisation, one must make a number of 
assumptions, including: (i) that the health budget reflects the allocation of public resources to 
health care rather than to ‘health’; (ii) that the cost of any health-producing intervention under 
consideration is fully borne by the health budget; and (iii) that the merit of any intervention is 
solely determined by its impact on population health. However, a health-producing intervention 
delivered outside the health sector (or a public health intervention) is likely to have other non-
health benefits, and thus other payers that are willing to allocate part of their budgets to it. We 
suggest and illustrate how, in such cases, these underlying assumptions may result in health 
losses. From here on, we refer to ‘non-health interventions’, as interventions with non-health 
primary objectives and spill over health outcomes; while ‘public health interventions’ will have 
public health as a primary objective and spill over non-health outcomes.        
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Figure 5.1 The bookshelf of health care resource allocation 
 
Source: Adapted from Culyer (2015) 
First, we examine what the ‘bookshelf’ would look like if the ‘health’ budget is provided to a 
payer maximising health, but that can only fund health care services to do so. We consider a 
stylised case where the exogenous government budget is split between two sectors or payers: 
a health payer and an education payer. We also assume that the education payer does not 
have health maximisation as an objective, and would need to fully fund any intervention if it 
were interested in its education benefits. It would follow a similar prioritisation approach as the 
health payer, with its own books ranked on a bookshelf according to education productivity. In 
this case, any intervention that improved health but was not provided within the health care 
system, even if more efficient, would not be prioritised, unless its education benefits were 
sufficient to justify the education payer fully funding it (for example the blue bar in Figure 5.2). 
If not, this would be at the cost of lives and/or quality of life – as represented by the black area 
in Figure 5.2. In reality, there may be specific activities or tweaks of interventions in other 
sectors that would optimise their positive health externalities, or mitigate their negative health 
externalities, that would be better value for money than certain existing health care interventions 
(16). For example, adding health modules in schools’ life skills curricula, or providing 
micronutrient supplementation in schools could be relatively low-cost interventions with 
significant education, health and economic benefits, but they have not always been embraced 
by the health sector (39).   
Second, we examine a situation where the ‘health’ budget is provided to a payer maximising 
health, who can fund any health or education intervention to do so. We assume that the 
education payer still does not have a health objective, interventions are indivisible (40), and 
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one payer must bear the full cost of an intervention. In this case, some interventions may not 
be funded, because they do not generate sufficient return in either sector, such as book 6 in 
Figure 5.3 a/b.  
Figure 5.2 Health loss from exclusion of non-health care interventions 
 
Note: Pink books are health care interventions, while blue books are non-health care interventions. The 
black area represents the health loss from the exclusion of the latter in the prioritisation process.   
Take the example of an education reform in Botswana. In 1996, the government reformed the 
grade structure of secondary schooling, effectively extending it by a year. Through a natural 
experiment, De Neve and colleagues found that this led to 0.79 additional years of secondary 
schooling among the affected cohorts, with each added year reducing HIV risk remarkably by 
8 percentage points (41). From the health payer’s perspective, at a cost per HIV infection 
averted of USD 27,753, this would have been a less good investment than other HIV 
interventions, like male circumcision or treatment as prevention (ranging from USD 550 to USD 
8,375) (41), and it would not have been prioritised. Although in this case it was actually 
implemented by the education sector, one could imagine a scenario where there could have 
been more efficient education policy options to achieve the same educational impact, and even 
the education payer may have chosen an alternative investment without health spill overs.  
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Figure 5.3 Potential undervaluation of interventions with multi-sectoral benefits  
a) Health payer perspective 
 
b) Education payer perspective 
 
Note: The books numbered 1 to 5 are health care interventions, while the books numbered 6 to 10 are 
education interventions. The horizontal axis in figure a) should be read from left to right, while the 
horizontal axis in figure b) should be read from right to left. 
 
However, if we drop the assumption of indivisible costs and allow multiple payers for one 
intervention, then the health care cost (or contribution) could be lower than the total intervention 
cost. The health productivity of an education intervention per health dollar spent would therefore 
increase, as would its education productivity. For example, if the cost of intervention 6 would 
be shared equally, then its health and education productivity (per unit of expenditure) would 
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double, making it better value for money than health intervention 5 in Figure 5.4a, and education 
intervention 7 in Figure 5.4b. This would allow both payers to prevent losses of health and 
education outcomes – depicted by the black areas in both figures. As a consequence, both 
sectors’ thresholds would shift up in terms of health/education gain per dollar spent, from th to 
th’ and from te to te’ (in Figures 5.4a/b) reflecting the previous inefficiencies in each sector. 
A real-life example of this is a USD 110,000 cash transfer intervention in Malawi targeting girls 
of school-going age to keep them in school, which was found to have a range of health, 
education and gender outcomes (including averting 94 HIV DALYs) (42). However, the initial 
analysis that only took the perspective of HIV impact, indicated that it would not have been 
cost-effective and the HIV budget holder would not have paid the full cost. However, after 
incorporating the other outcomes and payers’ cost-effectiveness thresholds, the HIV sector was 
found to only need to allocate up to USD 29,000 to the intervention, bringing its HIV productivity 
up from about USD 1,170 per HIV DALY averted to USD 339 (43). Such a ‘book’ would become 
taller in this scenario and excluding it from the health budget could result in a loss of health (as 
represented by the black area in Figure 5.4a).  
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Figure 5.4  Health and education losses from measuring productivity as a function of total 
costs instead of health or education costs 
a) Health payer perspective 
 
b) Education payer perspective 
 
Note: Pink books are interventions with single sector benefits, while the blue book is an intervention with 
multi-sectoral benefits. The area in black represents the health/education losses of not allowing for cost-
sharing. The horizontal axis in figure a) should be read from left to right, while the horizontal axis in figure 
b) should be read from right to left.     
 
5.3 Potential Solutions to enabling multi-sectoral synergies 
In a ‘first best’ situation, we would imagine a central purchaser of social welfare (including health 
and education gains) with perfect information. This payer could choose all the most efficient 
interventions to maximise social welfare, regardless of which sector they were implemented in. 
the efficiency gains illustrated in Figure 5.4a and 5.4b above would be realised by allocating 
‘health resources’ across sectoral budget holders (ministries) bearing their interventions’ spill 
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over benefits and costs into account. This would result in the budgets allocated to each sector 
shifting accordingly: the health sector budget would shrink (pushing out intervention 5 in Figure 
5.3a), and the education budget would grow to include intervention 6 (after excluding 
intervention 7 in Figure 5.3b). 
However, in reality, there is often no perfectly coordinated and informed central decision-maker. 
Overall sectoral budgets are set, and then public investments in one sector tend to be evaluated 
independently from investments in other sectors, which are taken as ‘given’. This is known as 
the ‘second-best’ constraint of real world public sector decision-making (44, 45). In practice, 
governments are therefore more likely to allocate their health outcome-earmarked budget in full 
to the Ministry of Health (MoH) with the mandate to maximise population health. Institutional 
mandates and policies thereafter tend to constrain ministries of health to allocations to health 
care alone (13, 44, 46).   
Accepting the ‘second best’ scenario, a pragmatic option to achieve a more optimal allocation 
is that the health payer (MoH) could redistribute part of its budget to other sectors, where 
specific non-health interventions achieved a health gain more efficiently than the health sector’s 
marginal productivity (opportunity cost) – hereafter referred to as a ‘co-financing’ approach. 
Likewise, non-health sectors could transfer part of their budgets into a ‘co-financing’ mechanism 
where public health programmes generate benefits that they are also interested in. This ‘co-
financing’ approach recognises the opportunity costs of different payers, but at the same time 
enables additional improvements in both health and other sectors, and a means to finance often 
highly efficient upstream non-health or public health interventions (43).  
Although we focus on benefits here, a similar approach could be taken for interventions that 
impose costs on other sectors or reduce their benefits through negative externalities. For 
example, if a specific health intervention led to an increase in the costs of an education 
intervention, the education sector could end up foregoing education benefits from having to 
keep a now ‘thicker’ book on its shelf, and drop a more productive one. We could think of the 
inclusion of a health education subject in the curriculum, whereby schools may hypothetically 
have to divert teachers and available school hours away from other important subjects, 
negatively affecting students’ learning in those areas. If these negative spill overs were taken 
into account, the education sector could potentially be compensated through a larger share of 
the budget, if the resulting health losses from a reduced budget were valued less than the 
education losses. 
While not widespread, in practice, this co-financing approach is not unheard of. In some high-
income countries, like the UK and Sweden, there have been initiatives to pool budgets between 
health and social care for the management of chronic health problems and disabilities in 
particular, in order to overcome narrow sectoral interests and achieve efficiency savings (26, 
47). In certain global health programmes, investment plans have been developed that include 
multiple sectors and health-producing interventions outside the health sector, as well as large 
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scale public health interventions with wide-ranging effects. For example, the global strategic 
investment framework for HIV identified structural interventions as integral components of 
effective responses, including community mobilisation, social protection and education 
programmes, alongside basic HIV programme activities like condom programming and 
antiretroviral therapy (48). Specifically, the South African HIV/Tuberculosis Investment case 
has included partial funding for child-focused cash transfers, and school feeding, among others, 
even though these would be implemented in other non-HIV sectors (49).  
 
5.4 Challenges and Areas for Future Research  
At its core, any ‘co-financing’ approach requires a clear identification of a range of intervention 
outcomes and the sectoral payers benefiting from the intervention. The second US panel’s 
recommendation of a multi-sectoral impact inventory can be highly useful in this respect. It 
would provide analysts from other sectors the required information to support decisions on what 
they may be willing to pay for ‘their’ share of benefits generated by a health intervention, and it 
would encourage those within the health sector to explore ‘co-financing’ arrangements to 
enable such transfers. The same would be true for non-health interventions. In low and middle-
income settings, where resources may not be sufficient to cover large-scale social programmes 
like universal primary education, for example, analytical and institutional approaches that do 
not highlight and value multiple benefits, may have particularly high opportunity costs. 
Co-financing also require changes in public finance mechanisms to ensure that interventions 
can be funded from different sectors. While Claxton and colleagues demonstrated that public 
health interventions with multi-sectoral costs and benefits should be funded if other sectors 
could compensate the implementing sector in principle (13), in practice this compensation 
would need to be real and a mechanism would need to be in place to allow for it. Moreover, it 
is worth noting that while we simplified each sector to a single payer, there are likely to be more 
payers with similar objectives, but separate budget constraints. In low and middle-income 
countries, for example, where there is significant external development assistance for health, 
there would be separate health payers, namely a national public payer and donors, each with 
their own thresholds. Even within government, it may be relevant to consider the various levels 
of resource allocation, especially where local governments are increasingly managing 
decentralised and often unearmarked budgets (34, 50).      
Capturing and measuring multiple programme outcomes is a significant challenge given data 
scarcity, with many evaluations of global health interventions focusing on within sector primary 
outcomes, rather than exploring a range of sectoral outcomes. It would also come at a cost, 
and would only be warranted in as far as the additional non-health consequences are significant 
enough to effect the results of the analysis, as has been recommended in the second US panel 
(36). In addition, the ‘co-financing’ approach requires the determination of thresholds for 
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different sectors in order to estimate each payer’s potential contribution (43). The application of 
thresholds varies by sector, with some having cost-effectiveness thresholds and other sectors 
adopting cost-benefit approaches (29). Two empirical approaches are currently being explored 
in health and could be applied to other sectors. The first searches for this threshold through 
econometric analyses of health care expenditures and health outcomes to estimate marginal 
productivity (9). Another approach is to search for the threshold by identifying the least cost-
effective intervention included in the package and the most cost-effective intervention excluded, 
based on published literature (38). While both approaches are promising, they require 
substantial data, and may be difficult to apply in some sectors with less developed economic 
evaluation frameworks, and where a critical mass of economic evaluations is not available (29, 
51, 52). 
Given the importance of financing multi-sectoral interventions, analysts may also consider 
using more pragmatic approaches to estimate these thresholds, possibly exploring willingness-
to-pay elicitation from decision-makers, and expert-informed threshold searching. Eliciting 
decision-makers’ WTP for a gain in a unit of outcome from the production of a service, requires 
the assumption that this is their best estimate of the opportunity cost. However, such a measure 
is likely to incorporate more than the criterion of efficiency, and may be higher than the marginal 
productivity of the existing service package, as decision-makers will have imperfect information, 
and would rightly have other criteria that determine their willingness-to-pay in practice, such as 
equity (53, 54). Their estimate of willingness-to-pay is at best likely to conflate these aims, and 
thus overestimate the threshold, or be more aspirational (7). Another potentially more promising 
approach would be to use decision-makers as experts to identify the perceived least efficient 
intervention they are currently implementing, and the most efficient they are not implementing, 
as a starting point, and then review evidence on their cost-effectiveness. However, both of 
these methods need further exploration and validation against the range of empirical 
approaches currently being developed. 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
Good health is a function of a range of biological, environmental, behavioural and social factors. 
The consumption of quality health care services is only part of how good health is produced. 
Although few would argue with this, the economic framework used to allocate resources to 
optimise population health is applied in a way that constrains the analyst and the decision-
maker to health care services. As a result, lives and quality of life may be lost. We propose a 
second best approach to decision rules for health-producing interventions in non-health 
sectors, and public health interventions with multi-sectoral effects, that could bring a health 
decision-maker closer to maximising population health in general, rather than through health 
care alone. This would require the health payer to co-finance such interventions with other 
sectors, based on its cost-effectiveness threshold. Likewise, other sectors would determine 
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how much to contribute towards such an intervention, given the current marginal productivity of 
their budgets.  
The co-financing approach is embedded in the prevailing extra-welfarist framework of health 
economic evaluation. It does not fundamentally question the framework, but provides a 
theoretically consistent mechanism to bridge the health evaluative space with other evaluative 
spaces, thereby going beyond a single health outcome to bring allocations closer to the general 
equilibrium that is sought in a welfarist framework. It fully aligns with the decision-maker’s 
perspective, whereby the focus is on societal objectives (such as population health), rather than 
aggregate individual utility (12, 14, 15, 53).  
However, the data and analytical demands of estimating cost-effectiveness thresholds across 
multiple payers may hamper the realisation of such an efficiency-enhancing co-financing 
mechanism. Further research is called for to test and validate various measurement 
approaches, in order to support the optimal allocation of resources to global multi-sectoral and 
public health interventions going forward.  
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CHAPTER 6 Financing the HIV Response in Sub-Saharan 
Africa from Domestic Sources: Moving Beyond a 
Normative Approach 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite optimism about the end of AIDS, and remarkable progress towards this ambition, a 
sustained HIV response will be required for years to come. HIV remains the fifth global cause 
of morbidity and mortality, and ranks second in sub-Saharan Africa (1). Unprecedented 
resources have been mobilised in response to the epidemic, reaching USD 19.1 billion in 2013 
in low and middle-income countries. Yet, this still falls short of UNAIDS’ previous resource 
needs estimates of USD 22-24 billion by 2015 and its USD 36 billion estimate for 2020 in the 
ambitious ‘fast-track’ scenario that would seek to reduce the number of new infections and 
AIDS-related deaths by 90% by 2030 (2).  
With the success of antiretroviral therapy (ART), HIV infection is no longer a death sentence, 
and national governments face the challenge of how to sustain their growing obligations and 
duty to maintain people on life-long treatment (3), alongside laudable commitments to continue 
scaling up treatment access for all those who are HIV-infected (2), and the need to continue 
investing in HIV prevention to reduce the rate of new infections. This challenge is substantial. 
A recent paper estimates the fiscal consequences of this moral duty to treat (4). The figures 
are stark. In a scenario where 81% of people living with HIV with CD4 counts below 350 mm3 
are on ART, the fiscal obligations of treatment alone until 2050 have been conservatively 
estimated at 21% of current Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for South Africa, and 80% of 
current GDP for Malawi, among others (4). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) sets the 
‘sound’ threshold for the debt burden of countries at 40% of GDP, and therefore this hidden 
HIV-obligation is potentially of real economic concern for both governments and donors. Some 
now argue that HIV is a fiscal as well as a public health crisis, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa 
(4, 5).  
To date, much of the HIV response across the region has depended on international financing: 
only 10% to 22% of HIV expenditures in 2013 were financed from domestic sources in low-
income and lower-middle-income countries respectively (2). However, with the flat-lining of 
external HIV funding commitments, optimistic economic growth forecasts and the prospects of 
increased revenues from natural resources (5), several global and regional declarations have 
called for African governments to fund more of their own responses (6-8). This, it is argued, 
would allow donors to refocus their resources on countries that most need external support (7). 
In addition, there is a growing promotion of ‘innovative financing’ mechanisms – such as 
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earmarked taxes or diaspora bonds (9, 10) – to create new sources of HIV financing. A 
withdrawal or re-allocation of donor financing, without a compensating domestic financing 
response, may  affect the continuity of care for those on treatment, and/or have high opportunity 
costs by removing financing from other critical areas of domestic spending both within or 
beyond the health sector. Paradoxically, some of these other areas of spending may also be 
fundamental to the effectiveness of the HIV response, such as education or the strengthening 
of health systems (11, 12). It is therefore important to understand the factors that influence 
countries’ potential ability to sustainably fund their national HIV response, without negatively 
impacting on spending in other critical areas or undermining macroeconomic conditions.  
Previous investigations into the amount of domestic financing available for the HIV response 
have not been comprehensive or formally adjusted for past patterns of financing. These 
analyses may have been overly simplistic; providing a partial understanding of the overall 
potential financing available. Some have analysed the determinants of domestic financing for 
HIV or the potential of specific financing sources (6, 7, 9, 13-16). However, none of these 
studies considered options under all of the potential sources for generating new resources 
(revenue mobilisation); sharing existing resources differently (reallocation); and spending 
existing resources better (efficiency gains). Previous analyses have only considered spending 
for services within the health or HIV boundaries, and do not consider how spending in other 
sectors that also influence health or HIV may contribute to effective financing of the HIV 
response. Finally, most estimates of domestic financing for HIV to date have used normative 
targets in areas such as allocations to the health sector and general revenue generation 
capacity, assuming that these norms can be reached (7), although there is one previous study  
that examines whether countries can achieve levels of spending observed among their peers 
(6), but does not examine whether these levels are optimal.  
Focusing on the 14 most HIV-affected countries in SSA, this paper explores the potential to 
expand domestic financing for HIV from a comprehensive range of domestic sources, including 
general health and cross-sectoral financing streams. We examine the financing system as a 
whole, incorporating changes in efficiency of spending, as well as revenue-raising. We use two 
approaches: one focused on achieving a range of financing targets - our ‘normative’ approach; 
and the other that incorporates previous fiscal behaviours, to try to incorporate the ‘real world’ 
constraints on domestic financing. For the latter, we examine historical fiscal data to explore 
how much changes in key characteristics of domestic public finance (such as proportional 
spend on health care) have led to changes in HIV expenditure. In doing so, we aim to 
demonstrate a comprehensive empirical approach to estimating the available domestic 
financing for HIV, and provoke discussion on the appropriate policy response and allocation of 
international financing for the HIV response in the coming years.  
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6.2 Methods  
We applied the concept of ‘fiscal space’ to explore how much additional public financing could 
be made available for HIV in the next 5 years, in the 14 sub-Saharan African countries with the 
largest HIV epidemics and expected fiscal burdens (3, 17)– South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Botswana, 
Namibia and Swaziland. These include the 10 countries with the most people living with HIV 
(PLHIV) and all hyperendemic countries, with adult prevalence above 15%. Together they 
account for 85% of the disease burden in the region, in terms of number of PLHIV (17). Our 
analysis focused on the medium-term, i.e. the next 5 years, given the uncertainty around the 
macroeconomic and political context in the longer run, but we discuss the implications for 
addressing the substantial economic challenge of HIV financing in the coming decades.  
In public finance, ‘fiscal space’ is used to describe the budgetary space available to allocate 
public resources to a specific objective, without damaging other developmental or 
macroeconomic objectives (18, 19), including fiscal sustainability. The potential sources of 
fiscal space for HIV are similar to those for health services generally, but may vary across 
countries. Theoretically, domestic sources include: (1) conducive macroeconomic conditions 
through economic growth, (2) improved taxation/revenue generation, (3) borrowing, (4) 
reprioritisation (within the government or health budget), (5) sector-specific earmarked sources 
of revenue, and (6) efficiency gains (20-22). An additional external source is external grants.   
To explore which financing policy options have the most potential to create fiscal space for HIV 
– measured as increased public HIV spending – we followed two approaches. The first 
‘extended normative’ approach considers what countries could be spending, given their fiscal 
position, health system and epidemic context. We estimated how much fiscal space could be 
created for HIV in a specific country by reaching a normative target or benchmark, using a 
comprehensive set of fiscal space sources, and holding all other factors constant. For example, 
how much more could a country spend on HIV if the health share in government spending was 
increased to the so-called Abuja target of 15% that was agreed upon in 2001, and HIV spending 
increased proportionately? These estimates are likely to be optimistic and can be seen as 
representing an upper bound estimate of fiscal space.  
In the second approach, we seek to challenge these optimistic estimates to reflect some of the 
uncertainty around the impact of each fiscal policy change on the fiscal space for HIV, by 
incorporating empirical evidence on how the different fiscal levers were associated with public 
HIV expenditure in the past. This empirical approach aims to explore which financing options 
are most likely to translate into real increases in public HIV resources based on past 
behaviours. To do this, we developed econometric models to test to what extent variation in 
public HIV spending between countries may be explained by variation in the different fiscal 
levers. This second approach incorporates the possibility that changes in fiscal indicators may 
not always ‘trickle-down’ to changes in public HIV spending. For example, an increase in the 
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share of health in the national budget may result in a decrease in the relative share of HIV in 
the heath budget, if policy makers are satisfied with levels of HIV spending.  
Data sources 
We used publicly available data on the latest fiscal, macroeconomic, epidemiological, 
expenditure and health system data available between 2008 and 2012. A full description of all 
data sources is contained in Appendix 2. We analysed the fiscal space implications for the 14 
selected sub-Saharan African countries, but for the empirical approach, we used a cross-
sectional dataset of 92 countries. Table 6.1 presents its summary statistics. We did not impute 
missing values, potentially underestimating fiscal space in certain countries, when country-
specific data was not available. All monetary figures are expressed in 2014 USD.  
Table 6.1  Summary statistics of the variables in the regression analyses 
Variable n Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Public HIV Spending per PLHIV  (USD) 92 347 565 2 3,191 
GDP per capita (USD) 92 3,225 3,173 239 11,695 
Adult HIV prevalence (%) 92 3% 5% 0% 27% 
Control of corruption index* 92 4.36 0.51 3.54 5.94 
International HIV Spending per PLHIV (USD) 92 419 457 1 2,137 
Government revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 92 23% 9% 10% 57% 
Gross Government Debt (% of GDP) 87 41% 23% 9% 143% 
Government Health Expenditure (% of Government 
Expenditure) 
91 11% 5% 2% 28% 
Out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita (USD) 90 68 76 2 382 
Non-drug cost per person retained on antiretroviral 
treatment (USD) 
86 1,152 1,349 37 6,793 
Public HIV Spending (% of Government Health 
Expenditure) 
92 3% 8% 0% 69% 
 
* This Worldwide Governance Indicator is rescaled to range from 2.5 to 7.5.  
 
Extended Normative Approach 
Our extended normative analysis considered how much additional resources could be 
generated if countries were to meet targets or benchmarks anchored in either fiscal capacity, 
minimum standards or optimal targets. We drew on the framework of domestic fiscal space 
sources above. In addition to forecasted economic growth, government revenue generation, 
and the prioritisation benchmarks used in a recent study (7), we included borrowing and 
incorporated new norms for the earmarked revenue category and efficiency gains. We used 
norms set by global/regional agreements, governing bodies or institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Where these were not available, we developed norms 
based on optimal levels from other countries as described below. All financing sources and 
measures are summarised in Table 6.2.  
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Compared to previous normative analyses (7, 13, 14), we included three additional components 
of fiscal space. First, we attempted to quantify the potential fiscal space from health-earmarked 
revenue sources, using the example of social health insurance. To estimate how much fiscal 
space may be generated from such a scheme, we assumed current out-of-pocket expenditures 
in excess of the WHO acceptable level of 20% of total health expenditure spent in the private 
sector, could be converted into social health insurance premia that would flow to the 
government health budget and be used for strategic purchasing (23). We also examined the 
fiscal space generated by an increased excise tax on alcohol (beer specifically), whereby the 
net additional revenue from increasing the tax from its current level to the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union’s threshold of 50% (24) could be allocated to health, and 
proportionately to HIV.   
Second, we constructed a simple measure of technical efficiency using the ratio of non-drug 
expenditures per person retained on ART to GDP per capita, and identified the best performing 
country among the 14 countries per income category (low-income, lower-middle-income, 
upper-middle-income). We then estimated logarithmic functions for each income category 
based on these best performers and the finding from a cross-country empirical analysis of ART 
unit costs that found that a doubling in per-capita GDP was associated with a 22% increase in 
non-drug ART unit costs (25). These functions served as an efficiency frontier to estimate each 
country’s potential non-drug ART unit cost given its GDP per capita, and how much fiscal space 
would be generated if each country reached that benchmark in their HIV programme, thereby 
freeing up further resources to spend on HIV services. It is worth pointing out that we did not 
find an adequate cross-country measure of allocative efficiency between HIV programme 
areas, while this may be a key source of efficiency gains. 
Finally, while previous analyses have implicitly assumed that less prioritisation of the HIV 
programme would reduce fiscal space for HIV improvement (7, 13), we explored the potential 
HIV gains from reprioritisation towards investments in other areas of spending (either in health 
systems, or in other sectors) that have been shown to improve HIV outcomes. To illustrate this 
potential, we used an exploratory cross-sectional econometric model for Prevention of Mother-
to-Child HIV Transmission (PMTCT) screening (see Appendix 2 S12), which examines how 
much higher PMTCT screening coverage could be achieved if countries achieved the WHO 
minimum norm of having 2.3 health workers per 1000 population. We then estimated how much 
more a country would have had to spend in total on HIV to achieve that same increase. We 
applied that percentage increase to the public HIV spending figure, as a measure of potential 
savings to the HIV budget from investments by other health systems budgets. Put differently, 
by using the effects of human resource inputs and financial inputs on service coverage, we 
were able to calculate the monetary valuation of the effect of increasing the number of health 
workers to the norm, from the HIV budget holder’s perspective. To illustrate the same potential 
for interventions outside the health sector (11), we took the example of how a reduction in 
undernourishment to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target, could improve HIV 
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service coverage – again using PMTCT screening coverage – and therefore free up space in 
the HIV budget (26).  
Empirical Approach 
To examine how domestic HIV spending in low and middle-income countries was associated 
with movements in different fiscal levers in the past, we constructed separate econometric 
regression models for each fiscal space source used in the extended normative approach, 
except the non-HIV efficiency sources that were estimated for illustrative purposes from a 
separate model described in Appendix 2.  
Each of the regression models are specified as follows:  
(1) Yj = θi Cij + β x + εj 
where Yj, the dependent variable, is public HIV spending per person living with HIV (PLHIV) in 
country j; Cij is a vector of covariates ci with θi vector of mean coefficients; x is each explanatory 
variable (or fiscal space source) with β its mean coefficient; and εi is an error term. The 
dependent variable and independent variables with monetary values or proportions were 
transformed into natural logarithmic form, implying that the coefficients of the independent 
variables can be interpreted as elasticities, or measures of responsiveness (27). 
Covariates were selected based on a previous study investigating the determinants of domestic 
HIV spending (15). These include disease burden (HIV prevalence), quality of governance 
(control of corruption), and national income level (GDP per capita). In addition, we include 
international HIV spending per PLHIV as a covariate, given the potential interaction and 
fungibility with public spending, as documented in the health expenditure literature (28). The 
year of the spending data was added as a time trend variable for the independent effect of 
changes in technology, medical practices and cost pressures (29). Finally, we included regional 
dummies to account for qualitative differences between UNAIDS regions.  
We specified seven different models. In the first model, we included all the aforementioned 
covariates and the first theoretical source of fiscal space: economic growth, proxied by GDP 
per capita as the independent explanatory variable. In the seven successive models, we kept 
GDP per capita as a covariate and added variables for each theoretical source of fiscal space 
one by one (models 2 to 8). We would expect public HIV spending per PLHIV to be positively 
associated with GDP per capita, government revenue, government health and HIV prioritisation 
(7, 13, 20); but negatively associated with out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita (the 
inverse of the extent of risk pooling) (29). The relationship with government debt could be either 
positive or negative, depending on whether additional borrowing frees up other government 
resources for the HIV programme (13, 30). The relationship with the measure for technical 
efficiency (the non-drug cost per person retained on ART) is particularly ambiguous, as it will 
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depend on whether a more efficient ART programme attracts more government resources or 
less.  
We used ordinary least squares estimation and performed standard diagnostic tests to validate 
the underlying assumptions. To explore the sensitivity of the findings and obtain additional 
insights into the variability of the effects, we used two additional estimation methods: quantile 
regression and neighbour matching fixed effects (31). The former is less sensitive to outliers 
and accommodates for the effects of the independent variables to vary over quantiles of the 
dependent variable. Indeed, it is likely that public HIV spending is more or less responsive to 
changes in fiscal policy at different levels of spending. In addition, it is possible that our models 
omit important variables (observable or unobservable) that are driving both fiscal policies and 
public HIV spending. For example, certain dimensions of governance may not be sufficiently 
captured in our measures. To take this possibility into account, we applied neighbour fixed 
effects modelling (31), which involves a matching exercise between neighbouring countries 
aimed at controlling for unobserved characteristics that are similar between neighbouring 
countries (see Appendix 2, section 4.2.3).  
Comparing the two approaches 
We compared the cumulative maximum public HIV spending per PLHIV under the first 
approach where all normative targets are met, to an empirical scenario based on past 
government responsiveness to changes in each fiscal lever using the coefficients (or 
elasticities) from the OLS models for each statistically significant source of financing. Finally, 
we estimated the financing gap by comparing both estimates to the average annual fiscal cost 
of delivering HIV services over the same period in a continued scale-up scenario, as modelled 
in a recent analysis (32).    
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Table 6.2 Fiscal space framework and measures used per source 
Source  Indicator  Modelled target  HIV adjustment 
Economic growth  GDP, constant $ 
(IMF)  
Average forecasted annual growth (2014-
2018)  
 
Improved government revenue 
generation  
Government revenue, excluding 
grants, as % of GDP 
(World Bank) 
25% 
(McIntyre & Meheus, 2013)  
 
Reprioritisation  
– of Health 
 
General government health 
expenditure as % of Total 
government expenditure 
(WHO)  
15%  
(Abuja target)  
 
– of HIV Public HIV spending as % of 
Government health expenditure 
(UNAIDS, WHO) 
0.5 x HIV DALYs as % of total DALYs  
(IHME 2010 Global Burden of Disease data)  
 
Government borrowing  Gross debt as % of GDP 
(IMF)  
40% 
(IMF ‘sound’ level) 
 
Health-earmarked resources 
 – Risk pooling mechanisms  
Reduced out-of-pocket health 
expenditure per capita through 
contributory pooling mechanism  
(WHO)  
20% 
(WHO acceptable level)  
50% of spending in excess of threshold converted from 
private sector to government health resources; minus 
risk-pooling mechanism administration cost (of USD 1.77 
per capita) then apportioned to HIV based on current 
ratio of total HIV spending to total health spending 
 
– Innovative domestic financing  Increased revenues from increase 
in excise tax on alcohol (beer)  
(WHO) 
50% 
(West African Economic and Monetary 
Union threshold) 
Minus reduction in sales due to tax assuming -0.3 price 
elasticity deducted from total revenue; then apportioned 
as above 
Efficiency gains 
– Treatment & care programme 
technical efficiency  
Ratio of Non-drug treatment 
spending per person retained on 
ART to GDP per capita 
(UNAIDS)  
Non-drug unit cost estimated from 
logarithmic production possibility frontier 
derived from most ‘efficient’ country with the 
minimum ratio by income group:16% 
(Zimbabwe) for LICs; 9% (Zambia) in Lower 
MICs; 15% (Botswana) in UMICs 
 
Number of people receiving antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) 
adjusted by 12 month retention rate; 
Share of savings in total HIV treatment and care 
spending then applied to public HIV spending 
– Health system technical efficiency 
gains for the PMTCT programme 
 
Aggregate health personnel 
density 
(WHO) 
2.3 per 1000 population  
(WHO minimum level) 
Regression model of PMTCT screening coverage, with 
Nurse density, Proportion of undernourished in total 
population, HIV prevalence, GDP per capita, Total HIV 
spending per PLHIV, Adult female literacy, Urbanisation 
rate   
(see Appendix 2 for details) 
– Non-health sector efficiency gains 
for the PMTCT programme 
 
Proportion of undernourished 
People in the total population 
(FAO) 
11.7%  
(MDG1 target of halving 1990 level of 23.4% 
in developing countries)  
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6.3 Results  
As presented in Table 6.3, annual public HIV spending in the 14 countries is currently estimated 
at USD 3.04 billion. Using the extended normative approach, we estimated that in the next five 
years an additional USD 120 million could be generated per year from economic growth, USD 
79 million from improved revenue generation, USD 888 million from borrowing, USD 1.05 billion 
from increased health prioritisation, USD 1.68 billion from greater HIV prioritisation, USD 275 
million from pooling out-of-pocket expenditures, USD 171 million from increased alcohol 
taxation, and USD 937 million from efficiency gains in the public HIV programme based on ART 
service efficiencies. Cumulatively, if all these fiscal levers were simultaneously leveraged, 
public HIV spending could reach USD 10.84 billion per year. In addition, investments in the 
health system to increase human resources to the recommended minimum would reduce the 
need for additional direct HIV expenditures of USD 418 million; while investments to reduce 
malnutrition could further save USD 653 million of direct HIV investment (see Appendix 2 S13-
15). 
The largest sources of fiscal space varied considerably between countries and income 
categories. For our selected low-income countries, a greater prioritisation of HIV in the health 
budget could mobilise substantial resources. For the lower-middle-income countries, a greater 
prioritisation of health in the national budget had the greatest potential in the medium-term. The 
next best option was borrowing, which was largely driven by Nigeria’s low debt ratio. For the 
upper-middle-income countries, greater HIV prioritisation in the health budget and savings 
following a more efficient delivery of ART services were the top source of fiscal space. Within 
the five-year period, economic growth and better revenue generation would provide 
comparatively fewer resources across all countries. Interestingly, the potential HIV budget 
savings from non-HIV investments compared favourably with other sources, especially in low-
income countries.  
There was substantial variation in both fiscal space and the number of fiscal levers available 
across countries. For example, Lesotho and Malawi had few options to create substantial fiscal 
space, whereas Nigeria could capitalise on several options that could independently double its 
current expenditure.  
The empirical models in Table 6.4 show how much fiscal space was generated for HIV in the 
past from changes in each fiscal lever. They indicate that the assumption that other fiscal levers 
remain unaffected when one fiscal lever is changed may overestimate the potential for 
additional financing. Our analysis of the determinants of past spending suggested that only 
higher GDP per capita (economic growth) may have led to a more than proportionate increase 
in public HIV spending, as a 1% increase in GDP per capita was associated with 1.09% 
increase in public HIV spending (model 1). This may indicate that HIV services were viewed in 
economic terms as ‘luxury’ services, which received larger shares of income as income grew - 
or were ‘income elastic’. However, since this coefficient is not significantly greater than 1 
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(ranging from 0.94-1.24), public HIV spending could also have received a smaller or equal 
share of national income as it increased). The neighbour pair fixed effects model presented in 
Table 6.5, found a higher and more robust income elasticity (1.25), while the quantile 
regressions suggested more responsiveness among the lower spenders (typically the lower-
income countries) and less among the bigger spenders (1.21 vs 0.75).  
Conversely, countries with a 1% higher prioritisation of health in the national budget only spent 
0.40% more on HIV, indicating that countries spent disproportionately less of their larger health 
budget on HIV services. The bigger spenders (75th percentile) were more responsive to this 
lever, while the lower spenders might not have been (Table 6.5). Looking more closely at the 
determinants of HIV prioritisation, we found that countries with a 1% higher health share in the 
government budget, allocated 0.74% less to HIV from the health budget (Appendix 2 S11). This 
suggested that countries that prioritised HIV more, did so despite or in compensation of lower 
government health spending. Model 7 in Table 6.4 seems to further corroborate this, as even 
a 1% increase in the share of HIV in the health budget was only associated with a 0.76% 
increase in HIV spending. This low level of responsiveness, or ‘inelasticity’, is robust to all 
estimation methods (Table 6.5).   
Other fiscal levers did not seem to have had an impact on HIV expenditures to date according 
to the OLS estimation, but their signs were consistent with our expectations and all coefficients 
suggested an inelastic relationship (<1). The models had relatively high explanatory power, and 
the diagnostic tests did not indicate concerns around model specification or omitted variables.  
That being said, we gained further insights from the alternative estimation methods we used to 
explore what these results were sensitive to. For example, another noteworthy difference is that 
after adjusting for unobserved characteristics that are similar among neighbouring countries, 
improved government revenue generation appeared to be significantly associated with public 
HIV spending, while health prioritisation was not. This suggests that governments that were 
better at collecting revenue were also more consistently able and willing to spend those 
resources on HIV.  
Another finding worth highlighting is the repeatedly significant positive relationship between 
countries’ levels of public and international HIV spending. A 10% increase in international 
spending was associated with a significant 1.0% to 4.0% increase in public HIV spending (Table 
6.4). This may be linked to its significant positive relationship with government’s prioritisation of 
HIV in the health budget (Appendix 2 S11).  
If past behaviours of low and middle-income countries continue into the future, we found that 
fiscal space may only be realistically created from economic growth, greater health or HIV 
prioritisation. For these prioritisation measures, the resulting increase in public HIV expenditure 
would be less than has been assumed, and a larger share of health in the national budget and 
of HIV in the health budget have not been achieved simultaneously. Comparing the maximum 
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annual fiscal space estimates under the normative approach to the fiscal space estimates 
based on the responsiveness found in the OLS models, with only GDP per capita, health and 
HIV prioritisation being brought up to their forecasted levels or targets, we find between 4% and 
80% less potential public finance in the selected countries (median 57% less) (see Figure 6.1). 
When comparing both the normative and empirical estimates of fiscal space for HIV to the fiscal 
needs, we found that Malawi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Lesotho and 
Zambia would not be able to fund their HIV programmes in either scenario. On the other hand, 
under the normative approach, Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Swaziland could cover this cost 
in principle, but not under the empirical approach. In this case, only South Africa, Botswana 
and Namibia could meet this fiscal need under both scenarios.   
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Table 6.3 Potential medium-term sources of domestic financing (USD) in selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa based on the expanded normative approach 
 
Current Public 
HIV spending 
(USD) 
Average Additional Public HIV Spending (2014-2018 annualised, USD) 
Maximum 
potential Public 
HIV Spending 
(USD) 
Average HIV savings from non-
HIV spending (2014-18, 
annualized, USD) 
Economic 
growth 
Govt 
revenue 
generation 
External 
borrowing 
Reprioritisation Health-earmarked sources 
Technical 
efficiency gains 
Health HIV 
Health risk-
pooling 
mechanism 
Alcohol tax 
Reduced ART 
non-drug unit 
cost 
Expansion 
of HRH 
Reduced 
undernourish
ment 
Low-Income Countries 
 
 
Ethiopia 29,873,725 2,483,346 23,472,213 23,914,041 10,502,582 0 1,676,226 0 18,799,533 218,672,382 109,013,328 31,722,582 
Malawi 2,076,376 148,797 0 0 0 28,452,963 0 11,280,604 0 48,099,500 5,917,374 1,046,868 
Mozambique 13,833,586 1,286,161 1,009,317 0 9,729,293 39,293,813 0 n.a. 7,267,865 163,100,675 35,106,269 15,879,784 
Uganda 42,372,003 3,376,698 36,680,242 4,424,621 19,824,309 0 44,342,876 0 34,919,679 226,770,473 26,116,695 47,835,568 
Tanzania 7,292,938 598,900 3,175,056 0 3,433,372 70,781,762 5,357,016 n.a. 5,169,052 253,765,981 35,412,688 7,963,036 
Zimbabwe 35,710,509 1,685,083 0 0 n.a. 10,623,961 n.a n.a. 0 52,795,374  18,938,406 31,647,486 
Lower-Middle-Income Countries   
Kenya 144,603,851 10,477,064 11,219,264 0 226,129,240 0 89,037,711 n.a. 92,154,809 674,250,737 152,310,361 116,208,273 
Lesotho 50,694,268 3,057,221 0 0 1,817,686 0 0 n.a. 40,404,416 102,101,635 n.a. n.a. 
Nigeria 123,946,158 9,819,442 0 213,804,800 155,173,666 67,048,691 134,816,685 41,181,447 61,196,796 1,678,586,031 16,288,281 0 
Swaziland 32,128,818 693,315 0 26,178,551 0 16,889,249 0 4,064,522 15,356,386 114,058,678 n.a. n.a. 
Zambia 16,350,025 1,278,110 3,114,290 7,027,191 0 68,248,827 0 n.a. 0 217,804,380  18,567,945 22,079,281 
Upper-Middle-Income Countries   
Botswana 315,948,052 14,128,478 0 527,198,394 273,135,411 0 0 14,386,505 0  1,779,276,710  0 216,418,647 
Namibia 181,203,580 8,983,056 0 85,723,694 14,961,072 0 0 n.a. 31,841,130 362,037,531 0 161,999,829 
South Africa 2,040,790,395 61,494,978 0 0 337,351,516 1,378,692,629 0 99,860,577 629,861,977 4,953,607,750 0 0 
Total LICs 131,159,138 9,578,984 64,336,828 28,338,662 43,489,557 149,152,499 51,376,118 11,280,604  66,156,129  963,204,386 230,504,760 136,095,325 
Total Low MICs 367,723,120 25,325,153 14,333,555 247,010,542 383,120,593 152,186,768 223,854,396 45,245,969  209,112,407 2,786,801,461 187,166,586 138,287,554 
Total UMICs 2,537,942,027 84,606,512 0 612,922,088 625,447,998 1,378,692,629 0 114,247,082  661,703,107 7,094,921,991 0 378,418,477 
TOTAL 3,036,824,285 119,510,649 78,670,382 888,271,292 1,052,058,148 1,680,031,895 275,230,514 170,773,654 936,971,643 10,844,927,838 417,671,345 652,801,356 
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Note: All monetary figures are in 2014USD. Maximum potential public spending is a cumulative value if all the sources are increased simultaneously, which is why it is more than 
the sum of each source. To avoid double-counting, where revenue generation was increased to the norm and health reprioritised, we did not include the additional health-
earmarked sources in this cumulative sum. LICs: Low-income countries; Lower MICs: Lower-middle-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle-income countries.
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Table 6.4 Regression analyses (OLS) of Public HIV spending per PLHIV (USD) by source of 
fiscal space  
 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Control variables        
HIV prevalence 
-0.172 
(0.123) 
-0.221* 
(0.128) 
-0.191 
(0.126) 
-0.181 
(0.124) 
-0.158 
(0.127) 
-0.254** 
(0.124) 
-0.782*** 
(0.084) 
Control of corruption index 
0.240 
(0.250) 
0.245 
(0.249) 
0.186 
(0.263) 
0.077 
(0.265) 
0.224 
(0.255) 
0.512** 
(0.249) 
0.282** 
(0.142) 
International HIV spending per 
PLHIV 
0.212** 
(0.094) 
0.214** 
(0.093) 
0.198** 
(0.097) 
0.190** 
(0.093) 
0.202** 
(0.095) 
0.132 
(0.094) 
0.101* 
(0.054) 
Year of spending data 
0.036 
(0.087) 
0.050 
(0.088) 
0.059 
(0.088) 
0.064 
(0.087) 
0.045 
(0.090) 
0.028 
(0.084) 
-0.036 
(0.050) 
Reference:  
West & Central Africa 
  
 
    
East & Southern Africa 
0.328 
(0.354) 
0.375 
(0.355) 
0.484 
(0.366) 
0.396 
(0.353) 
0.286 
(0.372) 
0.185 
(0.333) 
0.108 
(0.202) 
Asia & Pacific region 
0.019 
(0.403) 
0.088 
(0.406) 
-0.108 
(0.408) 
0.026 
(0.399) 
-0.034 
(0.415) 
-0.156 
(0.387) 
-0.040 
(0.229) 
Latin America region 
1.310*** 
(0.428) 
1.309*** 
(0.427) 
1.350*** 
(0.425) 
1.135*** 
(0.446) 
1.374*** 
(0.438) 
1.017** 
(0.429) 
0.708*** 
(0.247) 
Caribbean region 
-0.359 
(0.543) 
-0.328 
(0.541) 
-0.243 
(0.543) 
-0.353 
(0.537) 
-0.368 
(0.562) 
-0.473 
(0.503) 
-0.123 
(0.308) 
Easter Europe & Central Asia 
region 
0.687 
(0.485) 
0.521 
(0.500) 
0.663 
(0.485) 
0.706 
(0.481) 
0.764 
(0.495) 
0.408 
(0.468) 
0.345 
(0.276) 
North Africa & Middle East region 
-0.586 
(0.539) 
-0.715 
(0.547) 
-0.245 
(0.559) 
-0.575 
(0.536) 
-0.493 
(0.553) 
-0.524 
(0.551) 
0.148 
(0.311) 
Sources of fiscal space (explanatory variables) 
GDP per capita 
1.091*** 
(0.153) 
1.007*** 
(0.166) 
1.050*** 
(0.157) 
1.116*** 
(0.153) 
1.137*** 
(0.216) 
1.017***  
(0.149) 
0.994*** 
(0.087) 
Government revenue, excl. 
grants as % GDP 
 
0.443 
(0.350) 
 
    
Gross government debt as % 
GDP 
  
-0.162 
(0.207) 
  
 
 
Government Health Expenditure 
as % Total Government 
Expenditure 
  
 
0.400* 
(0.251) 
 
 
 
Out-of-pocket health expenditure 
per capita 
  
 
 
-0.071 
(0.181) 
 
 
Non-drug cost per person on 
ART 
  
 
  
0.105 
(0.118) 
 
Public HIV spending as % of 
Government Health Expenditure 
  
 
  
 0.757*** 
(0.058) 
Constant 
-78.508 
(175.606) 
-107.211 
(176.421) 
-124.623 
(176.942) 
-134.622 
(175.506) 
-97.565 
(180.588) 
-64.140 
(168.128) 
68.346 
(100.270) 
Observations 92 92 87 91 90 86 92 
R2 0.733 0.739 0.743 0.743 0.733 0.785 0.915 
 
For the regressions the dependent variable and independent variables with monetary values or 
proportions were transformed into natural logarithmic form. The numbers in the cells are regression 
coefficients (standard errors). Significance levels are denoted as * for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, *** for p < 
0.01.  
Each model tests the relationship with a different fiscal lever: (1) economic growth; (2) general revenue 
generation; (3) borrowing; (4) health prioritisation; (5) earmarked health revenue through risk-pooling 
scheme; (6) technical efficiency gains in the HIV programme based on ART programme efficiency; (7) 
HIV prioirtisation in health.  
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Table 6.5 Relationship between Public HIV spending per PLHIV and each fiscal lever with 
different estimation methods 
 OLS Quantile regressions Neighbour(hood) models 
Fiscal space policy 
options 
 
25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Pair FE 
Random 
pair FE 
Neighbour-
hood FE 
GDP per capita 
1.091*** 
(0.153) 
1.207*** 
(0.290) 
1.102*** 
(0.183) 
0.754*** 
(0.172) 
1.168*** 
(0.174) 
1.190*** 
(0.170) 
1.246*** 
(0.150) 
Government revenue, 
excl. grants as % GDP 
0.443 
(0.350) 
0.312 
(0.677) 
0.242 
(0.452) 
0.486 
(0.411) 
0.850** 
(0.421) 
0.845** 
(0.355) 
0.825** 
(0.395) 
Gross government debt 
as % GDP 
-0.162 
(0.207) 
-0.065 
(0.301) 
-0.022 
(0.358) 
-0.074 
(0.436) 
-0.0758 
(0.194) 
-0.00471 
(0.162) 
-0.145 
(0.182) 
Government Health 
Expenditure as % 
Government 
Expenditure 
0.400* 
(0.251) 
0.189 
(0.466) 
0.419*** 
(0.337) 
0.675*** 
(0.223) 
0.199 
(0.206) 
0.284 
(0.222) 
0.229 
(0.197) 
Out-of-pocket health 
expenditure per capita 
-0.071 
(0.181) 
-0.002 
(0.332) 
0.035 
(0.220) 
-0.144 
(0.197) 
-0.157 
(0.165) 
-0.107 
(0.159) 
-0.107 
(0.168) 
Non-drug cost per 
person on ART 
0.105 
(0.118) 
0.045 
(0.165) 
-0.024 
(0.166) 
0.146 
(0.127) 
0.182 
(0.127) 
0.124 
(0.108) 
0.233** 
(0.116) 
Public HIV spending as 
% of GHE 
0.757*** 
(0.058) 
0.851*** 
(0.068) 
0.783*** 
(0.074) 
0.812*** 
(0.088) 
0.715*** 
(0.111) 
0.688*** 
(0.117) 
0.758*** 
(0.0767) 
The numbers in the cells are regression coefficients (standard errors). Significance levels are denoted as 
* for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, *** for p < 0.01. 
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Figure 6.1 Comparing the potential fiscal space for HIV from the extended normative approach to the empirical approach 
 
* Botswana’s additional space extends beyond the figure to USD 5,270, but was capped for legibility. Note: Fiscal commitments are average estimates over the same period 
from Hontelez et al (2016), except for Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho. For these countries we use averages from the countries in the same income categories. The 
normative estimate of potential public HIV spending excludes the potential savings from non-HIV spending. 
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6.4 Discussion  
Our analysis suggests that the most HIV-affected lower-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
will not be able to generate sufficient domestic public resources in the medium-term, even if 
they take very bold measures to improve revenue generation, reallocate resources and 
maximise efficiency in line with their economic capacity. The shortfall between the optimistic 
normative estimate of potential financing and recent conservative estimates of financial 
obligations (with continued scale-up) remains considerable (32). Some of the lower-middle 
income countries could cover these costs in principle if they would adopt normative targets and 
tap more innovative fiscal levers. However, when past HIV financing behaviour (which may be 
rational) is taken into account, even they could not pay for their HIV programmes. Only the 
upper-middle income countries could potentially shoulder the fiscal costs of their responses in 
the near future. Our findings therefore support the broad global policy response to increasingly 
target international financing. 
Our normative estimates of fiscal space are substantially higher than previous studies, because 
we include a more comprehensive (but still non-exhaustive) set of fiscal policy options, including 
some unconventional ones. This provides an optimistic picture, with significant effort required 
to realise some of this potential. We consider borrowing as a serious policy option; unpack and 
quantify some health-earmarked sources; as well as efficiency gains from within and beyond 
the HIV programme. When comparing the same sources, we generally find similar potential as 
the most recent study by Resch and colleagues (2015), although our estimates of fiscal space 
from economic growth and general revenue generation tend to be somewhat lower, possibly 
due to differences in data sources.  
When we constrain our estimates by the empirical models of which levers have been related to 
public HIV spending in the past, they become lower than previous estimates. This approach 
highlights that achieving various norms/benchmarks is not likely to automatically translate into 
a real proportionate increase in HIV spending; in part due to the interaction between different 
fiscal policies. Therefore, focusing on reprioritising resources towards HIV and/or health alone, 
based on targets that have already proven to be politically challenging – may end up yielding 
less additional finance than anticipated.  
It should be noted that our findings have several limitations. First, the quality of HIV spending 
data is weak. They may partly reflect spending where government is the agent rather than the 
source; capture disbursements rather than expenditures; and identify only HIV-labelled 
expenditures rather than overall expenditures for HIV. Secondly, we implicitly assume an 
immediate policy decision, no transaction costs and the absorptive capacity to implement fiscal 
targets (13). This is unlikely, particularly in areas like converting out-of-pocket expenditures into 
social health insurance premia, and hence we may overestimate the short-term potential from 
these sources. Similarly, although our empirical analysis was designed to incorporate the 
uncertainty around adjustments between fiscal policies, we have not incorporated the 
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uncertainty around the feasibility of achieving each norm. Some of the ‘global’ norms we used 
are quite conservative, such as economic growth and government revenue generation (12), 
whereas others are considerably more optimistic, like the Abuja target, or the share of out-of-
pocket expenditures in total health expenditures. Still, there are countries among the 14 that 
achieved or surpassed each one of them.  
A third limitation stems from relying on global analyses to draw conclusions for the sub-Saharan 
African sub-group, and past spending data to predict future spending. Indeed, it is reasonable 
to expect that the 14 most HIV-affected countries are qualitatively different from other low and 
middle-income countries, just as governments may make decisions differently going forward, 
especially if donors start changing their financing patterns (33, 34).  
Finally, an important limitation in our empirical models is a potential endogeneity bias from our 
cross-sectional dataset. Although we used similar methods adopted in previous studies on the 
determinants of HIV and health expenditures (15, 27, 29, 35)- albeit for panel datasets - there 
is a risk when making causal inferences. We applied the neighbour fixed effects approach (31) 
to address the potential omitted variable bias, but neither estimation method addresses the 
potential bi-directionality between certain explanatory variables and public HIV spending. We 
considered this bias for each of the variables of interest. Where they may influence our 
estimates, it is likely to be by attenuating the impact of fiscal adjustments and overestimating 
coefficients. This would imply that our adjusted ‘real world’ estimates are still overestimates of 
the real fiscal policy effect on pubic HIV spending, but they would be closer than current 
normative estimates. The only exception would be GDP per capita, where we find greater 
responsiveness, but existing evidence does not support such macroeconomic impacts of HIV 
(36), even in high burden countries. The other variables of interest with a more important 
potential bi-directionality bias that could affect our findings are out-of-pocket health 
expenditures and the non-drug cost per person retained on ART. For both measures, the 
insignificant relationships we found do not rule out the existence of a relationship in either 
direction, and their exclusion from the empirical estimates may underestimate their potential. 
Despite these limitations, our findings have some clear specific policy implications. Our 
empirical analysis suggests that governments have not used many of their domestic fiscal 
levers to increase HIV allocations. Country-level consultations indicate that domestic resource 
mobilisation has not been a priority in certain countries, given the availability of large external 
HIV funds and varying perceptions as to their likely decline (37). This could further explain why 
increasing the tax base was not consistently associated with past public HIV spending, as 
external HIV financing may have been easier for governments to mobilise. 
Only economic growth, health and HIV prioritisation appear to have consistently influenced 
national levels of HIV expenditure. Strong economic growth in Africa is being hailed as a major 
source of domestic financing, but although we find that public HIV spending is very responsive 
to income (similarly to health expenditure (29, 35)), the magnitude of the increase from this 
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source alone is relatively small in the medium-term (30). Nonetheless, it represents a relatively 
reliable source that could sustain and multiply the impact of other measures in the long run. 
With strong political will, it may also be used more proactively to ring-fence resources for HIV 
services through a more than proportionate allocation formula, where desirable.  
Countries could generate significant resources by reprioritising health in the general budget 
and HIV in the health budget (7), even though their independent and joint potential may have 
been overestimated to date (38). Moreover, greater HIV reprioritisation could risk crowding out 
other areas of health investment (12), although the evidence on this is mixed (39). It may be 
particularly difficult to further prioritise HIV in contexts where external financing is declining, 
without a simultaneous increase in other fiscal space sources, as our empirical models suggest 
that international financing for HIV may have indirectly contributed to greater HIV prioritisation 
in health, through some crowding-in effect. This contrasts with previous studies that find 
evidence of fungibility in the health sector more generally, whereby increases in development 
assistance for health channelled through governments have been associated with reductions 
in public spending on health from public sources (28, 35, 40). Even though it suggests care has 
to be taken to ensure appropriate co-financing arrangements, this could bode well for future 
agreements between governments and donors, such as the Global Fund’s counterpart 
financing requirements or the PEPFAR partnership frameworks. However, there may be 
external explanations for this finding. Alternative interpretations include that much of HIV-
related aid may have been channelled to NGOs and therefore not displaced government 
spending (28); or aid may be given to countries that already prioritise HIV more and have better 
governance, as we find in our analysis. This may also be a measurement error, where some 
reported public spending may include external aid channelled through government budgets.  
In terms of the new areas of financing identified, our analysis suggests that several are worth 
further exploration. Concessional borrowing has potential in principle, assuming the returns to 
these investments outweigh the costs of borrowing. Yet, this has not been a politically attractive 
option for direct HIV spending or for freeing up government resources. This could have several 
reasons, including that governments may not view HIV spending as an investment with financial 
returns, despite the 15:1 return estimated by UNAIDS (2). Moreover, this ability to borrow could 
also be a reflection of recent debt relief in some countries resulting in low debt stocks, rather 
than sound debt management. Yet, given the magnitude of future HIV treatment obligations, 
the case could potentially be made for more concessional HIV borrowing, especially in 
resource-rich countries (41). Further macroeconomic modelling is required to estimate the 
dynamic feedback of HIV investments on fiscal space.  
We also find substantial potential from earmarked sources for health, suggesting that those 
focusing on HIV have a strong mutual interest with those working on general health sector 
financing. Converting high levels of out-of-pocket expenditure into stable and non-regressive 
public revenue through social health insurance could mobilise considerable resources for HIV, 
and other health programmes, in Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, for example. But the institutional 
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reforms required would be substantial and time-consuming. The government of Kenya has 
recognised this potential and decided to increase premia for the National Hospital Insurance 
Fund by 25% to raise domestic resources for HIV and non-communicable disease by a 
projected USD 120 million over 5 years (37). This is considerably less than our estimated USD 
89 million per year, but is likely a more realistic estimate of gradual revenue generation through 
this mechanism. Earmarked increases in alcohol taxes could also generate resources, in 
addition to their expected double dividend of reducing HIV transmission and improving 
treatment efficacy (42, 43). Kenya and Benin have also considered HIV-earmarked taxes on 
airline tickets and mobile phone usage, respectively (37). However, any earmarking may reduce 
fiscal flexibility and allocative efficiency in public finance more broadly (23, 38); and may not be 
acceptable to ministries of finance. Moreover, it is quite likely that increased revenues from 
HIV-earmarked sources may in practice be accompanied by a reduction in allocations from 
general government revenue to HIV (12, 21, 38). In the extreme case of Kazakhstan, for 
example, following the introduction of a payroll tax earmarked for health, the subsequent 
general tax allocation to health reduced by more than the additional payroll tax, leading to a net 
reduction in health resources (30). Such mechanisms therefore might not generate any 
additional resources in the absence of credible commitment mechanisms.  
Our analysis confirms the potential of technical efficiency gains; and supports the global policy 
emphasis on improving HIV programme efficiency for a sustained HIV response. Our estimates 
for South Africa, for example, suggest that there could be more to gain from the latter than from 
a greater prioritisation of health. However, the empirical data does not confirm our input-
oriented measure of technical efficiency as a determinant of past public HIV spending. This 
may be because higher unit costs can influence spending in two opposite ways: by increasing 
spending to get the same output, or decreasing government’s willingness to allocate resources 
to an inefficient programme. Also, this measure does not sufficiently capture price differentials 
or site-level heterogeneity. Nonetheless, it was expected to broadly reflect in aggregate terms 
the relative room for efficiency improvements, and interestingly, our normative estimates of 
potential efficiency gains (29% of current spending) – are more conservative than recent 
estimates using more sophisticated Data Envelopment Analysis techniques (53%) (16, 44). Our 
results are sensitive to which country is considered the best performer, particularly for the 
upper-middle-income country category, which is not surprising given the large unexplained 
variation in ART unit costs found in most empirical studies (45). Still, further research is needed 
to develop country-level measures of programme efficiency and understand its determinants. 
For low-income countries, we found substantial gains from more effective complementary 
investments in health systems and social development. In these highly resource-constrained 
settings, the opportunity cost of increased HIV financing may be particularly high and 
synergistic investments all the more important. Our findings cautiously suggest that the HIV 
budget holder could see financial value in contributing to human resource expansion or reduced 
undernourishment, to avert direct HIV expenditures. This does not necessarily mean that they 
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should do so – the cost of this investment would first need to be determined and the net benefit 
of the investment established. Effective fiscal space would only be created if the investment 
required was more efficient than a direct investment in HIV services. However, given that both 
these investments have wider benefits than HIV alone, a co-financing approach that seeks to 
maximise HIV and other outcomes may be considered (12, 26). Some argue that the HIV sector 
has made only marginal short-term investments in health system complements that could be 
reaching their limits (46). It may be more rational for HIV budget holders to consider co-investing 
in these binding constraints. However, more research is needed in this area to explore which 
non-HIV investments could contribute most to the efficiency of HIV programmes and what 
institutional mechanisms could incentivise cross-sectoral and cross-disease governance and 
financing. 
In conclusion, we present a more realistic, but still optimistic picture of improved domestic 
financing for HIV that will require the HIV community to engage with broader public finance and 
social development agendas. International funders can support this effort with a more coherent 
engagement across health and social development investments, a continued focus on 
efficiency, and a longer term approach to co-financing national HIV responses within broader 
health financing frameworks. With the ongoing dialogue on how to finance the sustainable 
development goals, it will be important that those working in HIV join the call for increased 
health prioritisation in the context of universal health coverage, and work to identify tailored 
country-specific approaches to proactively leverage broader development investments. This 
will be central to expanding access to HIV prevention and treatment in a way that is sustainable 
and in line with the post-2015 development agenda.  
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CHAPTER 7  Economic Returns to Investing in a Food-Based 
Intervention for People living with HIV Initiating 
Antiretroviral Therapy in East and Southern 
Africa 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The international community has embraced an ambitious global agenda to achieve 17 wide-
ranging Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their 179 targets by 2030 (1). This 
includes ending the AIDS epidemic as a public health threat, and much of the focus in the global 
HIV response is currently on reaching the 90-90-90 targets by 2020 (i.e. to ensure that 90% of 
all people living with HIV (PLHIV) get diagnosed, 90% of them are on treatment, and 90% of 
those on treatment achieve viral suppression) (2). However, there are serious challenges along 
the HIV treatment and care cascade, with only 54% of PLHIV knowing their status, globally, 
and 22% of those being lost-to-follow-up before even initiating treatment (3). Retention in care 
and adherence to antiretroviral therapy (ART) are also major concerns. Recent estimates from 
multi-country cohorts of ART patients indicate that 30-35% of patients are no longer in care 3 
years after initiation (4). In Southern Africa, this attrition rate increases further to over half of 
PLHIV being out of care 5 years post-initiation (3). Although viral suppression is the ultimate 
goal of ART, both to halt disease progression and reduce onward transmission, only 45% of 
adults that start treatment are virally suppressed 36 months after initiation (3). 
Clearly, the potential of ART to improve the lives of PLHIV and prevent new infections is not 
being fully realised, and the risk of resistance to antiretroviral drugs is further increased by 
patients’ disengagement from care and sub-optimal adherence (3). The optimism around a 
universal test-and-treat strategy to reverse the epidemic has been dampened by recent 
evidence showing that even when home-based HIV testing is provided, followed by an 
immediate offer of ART for those who are HIV-positive, linkage to care and ART uptake have 
remained below expectation (5). This has underscored the limits of biomedical interventions 
alone and further pointed to the importance of structural drivers for HIV service uptake, 
treatment adherence and onward transmission (6, 7).  
Food insecurity has been identified as a key barrier to retention and adherence in several 
settings (8, 9). This can be explained by a nutritional pathway, whereby food insecurity can 
exacerbate ART side effects; a mental health pathway, where food insecurity compounds 
patients’ anxiety around initiating ART and the expected increase in appetite; and a behavioural 
pathway, through which food-insecure patients cannot adhere to their treatment regimen or 
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clinic appointments due to competing demands on their resources (9, 10). Even before starting 
ART, food insufficiency can translate into accelerated weight loss and immunosuppression 
(11). In addition, undernutrition significantly increases the risk of mortality among ART initiates 
(12-15), and weight gain immediately after ART initiation is an important predictor of long-term 
survival among those with a low Body Mass Index (BMI) (16, 17). 
The significant geographical overlap between food insecurity and HIV disease burdens, as well 
as the complex bidirectional relationship between HIV treatment outcomes, nutrition and food 
security calls for integrated strategies (18, 19). While ART alone can have dramatic benefits for 
patients’ nutrition and household food security, the outcomes of these treatment programmes 
can also be jeopardised by undernutrition and food insecurity (20, 21). 
Existing evidence suggests that the most promising complementary food-based interventions 
for HIV treatment and prevention are in the form of conditional nutritional support to people 
initiating ART (22). Food supplementation has been found to improve adherence to treatment 
and reduce attrition (23-28), certain combinations of multiple micronutrient supplementation for 
pregnant mothers can confer clinical benefits for the mother-infant pair in the absence of ART, 
although they have not been found to reduce vertical transmission (29-31). There is limited but 
growing evidence on the potential HIV impact of non-food economic interventions targeted at 
food-insecure HIV-negative and HIV-positive populations, including cash transfers and 
economic strengthening interventions (19, 32, 33). However, most of these interventions have 
not been evaluated from an economic perspective, and their value for money remains unclear. 
Flat-lining international HIV financing, coupled with the many competing development priorities 
in the SDGs, has heightened the need for prioritised investment approaches (34, 35). Decision-
makers are having to strike a balance between allocating HIV resources to expand access to 
ART alone, or to add on adherence-enhancing interventions to prevent leaks in the cascade 
(36-38). Ensuring effective HIV prevention, care and treatment may require moving away from 
a siloed prioritisation approach to a more integrated multi-sectoral approach. This study aims 
to assess the costs, outcomes and value for money of a food and nutrition intervention, both 
for HIV and broader development impact.  
 
7.2 Methods 
Study design 
We assessed the cost-effectiveness of investing HIV resources in an add-on food support 
component targeting food-insecure patients initiating ART. We used a Markov model to 
estimate the costs and outcomes of providing food assistance to these patients during their first 
6 months on ART, compared to a ‘standard of care’ base case where patients received ART 
without food support, in five countries in East and Southern Africa. We took both a health care 
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provider perspective, and a broader multi-sectoral perspective to capture the non-health 
consequences of the intervention, in line with recent guidance (39, 40). This involved modelling 
three interventions cases: the first considered the health care consequences on the cohort 
alone, the second considered the cohort and partners, and the third factored in health and non-
health consequences. The primary model outcomes were a cost per Disability-Adjusted Life 
Year (DALY) averted, and a benefit-cost ratio (BCR). The time horizon of the study was the 
lifetime of the cohort of patients initiating ART, i.e. until the last patient died. 
Study setting and timeframe 
To investigate the potential return on investment from implementing this food-based 
intervention in different settings, we selected five of the UNAIDS ‘fast-track’ countries in sub-
Saharan Africa with different typologies in terms of HIV burden, food insecurity and income 
levels, namely Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho and South Africa. In addition to the lifetime 
timeframe, we analysed results after 5 and 15 years to reflect the UNAIDS ‘window of 
opportunity’ between 2016-2020 to frontload investments and control the epidemic, as well as 
the global commitment to ending AIDS as a public health threat by 2030 (2). 
HIV models 
We developed a Markov model for ART patients to follow a hypothetical cohort of individuals 
as they moved along a linear clinical pathway, based on simple Markov chains. Markov 
modelling is particularly well-suited to chronic diseases, and has been extensively used to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of treatment options for heart disease, asthma, cancers, and 
also HIV care (41-43). Disease progression can be divided into separate health states, with 
transition probabilities that determine individuals’ movements between these states for each 
time period (or ‘Markov’ cycle) (41). Unit costs and health utility (or disutility) are assigned to 
each state, and by running the model over several cycles, it is possible to estimate the long-
term costs and health outcomes with and without an intervention.  
Our model consisted of 6 states through which individuals could progress: three states in ART 
care; two states out of care; and an absorbing ‘dead’ state (see Figure 7.1). All individuals 
entered the model and started first-line ART at time t0. By the end of the first cycle, they were 
either in care and virally suppressed; in care but unsuppressed; out of care; or dead. Those 
who were on first-line therapy but unsuppressed could either remain unsuppressed, achieve 
viral suppression, die, or progress to second-line therapy in the next cycle. We made several 
simplifying assumptions. First, once in second-line ART care, this small group of patients (44) 
were virally suppressed and could only remain in that state or progress to death. Second, 
individuals who had disengaged from care for one cycle could return into first-line ART care, 
but were expected to be unsuppressed for at least one cycle if they did. Third, once patients 
progressed to a second cycle out of care, they could not transition back, and either remained 
out of care or died.  
Chapter 7 – Economic Returns 
148 
 
Each cycle accounted for a 6-month period, given the higher rates of mortality and loss to follow 
up (LTFU) in the first 6 and 12 months of ART. We followed a cohort of 1,000 food-insecure 
individuals initiating ART, until they all died.  
The ART Patients model was linked to a simple static HIV transmission model to estimate the 
number of secondary HIV infections from this cohort of patients to their sero-negative sexual 
partners. We used risk equations to estimate the probability of transmission among uninfected 
partners per cycle until the cohort turned 60 years old. Separate probabilities were calculated 
for individuals who mixed with the patients in virally suppressed states, and those in 
unsuppressed states (see Figure 7.1). The model equations and further details are provided in 
Appendix 3.   
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Figure 7.1 Model diagram 
 
ART Patients Markov Model           HIV Transmission Model 
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Base case 
In the base case, we modelled the progression of a cohort of patients initiating ART at the age 
of 35, in each country, without the intervention. Model input parameters are summarised in 
Table 7.1. State transition probabilities were sourced from the literature where possible. In the 
absence of country-specific data, we used the same transition probabilities derived from 
systematic reviews from the region or from ART cohorts from low and middle-income countries 
(4, 12, 45). We incorporated time-dependent transition probabilities to reflect heightened risk of 
LTFU and AIDS-related mortality in the first 6 and 12 months on ART. Also, given the known 
misclassification of mortality as LTFU for people in ART care (46, 47), we adjusted these 
mortality parameters upward by a correction factor from the literature (14, 48). All-cause 
mortality rates were also time-dependent and adjusted for every 5-year period, based on the 
WHO life tables for each country. All other transition probabilities were kept the same from the 
third cycle onward, except for adjustments to account for increasing mortality as the cohort 
aged.  
We made assumptions about several transition probabilities due to lack of data. These 
probabilities were then adjusted to calibrate the model outcomes to the average rates of: (i) 
retention in care, (ii) on-treatment viral suppression, and (iii) mortality on ART, as reported by 
multi-country ART cohort sites either in sub-Saharan Africa or low and middle-income countries, 
at various time points between 6 and 60 months post-initiation (3, 4, 49, 50). This is likely to 
have generated more optimistic outcomes than may be expected among the vulnerable food-
insecure patients the intervention would target.  
Intervention case 1 - Health care cohort perspective 
In the first intervention scenario, we modelled the intervention’s health care impact on the cohort 
alone. The intervention modelled is a common standard food assistance intervention, as 
delivered by the World Food Programme and other organisations, which typically involves the 
provision of a monthly food ration, consisting of cereals, legumes and sometimes vegetable oil 
(22). The food basket is provided during the first 6 months of ART, and can be conditional on 
clinic attendance. Eligibility is assessed during an initial screening, using a household food 
security assessment questionnaire like the Household Hunger Scale (28), to identify individuals 
in moderately or severely food-insecure households. Clinically malnourished patients, with a 
Body Mass Index (BMI) below 18.5, are referred to supplementary feeding with fortified foods 
where available, and may additionally receive food assistance (22).  
We identified eight studies evaluating the effectiveness of food assistance on HIV treatment 
outcomes among adults in low and middle-income countries, including those from a previous 
review (22) (see appendix 3 Table S1). Most studies were conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, 
including one multi-country study, and two were from Central America and the Caribbean. The 
studies were of mixed quality: only two had either an individually or cluster randomised design 
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(28, 51), and two were quasi-experimental (24, 52). The remaining four evaluations lacked a 
comparable control group (23, 25-27). While seven studies had an ART adherence outcome, 
only two considered attrition outcomes (23, 53). None of the studies explored the effect of 
improved adherence on HIV transmission. All but one found a positive effect of food assistance 
on adherence or reduced attrition (52).  
The Tanzanian ‘Afya study’ was the only randomised controlled trial identified that assessed 
adherence, attrition and costs. We therefore modelled its direct effects in our main analysis. 
However, we explored the sensitivity of our results to the range of effectiveness data from the 
other studies (see Table 7.1) (23, 24). 
Adherence was defined as a Medication Possession Ratio (MPR) of at least 95% at 6 months 
after initiation, which is the proportion of days within a specific period that an individual is in 
possession of at least one ART dose (54). The intervention risk ratio for this adherence 
measure was 1.25 (95% CI: 1.07-1.45) (28). We then used data from a meta-analysis that found 
a pooled odds ratio for virologic failure with optimal adherence compared to suboptimal 
adherence of 0.34 (95% CI: 0.26–0.44), suggesting that individuals with optimal adherence 
were 66% more likely to be virally suppressed (55). This was used to alter the transition 
probability to remaining in care and suppressed in the first cycle from 0.685 to 0.797, in our 
Markov model. 
Attrition was defined as the proportion of patients initiating ART that died or were lost to follow-
up, i.e. had not attended a scheduled visit for at least 90 days (excluding clinic transfers) (23, 
28). We applied the effect of food assistance on reducing LTFU in the first 6 months of ART 
from the Afya study (RR=0.14, 95% CI: 0.05-0.38) (28). Both the probability of disengaging 
from care and dying in the first 6-month cycle were therefore adjusted in the intervention 
scenario from 0.114 to 0.016, and from 0.066 to 0.009 respectively.      
Intervention case 2 - Health care perspective with HIV transmission 
In this broader health care perspective, we also considered the secondary health 
consequences of the intervention on the partners of the patient cohort. We ran the HIV 
transmission model to estimate the impact of the 96% reduced risk of HIV transmission to a 
sero-negative sexual partner when a patient has achieved viral suppression (56). We sourced 
country-specific sexual behaviour data from Spectrum (a publicly available modelling tool used 
by UNAIDS) (57) to parameterise the model (see Table 7.1). 
Intervention case 3 - Multi-sectoral perspective 
In this perspective, we sought to capture any non-health consequences of the intervention. 
However, the evidence base on the broader welfare effects of food assistance (e.g. on labour 
productivity, nutrition) is scant (58), and we only identified one recent study from Honduras with 
a demonstrated effect of food assistance on severe food insecurity among established ART 
Chapter 7 – Economic Returns 
152 
 
patients (59). We therefore explored the implications of this potential effect on food security 
alone, and modelled what would happen if part of the incremental costs of the intervention were 
covered by a social protection budget based on this benefit (60). The effect modelled is a 24% 
reduction in severe household food insecurity after 6 months of food assistance (RR= 0.76, 
95% CI 0.60-0.97) (59).  
Economic Costs 
Costs for each state in the model were sourced from empirical provider costing studies, 
identified from a systematic review(61) and studies with large samples of facilities. All costs 
were extrapolated to the 5 selected countries following a log GDP per capita adjustment for 
non-tradeables (as the best empirical fit)(62), whereas tradeable goods (namely drugs) were 
kept fixed. All costs were then inflated to USD 2015 using the US GDP deflators.  
Country-specific first-line ART costs per person were calculated as a median across three 
studies, including 8 sub-Saharan African countries (63-65). This was adjusted with a mark-up 
for those in care but unsuppressed who require additional facility visits and tests (66). Second-
line ART costs per person were extrapolated from South Africa, as above (67). Individuals that 
had disengaged from care incurred other health care costs, namely hospitalisation (68), while 
those who died first incurred costs related to end-of-life palliative care (69). We conservatively 
did not consider any additional costs of re-entering care. 
The direct intervention provider costs were estimated from the Tanzanian Afya trial at USD198 
per client for 6 months (70). The latter was implemented from November 2013 to February 2016 
in three study sites in Shinyanga region. For this economic costing, data were collected 
retrospectively, following an ingredients approach and excluding research costs. Input prices 
were obtained from the project, health facilities, regional office records, and local suppliers. 
Capital costs were annuitized using standard useful life years, and discounted at 3%. All project 
overhead and intervention costs were allocated based on estimated use by activity, using step-
down allocation. Staff time allocation between activities was estimated from a combination of 
self-assessments, interviews and time sheets, and used to allocate overheads. The relative 
numbers of beneficiaries receiving food baskets was used to allocate the support costs. Costs 
were estimated in Tanzanian Shillings and then converted into 2015 USD. Further details are 
provided in Appendix 3.  
Given the intervention’s small-scale delivery model and its relatively small locally-procured food 
basket, it may be considerably less costly but potentially difficult to replicate at a larger scale. 
We therefore also consider much higher cost estimates from a World Food Programme 
intervention in Mozambique in a sensitivity analysis (71).   
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Valuation, Cost-effectiveness and Economic Returns 
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICER) were estimated as a cost per (HIV) DALY averted 
– a standard measure of value for money used in HIV and health intervention prioritisation (72). 
To estimate DALYs, we used common disability weights for HIV sequelae (73). For individuals 
who were in care but unsuppressed, we used the disability weight for symptomatic HIV pre-
AIDS (73). DALYs averted by preventing new HIV infections were calculated using new 
standard formulae, without age-weighting (74), and assuming full ART coverage after the 
asymptomatic and pre-AIDS stages. Given that costs were discounted at 3%, we applied the 
same rate to DALYs in the main analysis, but explored a no-discounting approach in a 
sensitivity analysis (75).   
In addition, benefit-cost ratios were derived by monetising each DALY at USD1,000 to provide 
an indication of the potential economic returns of investing in this intervention (76).    
There are currently no empirical country-specific cost-effectiveness thresholds that reflect real 
opportunity costs to the HIV or health budget (77), and that can be used to determine whether 
an intervention is cost-effective. We tentatively compare the ICER to the thresholds estimated 
for several low and middle-income countries by extrapolating an empirical analysis from the 
UK, which is around 0.5 times a country’s GDP per capita (78). If food assistance could avert 
a DALY at a cost below this, it would be deemed a cost-effective HIV investment.  
For the multi-sectoral perspective, the non-health outcome was valued in terms of how much 
the corresponding sector budget would be willing to pay for it. Based on studies on the cost and 
impact of a cash transfer programme on severe food insecurity in Zambia, we estimated the 
social protection sector’s or payer’s revealed willingness-to-pay per averted case of severe 
household food insecurity (see Table 7.1) (79, 80). This estimate of the opportunity cost was 
then multiplied by the number of individuals that would be expected to not be severely food-
insecure during the 6-months of the intervention. This amount was then deducted from the HIV 
payer’s total cost in the first cycle (60).    
Sensitivity Analysis 
Univariate and probabilistic sensitivity analyses (PSA) were conducted to explore the sensitivity 
of the results to various parameter and distributional assumptions. For the PSA, we specified 
parameter distributions and then propagated the uncertainty throughout the model using 
second order Monte Carlo simulations, which were run 1,000 times. Given the uncertainty 
around the value of the cost-effectiveness threshold (78, 81), we also produced cost-
effectiveness acceptability curves to illustrate the probability that this intervention would be 
cost-effective at different thresholds.  
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Budget, health and food security impact of implementing the intervention over the next 
5 years 
We used the Spectrum model to estimate the number of people initiating ART per year from 
2016 to 2020 (57), and derived an estimate of severely food-insecure patients who would be 
eligible for food assistance. We then ran these cohorts of patients initiating ART over the next 
5 years through the model and estimated the incremental national costs, DALYs, and cases of 
severe food insecurity averted until 2030. 
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Table 7.1 Key assumptions and Model Parameters 
Parameter Tanzania Zambia Ethiopia Lesotho South Africa Distribu
tion 
Source(s) 
Cohort characteristics   
Cohort size  1,000 n.a. Assumption 
Age at initiation  35 
n.a. McCoy et al, 2017 (Tanzania) (28) 
Haas et al, 2015 (multi-country SSA)  
CD4 count at initiation 200 n.a. McCoy et al, 2017 (Tanzania) (28) 
Transition probabilities per cycle    
Remaining in care and virally suppressed (ICS)    
        at 6 months 0.685 (0.55 – 0.82) Beta Probability of remaining in care (Fox & 
Rosen, 2015 (multi-country SSA)(4)) x 
Rate of viral suppression (McMahon et 
al, 2013 (multi-country LMIC)(45)) 
        at 12 months  0.819 (0.66 – 0.98)  Beta 
        after 12 months  0.888 (0.71 – 1.00) Beta 
Transitioning to in care but unsuppressed (ICS  ICU)    
        at 6 months 0.135 (0.11 – 0.16) Beta Probability of remaining in care (Fox & 
Rosen, 2015 (multi-country SSA)(4))  
– probability of remaining in care and 
virally suppressed  
        at 12 months  0.108 (0.09 – 0.13) Beta 
        after 12 months1  0.047 (0.037 – 0.56) Beta 
Mortality adjusted for misclassified LTFU (IC1S  D)   
Correction factor for mortality from 
misclassified loss to follow-up (LTFU) 1.57 (1.2-8) n.a. 
Somi et al, 2012 (Tanzania)(14), 
Egger et al, 2011 (multi-country 
SSA)(48) 
        at 6 months 0.066 (0.03 – 0.10) Beta 
Assumed 3-month mortality from 
Brennan et al, 2016 (multi-country) 
        at 12 months 0.024 (0.01 – 0.035) Beta 
Fox & Rosen, 2010 (multi-country 
SSA)  
        after 12 months - other cause mortality:       Beta  
        35-39 years 0.003  
(0.003-0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003-0.005) 
0.002  
(0.002-0.003) 
0.009  
(0.007-0.011) 
0.005 
(0.004-0.006) 
 
WHO life tables  
Per cycle transition probability was 
calculated as: 
1 - (1 – five year probability)1/10 (41) 
 
        40-44 years  0.004  
(0.003-0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004-0.006) 
0.003 
(0.002-0.003) 
0.011 
(0.009-0.013) 
0.005 
(0.004-0.006) 
Beta 
        45-49 years 0.005  
(0.004-0.006) 
0.005 
(0.004-0.007) 
0.003 
(0.003-0.004) 
0.012 
(0.009-0.014) 
0.006 
(0.005-0.007) 
Beta 
        50-54 years 0.006  
(0.005-0.007) 
0.006 
(0.005-0.008) 
0.005 
(0.004-0.006) 
0.012 
(0.009-0.014) 
0.008 
(0.006-0.009) 
Beta 
        55-59 years 0.007  0.007  0.006 0.012 0.010 Beta 
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Parameter Tanzania Zambia Ethiopia Lesotho South Africa Distribu
tion 
Source(s) 
(0.006-0.008) (0.006-0.009) (0.005-0.007) (0.010-0.014) (0.008-0.012) 
        60-64 years 0.010  
(0.008-0.012) 
0.010 (0.008-
0.012) 
0.009 
(0.008-0.011) 
0.015 
(0.012-0.018) 
0.015 
(0.012-0.017) 
Beta 
        65-69 years 0.015  
(0.012-0.018) 
0.015 
(0.012-0.018) 
0.015 
(0.012-0.018) 
0.020 
(0.016-0.024) 
0.021 
(0.017-0.025) 
Beta 
        70-74 years 0.023  
(0.018-0.028) 
0.024 (0.019-
0.028) 
0.024 
(0.019-0.028) 
0.030 
(0.024-0.036) 
0.030 
(0.024-0.036) 
Beta 
        75-79 years 0.035  
(0.028-0.042) 
0.038 
(0.030-0.046) 
0.038 
(0.031-0.046) 
0.047 
(0.037-0.056) 
0.042 
(0.034-0.051) 
Beta 
        80-84 years 0.051  
(0.041-0.061) 
0.061 
(0.049-0.074) 
0.062 
(0.049-0.074) 
0.073 
(0.058-0.087) 
0.062 
(0.050-0.075) 
Beta 
        85-89 years 0.072  
(0.057-0.086) 
0.095 
(0.076-0.114) 
0.096 
(0.077-0.115) 
0.109 
(0.087-0.131) 
0.088 
(0.071-0.106) 
Beta 
        90-94 years 0.094  
(0.076-0.113) 
0.140 
(0.112-0.168) 
0.141 
(0.113-0.170) 
0.158 
(0.126-0.189) 
0.124 
(0.099-0.149) 
Beta 
        95-99+ years 0.116  
(0.093-0.14) 
0.192 (0.154-
0.231) 
0.194 
(0.155-0.233) 
0.211 
(0.169-0.253) 
0.167 
(0.134-0.201) 
Beta 
Disengaging from care (ICSOOC1)  
        at 6 months 0.114 Beta Residual probability 
        at 12 months  0.050 Beta 
        after 12 months (cycles 3-10) 0.062 Beta 
Transition probabilities from In Care Unsuppressed State  
Remaining in state (ICU) 0.363 Beta Residual probability 
Achieving viral suppression in first-line care 
(ICU IC1S) 
0.50  
(0.1-0.6) 
Beta 
Assumption. Reduced by 0.1 for every 
subsequent five-year period, and 
capped at 0 from cycle 101. 
Switching to second-line therapy from ICU 
(ICUIC2S) 
0.045  
(0.01-0.10) 
Beta 
Assumption using annual switching 
probability from Kityo et al, 2014 
(Uganda)(82) 
Disengaging from care (ICUOOC1) 
0.05  
(0-0.5) 
Beta 
Assumption. Increased by 0.1 for 
every subsequent five-year period 
until cycle 80, then reduced to adjust 
for increased mortality.   
Mortality after 6 months (ICUD)2 
0.042  
(0.01-0.08) 
Beta 
Fox & Rosen, 2010 (multi-country) 
(83) 
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Parameter Tanzania Zambia Ethiopia Lesotho South Africa Distribu
tion 
Source(s) 
Increased for every 5-year period at 
the same rate as all cause mortality 
Transition probabilities from Out of Care 1 State  
Returning to care from being out of care 
(OOC1IC1U) 
0.230 (0.03-0.43) Beta 
Kranzer & Ford, 2011 (84) 
Remaining out of care for a second cycle 
(OOC1OOC2) 
0.526 Beta 
Residual probability 
Mortality if out of care for 1 cycle (OOC1D) 0.244 (0.10-0.50) Beta 
Van Cutsem et al, 2011 (47) 
Increased for every 5-year period at 
the same rate as all cause mortality, 
but capped at 0.77. 
Transition probabilities from Out of Care 2 State  
Mortality if out of care for at least 2 cycles 
(OOC2D) 
0.349 (0.10-0.99) Beta 
Van Cutsem et al, 2011 (47) 
Increased for every 5-year period at 
the same rate as all cause mortality, 
but capped at 1. 
Remaining out of care for more than 2 cycles 
(OOC2) 
0.651 (0.01-0.9) Beta 
Residual probability 
Costs (USD 2015) per cycle  
Cost in ART care (IC1S), first-line 
147  
(66-640) 
312  
(115-881) 
100  
(40-356) 
259  
(98-874) 
 
365  
(173-1,068) 
 
Gamma 
Median (min-max) from Menzies et al, 
2011 (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Botswana)(65); Marseille et al, 2012 
(Zambia)(63); Tagar et al, 2014 (South 
Africa, Zambia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Malawi)(64) adjusted for each country 
Cost in ART care (IC2S), second-line 
559  
(279-838) 
587  
(294-1,107) 
541  
(271-812) 
568 
(284-851) 
712 
(356-6,632) 
Gamma Rosen et al, 2011 (South Africa) (67) 
Cost in ART care unsuppressed (IC1U), first-
line  
148  
(68-657) 
314  
(118-906) 
100  
(41-364) 
260 
(101-898) 
367  
(180-1,107) 
Gamma 
Rosen et al, 2008 adjustment (South 
Africa) (66) 
Health care cost of being out of ART care 
(OOC1 and OOC2)  
123  
(47-246) 
112  
(81-224) 
48  
(25 - 97) 
137  
(67-275) 
761  
(269-1,522) 
Gamma 
Guinness et al, 2002 (Kenya) (68), 
Rosen et al, 2008 (South Africa) (66) 
End-of-life costs (D) 
37  
(19-56) 
45  
(23-68) 
32  
(16-48) 
40  
(20-60) 
97 
(49-146) 
Gamma Goldie et al, 2006 (Cote d’Ivoire) (69) 
Provider cost of 6-month food assistance 
198  
(885) 
249  
(1,410) 
167  
(538) 
215  
(1,152) 
592  
(6,448) 
Gamma 
Afya costing study (see appendix 3 
S5); upper bound from Posse et al, 
2013 (Mozambique) (71) 
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Parameter Tanzania Zambia Ethiopia Lesotho South Africa Distribu
tion 
Source(s) 
Disutilities and discount rates per cycle  
Disability weight for HIV/AIDS on treatment  0.026 (0.01-0.04) Gamma 
Salomon et al, 2012 (73) Disability weight for symptomatic, pre-AIDS  0.111 (0.06-0.17) Gamma 
Disability weight for AIDS, not on treatment  0.274 (0.14-0.41) Gamma 
Disability weight for death 0.25 (0.13-0.38) Gamma Half-cycle adjustment (41) 
Discount rate for costs 
0.03 (0.0-0.05) 
Log 
normal 
iDSI reference case (72) 
Discount rate for outcomes  
0.03 (0.0-0.05) 
Log 
normal 
iDSI reference case (72) 
Intervention effects  
Adjusted risk ratio for adherence measure 
(MPR>95%) 
1.25 
(1.09-1.5) 
Log 
normal 
McCoy et al, 2017 (Tanzania) (28) 
Tirivayi et al, 2012 (Zambia) (24) 
Association between optimal adherence and 
virologic failure 
0.34  
(0.26-0.44) 
Log 
normal 
Bezabhe et al, 2016 (multi-country) 
(55) 
Intervention risk ratio for probability of being 
in care and suppressed (in first cycle) 
1.18  
(1.07-1.28) 
Log 
normal 
Effect on adherence x (1 – association 
between optimal adherence and 
virologic failure) 
Risk ratio in subsequent cycles for 
maintained adherence effect 
1.00  
(1.036) 
Log 
normal 
None (to 20%) of the adherence effect 
maintained  
Adjusted risk ratio for probability of dying or 
being LTFU (in first cycle) 
0.138  
(0.90) 
Log 
normal 
McCoy et al, 2017 (Tanzania) (28) 
Lamb et al, 2012 (multi-country)  (23) 
Transmission model parameters  
HIV prevalence 
0.047  
(0.042-0.053) 
0.129  
(0.123-0.134) 
0.02 
(0.018-0.022) 
0.227  
(0.208-0.243) 
0.192  
(0.184-0.20) 
Beta UNAIDS (2) 
Base probability of HIV transmission per act 0.0033 (0.0006-0.006) Beta Boily et al, 2009 (85) 
Multiplier for the effect of condom use 
0.79  
(0.71-0.87) 
0.86 
(0.77-0.95) 
0.94 
(0.89-0.98) 
0.77 
(0.69-0.85) 
0.67 
(0.60-0.73) 
Beta Calculated as condom efficacy x 
average condom use. Condom 
efficacy = 0.8 (86, 87). See text S2 
Multiplier for the effect of male circumcision 
0.50  
(0.45-0.55) 
0.78 
(0.70-0.86) 
0.54 
(0.49-0.60) 
0.59  
(0.53-0.64) 
0.66 
(0.60-0.73) 
Beta Male circumcision efficacy = 0.6 (88) 
Number of acts per partner per year 38 (19-57) 69 (55-83) 36 (29-43) 61 (49-73) 63 (51-76) Gamma Spectrum/Goals (57) 
Number of partners per year 8 (4-12) 3 (2-5) 4 (2-6) 3 (2-5) 11 (5-16) Gamma Spectrum/Goals (57) 
Multiplier for the effect of stage of infection 4.45 (1-8) Beta Spectrum/Goals (57) 
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Parameter Tanzania Zambia Ethiopia Lesotho South Africa Distribu
tion 
Source(s) 
Multiplier for effect of treatment 0.04 (0.01-0.10) 
Beta Hazard ratio for HIV incidence among 
serodiscordant couples on ART 
Cohen et al, 2011 (56)  
Discounted lifetime ART costs 
7,224  
(5,618-8,427) 
7,667  
(6,134-9,200) 
6,948  
(5,558-8,338) 
7,343  
(5,874-8,812) 
12,430  
(9,944-14,916) 
Gamma Cleary et al 2008 (89) 
Intervention food security effects and opportunity costs  
Risk ratio for severe food insecurity  0.76 (0.6-0.97) 
Log 
normal 
Palar et al, 2015 (Honduras) (59) 
Base case food insecurity (6 months after the 
intervention) 
0.67 (0.50-0.80) 
Beta Fahey et al, 2017 (Tanzania) 
Unit cost of alternative food security 
intervention (cash transfer) 
118  
(56-176) 
219  
(109-328) 
64  
(32-96) 
148  
(74-222) 
778  
(389-1,167) 
Gamma Chiwele 2010 (Zambia) (79) 
Percentage point increase in not severely 
food insecure households among cash 
transfer beneficiaries 
0.177 (0.09-0.27) 
Log 
normal 
Seidenfeld et al 2014 (Zambia) (80) 
Cost per household food insecurity averted 332 618 180 418 2,197 Gamma Calculated from above parameters 
Notes: Parameters used in the main analysis are followed by the lower and upper bounds used in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis between parentheses. 1After 100 cycles, 
this is conservatively used as the clearing variable, as mortality increases. 2After cycle 10, this is increased at the same rate as ‘all-cause mortality’ from the WHO life tables.  
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7.3 Results 
In the base case cohort simulation (no food assistance), nearly 60%, 35% and 23% of the food-
insecure patients initiating ART would be alive after 5, 10 and 15 years in all 5 countries, 
respectively, with marginally lower figures in Lesotho (see appendix 3 Figure S5). The lifetime 
of the cohort – i.e. the time between ART initiation and the death of the last person – ranged 
from 60 years in Lesotho, to about 67 years in Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia, and South Africa. 
Between 19,342 (Lesotho) and 24,985 (Ethiopia) DALYs would have been lost in this cohort of 
1,000 patients, mainly due to premature death (see Table 7.2). 12% of deaths would have 
occurred in the first 6 months after initiation. 
At 5 years post-initiation of ART an estimated 51% of the cohort would still be in care, and of 
those 91% would be virally suppressed (see appendix 3 Table S4). Just over 6% of those in 
care would have switched to second-line therapy. Around 8-9% of those who were alive would 
have disengaged from care. After about 25 years, all those who were still alive would be in 
care. 
The introduction of the 6-month food assistance intervention would lead to an increase in 
survival to 69%, 40% and 27% at 5, 10 and 15 years after initiation, respectively (again slightly 
lower figures in Lesotho) (see appendix 3 Figure S6). As presented in Table 7.2, this would 
result in a concomitant reduction in DALYs over the lifetime of the cohort to between 18,229 
(Lesotho) and 23,426 (Ethiopia). With incremental costs between USD327,138 (Ethiopia) and 
USD1.2 million (South Africa), the intervention would have a mean cost of USD210 per DALY 
averted in Ethiopia; USD310 per DALY averted in Tanzania; USD556 per DALY averted in 
Zambia; USD600 per DALY averted in Lesotho; and USD889 in South Africa. These estimates 
are all below half the countries’ GDP per capita and therefore cost-effective, except in Lesotho 
where it is just over the threshold. In all cases, there would be a net benefit of the intervention, 
with the highest economic return in Ethiopia and the lowest in South Africa.   
Taking a broader perspective to consider potential intervention effects on secondary HIV 
transmission, we found that given the improvement in survival, there was only a reduction in 
HIV transmission in the first year or two, followed by increased transmission from the fact that 
more people were alive. This led to a slight increase in future ART costs across the board, and 
minor changes in DALYs averted, which did not change the cost-effectiveness significantly, 
except in South Africa where it became more cost-effective (see Table 7.2).   
Finally, in the multi-sectoral perspective with co-financing, we estimated that the intervention 
would pull 160 individuals in the cohort and their households out of severe food insecurity in 
the first 6 months on ART (with no sustained effect thereafter). Given what is spent on cash 
transfer programmes to achieve this same food security outcome, we estimated that the social 
protection payer would be willing to contribute between USD29,000 (Ethiopia) and USD352,000 
(South Africa) to the intervention costs (see Table 7.2). This represents 17% to 60% of the 
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direct intervention costs, but only 9% to 27% of the total incremental costs from its 
implementation over the cohort’s lifetime (including indirect costs from increased health service 
use and net ART costs/savings from secondary infections). The cost per DALY averted for the 
HIV payer is thus reduced to USD191 in Ethiopia; USD278 in Tanzania; USD501 in Zambia; 
USD536 in Lesotho; and USD566 in South Africa. It therefore becomes more cost-effective and 
provides an economic return of up to USD3.9 for every dollar invested in Ethiopia.     
As illustrated in the panel in Figure 7.2, if policy-makers would fully discount future costs and 
benefits beyond 5 or 15 years, and thereby take a more short-term approach to prioritisation, 
the intervention would be cost-effective across all countries and even cost-saving in the broader 
perspectives in South Africa and Tanzania.   
Univariate sensitivity analyses are presented in Figure 7.3 for the multi-sectoral perspective. 
We find that the intervention’s cost-effectiveness is very sensitive to the cost of the intervention 
and the size of the adherence and attrition effects. In particular, if the intervention cost was 
closer to the estimate in Posse et al (71) (which was a larger food basket), it would not be cost-
effective in any of the 5 countries (see Figure 7.3e). Even a moderate maintenance of 20% of 
the adherence effect over the cohort’s lifetime would make the intervention cost-saving in all 
countries. Surprisingly, a reduced attrition effect would improve cost-effectiveness, possibly 
because of less HIV transmission and related ART costs from patients who would die earlier. 
The result for South Africa is the most sensitive to variations in model parameters, but due to 
its much higher threshold (higher GDP per capita), it remains cost-effective in most cases. Our 
results are moderately sensitive to the DALY discount rate, but less sensitive to the food 
security effect, mortality correction factor to adjust for misclassified LTFU and the switching rate 
to second-line therapy.  
Results from the probabilistic sensitivity analysis and the cost-effectiveness acceptability 
curves (see Figure 7.4) suggest that the intervention is likely to be cost-effective for all 
perspectives in Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia. It may even be cost-saving in South Africa. 
For a WTP threshold of half each country’s GDP per capita, the probability that the intervention 
would be cost-effective is highest in South Africa (90-92%), followed by Ethiopia (81-84%), 
Tanzania (74-79%), and Zambia (65-71%). For Lesotho, it is least likely to be cost-effective 
(42-53%).  
When we run the model with the expected cohorts of eligible patients receiving the intervention 
from 2016-2020, we find a similar pattern across countries. The incremental costs until 2030 of 
implementing the intervention would be USD92 million in Tanzania, or USD75 million with co-
financing, and it would avert about 9,500 deaths and 555,700 DALYs, as well as resulting in 
nearly 48,000 fewer households being food-insecure for the first 6 months following ART 
initiation. In Zambia, the incremental cost would be between USD74 million and USD89 million, 
for about 5,200 deaths and 279,500 DALYs averted, as well as 25,000 fewer food-insecure 
households. In Ethiopia, for an incremental cost between USD24 million and USD27 million, 
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about 3,000 deaths, 192,300 DALYs and nearly 16,000 cases of household food insecurity 
would be averted. The findings for Lesotho suggest that the intervention would cost between 
USD20 million and USD24 million, and avert 72,700 DALYs, 1,600 deaths, and 7,800 food-
insecure households. Finally, South Africa, with its low levels of food insecurity but large 
number of patients initiating ART, could provide 6-month food assistance to severely food-
insecure patients for the next five years and save between USD35–55 million, and avert 1,900 
deaths, 400 new HIV infections and 124,400 DALYs, as well as prevent about 9,200 cases of 
household food insecurity.   
 
Table 7.2 Cost-effectiveness and economic returns over cohort lifetime  
 Tanzania Zambia Ethiopia Lesotho 
South 
Africa 
Base Case      
Costs (USD) 2,968,683 4,760,264 2,314,350 3,967,025 6,520,376 
DALYs 23,016 23,661 24,985 19,342 22,242 
Intervention case 1: Health care cohort perspective without transmission 
Costs (USD) 3,415,422 5,564,502 2,641,489 4,634,819 7,737,829 
DALYs 21,573 22,214 23,426 18,229 20,873 
Incremental costs 
(USD) 
446,739 804,238 327,138 667,794 1,217,453 
Incremental DALYs 
averted  
1,443 1,447 1,559 1,113 1,369 
ICER (USD) 310 556 210 600 889 
BCR 3.2 1.8 4.8 1.7 1.1 
Intervention case 2: Health care perspective with transmission  
Incremental costs 
(USD) 
463,578 840,045 327,883 677,628 1,305,615 
Incremental HIV 
infections averted 
-24 -29 -2 -22 -207 
Incremental DALYs 
averted  
1,476 1,480 1,562 1,140 1,685 
ICER (USD) 314 568 210 595 775 
BCR 3.2 1.8 4.8 1.7 1.3 
Intervention case 3: Multi-sectoral perspective 
Incremental costs 
(USD) 
410,371 741,032 299,018 610,572 484,401 
Incremental DALYs 
averted 
1,476 1,480 1,562 1,140 1,685 
ICER (USD) 278 501 191 536 566 
BCR 3.3 1.9 4.9 1.8 1.6 
 
Note: DALY: Disability-Adjusted Life Years, ICER: Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio; BCR: Benefit-
Cost Ratio. All costs and benefits are discounted at 3%. Incremental costs and outcomes under each 
perspective are incremental compared to the base case. Country cost-effectiveness thresholds at 0.5 x 
GDP per capita are: USD 471 for Tanzania; USD 675 for Zambia; USD 344 for Ethiopia; USD 526 for 
Lesotho; USD 2,848 for South Africa.    
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Figure 7.2 Incremental cost-effectiveness at 5 years, 15 years and lifetime 
a) Tanzania 
 
b) Zambia 
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c) Ethiopia 
 
d) Lesotho 
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e) South Africa  
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Note: The diamond labels are the point estimates in the main analysis. All negative 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios are from negative incremental costs, not negative incremental DALYs, and thus represent cost savings.   
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Figure 7.4 Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves for each perspective per country 
a) Tanzania 
 
 
b) Zambia 
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c) Ethiopia 
 
 
d) Lesotho 
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e) South Africa 
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Table 7.3 Costs and DALYs averted until 2030 by implementing the intervention for 5 years 
(2016-2020) 
 Tanzania Zambia Ethiopia Lesotho South Africa 
Population      
Total ART Initiates1 (2016-
2020) 
764,716 325,968 255,588 127,703 1,150,559 
Proportion food-insecure2 39% 48% 39% 38% 5% 
Total number of eligible 
initiates 
301,298 156,465 98,913 48,527 57,528 
Base Case (no 
intervention) 
     
Costs  609,721,061  533,119,195  142,852,121  146,837,318   292,726,941  
Deaths  230,566  100,907  75,825   36,994   43,672  
DALYs  6,252,954  3,144,866  2,232,381   831,135   1,143,546  
Intervention case 1: Health care cohort perspective without 
transmission 
  
Incremental costs 117,372,680  106,438,012  27,993,715   28,455,561   63,010,642  
Incremental DALYs averted  542,145 273,771  191,815   70,871   99,996  
Deaths averted 9,521 5,157 3,076 1,623 1,894 
ICER 216 389 146 402 630 
BCR 4.6 2.6 6.9 2.5 1.6 
Intervention case 2: Health care perspective with transmission   
Incremental costs 91,643,328 88,858,523  27,246,976   23,690,112  -34,907,368  
Incremental DALYs averted  555,707 279,494  192,261   72,656   124,418  
Infections averted -700 -642 -14 44 423 
ICER 165 318 142 326 Cost saving 
BCR 6.1 3.2 7.1 3.1 n.a. 
Intervention case 3: Multi-sectoral perspective   
Incremental costs 75,612,094   74,466,419  24,391,815   20,436,059  -55,168,328  
Incremental DALYs averted  555,707 279,494  192,261   72,656   124,418  
Food-insecure households 
averted (6 months)  
48,292 25,077 15,854 7,779 9,221 
ICER 136 266 127 281 Cost saving 
BCR 7.4 3.8 7.9 3.6 n.a. 
Note: DALY: Disability-Adjusted Life Years, ICER: Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio; BCR: Benefit-
Cost Ratio. All costs and benefits are discounted to their net present value in 2015 USD at 3% discount 
rate. Incremental costs and outcomes under each perspective are incremental compared to the base 
case. 1Extracted from Spectrum at a 500 CD4 eligibility threshold. 2Sources: Tanzania (90); Zambia (27); 
Ethiopia (91); South Africa (92); Lesotho (assumption).    
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7.4 Discussion 
This study assessed the costs, outcomes and economic returns of a 6-month food support 
intervention to food-insecure patients initiating ART in different settings in sub-Saharan Africa. We 
hypothesised that given the evidence on the positive effects of such an intervention on retention in 
care and adherence to treatment, and the high rates of LTFU and mortality in the critical period 
immediately following ART initiation, this intervention may also be a valuable investment for 
particularly vulnerable groups, alongside the continued expansion of treatment. This is of 
significance, considering that the prevalence of moderate and severe food insecurity among people 
eligible for or having recently initiated ART has been found to range between 68% and 90% in parts 
of East Africa (90, 93, 94). We found that food assistance for this population may be a cost-effective 
complementary intervention for HIV treatment programmes, if its short-term effects on adherence 
and attrition can be generalised beyond the Tanzanian setting and if its cost is minimised. Given 
its potential short-term impact on household food security, it may also be valued by the social 
protection sector and therefore co-financed, further increasing its cost-effectiveness for the HIV 
payer. In Lesotho, however, it is unlikely to be cost-effective in the long-term. Looking across 
countries with large HIV epidemics, we found that the intervention would be expected to have a 
higher net economic benefit in a context like Ethiopia with low price levels, while it would only have 
a marginal net benefit in South Africa, where high ART costs would offset some of the monetised 
benefits. Taking a broader perspective to consider the potential effect on secondary HIV 
transmission, only slightly increased the net benefit across countries.  
This study is the first economic evaluation of food assistance or nutritional support for ART patients 
using empirical cost and effectiveness data, as well as modelling outcomes through to DALYs, as 
recommended by current guidelines (72). A previous study evaluated the cost-effectiveness of a 
similar nutritional supplementation intervention in Zambia, using hypothetical mortality and 
retention effects (53), while another study estimated the cost per case of LTFU averted (based on 
an evaluation with significant selection bias) (95). Our study is also the first to compare costs and 
outcomes across different country settings.   
Our findings suggest that such an intervention is likely to be cost-effective if delivered through a 
low-cost model with local suppliers (28). Unlike Koethe et al (2014), we find that food assistance 
can be good value-for-money at food unit costs well above USD 5 per quarter in Zambia (53), but 
would need to remain well below the overall cost per person found in a programme in Mozambique 
that provided a larger food basket (USD 288 per quarter) (71). Food assistance may be a good HIV 
investment if costs can be minimised through a smaller individual food basket, and distribution 
costs further contained, even in places with limited food supply. While this may be the best mode 
of delivery to achieve nutritional outcomes in settings with limited local food availability and poorly 
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functioning markets, it has substantial logistical costs. Indeed, the intervention in Mozambique 
understandably reported double the food costs per person, but it also had three times the non-food 
costs found in our study (after adjusting for income level). There has been experimentation with 
alternative models of delivery of assistance to food-insecure households, including vouchers and 
cash transfers, which can be cheaper to deliver, and may be preferred by beneficiaries where food 
is locally available, but their nutritional impacts have varied (28, 96-98). Future research to evaluate 
the cost-effectiveness of these strategies under various circumstances would be warranted.   
Given the potential cross-sectoral outcomes of such a food support intervention, we adopted a co-
financing approach in our modelling (60). In this conceptual investment framework, we reflected on 
who the potential payers were, and what they would be trying to maximise when allocating their 
resources between interventions. The delivery platforms used for food and nutrition support are 
particularly important, because they reflect financing channels and budget holders. We therefore 
sought to estimate what level of HIV impact and programme costs would warrant a co-financing 
contribution from the HIV payer if this was programmatically delivered by the social protection 
sector; or the ART programme. It was clear that most of the direct costs would be covered by the 
HIV budget in Zambia (60%), Tanzania (73%), and Ethiopia (83%). However, in South Africa, only 
about 40% of direct intervention costs would remain to be covered by the HIV programme, after 
deducting the social protection sector’s share. In this case, it would probably be feasible for the HIV 
payer to only pay the unit costs of the food provided to HIV patients (i.e. about a third of the direct 
cost), as well as part of the operational mark-up, but rely on the social protection budget to cover 
the remaining operational costs of delivery. 
The study has a number of limitations that we sought to mitigate. We made several assumptions 
in the design and parameterisation of our model, due to limited data availability. In the absence of 
survival, retention in care and viral load data from country-specific cohorts of patients that were 
food-insecure upon initiation, we were not able to externally validate our model. Although we used 
multi-country data of ART cohorts in low and middle-income countries to calibrate the model, these 
average outcomes are likely to be more favourable than the outcomes for patients who are food-
insecure when starting ART and thus the effect of the intervention may be underestimated. The 
same is true when using all-cause mortality as a proxy for non-AIDS mortality rates. We adopted a 
similarly conservative approach across the board. For example, we did not model the increased 
risk of virologic failure from patients falling in and out of care (84) and the indirect effect of improved 
adherence on reducing the need to switch to second-line therapy – an important cost driver (89). 
Also, in the main analysis, we did not consider the potential long-term effect of food assistance on 
adherence beyond the 6-month period, although there is some evidence that improvements early 
on can be sustained (90, 99). The sensitivity analysis shows that this would make the intervention 
cost-saving in all countries. We also assumed a gender-balanced cohort and did not consider any 
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additional impact on vertical transmission of increasing viral suppression among pregnant women, 
nor any intergenerational effects of improved household food security (100). Moreover, we 
incorporated probabilistic sensitivity analyses to account for parameter uncertainty.  
Nonetheless, further limitations remain. First, there is the underlying limitation of the memory-less 
Markov model, which ignores previous individual pathways between states (41). Second, although 
our sensitivity analysis incorporates evidence from several effectiveness studies, our primary 
analysis is based on a single trial in Tanzania, which may be context-specific. Third, we use a 
simplified static model to explore the HIV transmission effect, which would be more accurately 
modelled in an individual dynamic micro-simulation model. Finally, the potential incremental food 
security effect came from a small study from Honduras among established ART patients (not 
initiates) (59). Since none of the trials in sub-Saharan Africa evaluated the intervention against a 
food security outcome, it is unclear whether such an effect can be expected, and thus any co-
financing justified. Even so, our inclusion of this as the only non-health consequence is likely to be 
limited (101).    
Future research should consider exploring the value for money of alternative models of intervention 
for this food-insecure target group that have also been found to effectively improve adherence, 
such as cash transfers (90), economic strengthening and agricultural livelihoods interventions (32). 
Although not food-based, cash transfers in particular may have lower costs, broader impacts 
beyond HIV, and more potential for scalability in settings with food availability, functioning markets, 
and mobile money transfer services (97). In addition, given the major challenge in linking diagnosed 
patients to care, food support interventions at initiation could serve as an effective demand-side 
incentive to nudge people into care, thus overcoming the second major hurdle in the treatment 
cascade (3, 7). Combined with peer adherence support, this may be particularly effective at 
improving virologic outcomes (102). The economic livelihood type interventions may be better 
suited for 3-6 months after ART initiation, following a period of in-kind or cash support, as a means 
of sustaining the adherence effect and promoting a range of other socio-economic outcomes for 
these vulnerable households.  
While food and nutrition support could play a key role in optimising HIV treatment outcomes, there 
is also evidence to suggest that food insecurity increases high risk sexual behaviour, especially 
among women and adolescent girls, and that food-based interventions targeted at this vulnerable 
group could impact on persistently high rates of HIV transmission (103-105). For example, school 
feeding and household food parcels are associated with reduced risky sexual behaviours, such as 
transactional and intergenerational sex (106). It would therefore be worth assessing their potential 
value for money, based on their envisaged effects on HIV incidence and school enrolment (107). 
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The new global development agenda highlights the importance of interlinkages and the indivisibility 
of the SDGs. Preliminary results suggest that investments in reducing food insecurity and ending 
hunger could contribute to better HIV outcomes, through improved treatment adherence and 
retention in care. HIV-sensitive social protection programmes that reach individuals at risk and 
affected by HIV could therefore enhance the response. Rather than competing with such 
complementary programmes in a zero-sum game, the HIV response might consider co-investing 
in them to ensure they reach optimal scale and enhance the efficiency of HIV treatment and 
prevention efforts. 
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CHAPTER 8 Co-financing upstream programmes with multi-
sectoral benefits: Feasibility, Barriers and 
Enablers in Tanzania 
 
8.1 Introduction  
The international community has adopted ambitious targets to end the HIV epidemic as a public 
health threat by 2030. This will require a fast-tracked response to ensure high levels of effective 
treatment coverage, as well as intensified prevention efforts to achieve a substantial reduction 
in incidence (1). However, current global estimates suggest significant challenges along the 
prevention and treatment cascades (2, 3), and it is increasingly recognised that these targets 
will not be achieved without addressing structural barriers to service uptake and adherence, as 
well as structural drivers of HIV risk (4). There is evidence to suggest that structural 
interventions, such as social cash transfers or secondary schooling, could effectively prevent 
HIV transmission and improve treatment outcomes, among other health and development 
impacts (5-9). Yet, since such interventions tend to have non-HIV primary objectives and to be 
implemented in other sectors, valuing them based on a single HIV outcome, is likely to lead to 
their under-prioritisation (10, 11), and potentially sub-optimal financing decisions (12, 13).  
Pooling HIV financing with other disease-specific and broader development sector budgets to 
implement upstream interventions with multiple benefits - or ‘co-financing’ - may contribute to 
optimising the efficiency of HIV spending, without crowding out health system strengthening 
and social development programmes with spill-over HIV benefits (10, 14-17). Other sectors and 
disease programmes could also gain from the prioritisation of such win-win interventions, 
provided that costs are shared (12). For example, although an education reform to extend 
secondary schooling could significantly reduce HIV incidence, it may not be a cost-effective 
way to spend HIV resources, if assumed that the HIV budget would fund the full programme 
(5). Given its educational benefits, the education budget may consider funding it, but lack the 
resources to cover its full cost. In this case, it could be more cost-effective for both the HIV 
budget and the education budget to jointly contribute to the programme through a co-financing 
mechanism, in order to reap its full benefits (18).    
In practice, such intra- and cross-sectoral coordination and joint budgeting have proven to be 
institutionally challenging in a number of high-income countries, in the broader context of 
‘joined-up government’, as well as in the areas of health promotion and integrated care (16, 19-
21). While there have been some successes with these mechanisms in terms of strengthening 
interdisciplinary and inter-organisational collaboration for mutual benefits, there have been 
considerable barriers, related to professional identities, differential power relationships, lack of 
Chapter 8 – Co-financing Feasibility 
188 
 
trust, legislative obstacles, entrenched sectoral accountabilities and unresolved value pluralism 
(20-23).  
Yet, the changing development and HIV financing landscape may heighten the need to make 
integrated approaches work (24). The new global development agenda and its 17 
interconnected Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) calls for effective inter-sectoral 
coordination and action (25). While the HIV sub-sector’s appetite for financing structural 
interventions was previously low (11), the constriction of international HIV financing may create 
the policy space for more innovative financing approaches that leverage other sectoral 
investments (24, 26). 
This study seeks to understand the operational feasibility, as well as the institutional barriers, 
enablers, and (dis)incentives to adopting a co-financing framework for programmes with 
multiple benefits, with a focus on structural HIV interventions in Tanzania. As a low-income 
country with a generalised HIV epidemic, an HIV response that is almost entirely externally-
financed and multiple competing development priorities, Tanzania could stand to benefit from 
financing mechanisms that yield efficiency gains and cost savings across sectors (27).   
In this paper, we first present the study setting and methods used to explore policy-makers’ 
perceptions about resource allocation and how co-financing might fit into existing processes. 
Next, we report on our findings from the qualitative analysis of interviews with these decision-
makers, focusing on institutional structures, barriers and enablers. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of our findings for the application and adoption of co-financing for upstream 
programmes.  
 
8.2 Methods 
To understand the real-world feasibility of adopting a co-financing approach to resource 
allocation, the study sought to elicit insights from decision-makers directly involved in planning 
and budgeting in Tanzania. The theoretical underpinnings of the study are rooted in the 
positivist discipline of health economics, with insights from political economy theories (28). 
Although there is likely an objective reality of how resources are allocated, it is acknowledged 
that the interaction between the researcher and the research subjects would allow for a joint 
construction, or co-production and interpretation of the institutional feasibility of applying this 
relatively novel approach to public financing (29). 
The study built on previous work to develop and specify the co-financing framework, and two 
case studies of cash transfer interventions with empirical evidence of multi-sectoral HIV and 
non-HIV impacts in Tanzania and Malawi (7, 9). To ground the interviews in the national context 
and reality, and minimise hypothetical biases, the study drew on the Tanzanian national cash 
transfer programme (TASAF) as a tangible example to explore for co-financing (30). Below, we 
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describe the co-financing framework, followed by the study setting and cash transfer 
intervention focus, before explaining our data collection and analysis methods in more detail.  
Co-financing conceptual framework  
It is well accepted that population health is a result of several biological, environmental, 
behavioural and social factors, and while access to quality health care services is critical, there 
are a range of other non-health interventions that contribute to improvements in health 
outcomes (31). Yet, the theory and to a large extent the reality of priority-setting for health, 
tends to focus on intervention options within the health care system (32-36). Moreover, when 
considering economic efficiency in resource allocation, the dominant evaluation framework of 
cost-effectiveness analysis is built around comparing the relationship between health care 
inputs (costs) and a single measure of health gain (either in natural units, disability-adjusted or 
quality-adjusted life years). Non-health interventions with non-health primary objectives are 
therefore likely to be undervalued, given that their other benefits will not be factored in (37). 
While this may explain why such interventions are rarely considered by health decision-makers, 
it could also lead to inefficient resource allocation and ultimately health losses (12). The 
recommended approach for the economic evaluation of such interventions is to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis, where all the benefits of interventions are monetised, thereby allowing for 
multi-sectoral outcomes to be valued. However, the public health and medical community tend 
to exclude this approach, given the controversial requirement of converting health outcomes 
and thus lives into monetary values (38).   
The co-financing approach, on the other hand, is embedded in the current cost-effectiveness 
framework, while enabling non-health benefits and payers to be part of the equation (10). It 
would allow a health payer to re-allocate part of its budget to non-health interventions that 
achieved a health gain more efficiently than its least efficient health care intervention (its 
opportunity cost), provided that other benefiting sectors would also contribute their own 
resources. Co-financing can therefore be defined as the joint financing of interventions by 
multiple payers with distinct disease-specific or sector-specific objectives.  
There are two major assumptions underlying the approach. Firstly, each payer, or budget 
holder, is allocating its resources to maximise a specific outcome. Secondly, each payer has a 
single constraint, namely its available budget. Although it is clear that priority-setting rightfully 
involves several criteria and considerations (39) – of which efficiency is only one, the aim of 
economic evaluation is to identify the most efficient investments, and thus the trade-offs that 
would come from alternative allocations. From this angle, it is a reasonable simplification to 
assume that a rational decision-maker would be seeking to optimise their objectives, subject to 
the resources available. Based on the costs and multi-sectoral impacts of an intervention, the 
application of a co-financing approach would therefore require the identification of the key 
payers that are optimising the impacted outcomes, their respective budget constraints and 
opportunity costs.  
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Study setting 
Tanzania’s health policy is embedded in the national vision and development strategy. The 
National Development Vision 2025 aims to transform the nation into a middle-income and semi-
industrialised country. The second National Five Year Development Plan (2016/17-2021/22) 
lays out the priorities and approaches the government and national stakeholders have adopted 
to realise this vision, with a focus on “nurturing industrialisation for economic transformation 
and human development” (40). The Medium Term Economic Framework (MTEF) translates this 
strategic plan into a realistic medium-term public expenditure programme for budgeting 
purposes. Based on this overarching institutional framework, each sector has further developed 
medium-term plans specifying their intermediate outcomes, outputs and activities. These guide 
the annual budgeting exercises at the national level.  
The government is divided into two tiers of administration, namely the central level (including 
central ministries and 31 regional administrations) and the local government level (consisting 
of 169 districts). In the late nineties, Tanzania started implementing a local government reform 
programme of decentralisation by devolution (41). The reforms have devolved increasing fiscal 
responsibilities to the local government authorities that are now responsible for planning, 
budgeting, implementing and monitoring public service delivery. They plan and budget for 
central government resources they receive through block grants to supplement locally-
generated revenues.   
Official development assistance provided by bilateral and multilateral development partners 
remains an important source of development financing. In certain sectors, this aid represents a 
substantial or even the largest share of overall resources. For example, in health, 40% of total 
health financing was from external sources, according to the last National Health Accounts 
report (42). A review of public HIV expenditures reported that 98% of the response was 
externally-financed in 2012 (27). Development partners are therefore powerful actors in these 
(sub-)sectors’ priority-setting and resource allocation processes (43, 44).    
TASAF programme 
The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) programme is a poverty reduction and social 
protection programme aimed at increasing income, consumption and resilience to shocks, as 
well as protecting the human capital of children in extremely poor households. TASAF is 
currently in its third phase and consists of four components: (i) the Productive Social Safety Net 
(PSSN), which has a cash transfer sub-component (delivered to the poorest households, partly 
conditional on school attendance and under-five health visits); and a public works sub-
component for households with able-bodied adults; (ii) a livelihood component for those in 
target households that want to engage in productive income-generating activities, with skills 
development, community savings and livelihood enhancement grants; (iii) targeted 
infrastructure development; and (iv) capacity building (45).    
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The programme was initially funded by the World Bank through a loan, but it has since attracted 
additional grant funding from the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), as well as commitments from USAID. Four 
UN agencies are also providing technical assistance. The Tanzanian government is yet to 
disburse its own committed funds. PSSN was scaled up rapidly in 2014/15 and reached 70% 
of its target villages by mid-2016, i.e. 1.1 million households, making it the second largest cash 
transfer programme in sub-Saharan Africa (45).   
The first component of the programme is particularly interesting in the context of co-financing, 
because when the pilot cash transfer scheme was evaluated, it was found to have significant 
impacts on increasing girls’ school completion rates, reducing household members’ reported 
morbidity, increasing household membership of community-based health insurance, and 
increasing households’ agricultural assets (30). Given these demonstrated benefits across 
sectors, the example of TASAF was used to frame the study instruments.  
Data collection 
Data was collected in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania from December 2015 to December 2016 by 
the first author of this study, through a series of semi-structured interviews with national policy-
makers and budget holders. Building on the potential and demonstrated multi-sectoral benefits 
of the PSSN, a rapid mapping was first conducted of the main relevant payers (budgetary 
authorities) in the HIV, health, social protection and food security sectors. Policy-makers were 
then purposively selected within these sectors on the basis of their positions and involvement 
in planning and resource allocation, and sector coordination.  
The interview guide explored the principles used in resource allocation and their application to 
cross-sectoral programmes, as well as the perceived institutional feasibility of a co-financing 
approach. Specifically, it started by investigating how the planning and priority-setting within 
the remit of the respondent had been done for the current medium-term plan and annual 
budgeting cycle; what criteria were considered; what outcomes/objectives were being 
optimised; and what constraints each decision-maker faced.  
Next, a set of questions were designed to determine each sector’s opportunity cost, by eliciting 
decision-maker’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for key sectoral outcomes. In economics, WTP is 
the maximum amount an individual is willing to sacrifice to consume a good or service, and is 
by definition less or equal to their ability to pay (46). In health economic evaluation, the cost-
effectiveness of an intervention is often compared to an estimate of society’s WTP for an 
additional unit of health outcome (47). In a welfarist economic framework, this would represent 
the average across individuals’ WTP, whereas in extra-welfarism, it reflects the decision-
maker’s marginal productivity, or how much they are currently paying to produce their most 
expensive unit of outcome (48, 49). To elicit the latter, questions were adapted from individual 
WTP methods, in particular contingent valuation that elicits a monetary value of individual’s 
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preference for a good, service or policy change (50). This involves clearly formulating the 
valuation problem and describing the expected impact of the policy, and then asking the 
respondent to state their WTP for it. Given the limitations of these methods, the intention was 
not to get a precise measure of WTP, rather the expectation was that this would draw out any 
normative thresholds or rules of thumb that were explicitly or implicitly applied (51). As an 
alternative, respondents were also asked to identify their currently least efficient interventions, 
as an indication of their maximum WTP per unit of outcome.   
Finally, the topic guide re-introduced co-financing with the TASAF example, and evidence of 
the programme’s and other cash transfer interventions’ multi-sectoral impacts. It then explored 
respondents’ perceptions on the benefits, risks, barriers, enablers, and potential mechanisms 
for implementing cross-budget co-financing.  
In preparation for the interviews, a document review was conducted to enable more informed 
discussions around national planning and priority-setting, including national development 
frameworks, medium-term plans and monitoring and evaluation frameworks, as well as sector-
specific strategic plans and frameworks (health, HIV, social protection, agriculture). In addition, 
the United Nations Development Assistance Plan and other bilateral and multilateral 
development partners’ country programme documents were reviewed. 
Data analysis 
The interview transcripts and the researcher’s interview and post-interview notes formed the 
basis for the analysis, while the data from the documents reviewed were used to support and 
validate the issues that emerged. Principles of grounded theory were applied (52). First, we 
read through all the interviews to identify high-level general themes. Second, we coded each 
interview transcript and the interview notes using a mixed deductive and inductive approach to 
identify key concepts and new ideas (53). Third, we organised the data into groups of ideas or 
categories that were more generalizable. To evaluate the institutional feasibility of co-financing, 
we considered how these categories related to the assumptions of co-financing, and where 
they did not, we analysed to what extent co-financing could be applied within the existing 
resource allocation processes. The analysis was conducted in NVivo 10. 
Ethical issues 
Ethical approval was obtained from the LSHTM Research Ethics Committee, the University of 
California, Berkeley’s Institutional Review Board, the Tanzanian National Institute for Medical 
Research (NIMR) and the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). 
All study participants chose to participate and provided written consent. Interviews were 
anonymised and participants are quoted with reference to their broad institutional category 
(government, bilateral or multilateral development partner).    
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8.3 Results 
Twenty respondents were interviewed, of which 9 were government officials, and 11 were 
senior officials among key bilateral and multilateral development partners. 35% were in the HIV 
sub-sector; 20% in the broader health sector; 25% in the social protection sector, 10% in the 
food security sector, and 10% in government body above the sectoral level, responsible for 
sector coordination or finance. 65% were departmental directors, organisational country 
directors, or their deputies; while 35% were senior advisors or heads of sections.   
Insights from these decision-makers in the Tanzanian context revealed that the simplifying 
assumptions underlying the co-financing approach (and most standard health economic 
evaluation techniques), did not reflect the reality of resource allocation, where efficiency was 
only one of many considerations, and where budgetary authorities were constrained by many 
more factors than the level of the budget. Moreover, willingness-to-pay per outcome was not a 
working concept in resource allocation decisions, and would therefore not serve as a useful tool 
for negotiation around each benefiting payer’s co-financing share. Despite these issues, the 
data suggested that co-financing could still be applied with some real-world adjustments, and 
that there were even examples of how the principles and to a certain extent the financing 
mechanism were already in place. Respondents identified specific enabling factors, but also 
several risks and barriers that would need to be overcome.  
1. Co-financing appears to be institutionally feasible, as some examples exist and 
others are being explored 
The notion of co-financing was deemed feasible by several respondents, but also met with 
some scepticism. The primary enabler that was consistently identified was the need for 
compelling evidence of impact across sectors, as the basis for any co-financing mechanism to 
be considered. Costs and cost-effectiveness compared to alternative investments was not often 
mentioned in this context. Evidence of impact seemed to be enough to bring different sectors 
and funders to the table.  
“I am telling you the truth it is the evidence. If it works, the modality of how we do it is 
not an issue.” Government official 
“That will be possible because we have evidence on the ground that investing in this 
will give these results, why do you want to go alone while other people can deliver?” 
Government official 
“… anything that has evidence that shows that it is effective, we are willing to look at it, 
and then judge against the other methodologies that are used to see the cost benefit, 
and what else it is adding on…” Bilateral development partner 
When reacting to questions about the feasibility of transferring funds from one sector ministry 
to another in order to achieve the former’s objectives, several government officials responded 
positively with statements like: “Yes, it’s possible.”; “Why not?”; “You can, you can do that.” 
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There were even cases where this had already happened or was seriously being considered 
for the TASAF programme. For example, the Tanzanian Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) 
allocated its own HIV resources to TASAF during its previous phase (around 2010) to enable 
the inclusion of vulnerable households affected by HIV and AIDS. The Ministry of Health was 
considering investing in TASAF to improve its enrolment rates in the Community Health Fund. 
Other examples were given where line ministries transfer funds to other government 
departments/ministries for specific services, such as surveys from the National Bureau of 
Statistics.   
“because sometimes even us, we are given an assignment, you can’t do it, you give 
money to other people who can do it for you (…) It’s like contracting out… It’s possible!” 
Government official 
“if I want something from TASAF, provided that it is within my mandate, they will give 
me money and then I will transfer to TASAF.” Government official 
Development partners were more sceptical about the institutional feasibility to co-finance within 
government structures:  
“in the Tanzanian context, sector ministries would have difficulties allocating money to 
another ministry. In fact, they don’t, because they say how are we as a sector to give 
another sector money because it will mean deducting from our resources…” Bilateral 
development partner 
Yet, there were also several examples raised by respondents where donors with different 
objectives had bought into the TASAF programme. This is not done on an explicit price-per-
outcome basis, but it is implicitly a form of co-financing. TASAF has welcomed contributions to 
its pooled funding basket, and has put in place joint accountability mechanisms. It is not 
possible for donors to select components to fund, rather every funder is contributing to the 
overall programme. Nonetheless, being at the table and being involved in programme design, 
monitoring and evaluation, funders have been able to contribute to shaping TASAF targeting 
and the selection of targeted infrastructure development projects. There is some evidence to 
suggest that some have been able to use their contributions to catalyse programme tweaks 
that would enhance their specific objectives. There are several funding sources with 
environmental and climate change mitigation objectives, for example, which contributed to a 
greater focus on environmentally-responsive public works and infrastructure development 
projects.  
“40 percent of funds from UK comes from an environmental fund – that’s how important 
they see it as an environmental investment” Bilateral development partner 
“[There was a] programme from the World Bank, of course resources were going to the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and then the Ministry was channelling 
resources to TASAF.” Government official 
Some of the reasons why TASAF has been able to attract co-financing relate to it being 
perceived as a relatively low-risk programme to redirect resources to, because of its established 
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and well-functioning delivery system, as well as its strong financial management. This suggests 
that a programme may become more attractive to others to contribute to once the initial higher-
risk investment is made in building a system, or a delivery platform. From a financial 
management perspective, the fact that heavy-weight funders are investing in a programme 
could signal trust and crowd in other sources of funding. TASAF was also the only government 
programme providing cash transfers, and was therefore possibly perceived as less threatening 
to other sectors or ministries’ mandates. 
“The benefit is to use already organized structure. So no additional funds, they have 
experience, they have structures in place, logistically they are okay.” Government 
official 
“We stand to gain more than losing, I mean in partnering with the World Bank or USAID 
– that’s a good thing to do because these are the big boys in town.” Multilateral 
development partner 
Development partner respondents also mentioned less direct examples of co-financing, where 
HIV funding was used for health system strengthening interventions and for adolescent 
programming, based on their expected impact on HIV and other health outcomes. 
“we’ve recognized (…) that there was need for building of the health infrastructure 
within countries and so we expanded a bit there, but otherwise we are supposed to 
maintain a strict HIV focus with our programmes.” Bilateral development partner 
“we have even been putting some of our limited HIV resources internally in supporting 
adolescent health.” Multilateral development partner 
Most respondents appeared open to transferring funds and some measures had been or could 
be put in place to facilitate and account for such transfers. There was some evidence of this 
happening (especially for TASAF), but the extent of the political will and impetus to do so 
remained unclear. 
2. Willingness to pay is not a working concept in resource allocation, but decision-
makers do have a sense of their least efficient investments or where efficiencies can be 
gained 
Although one of the study objectives was to elicit WTP benchmarks from interviewees, it soon 
became clear that this concept was not being applied explicitly or implicitly in resource 
allocation. While none of the respondents volunteered a normative threshold that they used, 
when asked if they would be willing to spend USD 350 (half of Tanzania’s GDP per capita) on 
their unit of outcome, most of them said that this would depend on the opportunity cost, or 
alternative use of resources, as well as on their ability to pay.     
“… the answer would be yes, emotionally, as a Tanzanian one person dying is one too 
many and you will get a yes from everybody in Tanzania. The question is can Tanzania 
afford it…” Government official 
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“That is a very unfair question because I can’t tell you what it costs to avert one infection 
right now. (…) so if you’re asking me would you spend 350 dollars – of course I would. 
Would you spend 500? Of course I would. But do I have it? No. If I had it, I would spend 
it.” Multilateral development partner 
“… we haven’t done that analysis… we do know how much we’re paying per person 
with HIV (…), but I don’t have that data off the top of my head…” Bilateral development 
partner 
“just from onset, our per capita [health expenditure] is 50 [dollars]. I know the ability to 
pay, so it’s very hard now to think of paying 350 [dollars] per person. And how 
sustainable it is.” Government official 
“… you would also have to look at the other opportunity costs, because if you say that 
you take that money to that direction that means that definitely the other units have to 
be cancelled or they will not be there, so it’s a very very difficult decision (…) there are 
a lot of resources coming there [for disease X]. So in terms of [disease X] if you ask us 
about our willingness to pay, you will find that our willingness to pay for [disease X] 
intervention is much higher”. Multilateral development partner 
As it soon became clear that the WTP questions would not yield meaningful results, the focus 
was on identifying the payer’s current least efficient intervention, as a proxy for the opportunity 
cost. When asked about this, most respondents singled out specific interventions or programme 
components that they viewed as providing the least return in terms of benefits. Although none 
of these were based on explicit analyses of both costs and benefits, they implicitly took into 
account the certainty and effect size of the intervention’s impact or how costly the intervention 
was compared to its benefits and scale. For example, in the HIV field, several respondents 
brought up behaviour change interventions, primarily because their impact was questioned. 
Several respondents also referred to management costs, as being potentially amongst the 
lease efficient investments, although this may be because their contribution to programmatic 
impacts were particularly difficult to attribute.  
“Our least efficient is behaviour change, the way it’s done, because it is very labour-
intensive and very difficult to show results in a short time.” Government official 
“Management which consumes so much money is one of the most indolent, non-
quantifiable parts, versus the other programme areas, but then you need them (…) 
They consume money but in terms of contributing to [impact], you could say well, 
perhaps not. So that’s why we tend to minimise the expenditure on management.” 
Multilateral development partner 
“… we look at budgets and (…) see that a lot of the money that we are spending is 
going towards planning, workshops, it’s going towards training and orientation and new 
guidelines… They are necessary, but takes a lot of money, sometimes away from 
reaching the direct beneficiaries.” Multilateral development partner 
The idea of disinvesting from some of these interventions to potentially reinvest in more efficient 
interventions (possibly implemented in other sectors) was less appealing to some respondents.  
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“I would not disinvest, rather maybe to integrate programmes and, so that we can have 
savings. Because I know the same targets would be reached, with less.” Government 
official 
“… we’ve gone through prioritization process over and over and over and over again 
and we believe that everything we’re doing is necessary (…) so there is nothing that 
we can say ‘oh okay, great, we’ve been wondering what we were going to replace this 
with’.” Bilateral development partner 
Budget holders did not know how much they were currently spending per unit of outcome, on 
average or at the margin. This is therefore not a useful metric. However, most respondents had 
an implicit ranking of investments, and a sense of which they perceived as least efficient. This 
could be a starting point when exploring which funds could be transferred to another sector.    
3. Strategy and target-alignment are a greater concern than efficiency 
For co-financing for multiple outcomes to work, efficiency or cost-effectiveness, would have to 
be an important consideration in how resources are allocated between interventions. We found 
that efficiency is, at best, one of many considerations in priority-setting. Most interviewees 
referred to a standard evidence-based planning process, in which a needs assessment or 
situation analysis was first conducted to identify national needs and gaps to inform a medium-
term plan. This formed the basis for a consultative process to select broad priority areas both 
in government and among development partners. Results or outcomes in each of those priority 
areas were set for the medium-term period – 5 years for national government or sector plans, 
or 2-3 years for development partners’ cooperation plans.  
In the government priority-setting exercises, costs and budget constraints were not explicitly 
mentioned as considerations. Rather, population needs (such as disease burden in health), 
and global targets and commitments, such as the SDGs or the 90-90-90 targets for ending the 
AIDS epidemic, were repeatedly referred to. Once targets were set, plans were then costed 
and financing gaps identified, suggesting less of a process of constrained optimisation or 
priority-setting and more of a normative planning process of what should be done. 
While global agendas were said to influence national government planning, development 
partners also spoke of UN or their own organisation’s or government’s global strategies as the 
starting point for their in-country prioritisation.  
“Most of the targets and indicators are predetermined globally and we adapt them in 
the national context.” Multilateral development partner 
Alignment to the host government’s plans and priorities was consistently brought up by 
development partners, who spoke of allocating their resources “to leverage government of 
Tanzania’s resources”, “complement” government efforts and “amplify results” (bilateral and 
multilateral development partners).  
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Activities were then planned within the selected priority areas to contribute directly or indirectly 
to the outputs or intermediate outcomes, typically based on service outputs, numbers or 
proportion of people reached with certain interventions. When describing this activity planning 
and how specific activities/interventions were prioritised and resource allocation amounts 
decided by budget holders, interviewees mentioned a number of considerations besides the 
targets to be reached or outcomes to be achieved, including their mandates and comparative 
advantage, feasibility of implementation (human and financial capacity), historical allocations, 
reasonableness, financial guidelines/directives from the Ministry of Finance or development 
partner headquarters, geographic focus, sustainability, etc. Costs were put forward as a 
constraint by a number of interviewees, but only a few discussed these in relation to their 
expected impact or referred to the efficiency ratio of each activity or intervention as a criterion. 
Those who did were all development partners.   
4. Delivery instruments can be a greater constraint than different payers’ budgets 
The simplified notion that there are payers seeking to maximise a specific societal outcome 
from a defined budget allocated to that outcome, appears to be disconnected from the reality 
of resource allocation in Tanzania. There are several constraints, in addition to the budget 
constraint, that define the boundaries of budget holders’ decision space. In fact, we identified a 
range of different budget holders or payers: (i) pure purchasers with a single objective and only 
a budget constraint; (ii) purchaser-service providers, who are playing the dual role of purchasing 
outcomes and providing services to achieve those outcomes, and are thus constrained by their 
service platform; and (iii) pure service providers, who are funded to provide specific services 
only.         
Sector ministries were reported to be constrained by their so-called ‘instrument’, which limits 
the types of interventions they can allocate their resources to, namely to those delivered 
through their service platforms. For example, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is 
mandated to maximise health and meet impact-level health targets (infant and maternal 
mortality, life expectancy, disease prevalence), but it can only do so by ensuring the availability 
of and access to quality health and social services. These services are its ‘instrument’.   
“… when you establish new Ministries, you share the instruments, the instrument is a 
guideline, which tells you what is the role of the Ministry in this new government (…) 
we have five-year development plan so every ministry tries to (…) download their 
strategic plan out of those national strategic ones (…) of course confined with those 
instruments, that instrument which you have been instructed to do.” Government official 
“… you want to recognize that each sector has a mandate and each ministry has an 
instrument. You have a Ministry focusing on nutrition that is the instrument that is their 
mandate.” Government official 
However, there seems to be some blurriness regarding whether they are responsible for 
national-level outcomes that would be expected from their sector, i.e. is the Ministry of Health 
responsible and accountable for the overall level of health in the country, or is it responsible for 
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governing the health care system as one of the determinants of the population’s health? 
Officially, it appears to be the latter, as set out in the national vision and development plan. The 
National Health Sector Strategic Plan IV (2015-2020) indicates that “The Government Health 
Policy aims to improve the health of all Tanzanians, especially those at risk, and to increase 
the life expectancy, by providing health services that meet the needs of the population.” In 
practice, there appears to be some confusion. Several interviewees invoke the ‘instrument’ as 
a constraint and reason why one ministry could not transfer its funds to another ministry, even 
if it were for the achievement of its objectives. Yet, others refer to the high-level outcome as the 
ministry’s responsibility and primary objective.    
 “the President just issued the instrument, the Ministry of Agriculture will be responsible 
for promoting the agriculture crops, will be responsible for ensuring food security, will 
be responsible for preserving food from eventualities and so on…” Government official 
“When the president is actually elected into office, he forms the government, so he 
gives each ministry an instrument to show their mandate (…) So we work on that 
mandate (…) Even if you impact somebody else, but it’s not going to be in your 
objectives (…) [Other sector ministries] have other objectives. You know, we go with 
instrument. They don’t have that instrument. The only Ministry which has the health 
instrument is [the Ministry of Health]. So [other ministries] do things which they impact 
health, but they don’t have that instrument.” Government official 
“… it was outlined in the MKUKUTA that, overall, in terms of achieving certain 
outcomes, combination of different sectors to achieve certain outcomes, which was 
earlier expressed entirely under MKUKUTA II, but I think this idea faded away because 
of this individualism” Government official 
Respondents indicated that a clear accountability mechanism would be required to provide 
some guarantee to those transferring funds to another budgetary authority, either in the form of 
an accountability framework, or a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In addition, previous 
experiences were shared whereby budgeting guidelines from the Ministry of Finance were 
modified to enable specific priority budget lines to be built into a specific authority’s budget 
request.      
 “whatever method we will use we have to use the mutual accountability framework 
between the organizations which are working together. It is how everybody becomes 
accountable to each other and to those ones we are serving. So we should have 
accountability framework which works.” Government official 
“So if it is to be done it needs to be not to distance the [paying] stakeholders too much, 
so whatever sector finally does that, there should be a very close link. Not breathing 
down their necks, but agree on particular indicators - whether process or impact – that 
twice a year, four times a year, once a year, whichever is mutually agreeable, to meet 
and say: are we on track? We are not on track. Why are we not on track? Why aren’t 
we getting these results? Maybe they were the wrong results to look for, let’s change, 
like that. Without that, you become just as… you’ve given money, but you don’t know 
what has happened.” Government official 
“just put an MOU to make sure those things are taken into consideration. A risk 
assessment.” Government official 
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 “we can initiate something new, for example, when we were starting the nutrition 
coordination what we did was to ask the Ministry of Finance to create a special budget 
line for budgeting nutrition (…) we can also sometimes issue some guideline [to] guide 
the local government authorities ...” Government official 
Interviewees from multi-lateral development partners reported being constrained by their roles 
and/or the division of labour between them and other development partners, which defines what 
activities or interventions they can invest and engage in.   
“… we also look at areas over which we have mandates, for example, you know as an 
organisation we are mainly working at policy level, so there are certain interventions 
which are confined to the policy level, for example the guidelines and things like that” 
Multilateral development partner 
“allocation of resources in [organisation] is based on our core mandate. What is it that 
we are supposed to provide to the country versus what is it that the other agencies are 
supposed to provide (…) we’ve got division of labour” Multilateral development partner 
The only category of payers at the national level who can be considered pure payers, or 
purchasers of outcomes, are certain bilateral donors. In the HIV field particularly, bilateral 
donors reported a very acute outcome focus in recent years, as they increasingly sought to 
optimise HIV outcomes or targets, subject to their budget constraint alone. Still, even for these 
‘pure purchasers’ there was some underlying sense of an investment constraint along sector 
lines, and what could be considered something that specific sector’s money (e.g. “HIV funding”) 
could be used for.    
“… whatever produces a positive result should really be supported (…) that should be 
the bottom line.” Multilateral development partner 
“… [current leadership] is very narrowly focussed, so it’s got to be all about the HIV 
outcome” Bilateral development partner 
 “the US congress when they put PEPFAR together essentially said this is for HIV 
funding and HIV funding alone.” Bilateral development partner 
Several national-level decision-makers suggested that in the Tanzanian context of 
decentralisation by devolution, whereby more resources, fiscal autonomy and responsibility is 
being decentralised to local government authorities, these sub-national decision-makers may 
be the least constrained by siloed mandates, given that they are closer to the population and 
ultimately responsible for the well-being of their constituencies. There may therefore be more 
potential for co-financing among donors and at the decentralised local government level. 
The more common use of service outputs in planning and resource allocation, as well as the 
service platform constraint that many decision-makers face, suggests that co-financing would 
only work for national-level government actors if it focuses on the output-level. How co-financing 
is implemented appears to be a greater issue for collaboration than an unwillingness to share 
or pool budgets. This could be a potential problem if the cyclical nature of democratic politics 
means new governments issue new guidance or initiatives on public sector reform. 
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Respondents suggest they are familiar with new and distinct instruments across sectors, but 
familiarity does not lead to acceptance or effective means of working and accountability 
concerns prevail. 
5. Lack of budgetary autonomy and loss of control can constrain ability to co-
finance 
A number of barriers were mentioned by respondents when reflecting on the feasibility and 
viability of co-financing among government sectors and ministries. Many related to the limited 
financial autonomy each department or ministry effectively had to reallocate resources, and the 
very limited discretionary budgets they had to manoeuvre with.   
“Indeed it will be a problem, because the accounting officer for vote 52, which is ministry 
of health, is the permanent secretary, ministry of health. He is not even accounting 
officer for certain aspects which goes on for health (…) the money which he is 
accountable, he cannot transfer to the director of TASAF, so I think these are 
problems…” Multilateral development partner 
“the major challenge is that the resources they get, is not even enough to meet their 
demand, the normal ones. That is a critical one. For example, in the area of medicine, 
the area of improving the services in the hospitals, they are crying. They don’t have.” 
Government official 
“I think in terms of practicality, knowing that they are all getting resources from the 
same source anyway, and because they have very few resources it is unlikely that once 
they get allocation they would be willing to share it with another sector.” Bilateral 
development partner 
Several respondents described institutional disincentives to transfer funds to other budget 
authorities, because of the loss of budget control it would entail. While co-financing theory 
assumes that payers want to maximise their outcomes, it became clear that payers can have 
other objectives, namely to maximise resources under their control. This would invariably lead 
to resistance to co-financing.   
“resistance, resistance to change, resistance to… I don’t know, the typical force field 
analysis that you would have to do… To bring about, to persuade people who refuse, 
because they don’t think they are going to get money, they don’t think they are going 
to get value, they generally think they are losing power in this area, you know typical 
institutional fears that would happen.” Multilateral development partner 
Objective concerns were raised around the risks associated with such transfers, related to 
programme and financial accountability. In terms of programme design, one respondent 
suggested that if a programme like TASAF would change its targeting criteria, there would be 
the risk that the benefits to the other paying sectors could be negatively affected. Some also 
questioned how to ensure that those funds would actually be allocated to the desired 
intervention, that they would be spent prudently, and that the payer would not be held 
accountable for any financial misconduct by the implementer. Finally, there would be a risk to 
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the payer of losing public visibility, and thereby hampering its ability to attract funding in the 
future.  
“… we will get that money through my department, but if it’s their money maybe to 
channel the resources to go to the sectors, to go to TASAF or what, if you tell the 
commissioner of budget, don’t give me let’s say 800 million shillings, give me 700 
million shillings, 100 million shillings give it to them. Are you sure they are going to give 
them? (…) If you are not careful, you can have something and say co-financing and 
sharing. When we go to scrutinize the budget, we can just cut off the budget, we can 
say no no no, this is TASAF mandate…” Government official 
 “…also losing identity, when TASAF goes to village x and provides money, they would 
never say this comes from [government department]. And resource mobilisation goes 
with the fact that [government department] has done something and therefore has a 
good track record of doing x y z… If you just disappear, you provide money and become 
the ministry of finance. Because nobody thinks of the ministry of finance until budget 
time. (…) The risk is it may reduce your ability to source and attract other resources.” 
Government official 
Thus, the perceived barriers and risks to payers contributing to a co-financing scheme were 
their limited financial authority, constrained budgets and anticipated loss of budget control and 
visibility, both of which were viewed as fundamental to justifying their very existence.   
 
6. Political will of senior government and development partners overrides 
feasibility or evidence base 
Respondents acknowledged that resource allocation decisions are not a mere act of rational 
optimisation – they are political decisions, and are evidently influenced by power dynamics, 
political commitments, the desire by political actors in Tanzania as well as in donor countries to 
exert their influence and to be visible. Although high-level priorities appeared to be identified 
through a logical needs and evidence-based process, budget allocations to specific sectors and 
programmes were more often driven by path dependencies, donor priorities, political agendas 
and visibility. 
“It is not scientifically based what we contribute in different areas (…) and of course, it 
also comes in politics in that process, the interest of the government of the time (…) 
Budget allocation processes are messy, both on our side and the Tanzanian side, and 
are not fully rational always.” Bilateral development partner 
“It’s more a political decision. They’re not looking at (…) which interventions would be 
more cost-effective or which ones would bring more impact” Multilateral development 
partner 
Most respondents underscored the need for strong political will to adopt the approach, 
embodied in individual ‘champions’ or ‘advocates’ for co-financing. Ideally, this ‘champion’ 
would need to have convening power to bring multiple government ministries together, 
preferably in an already established and institutionalised multi-sectoral coordination 
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mechanism. The sitting administration’s narrative around efficiency and cost savings was 
expected to be opportune to promote such an approach. 
“…of course then you need a strong permanent secretary to say no, we are doing this… 
So you’ve got to be, got to be a very strong permanent secretary saying ‘bang. I want 
to do this’…” Multilateral development partner 
“I think you would need buy-in at a high level, again going back to your champion. (…) 
So it will have to have a clear lead, it will have to be very well inbuilt in an ongoing 
national process, like in a multi-sectorial action plan, where everyone is already 
convened and agreed to work on, and it would need to be backed up by a solid, very 
clear analysis of who is getting what and why, and then there has to be a senior 
decision that cascades down to the others.” Multilateral development partner 
What these responses suggest is that ultimately the mechanisms and feasibility to co-finance 
are under-pinned by the political will of senior figures and development partners to support the 
idea. However, as the case of the efficiency argument suggests, the co-financing model can in 
turn be a source of political will by government and development partner elites should it align 
with their wider strategic interests.  
7. Alternative mechanisms 
Some respondents suggested alternative approaches to co-financing that they considered 
more institutionally feasible. The first involved a situation where a central payer, in this case the 
Ministry of Finance, would allocate public resources to sectors in a way that incorporates the 
externalities generated by one for another. After all, several respondents pointed out that there 
is only one public payer, or as one government official put it: “it is all government money”. If this 
central payer would consider the multiple outcomes of each sector’s outputs in their allocation 
formula, this would be more efficient, could avoid double-counting and the transaction costs of 
cross-sectoral transfers.  
“I am not sure what is the best way sort of bringing that same good sort of view into 
these sectors. (…) Each sector have their own money, but actually they don’t have their 
own money, they all depend on one source of money, which is the treasury. (…) your 
entry point is actually ministry of finance and sort of planning, and saying the new vision 
is this, this is where we want to go.” Bilateral development partner 
Another related suggestion was that co-financing be used more as a mindset or mentality when 
considering the value of various investment options, rather than a technical exercise with 
formulas to calculate co-financing shares. The latter was considered to be “too complex”, 
requiring a “simpler formula in real politics and budget allocations”, without “all the gymnastics”, 
as a government official and bilateral development partner put it.  
“One doesn’t try to find the formula for the optimal allocation or for one incremental 
[dollar] what should we invest in one set of priorities… It wouldn’t work I think, but that 
is part of some sort of holistic thinking… Politicians they don’t think about that sort of 
thing. There is some sort of implicit formula in their thinking, in their mind. And also 
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bureaucrats. And then they try to find an allocation that makes some sort of sense given 
what different interventions contribute...” Bilateral development partner 
A second approach that was mentioned as a viable institutional response to the interlinkages 
between sectoral programmes and their outputs, was to rely on strengthening coordination 
through inter-sectoral governance structures. The underlying principle would be to ensure that 
sectors acknowledge their role in achieving other sectoral outcomes – the premise of 
mainstreaming. For example, the last of five objectives in the national health sector strategic 
plan is to address the social determinants of health through a health-in-all-policies approach. 
An alternative incentive for this coordination is for sectors to coordinate their activities to ensure 
a better match between supply and demand. For example, TASAF’s cash transfer programme 
increases demand for health and education services, which needs to be met with available 
quality services, for the human capital outcomes to be achieved. It is therefore from this 
perspective that various sectors are being convened at the national and local government level. 
This appears to be an important mechanism to stimulate communication and dialogue, which 
appears to be lacking.  
“so if we’re able just to influence polices in other ministries, I think that that would be 
the most efficient way of dealing with road safety issues that we are putting money, I 
don’t think we are right in…” Multilateral development partner 
“… we convene and explore areas where we can work together to minimize duplication 
of efforts and see opportunities or avenues that are in one programme or another 
programme. (…) some sector, because they participated in the design of the 
programme and they are participating in the implementation, they can easily see where 
in the cycle of implementation, that sector can intervene with the right intervention. So 
that we increase the impact of the programme.” Government official 
 “With the government here, it is even a challenge, even within one sector the different 
departments don’t talk to each other, even where you think they have a shared 
objective and a shared strategy, each of these deliver separately and if you take a 
budget of the sector Ministry, it does not give you a coordinated story of what they are 
delivering. They don’t even talk to each other in the different sections of the Ministry...” 
Bilateral development partner 
Another strand of thinking was that given the challenges in incentivising individuals and sectors 
to engage actively in such coordination mechanisms, some respondents suggested that a co-
financing instrument might be a nudge to an implementing sector of how they can contribute to 
other sectoral objectives. Indeed, co-financing was viewed by some as a short-term or one-off 
investment into a programme to enable a programme tweak that would generate other 
outcomes and ensure that the programme is delivered in this manner going forward. The 
assumption being that all sectors are jointly contributing to a common set of national social and 
development goals, rather than each sector being accountable for their own sub-set of 
objectives.     
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“this is just catalytic resources, but at the end of the day we want to see how other 
sectors can see the bigger picture in this, and sees how the contributions, how the 
resources lead to better outcomes (…) in general.” Multilateral development partner 
Finally, several examples were given whereby the multi-sectoral outcomes of a programme 
could be amplified by leveraging the programme platform and financing discrete add-on 
components. For example, building additional nutrition sensitisation sessions into the TASAF 
cash transfer delivery.   
“For instance, in the productive social safety net we have a provision of about half an 
hour before delivering cash benefits, where we administer community sessions. (…) 
this is an avenue for providing messages. Now, while we provide message on the 
programme, a nutrition expert can provide message on nutrition. So people have 
already been mobilized for this programme, so it is just a question of liaising with 
another sector, with the message for the same people.” Government official 
The suggestion of alternative approaches volunteered by respondents suggests that co-
financing is seen as just one method of achieving distinct outcomes in health financing. The 
results suggest that popular alternatives would be to selectively incorporate some of the co-
financing principles into existing processes, either as a mindset shift or a one-off tool to 
stimulate the new institutional mindset. Hence, while respondents agree that co-financing 
models are feasible, this does not necessarily mean they are their preferred approach.  
 
8.4 Discussion 
This study explored the institutional feasibility of adopting a cross-sectoral or cross-budget co-
financing approach for development programmes with multi-sectoral benefits. Insights and 
perceptions from national government and development partner decision-makers in the HIV, 
health, social protection and food security sectors in Tanzania suggest that such co-financing 
may be operationally feasible in a first instance if it focuses on producing service outputs more 
efficiently (rather than outcomes) and involves payers that directly finance service provision. 
The voluntary adoption of co-financing is unlikely given several institutional and political factors, 
unless certain enabling conditions are in place that incentivise and mandate such cost-sharing. 
However, cost-effectiveness is subsumed to political concerns with government actors 
assigning political value rather than monetary value to health. Political value in this case refers 
to the ability to control budgets, divisions of labour across sectors, and the ability to construct 
or draw upon political will. This section draws on the main results to discuss the barriers and 
enablers to co-financing, as well as opportunities going forward. 
Enablers 
The results outlined above suggest a certain level of adaptability and perceived feasibility to 
adopt co-financing approaches across the Tanzanian public and development sector. 
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Respondents indicate an openness to reform based on clear evidence of cost savings and 
improved outcomes (54), with tangible benefits – or win-wins – identified for each of the 
participating sectors and donors (22). This evidence could be an effective tool for shaping and 
enabling political will. Co-financing of programmes such as TASAF may enable future co-
financing initiatives by first providing evidence of how such models can work effectively in 
practice, and by initiating a path-dependent model for how government actors can work across 
sectors. Since multi-sectoral collaboration is embedded within the HIV/AIDS and health 
response in Tanzania, in principle, there is an ethos of working together. Co-financing could be 
an extension of such practices.  
Aligning co-financing initiatives to existing strategic plans and building the approach into future 
strategies could enable implementation. Strategic alignment gives capacity and justification for 
both government and development partner agencies to implement innovative approaches. 
Because funding and resource allocation is tied to pre-existing mutually agreed strategies and 
targets, any new financing model must demonstrate how it will help meet wider government 
and development partner strategies.  
In addition, there appears to be more flexibility with mandates and ‘instruments’ among payers 
with a strong results and population focus. In particular, donors that are not as constrained by 
the sectors or services they can invest in, function as pure purchasers of outcomes, and could 
be attracted to fund programmes with multi-sectoral benefits through a fee-for-outcome 
mechanism, akin to the results-based financing schemes being rolled out for health facilities 
(55). Similarly, there may be more potential for cross-sectoral thinking and planning at the 
decentralised level, where sectoral siloes are less dominant and officials are more population-
focused, in line with the experiences with joint budgeting in Sweden and the United Kingdom 
(16, 21). 
Scarcity is another important enabler of co-financing. For the HIV sub-sector in particular, there 
is definitely a much more acute imperative to prioritise than was the case 5 years ago, when 
HIV funding appeared abundant (11). In this increasingly constrained context, our findings 
suggest that evidence has become a more important factor in driving allocations, and there is 
less room for anything without a hard HIV endpoint. Scarcity may therefore enable more 
innovative and integrated financing, given the need to do the same or more, with less (26). 
Finally, both an enabler and barrier to co-financing programmes is political will. Political will is 
difficult to quantify and elicit, and is not necessarily based on the same rational economic 
calculations of cost-effectiveness analysis. It depends on the maintenance of an actor’s position 
(whether Minister, President, or senior advisor, for example) within the Tanzanian government 
or donor community, and is thus guided by additional motivations. There is ample evidence in 
the political economy literature indicating that bureaucrats are more likely to be maximising their 
budgets, and thus their power, than societal outcomes (11, 28). Our data suggests an important 
political desire and need for visibility by each payer, both to maintain political capital and 
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mobilise financial resources from government and donors. Such political incentives could 
directly annul any rationale for co-financing, and resistance to merge or transfer budgets is 
therefore to be expected. High-level buy-in and political will was a recurrent lever for uptake 
underlined by the Tanzanian policy-makers (56), who also pointed out that top-down directives 
may be required to instigate and incentivise co-financing (16).  
Barriers 
There appear to be several political and institutional barriers that prevent co-financing from 
happening. Limited government resources and sectoral budgets heighten each budget holder’s 
anxiety and grip over its limited resources. Many budget-holders have limited authority or 
control over how and where they can spend resources. This reduces their individual autonomy 
and agency in decision-making and thus ability and will to co-finance. Even though our evidence 
shows government officials are keen to demonstrate willingness to adopt new, more efficient 
forms of financing, such will is actioned in a few isolated examples in practice. Evidence in 
support of feasibility should be treated with caution, given a potential bias towards the subject-
matter in interview. Compounded with the scepticism of development partners, it can be argued 
that while co-financing may be operationally feasible, this is not met with a will to act. 
While some constraints could be relaxed by government directives, heavy donor dependence 
and earmarking of external financing will continue to limit the discretion of these budget holders 
to re-direct financing to another implementer. Moreover, some donors also appeared reluctant 
to shift funding towards upstream programmes where accountability and attribution may be 
more difficult to ascertain and control – possibly reminding them of their problematic experience 
with general and sectoral budget support (44).  
Our findings suggest a mismatch between the co-financing theoretical frame and the decision 
frames of the decision-makers the approach seeks to inform, particularly for health (57). Co-
financing is embedded in health economic evaluation, which focuses on the efficient production 
of ‘health’, and has been used in certain high-income countries to influence health care benefits 
and drugs/treatments covered by national health financing schemes (58). However, our study 
indicates that service outputs or service coverage are more likely to be the results budgetary 
authorities are directly accountable for and prioritising against, at least in Tanzania and possibly 
in other countries without health technology assessment bodies. The other boundary in the 
optimisation frame underlying co-financing assumes that each payer is constrained only by its 
budget, whereas our findings indicate that there are in fact additional constraints, chiefly the 
decision-maker’s delivery platform, mandate or its ‘instrument’. There is some confusion around 
sectoral responsibilities and ministerial ‘instruments’ that tend to be changed by every new 
president/ administration. This is more likely to encourage more conservative boundaries and 
financing decisions. Such constraints suggest it may be more fruitful, in a first instance, to 
refocus the co-financing decision frame around achieving the service outputs of payers more 
efficiently, making the underlying economic analysis more of a cost minimisation exercise than 
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an adapted cost-effectiveness analysis. However, even though this may be a more realistic 
starting point, it would be important to ensure that the concept of opportunity costs of 
investments remains central to the priority-setting dialogue, and that the link between 
investment and disinvestment is explicit during the resource allocation process.    
Study limitations 
This study has several limitations. Firstly, it only reflects the views of a small sample of decision-
makers in specific social sectors and financing and planning tiers at the national-level. The 
dynamics at the sub-national level may be quite different. Secondly, as there were few cases 
of explicit cross-sectoral co-financing, the insights from respondents were sometimes quite 
hypothetical, and may not be predictive of actual behaviour or revealed preferences. Thirdly, 
the role of the researcher, as an economist and an academic, may have led to desirability bias, 
which could partly explain the emphasis on the role of evidence as a crucial enabling factor 
(59), although this has not been found to be a consistent factor in other areas of health decision-
making in this context (60). Fourthly, the study was conducted in a decisively singular post-
election context, characterised by substantial uncertainty about the new government’s priorities 
and some reserve among respondents. The new ‘bulldozer’ president took office in the first 
phase of data collection and clearly set out to radically change the government’s business-as-
usual, transform public work ethics and increase efficiency. This may have led to more 
openness to new ideas for public service efficiency gains, but may also have restrained 
government respondents’ sense of control.  
While the findings from the study are context-specific, they are unlikely to be unique to Tanzania 
alone. The same development partner organisations, for example, support development 
programmes across the world, and will be influenced by similar agendas and organisational 
constraints. Also, governments in high-income countries have had to tackle related barriers and 
resistance to cross-sectoral coordination and joint budgeting (22).   
Policy implications and future research 
In practice, there is no central decision-maker with perfect information or the expertise to 
allocate resources between sectors factoring in all externalities (61). Cross-sectoral co-
financing could be a mechanism to internalise these externalities. Given how sectors plan, there 
are a number of entry points for integrating co-financing approaches at various steps in the 
planning cycle (62). First, evidence needs to be generated on the value of co-financing 
mechanisms. More policy experiments with co-financing mechanisms are needed, especially 
in low and middle-income countries, to investigate their effectiveness at realising efficiency 
gains and multiplying impact, and to understand where and how they are most likely to be 
institutionally acceptable. Existing programmes that increase multi-sectoral service outputs, 
and could generate cost savings for payers through cost-sharing, should be the starting point. 
This would provide a clear financial incentive for payers to engage in inter-sectoral 
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collaboration, which previous studies found to be an important determinant of uptake (17, 22). 
Specific opportunities identified by policy-makers were mainly related to matching 
complementary demand and supply-side interventions for greater impact. For example, the 
TASAF programme in Tanzania was an attractive demand-side mechanism to ensure access 
and utilisation of health and education services, thereby allowing for greater effective coverage. 
It is also a credible programme, perceived to be low-risk, due to its strong financial management 
and accountability structures. Such low-hanging fruit could demonstrate the financial gain from 
co-financing and make it more politically attractive.  
Secondly, this learning can feed into future planning, as a key consideration when setting 
priorities and targets. By valuing multi-sectoral benefits, co-financing can be a means of 
identifying investment areas that can address multiple objectives, or what is currently known as 
‘accelerators’ in the context of the SDGs. This may shift sectoral allocations, as certain sectoral 
programmes with large spill over benefits may become more attractive to fund.  
Thirdly, at the stage of developing interventions and identifying resources, sectors could 
proactively seek out investments beyond their sectors that will allow them to meet their sectoral 
goals. They could then consider extend pooled financing mechanisms to allow for cross-
sectoral transfers, or use results-based financing mechanisms to establish fee-for-outcome 
metrics for all interested payers (63). Clearly, this will have to be preceded by the establishment 
of a legislative framework that enables cost-sharing across government departments or 
ministries, as seen in other settings, and followed by a gradual implementation of cross-budget 
transfers (22). 
For the HIV response, the engagement of multi-sectoral stakeholders is diminishing along with 
HIV financing (11). This has its advantages, as HIV plans appear to be more coherent and 
prioritised, but it is also becoming more difficult for the HIV sub-sector to convene or stimulate 
cross-sectoral dialogue and planning, and harder for HIV to get a seat at other sectors’ tables. 
Co-financing could be used to overcome this hurdle and provide catalytic funding to kick-start 
or tweak multi-benefit interventions implemented beyond the HIV realm. This could be more 
effective than mainstreaming, as it does not require other sectors to take on an HIV mandate. 
Indeed, the lack of incentives for other sectors to mainstream HIV is likely to be further 
compounded by the shrinking HIV funding basket (64), unless these resources are used more 
strategically.  
Indeed, while the principles of joined-up government and integrated approaches are generally 
well-received, experience suggests that accepting the mindset or ‘ethos’ is not sufficient and 
may be counter-productive if political agendas and values are invisibilised in the process rather 
than being tackled head on (23). Tying a financing mechanism to the inter-sectoral collaboration 
may be a means to make the expectations of various stakeholders explicit and a tool to hold 
each other accountable.  
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This could be of increasing relevance within the new global development agenda, which 
underscores the importance of synergistic action across SDGs. Resources to achieve the 
SDGs are currently spread out among diverse actors and constrained by systems of public and 
private finance and development assistance that may not be fit for purpose (65). Co-financing 
approaches may contribute to re-engineering intersectoral governance and financing 
mechanisms to match the challenges ahead (25, 66).  
Another area for further investigation that was underscored by this study, is the fundamental 
question (and potential inefficiency) of who is responsible for maximising health gain overall, if 
it is not the national health payer or the health care sector. Current decision frameworks assume 
that the sectoral budgets are allocated to services rather than to outcomes, i.e. the national 
‘health’ budget is a reflection of society’s willingness to pay for health care services rather than 
its willingness to pay for health. In practice, and in an attempt to reflect a “decision-maker’s” 
approach (67), this is how economic evaluation in health is applied, with a myopic focus on 
health care (35, 37). As Culyer (1989) states: “health services are needed (…) only if the 
outcome is desired and there is no alternative (or more cost-effective) way of realizing it” (68). 
The premise of co-financing is that it could be a means to expand the evaluative space and 
decision frame if there is in fact a more cost-effective way of achieving the health outcome 
through cost-sharing, than the most efficient health care intervention.  
Determining who is responsible for ‘health’ is critical, if the public sector is to efficiently 
contribute to the production of better population health. If countries decide that the mandate to 
maximise health gain lies with the health sector, rather than with a central supra-ministerial 
payer, then constraints of which services or interventions they can fund need to be relaxed, and 
disciplinary identity boundaries will need to be breached. 
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CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This last chapter will summarise the main findings of the thesis under each of the study objectives, 
reflect on its limitations, and discuss its contribution to the literature. Finally, the key policy 
implications from the research will be discussed, together with a forward-looking research agenda.  
This thesis sought to tackle the challenges associated with economically evaluating and financing 
interventions with multiple outcomes valued by multiple sectors. Conventionally, cost-benefit 
analysis is the recommended method to value multiple benefits, but given the monetary utility 
measure of outcome, and the dominant extra-welfarist viewpoint in health, this approach is not 
often embraced by the health and certain other social sectors. To address this, alternative 
multidimensional outcome measures of well-being are being developed. However, even with such 
a measure, the question remains of who should finance an intervention that increases overall well-
being through various sectoral pathways and mechanisms, when in practice, there are multiple 
payers with distinct budget constraints and priorities.  
To address this gap, the aim of this thesis was to develop and explore the application of a novel 
methodological approach for both fiscal space analysis and economic evaluation that explicitly 
factors in multiple intervention benefits and multi-sectoral payers. The thesis research focused on 
structural HIV interventions that are delivered outside the conventional HIV sub-sector and achieve 
multiple HIV and non-HIV impacts. The underlying premise was that methodological developments 
were required to adequately consider these interventions when answering two distinct questions: 
what is the available resource envelope (fiscal space) for the societal goal of reducing HIV morbidity 
and mortality, and how can the fixed HIV budget be most efficiently (cost-effectively) allocated to 
achieve this goal? These questions have become increasingly central in global and national HIV 
responses that are being confronted with the binding constraints of their sub-sector and biomedical 
emphasis, as well as having multiple funding streams and budget constraints to contend with.  
This thesis set out to achieve the following objectives:  
1. To develop a methodological approach – ‘co-financing’ - for factoring in non-HIV benefits 
and non-HIV payers in the decision rules of resource allocation; 
2. To explore the potential of creating fiscal space for HIV across sub-Saharan Africa, 
incorporating co-financing of health system strengthening and broader development 
investments; 
3. To apply the co-financing approach by assessing the benefits and potential of co-financing 
of a food support intervention in various country settings; 
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4. To understand in practice the institutional barriers, enablers and (dis)incentives to adopting 
a co-financing framework in HIV financing and priority setting.  
Objective 1 was addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, while the following three objectives were covered 
in each of the subsequent results chapters (5-8).   
 
9.1 Main Findings 
 
9.1.1 To develop a new methodological approach that factors in non-HIV benefits and 
payers  
The first objective of this thesis was to develop a methodological approach to economic evaluation 
and financing that incorporates non-HIV benefits and non-HIV payers.  
In the HIV and public health fields, cost-effectiveness or cost-utility analyses tend to be the 
dominant decision-analytical tools for investment decisions. As highlighted in the literature review 
in Chapter 2, a well-documented limitation of cost-effectiveness analysis is its inability to deal with 
multiple outcomes and cross-sectoral costs and consequences, given its underlying single outcome 
framework (1, 2).   
The conventional approach to evaluating interventions with multiple benefits is a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA), which converts all outcomes into a single monetary measure of utility, and allows 
for cross-sector comparisons of investment alternatives (1, 3-6). However, it has been strongly 
argued that utility is a problematic and potentially undesirable proxy measure of social welfare, as 
it only reflects individual satisfaction that is derived from the consumption of goods and services 
(7).  
Another recommended approach for considering multiple benefits in an economic evaluation and 
investment decision is to conduct some form of cost-consequence analysis (CCA), which reports 
the different consequences of an intervention in natural units, alongside the costs (8). The purpose 
of a CCA is to present decision-makers with all relevant impacts and costs across sectors, including 
those that could not be quantified or monetised, in order to enable them to appraise the full value 
of the intervention options. Indeed, current guidance on the economic evaluation of health 
interventions requires a disaggregated cost-consequence approach when analysing and reporting 
results (8, 9). However, CCA does not provide a measure of relative efficiency that would allow for 
some form of intervention ranking.  
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Neither of these methods addresses how costs would be shared between payers for interventions 
with multiple outcomes, which has been underscored as a methodological gap in current guidance 
documents, including the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence’s (NICE) guidance for 
local government decisions in England and Wales, and the second US panel’s recommendations 
on cost-effectiveness analysis in health and medicine (8, 10). Claxton and colleagues’ so-called 
‘compensation test’ is the only method identified that deals with both multiple benefits and their 
multiple payers (or budget constraints) (11). It suggests that the normative decision rule for such 
interventions would be that if other benefiting sectors can compensate the implementing sector for 
its net cost, then the intervention should be funded.  
As described in Chapter 4, this thesis builds on this compensation principle, and proposes a so-
called co-financing approach, as an analytical prioritisation tool and a financing mechanism. 
Indeed, co-financing would require an actual financial transfer mechanism to be in place, rather 
than merely an analytical test to determine whether an intervention is worth investing in from a 
social welfare perspective. It thereby overcomes an underlying limitation of the ‘compensation test’, 
which implicitly ascribes non-health mandates and objectives to a health payer (and vice versa).   
The example of a cash transfer intervention for adolescent girls that was implemented in Malawi 
with HIV, education and other health outcomes (12), was used to illustrate with empirical data how 
a co-financing approach could lead to a more optimal financing outcome than the current status 
quo of budgeting in silos.  
The basis for the allocation of co-financing shares was the willingness-to-pay (WTP) by each sector 
for the achievement of one unit of their sector-specific outcome. For the health outcomes, we used 
normative cost-effectiveness thresholds stipulated by WHO, as a measure of opportunity cost (13, 
14). An HIV payer, a reproductive health payer, and a mental health payer, were each willing to 
pay one to three times Malawi’s GDP per capita for one Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) 
averted through improvements in their health indicators. For the education outcomes, estimates of 
cost-effectiveness ratios from other studies in the region were used as positive measures of 
revealed WTP. The one-way sensitivity analysis underscored how much the financing outcome, 
and efficiency-enhancing potential of co-financing, would depend on the WTP threshold applied. 
Although the health WTP threshold appeared to have relatively broad recognition, these WHO 
thresholds have been increasingly critiqued for not reflecting the opportunity cost or the shadow 
price of the health budget constraint (13, 15, 16), and even WHO has since distanced itself from 
them (17). 
Chapter 5 further develops the co-financing approach in the context of emerging scholarly debates 
and consensus around the meaning and measurement of these cost-effectiveness thresholds. 
Culyer’s bookshelf metaphor (18) is used to illustrate how current unisectoral approaches to 
Chapter 9 – Discussion 
219 
 
resource allocation could result in health losses, particularly when considering health-producing 
interventions in other sectors or public health interventions with multi-sectoral outcomes. Based on 
a stylised two-sector model in which health and education budgets are being optimised, the 
inefficiency of silo budgeting is reflected as health and education losses from having separate 
evaluative spaces. In this case, the health cost-effectiveness threshold may be lower than the 
health care perspective would suggest. The chapter then demonstrates the advantages of a second 
best co-financing approach, where the health payer could redistribute part of its budget to a non-
health sector, where co-financed non-health interventions achieved a health gain more efficiently 
than the health sector’s marginal productivity (opportunity cost). Likewise, other sectors would 
determine how much to contribute towards such an intervention, given the current marginal 
productivity of their budgets. 
Whereas Chapter 4 estimates the potential efficiency gains from a co-financing approach in the 
context of an endogenous budget constraint, Chapter 5 considers that the sectoral budgets are 
exogenous and fixed. Indeed, in Chapter 4, the financing outcome from the CBA is assumed to be 
optimal, and the welfare loss associated with maintaining the status quo is derived from the net 
benefit that would have otherwise been achieved. Yet, the CBA uses a do-nothing comparator and 
its decision rule requires that any intervention that grows the social welfare ‘pie’ (where benefits 
exceed costs) should be funded, even if this means increasing the budget constraint. Chapter 5, 
on the other hand, applies an opportunity-based approach where the investment alternative is the 
least efficient current intervention. Any new investment would therefore displace the latter and need 
to be compared against its foregone benefits. The latter is likely to be more consistent with the 
decision-maker’s perspective, and a better reflection of each payer’s decision problem. 
The proposed co-financing approach is a step forward in addressing the limitations of cost-
effectiveness analysis, as identified by Coast (7), without representing a departure from the guiding 
frame of extra-welfarism and its evaluative space. It also provides a potentially practical approach 
to dealing with an important limitation concerning the allocation of costs between budgetary 
authorities jointly benefiting from an intervention (8, 10).   
 
9.1.2 To conceptualise and apply the analytical tool to estimating the resource 
envelope 
The second objective of this thesis was to explore the potential of creating fiscal space for HIV 
through co-financing of health system strengthening and broader development investments. This 
was part of both method development for fiscal space analysis, and exploring method applicability.  
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Chapter 6 reports a fiscal space analysis estimating the sources of domestic financing for HIV in 
14 sub-Saharan African countries. In addition to traditional sources of fiscal space, such as 
economic growth, expanded revenue generation, borrowing and reprioritisation, the analysis also 
included measures of efficiency gains within the HIV programme, as well as cost savings from 
investments beyond the HIV envelope. While previous analyses implicitly assumed that less 
prioritisation of the HIV programme would reduce fiscal space for HIV (19, 20), this analysis 
explored the potential HIV gains from reprioritisation towards investments in other areas of 
spending that benefit HIV. 
Drawing on econometric methods, this chapter estimates the monetary value or the implied shadow 
price of the effect of non-HIV programme targets on the HIV programme’s level of output (21). The 
analysis specifies a model of HIV service production, and uses this to calculate how much extra 
HIV spending would be required to reach the same level of HIV programme output, as would be 
achieved by increasing the number of health personnel to the WHO target or reducing 
undernourishment to the MDG target level. 
The analysis suggests that substantial efficiency gains could be reaped from more effective 
complementary investments in health systems and social development, particularly in low-income 
countries. Indeed, in the six selected low-income countries with high HIV burdens, it was estimated 
that about USD 230 million could be saved annually in direct HIV spending over the next 5 years, 
if the ratio of health professionals to the population was increased to the WHO norm. This 
represented a much greater magnitude of potential fiscal space than the USD 9 million expected 
from economic growth alone or the USD 66 million from efficiency gains in the ART programme. 
Likewise, reductions in undernourishment to the MDG target level could save USD 136 million in 
annual HIV spending, which is not far from the USD 149 million in additional fiscal space from a 
steep increase in HIV prioritisation in the national health budget.  
In these resource-constrained settings, the opportunity cost of increased HIV financing may be 
particularly high and synergistic investments all the more important. Based on this, the HIV budget 
holder may find financial value in contributing to the expansion of human resources for health or 
reduced undernourishment, to avert the need for direct HIV expenditures. Although HIV financing 
has been channelled toward health systems (22-24), some argue that the HIV sector has made 
only marginal short-term investments in complementary health system inputs, and that these could 
be reaching their limits (25). This chapter suggests that it may be more rational for HIV budget 
holders to consider co-investing more systemically in these binding constraints, such as pre-service 
training and recruitment of health personnel or improvements in supply chain management (25, 
26). This may be particularly beneficial in resource-limited settings where the return from jointly 
investing in these non-HIV constraints may be higher, given that the so-called marginal rate of 
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technical substitution between financial and non-financial production inputs is likely to diminish as 
the availability of non-HIV inputs increases. 
In summary, this analysis shows the maximum gain in terms of increased funding for the HIV 
response from adopting a co-financing approach to investment choices, and getting the scheme in 
place. The viability of the approach will depend on the total costs of the non-HIV investments 
required, the availability of sufficient non-HIV resources to cover part of these costs, and the 
transaction costs of establishing and managing the co-financing scheme.  
 
9.1.3 To apply the analytical tool to assessing how to spend the envelope most 
efficiently 
The third objective of this thesis was to apply the co-financing approach as an analytical 
prioritisation tool in country-level analyses, by assessing the costs, benefits and potential of co-
financing a food support intervention aimed at improving HIV and food security outcomes. This 
serves as a proof-of-concept of the feasibility of applying this approach as an economic evaluation 
technique.  
Chapter 7 presents this study component, in which the economic returns of a 6-month food 
assistance intervention for food-insecure patients initiating ART were estimated in 5 sub-Saharan 
African countries (Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia, Lesotho and South Africa). Impact data from a 
randomised controlled trial in Tanzania (27) was used and supplemented with a costing analysis 
and an economic evaluation model. The analysis was conducted from a health care perspective, 
as well as a multi-sectoral perspective, as recommended by current international guidance (8, 9). 
The latter was extended to incorporate a co-financing approach to the valuation of the multi-sectoral 
outcomes.     
The findings suggest that targeted food assistance could be a cost-effective complementary 
intervention for HIV treatment programmes, particularly if the evidence on the effects of food 
assistance on ART adherence and loss-to-follow-up from Tanzania are generalizable to these other 
settings and if the intervention costs are minimised. Considering its potential short-term impact on 
household food security, targeted food assistance may also be valued by the social protection 
sector and therefore co-financed, further increasing its HIV-specific cost-effectiveness, and thus 
bringing it up in a ranking list of HIV interventions. Indeed, assuming a conservative cost-
effectiveness threshold per DALY averted of half of each country’s GDP per capita (28), the findings 
indicate that, with the exception of Lesotho, this intervention is likely to be cost-effective in the 
selected countries, both with and without co-financing. In Tanzania, Zambia and Ethiopia, the 
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probability that the intervention would be cost-effective ranges from 65% to 81% without co-
financing, and increases by up to 6 percentage points with co-financing to between 71% and 84%. 
For South Africa, co-financing would not alter the probability of cost-effectiveness, which remains 
at 92%. However, co-financing could affect the financing decision in Lesotho, where the 
intervention becomes marginally more likely to be cost-effective than its comparator with co-
financing (53%), compared to without (49%).  
Overall, if resource decisions are driven by assessments of cost-effectiveness, the findings suggest 
that it may not always be necessary to pursue co-financing options for such intervention 
components that are added on to basic HIV programmes to enhance their effectiveness (HIV+ type 
interventions), and that co-financing investments may be of most importance to supporting 
development synergy type interventions that are primarily aimed at achieving non-HIV objectives 
(DEV type interventions presented in Chapter 3) (29).  
The delivery platforms used for food and nutrition support are particularly important, because they 
reflect financing channels and budget holders. The intervention could be delivered as a broader 
social protection programme, with an add-on HIV component that would ensure that food-insecure 
PLHIV initiating ART were targeted. The cost to be co-financed may then only be the incremental 
variable cost of reaching this sub-population. Alternatively, if food support was to be delivered 
through the HIV programme and primarily viewed as an add-on component of the ART programme, 
it would be the incremental cost of providing food assistance through health facilities that would 
need to be co-financed. In this research, the costing was done from the latter perspective. When 
exploring what level of co-financing contribution would be warranted from the HIV payer if this were 
programmatically delivered through the ART programme, it was clear that most of the direct costs 
would be expected to be covered by the HIV budget in Zambia (60%), Tanzania (73%), and Ethiopia 
(83%). However, in South Africa, only about 40% of direct intervention costs would remain to be 
covered by the HIV programme, after deducting the social protection sector’s share. In fact, it would 
probably be good value for money and could potentially be practically feasible for the HIV payer to 
only pay the unit costs of the food provided to HIV patients in the case of South Africa (i.e. about a 
third of the direct intervention cost), as well as part of the operational mark-up, but rely on the social 
protection budget to cover the remaining operational costs of delivery. 
Although Chapter 7 demonstrates that the co-financing approach can be applied to assess the 
value for money of specific multi-benefit interventions, it also underlines the methodological 
challenges in doing so. Given the often narrow focus of impact evaluations, there is limited data on 
the non-health impact of health interventions, or health impact of non-health interventions (30). It 
ensues that the scope of the consequences considered in a multi-sectoral or societal economic 
evaluation is likely to be driven by the availability of data (or lack therefore), rather than by theory 
and plausibility of effects. The same shortcoming has been observed in applications of cost-benefit 
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analysis (31). In addition, the application of the co-financing methodology requires the estimation 
of a cost-effectiveness threshold for each non-health outcome, which is meant to capture the 
opportunity cost to the non-health payer of investing in the intervention being assessed. There is a 
severe lack of data to inform this and it was necessary therefore to use data from an unsystematic 
search of interventions in the non-health sector with the same food security outcome, to roughly 
estimate the cost-effectiveness ratio of the social protection payer’s assumed alternative 
investment. The resulting uncertainty around this parameter was at least partly addressed with 
robust sensitivity analyses.    
 
9.1.4 To understand the institutional feasibility of co-financing as a financing 
mechanism 
The fourth objective of the thesis was to understand in practice the institutional barriers, enablers 
and (dis)incentives to adopting a co-financing framework in HIV resource allocation. This forms 
part of the study’s exploration of the proposed method’s applicability as a financing mechanism.  
Chapter 8 discusses the thesis’ qualitative study component that explored the institutional feasibility 
of adopting a cross-sectoral or cross-budget financing approach for development programmes with 
multi-sectoral benefits, in the context of HIV. While there is evidence of modest uptake and 
implementation of co-financing or joint budgeting modalities, the literature remains fairly limited, 
with examples being skewed towards high-income countries (32-34). A series of key informant 
interviews were conducted with national government and development partner budget holders in 
the HIV, health, social protection and food security sectors in Tanzania.  
Insights and perceptions from these respondents suggest that co-financing may be feasible, under 
certain conditions, and with adaptations to the underlying framework. However, respondents 
stressed that even when there is a strong co-financing case to be made, they expected that its 
operationalisation would be hampered by political incentives and the institutional culture of the 
health sector and the civil service. 
The findings underscored how real-world decision frames are markedly different from the 
theoretical frame used in health economic evaluation and thus co-financing. The underlying 
assumptions that decision-makers are maximising sectoral outcomes, and that this is done subject 
to a budget constraint alone, is overly simplistic. Rather, to the extent to which optimising 
rationalities are guiding resource allocation at all, the reality is that payers are more likely to be 
optimising service outputs and coverage. Prioritisation between service outputs tends to be driven 
by global targets and the availability of certain earmarked funding streams. In addition to the budget 
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constraint, payers also face other constraints or boundaries, namely the decision-maker’s delivery 
platform or its so-called ‘instrument’.  
Given these additional institutional parameters, findings suggest that in practice co-financing may 
initially be more viable as a cost minimisation strategy, if payers allocate resources beyond their 
delivery platforms as a means of achieving the same service output at a lower cost through another 
sector’s intervention. This may be particularly relevant for matching supply and demand-side 
interventions, as with the example that was mentioned of using the national cash transfer 
programme as a mechanism to increase enrolment rates in the voluntary community-based health 
insurance scheme, rather than spending health sector resources on health insurance sensitisation 
campaigns. It would allow for a pragmatic consideration of service uptake constraints that originate 
in other sectors, rather than assuming that they do not exist (35).   
Several specific enablers were identified by the study participants. Compelling evidence of multi-
sectoral impacts and expected cost savings were consistently highlighted as being potentially 
influential. This has also been found in previous studies on joint budgeting (32, 36). Another 
important lever for uptake that was brought forward was strong political will and some form of top-
down directive mandating a co-financing scheme. Although high-level buy-in and champions will 
undoubtedly be vital, the literature suggests an important trade-off between the sustainability of co-
financing and top-down mandatory schemes that may increase sectoral resistance (32).  
Findings from the Tanzanian context further indicate that there may more flexibility with mandates 
and ‘instruments’ among payers with a strong results and population focus. In particular, donors 
that are not constrained by the sectors or services they can invest in, could function as pure 
purchasers of outcomes, and could potentially be attracted to fund programmes with multi-sectoral 
benefits in their own right, or through a fee-for-output or outcome mechanism, akin to the results-
based financing schemes being rolled out for health facilities (37). Similarly, respondents appeared 
to suggest that there could be more potential for cross-sectoral thinking and planning at the 
decentralised level, where sectoral siloes are less dominant and officials are more focused on 
delivering benefits to particular populations – as has been the case with joint budgeting in Sweden 
and the United Kingdom (38, 39). 
The study results suggest that the implementation of co-financing approaches may often not be 
straightforward, even when there is a strong economic justification for it. Limited resources and 
budgets could very well heighten each budget holder’s anxiety and grip over its limited resources, 
especially if these decision-makers are more likely to be maximising their budgets than social 
welfare, as argued in political economy theories (40, 41). Moreover, in Tanzania, the limited 
budgetary autonomy that many decision-makers effectively had over largely earmarked resources 
would further constrain the feasibility of reallocations towards cross-sectoral co-financing.   
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9.2 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis makes a key contribution to methods to value and finance health-enhancing 
interventions in non-health sectors. The proposed co-financing approach tackles the challenge of 
attribution of costs for interventions with multiple benefits and payers, which has been highlighted 
as an important methodological gap in economic evaluation (8, 10, 42). Although it is increasingly 
recognised that health economic evaluation needs to consider non-health consequences, current 
guidance remains silent on how a health payer should value consequences outside the sector, in 
order to decide on the most judicious allocation of its resources (8). In England and Wales, for 
example, NICE guidance further acknowledges the lack of a standard method to apportion costs 
when more than one government department or local government is involved in delivering an 
intervention or is reaping its benefits (10, 43).  
The most relevant evaluation method for such interventions was Claxton and colleagues’ 
‘compensation test’ (11), which proposed hypothetical compensation between sectors as an 
analytical tool, but discarded actual intersectoral transfers. In the domain of health promotion 
financing, and the integration of health and social care, there is a parallel literature on joint 
budgeting experiments that have been implemented to overcome the inefficiencies of siloed 
planning and resource allocation (32, 34). The contribution of this thesis is therefore to link the 
theoretical framework of hypothetical cross-sectoral compensation together with the experience of 
co-financing or pooled budgeting, and to apply the approach to empirical case studies in low-
income countries and in the context of HIV.   
Compared to other solutions that have been proposed to address the challenge of incorporating 
multiple benefits and payers, the co-financing approach appears to provide more internal 
consistency with the dominant health economic evaluation framework, and to have more potential 
for operationalisation as an institutional financing mechanism. Indeed, analysts grappling with this 
in the fields of social care and environmental economics are leaning towards a cost-benefit analysis 
framework that monetises non-health outcomes. For example, Wildman and colleagues propose a 
hybrid economic evaluation technique for social care interventions with health and social outcomes, 
that would monetise health outcomes using the cost-effectiveness threshold, while adopting WTP 
elicitation methods to monetise the social outcomes (44). Due to the blended frameworks, this 
approach could have a higher risk of double-counting benefits, and could be misleading. In the 
environmental field, there has been a general reliance on CBA and more consistent efforts to 
identify and value co-benefits, but this has been done more as an advocacy strategy to make the 
investment case for policy intervention, rather than as a means of informing resource allocation 
(45, 46). In the literature on fiscal federalism, it is suggested that a centralised budget could provide 
matching grants to decentralised fiscal authorities as a mechanism to internalise positive 
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externalities (47), which is somewhat similar to the principle of sectoral budgets matching each 
other’s budgets for this purpose.  
An important strength of this thesis is that it drew on various strands of the economic literature, 
including health economics, new institutional economics, political economy, and public finance, to 
understand and identify potential solutions to a common analytical challenge with partial equilibrium 
analysis that sectors tend to take, and to a financing challenge for siloed public policy. The 
programme of inquiry is also strengthened by its mixed methods approach, combining economic 
evaluation, econometric analysis, and qualitative in-depth interviews. This allowed for a more 
rounded analysis of the potential of co-financing as an efficiency-enhancing strategy, going beyond 
the theoretical method development to real-world application and the exploration of institutional 
feasibility. In addition, findings on the reality of decision-making were subsequently utilised to reflect 
on and reframe the co-financing decision space. 
 
9.3 Limitations 
As discussed in more depth in relevant chapters, the thesis and the methodology it proposes have 
a number of limitations that are worth noting. The limitations of the analytical co-financing approach 
are covered first, followed by the caveats around the findings on the value and applicability of the 
approach, given the methodological weaknesses of each study component and the methods 
applied. 
First, the proposed co-financing approach is embedded in an extra-welfarist framework, and 
assumes that all sectors adopt a similar decision frame. As discussed in Chapter 5, its focus is on 
societal objectives (such as population health), rather than aggregate individual utility, and the 
source of valuation is based on the efficiency of the current allocation, rather than individual 
preferences (18, 48, 49). This multiple payer approach further implies that each sector has a 
utilitarian objective of maximising a specific benefit, even though this does not necessarily reflect 
sectoral or societal values, and may not be the framework of choice in other non-health sectors, 
where welfarism and cost-benefit analyses may dominate (46, 50-52). There may be other risks 
within this extra-welfarist approach, since it does not question the current intersectoral allocation of 
overall resources and may over-rely on the biases and judgment of decision-makers (11, 52). 
However, assuming that individuals are the best judges of their and society’s well-being is also 
arguable, especially for areas like population health (53).  
Moreover, although the approach takes a broader cross-sectoral perspective to inform resource 
allocation decisions, it is greatly skewed towards a provider perspective and the efficiency of the 
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allocation of sectoral budgets that may tend to ignore the costs incurred by patients or consumers, 
unless those costs were substituting expenditures that would normally fall on the provider’s budget 
constraint (9). Related to this, the decision frame adopted when each sector or payer considers 
whether to co-finance an intervention is likely to require different comparators depending on how 
the intervention would be delivered, and what its implementation would be incremental to. This 
issue was highlighted in Chapter 7, where the intervention costing adopted a health sector 
perspective, whereas the implementation could have been through the social protection sector, in 
which case the incremental costs are likely to have differed. While most of these limitations relate 
to the underlying theoretical framework adopted, they can also be addressed by explicitly 
considering and deliberating on them when defining the decision problem and scope.   
Second, when assessing the most efficient use of a fixed budget, it is important to factor in that 
certain outcomes may be endogenous to others and there is a risk of double-counting. While co-
financing makes the simplistic assumption that education budgets are used to maximise education 
outcomes, and health budgets are used to maximise health outcomes, evidence suggests that 
education outcomes have downstream impacts on health outcomes and vice versa. Importantly, 
the allocation of the budget to the education sector may already be made, in part, on the basis of 
its contribution to health, in which case transferring part of the health budget on this basis could 
cause inefficiencies. This could be more important when considering sectoral budget allocations, 
where compound effects may be factors that have influenced and continue to guide allocations 
(54). Indeed, the education budget is often justified in relation to its expected benefits for economic 
productivity (55). On the other hand, a full consideration of all interactions in the long-term is likely 
to be too complex and impractical to operationalise. Decisions about financing interventions that 
deliver multi-sectoral benefits in the short-term could be more pragmatically assessed with this 
simplifying assumption that sectors are optimising separate mutually-exclusive outcomes.  
Third, using co-financing as an analytical approach is potentially very data-hungry and its results 
could be particularly sensitive to data availability. Evidence of impact and cost would be required 
across sectors, as well as data on the marginal productivity of each sector’s budget, or its cost-
effectiveness threshold. Moreover, the estimation of co-financing shares will depend on which 
outcome measures were evaluated for a given intervention, and on the data available on the costs 
and impact of other existing investments in each sector. Indeed, the fewer benefits considered, the 
higher each payer’s share. The data and analytical demands of estimating cost-effectiveness 
thresholds across multiple payers, as well as the costs of conducting multiple outcome evaluations, 
may prohibit the realisation of such an efficiency-enhancing co-financing mechanism. As a starting 
point, interdisciplinary evaluation approaches building on an evidence-based theory of change 
could be a way to ensure that the most plausible benefits are captured (31), and to determine the 
expected value of having this additional information (56).  
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Clearly, there are several methodological caveats around the co-financing approach developed 
and whether it could be applied and operationalised. Rather than being an indictment of the 
approach, however, many of these limitations simply underscore the need for further 
methodological development and optimisation, as well as the importance of a carefully considered 
and policy-orientated decision frame.  
Further key limitations in the applications of the co-financing approach in this thesis include the 
limited attention to transaction costs and non-health costs, the issue of endogeneity in the fiscal 
space analysis, data availability and quality for the quantitative analyses, and the context-specificity 
of the qualitative analysis. Indeed, the transaction costs of pooling budgets and reaching a 
coordinated outcome were not considered or quantified in the analyses. Yet, co-financing would 
only be able to generate efficiency gains if the additional benefits or the cost savings from pooled 
financing, would outweigh the transaction costs of coordination (57, 58).  
Moreover, there was a focus on non-health outcomes and much less on intersectoral costs resulting 
from an intervention. Evidently, these are equally important when taking a co-financing approach 
and exploring the use of cross-sectoral transfers, based on each sector’s net cost and net benefit. 
Conversely, a recent review on how economic evaluations have been incorporating a broader 
societal perspective reported that more attention is typically given to intersectoral costs (mainly 
productivity costs), which are more easily monetised, than to outcomes that are difficult to value 
(59). The inclusion of the former can have important implications for the results of an economic 
evaluation, particularly in certain disease areas, such as mental health programmes and their spill 
over cost consequences in the criminal justice sector for example (60). This limitation may have 
led to an over- or underestimation of different sectors co-financing shares estimated in Chapter 4 
and 7. For example, in the co-financing analysis of the cash transfer intervention in Malawi, the 
increase in school attendance would have had some resource implications for the education sector 
to provide services to more girls, but these costs were not estimated and would have reduced the 
education sector’s net benefit and thus contribution to the direct intervention costs. The omitted 
non-health sector costs resulting from the food support intervention for people initiating ART are 
less evident and may have been less important for the co-financing outcome.        
Another limitation when using co-financing principles to consider the resource envelope, as done 
in Chapter 6, was that there may be concerns around endogeneity. It is not unreasonable to expect 
that while sectoral expenditures drive outcomes, the level of outcome achievement may also drive 
resource allocation and sectoral spending. Similarly, the level of output, or in this case HIV service 
coverage, could affect the non-HIV inputs, including the number of health personnel and the level 
of undernourishment in the population, particularly in high burden countries. There may also be 
omitted variables that influence both expenditures and outcomes, as well as non-HIV inputs and 
coverage, but are difficult to control for. There are therefore limitations in the econometric methods 
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that were used to explore how investments in non-HIV programmes could generate cost savings 
for the HIV budget. The potential efficiency gains from co-financing may have been overestimated 
for investments in human resources for health and reduced food insecurity. That being said, there 
is a relatively stronger theoretical case for this direction of causality, especially for the former, with 
consistent observational data that suggests that a production function for health service coverage 
includes exogenous human resource inputs (61, 62).      
The availability and quality of the data used to conduct the economic evaluation modelling in 
Chapter 7, in particular, was not without its shortcomings. It relied on the results from two separate 
trials to model effectiveness for HIV and food security outcomes, and then required extrapolations 
of effects and costs between country settings. This was mitigated by considering a broader range 
of studies in a probabilistic sensitivity analysis, which still indicated likely scope and benefits from 
co-financing.   
Finally, although this thesis investigated the institutional incentives, enablers and barriers to the 
adoption of a co-financing framework at the national level in Tanzania, certain political and 
institutional factors identified are likely to be context-specific. Similar challenges, barriers and 
resistance to cross-sectoral coordination and joint budgeting have been documented among 
governments in high-income countries, and some aspects are likely to be generalizable to other 
contexts (32). Moreover, many of the same development partner organisations support 
programmes across the world, and are individually likely to be influenced by similar agendas and 
organisational constraints from their respective central levels. 
 
9.4 Policy implications and Future research 
The findings from this study have implications for policy and for future areas of research.  
While the HIV response has tasked itself with ending the epidemic as a public health threat by 
2030, and is focusing heavily on the 90-90-90 targets to ramp up effective treatment coverage, it 
continues to face serious constraints to service uptake and adherence as a result of structural 
factors (63). Despite earlier enthusiasm on ‘treating our way out’ of the epidemic, results from 
biomedical prevention and test-and-treat trials consistently point to the limits of this approach (64, 
65). Yet, the limited evidence base on the effectiveness of structural interventions, and their 
relatively high cost per HIV outcome, have made HIV payers reluctant to invest in them. Cross-
sectoral co-financing provides an analytical solution to prevent their undervaluation in value for 
money assessments, which would ensure that more of these options make their way into the HIV 
toolbox as interventions to be considered. In addition, the approach offers a financing solution to 
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make these interventions more financially viable for the HIV response, as well as other payers 
interested in social development goals. Whereas the HIV sub-sector’s appetite for financing 
structural interventions was previously low, the new context of relative funding scarcity may make 
innovative and integrated financing more attractive (66-68).  
Calls and initiatives for ‘joined-up government’ or ‘whole-of-government’ approaches are emerging 
in many areas of public policy. Like HIV mainstreaming, the agenda of Health-in-All-Policies further 
aims to mandate non-health sectors to take on more proactive roles in achieving health gains (38). 
Successes in promoting this have been insufficient, however, and the entrenched sector-based 
institutional incentives may partly explain this (69). Co-financing could be used as a financial 
incentive to enable more policy integration and coherence (67). HIV funders could also use it to 
provide catalytic funding to kick-start or tweak multi-benefit interventions implemented beyond the 
HIV realm. This would not require other sectors to take on an HIV mandate, and could therefore be 
more effective than mainstreaming by aligning cross-sectoral objectives (70). 
In the context of the 17 highly interconnected Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there is an 
evident need to think differently about development programmes, and to recognise the importance 
of cross-sectoral synergies and joint action. Some goals and targets are indivisible, or at least 
reinforcing or enabling, meaning that investments in one of these areas could deliver benefits 
across multiple targets (71). Reducing hunger and chronic malnourishment, for example, would be 
necessary to the goal of ending poverty and would contribute to quality education for all. However, 
there are also other areas where investments to achieve one goal or target could be at the expense 
of another. Promoting food production may negatively affect ecosystem protection or climate 
change mitigation efforts (71). Yet, resources to achieve the SDGs are currently spread out among 
diverse actors and constrained by systems of public and private finance and development 
assistance that may not be fit for purpose (72). Policy-makers continue to operate in silos and lack 
the tools to identify the most important interactions across sectoral targets, and thus opportunities 
to maximise positive interactions and minimise negative ones. A framework has been developed 
to support sectoral policy-makers to take mutually-reinforcing actions and minimise or better 
negotiate trade-offs (71). Co-financing approaches could contribute to re-engineering intersectoral 
governance, planning and financing mechanisms to match resource allocations to the identified 
programmatic areas that can accelerate the achievement of multiple goals and targets (73-75).  
Based on the research in this thesis, it is recommended that policy-makers seek to identify co-
financing opportunities, and focus efforts on areas and programmes where the undervaluation is 
expected to be most acute, and the potential gains from pooled budgets most likely to offset the 
transaction costs. Existing experience suggests that there may be more potential for this at 
decentralised levels of government, where siloes are less pronounced and objectives more 
population-focussed, rather than sector-focussed (32). 
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There are also certain policy risks that come with the promotion of a co-financing approach to fund 
upstream structural interventions with HIV and health impacts. The first is the risk of any efficiency-
enhancing strategy, namely that it will become an excuse for reduced overall financing. Specifically 
for co-financing, which recognises the linkages between social development objectives, it is 
important to not end up pitching social sectors against each other, but rather to argue for the 
consideration of co-benefits to increase the overall social budget. The second policy risk of 
highlighting the social determinants of health, is the possibility of ending up in a trickle-down 
paradigm (76), whereby economic development will be the upstream goal, with downstream 
benefits for education, health and social well-being. In the context of HIV, it is possible that once 
structural interventions are explicitly seen as relevant HIV investments, politicians could claim that 
several of their development investments are HIV-related, giving them room to manoeuvre to 
decrease HIV-specific investments, or conversely, that if there is a case to be made for other 
sectors to pay for structural interventions, the HIV budget could end up being more tightly 
earmarked for ‘core’ HIV programming, at the expense of investments in add-on enabling 
interventions.  
 
There is ample ground for future research in this area. Indeed, this thesis aimed to develop a new 
method and explore its applicability. It has provided some initial applications of the co-financing 
approach in economic evaluation in low-income countries. Others have since referred to the 
approach in their economic analyses of HIV programmes (77), and the co-financing mechanism 
has been identified as an innovative modality to be used in the implementation of national strategic 
plans for HIV and social protection (in South Africa and in Tanzania) (78, 79). However, the 
methodological approach is still in its infancy and requires further optimisation and standardisation. 
This would involve standardised analytical guidance aligned to and embedded within existing 
international guidance on conducting and reporting economic evaluations in global health (9), with 
a particular focus on how analysts should define the decision frames of each payers, given that 
they may have different comparators, objective functions and constraints. It would also be beneficial 
to apply the approach to other diseases and health areas that are likely to benefit from multi-sectoral 
action, such as cholera control, nutrition, the prevention of intimate partner violence, among others 
(80-82).  
In addition, this thesis provides evidence to inform further methodological optimisation that reflects 
real-world decision-making, and to inform the implementation and assessment of the financing 
mechanism. Although the co-financing model has been tested in a few European countries with 
mixed results (32, 36), prospective testing and evaluation of these models in low and middle-
income countries would be required, both from an efficiency perspective, as well as a political 
economy perspective. These would need to examine whether co-financing or joint budgeting 
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models have generated cost savings across sectors, and if so, whether these are greater than the 
associated transaction costs of coordination. In addition, further policy analysis would need to 
ascertain in what institutional contexts co-financing mechanisms are most likely to succeed or fail, 
and what pre-conditions could improve the likelihood of success.  
Some of the required data inputs for conducting a co-financing analysis are seriously lacking, and 
further research would be a prerequisite to the feasibility of the approach going forward. Indeed, 
the lack of evidence on the multiple outcomes of interventions resulting from the siloed approach 
to impact and economic evaluation needs to be addressed. Intersectoral evaluations should 
become the norm for public health interventions and non-health interventions that target key 
established social determinants of health, such as education, water and sanitation, nutrition and 
food security, and gender-based violence, especially in settings where such programmes appear 
to be underfunded. These evaluations should be driven by clear theories of change and theory-
based assessments of the likely cross-sectoral costs and consequences of policy interventions (7, 
42, 59). However, in cases where it is not feasible or too costly to conduct robust intersectoral 
evaluations, it will be important to have a larger body of evidence on the relationships between 
different risk factors and health benefits, to enable the modelling of health outcomes in the 
economic evaluation of non-health interventions.  
Moreover, the theoretical basis for co-financing shares should be each budget’s shadow price, or 
cost-effectiveness threshold. Although there is some burgeoning empirical research in the health 
field to ‘search’ for this threshold (83, 84), it is important that these efforts are extended beyond the 
UK and beyond the health sector, if decisions are to be based on positive measures of marginal 
productivity. This will only happen with strong policy demand for and subsequent use of such 
measures in priority-setting.    
 
Although the thesis adds to the literature on the theoretical frameworks and approaches to resource 
allocation between and within sectors, it also raises several questions that are not specific to the 
multi-sectoral perspective taken. First of all, it highlights a dissonance between the adoption and 
acceptance of a welfarist framework to establishing resource envelopes (fiscal space) between 
sectors, and an extra-welfarist framework to optimising the use of some of these budgets. There 
appears to be some emerging consensus in the scholarly debate around cost-effectiveness 
thresholds and the use of willingness-to-pay methods. Whereas the welfarist concept of WTP per 
health outcome (e.g. QALY or DALY) is accepted as relevant to setting the health budget, or 
determining the ‘consumption value of health’ (16, 18, 84) (– or rather health care) vis-à-vis the 
consumption of other sector goods and services; an extra-welfarist measure of marginal 
productivity of the health budget is considered most appropriate for efficient allocations to health 
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interventions. Yet, when considering a multi-sectoral framework, it becomes clear that this can only 
yield efficient outcomes if there is equivalence between aggregate individual utility derived from the 
consumption of all public sector goods and services, and the sum of all the sectors’ outcome 
measures valued by their opportunity costs. This is unlikely to be the case, given that utility and 
extra-welfarist measures, such as those considered in health, are fundamentally different measures 
of welfare. Sen’s capabilities’ approach has emerged as a viable and more comprehensive 
alternative to defining and measuring social welfare (7). Significant efforts are being made to 
develop multidimensional measures of capabilities and well-being that can be used to capture a 
range of socially desirable outcomes, and could potentially bridge these two approaches, if 
embraced across sectors as a primary measure for resource allocation (85). That being said, the 
latter is unlikely in the near future, and further investigation might explore the consequences and 
potential perverse incentives of some sectors optimising based on sector-specific outcomes, while 
others optimise based on utility. 
Finally, the thesis highlights that the scope of the decision problem for economic evaluation may 
need to be rethought, since there is a disconnect between the implicit optimization problem and the 
decision space of policy-makers these analyses are seeking to inform. The current evaluative 
space defines a single health decision-maker seeking to optimise health gain subject to a health 
budget alone, although this ‘health payer’ actually faces an additional constraint in terms of what 
types of interventions it can invest in, making it a ‘health care payer’. This raises the fundamental 
question (and potential inefficiency) of who is responsible for maximising health gain overall, if it is 
not the national health payer/ministry of health or the health care sector. This must be tackled if the 
public sector is to efficiently contribute to the production of better population health. If countries 
decide that the mandate to maximise health gain lies with the health sector, rather than with a 
central supra-ministerial payer, then constraints of which services or interventions they can fund 
need to be relaxed, and disciplinary identity boundaries will need to be overcome.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
ZOMBA CASH TRANSFER TRIAL 
The Zomba trial was implemented by the World Bank from January 2008 to December 2009. 
This randomised controlled trial is described in detail elsewhere [1]. All never-married girls aged 
13-22 at the end of 2007 in a random sample of 176 enumeration areas in the rural district of 
Zomba, Malawi were invited to take part in the trial. Of these, 3,796 were enrolled at baseline, 
of which 1,225 were randomised to the treatment group and were offered monthly cash 
transfers. The majority (789) were already in school at baseline while the others were girls that 
had dropped out of school (436). Among the baseline schoolgirls, 506 were randomised to the 
conditional arm, whereby their receipt of the monthly cash transfer was dependent on their 80% 
school attendance. The unconditional arm received the cash regardless of their attendance.  
Methods for estimating the Willingness to Pay 
In order to estimate how much each sector would be willing to pay for this intervention, we 
started by determining which (sub-)sectors would be interested in the first place, based on 
which outcomes were found to be significantly impacted by the intervention. Various reports 
from the trial provided evidence that the intervention had statistically significant impacts on 
prevalent HIV, prevalent HSV-2, school enrolment, English test scores, school drop-out rates, 
pregnancy rates and cases of depression. We therefore consider that the HIV budget holder, 
the sexual and reproductive health budget holder, the mental health budget holder and the 
education budget holder would see value in investing in such an intervention.  
Table S1. Sample sizes of Control and intervention groups and Intervention cost 
estimates 
Participants in Control Group 
Amount Source 
     Schoolgirls Only 1495 [1] 
     Dropouts Only 453 [1] 
     Total Participants   1948 [1] 
Participants in Intervention Group   
     Dropout Pooled 436 [1] 
     Schoolgirl Pooled  789 [1] 
           Schoolgirl Unconditional Only  283 [1] 
           Schoolgirl Conditional Only 506 [1] 
     Total Participants   1225 [1] 
Intervention Cost (2009 US$)     
     Cost per Pupil (Lower Estimate) $901 [2] 
                                                     
1 Assumes more reasonable administrative costs at scale (excluding the trial costs) and 
reducing the average cash payment amount to US$ 5 per month, which Baird and colleagues 
estimated could be achieved without affecting the intervention’s impact (Baird et al., 2012). 
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     Cost per Pupil (Upper Estimate) $225 [2] 
     Total Intervention Cost (Lower Estimate) $110,250 
Cost per pupil x Total girls 
in Intervention group 
     Total Intervention Cost (Upper Estimate) $275,625 
Cost per pupil x Total girls 
in Intervention group 
 
Since we equate willingness to pay (WTP) per (sub-)sector with sector-specific normative or 
positive thresholds, we first need to estimate the intervention’s impact in absolute terms and in 
the units of outcome for which thresholds exist. For all health outcomes, we therefore need to 
estimate impact in DALYs, which can be derived from infections/cases averted. For education 
outcomes, we found that cost-effectiveness ratios exist for enrolment in percentage, additional 
years of schooling, drop-outs averted, and 0.1 standard deviations in test scores. We therefore 
calculated absolute impact for these indicators, using the percentage-point difference between 
control and treatment groups and multiplying by the size of the sample in the trial. For the HIV, 
HSV-2 and teenage pregnancy outcomes, we used the unweighted percentage-point 
difference, rather than the weighted percentages estimated by the authors, as a more 
conservative estimate [3-5], but we also conduct a sensitivity analysis using the weighted ones.          
It is important to note that the effect was only significant for certain treatment groups, i.e. school 
girls that were in school at baseline, girls that had dropped out of school at baseline, or only 
among baseline school girls in the conditional arm. We only applied the impact to the specific 
sample for which it was significant, as shown in Table 4.      
     
Identification of lower and upper bound WTP thresholds in the education literature 
We used the review of cost-effective education interventions in developing countries conducted 
by J-PAL for school attendance. Findings are summarised on their website, at the following link: 
http://www.povertyactionlab.org/policy-lessons/education/student-participation. Four 
interventions are included for Africa, namely information on returns to education for parents 
(Madagascar); deworming through primary schools (Kenya); free primary school uniforms 
(Kenya); and merit scholarships for girls (Kenya). Each intervention’s cost-effectiveness ratio 
is presented as the number of additional years of school participation obtained per US$ 100 
spent. We translated this in a cost per additional year of participation ($100/CER). A member 
of J-PAL informed us that these were in 2010 US$, so we deflated the costs to 2009 US$ using 
the United States 2009 inflation rate World Bank (World Development Indicators)[6]. We used 
the lowest CER as the lowest WTP for an additional year of schooling and the highest CER as 
the highest WTP, i.e. providing parents with information on the returns to education and merit 
scholarships for girls respectively. 
For school enrolment and test scores, we adopted the review by Evans and Ghosh (2006)[7] 
as a starting point. From this review, we retained and reviewed studies evaluating interventions 
that were implemented in sub-Saharan African countries had the lowest and the highest cost-
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effectiveness ratio. For test scores, we used the CER figures reported in Evans and Ghosh 
(2006) for studies with randomised designs, since they were expressed in the same unit (0.1 
standard deviation gain) as what we had calculated for the Zomba trial. We kept the CERs that 
adjusted for the deadweight loss associated with the intervention.  
For school enrolment, we selected and reviewed in detail the studies from Sub-Saharan Africa 
with the lowest (Glick & Sahn, 2005) and highest CER (Handa, 2002), including non-
randomised designs (there was only one study with a randomised design from SSA). Glick & 
Sahn (2005) modelled the cost-effectiveness of school consolidation with multigrade 
elimination, which had the lowest CER expressed per additional student enrolled (translated 
from Malgashy francs to US$ based on the 1994 exchange rate reported in the study).    
For Handa (2002), the highest estimated CER that the authors concluded was worth 
considering was for another supply-side intervention consisting of the construction of additional 
schools to improve accessibility (70 schools per province). The total cost was estimated at US$ 
49 million (assumed 1998 US$). The projected enrolment gain was 13%, but the authors did 
not indicate how much this represented in absolute numbers of additional students enrolled. 
We used data from the other intervention modelled in the paper to deduce the total primary 
school age population under consideration. For the adult literacy intervention, the authors 
indicate that there are 490,000 illiterate household heads are in the bottom quartile, which 
represent 59% of all households in this quartile). We therefore calculate that there are 
490,000/0.59 x 4= 3,322,033 households in total. In the survey sample of 8,250 households, 
there were 2,293 (girls) and 2,203 (boys), or 4,496 children, between 7 and 11 years old – the 
primary school age. The ratio of households to students was therefore used to estimate the 
total number of school aged children targeted with the school construction intervention, i.e. 
3,322,033/1.835= 1,810,408. The 13% increase in enrolment in this population therefore 
corresponded to an additional 235,353 children enrolled, or a CER of US$ 208 (1998 US$).  
In terms of drop-outs averted, we only found one study with this measure and programme costs, 
i.e. Duflo et al (2006), which evaluated an intervention in Kenya to reduce the costs of primary 
schooling by providing free uniforms. This intervention is also considered above for additional 
years of schooling. The study reported a reduction in drop-out rates among girls from 12.4% to 
9.9%. It benefited an average of 28 girls in 328 schools, or 9,184 girls in total. The reduction in 
drop-out thus corresponds to 230 female drop-outs averted. At a total cost of US$ 93,152 (=284 
per school in 328 schools), this represent a cost per drop-out averted of US$ 406 (2005US$).   
All the CERs from these reviews were adjusted to 2009 US$ using the United States inflation 
rates from the World Bank (World Development Indicators)[6]. Where the year of the currency 
was unclear, we assumed that it was for the year before the study was submitted for publication 
(Handa, 2002) or published (Duflo et al, 2006).   
Finally, all CERs in 2009 US$ were adjusted to Malawi using the ratio of the CER to the 2009 
GDP per capita of the country in which the intervention was implemented [6]. For example, the 
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cost per drop-out averted of 2009 US$ 455 in Kenya (Duflo et al, 2006) represented 60% of 
Kenya’s 2009 GDP per capita of US$755 in 2009 US$; or US$ 204 in Malawi (59% of Malawi’s 
2009 GDP per capita US$339).   
 
Conversion of health outcomes to DALY  
We estimated the health outcomes of the Zomba trial in the following natural units: HIV 
infections averted, HSV-2 infections averted, teen pregnancies averted and depression cases 
averted. Since the WHO cost-effectiveness thresholds that we use are for costs per DALY 
averted, we had to translate these into DALY equivalents.  
For HIV infections averted, we estimated the associated DALYs, based on standard DALY 
formulae [8] and parameters relevant for the target population, with both a no ART and a full 
ART scenario (see Table 3). We estimate 25.76 DALYs per HIV infection in a no ART scenario 
and 15.66 DALYs per HIV infection in a scenario with full ART coverage. We use the latter more 
conservative estimate in our analysis.     
Table S2. DALY Parameters [9] 
Parameters Value Source 
Age-weighting modulation constant 1 Murray et al, 2006[8] 
Discount rate 3% Murray et al, 2006[8] 
Age weighting constant 0.04 Murray et al, 2006[8] 
Adjustment constant for age-weights 0.1658 Murray et al, 2006[8] 
Disability weight pre- AIDS 0.221 Salomon et al, 2012[10] 
Disability weight AIDS – no ART 0.547 Salomon et al, 2012[10] 
Disability weight AIDS receiving ART 0.053 Salomon et al, 2012[10] 
Duration pre-AIDS 8 years Hogan et al, 2005[11] 
Duration ART 13 years Cleary et al, 2008[12] 
Duration AIDS (no ART) 2.9 years Cleary et al, 2008[12] 
Age of onset of HIV (ART) 16 years Baird et al, 2012[1] 
Disability weight major depressive disorder – mild 
episode 
0.159 Salomon et al, 2012[10] 
Disability weight major depressive disorder – 
moderate episode 
0.406 Salomon et al, 2012[10] 
Disability weight major depressive disorder – severe 
episode 
0.655 Salomon et al, 2012[10] 
Duration of an untreated depressive episode 0.5 year Chisholm et al, 2004[13] 
Lifetime suicide risk for affective disorders, ages 15-
45 
9% Chisholm et al, 2004[13] 
Weighting of mild untreated depressive episodes  30% Chisholm et al, 2004[13] 
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Parameters Value Source 
Weighting of moderate untreated depressive 
episodes 
47% Chisholm et al, 2004[13] 
Weighting of severe untreated depressive episodes 23% Chisholm et al, 2004[13] 
Expectation of life at 15-19, females, Malawi, 2011 49.77 WHO life tables[14] 
Expectation of life at 25-29, females, Malawi, 2011 40.90 WHO life tables[14] 
Expectation of life at 35-39, females, Malawi, 2011 34.22 WHO life tables[14] 
Age at onset of depressive episode 15 years Baird et al, 2012[1] 
 
DALYs associated with cases of depression were estimated in the same way, with 
specific depression parameters from the 2004 WHO CHOICE exercise [13] and the 
latest Global Burden of Disease study [8]. We assume that 91% of cases of depression 
will consist of a single untreated episode of 6 months (weighted to include mild, 
moderate and severe episodes), followed by full recovery and no loss of life. This is 
conservative as it excludes remission, which is known to be quite high. For the 
remaining 9%, we assume that the 6-month episode will be severe and end in suicide. 
This may be an overestimate of years of life lost, since 9% is the lifetime suicide risk 
in this age group, not the risk per episode. Nonetheless, we estimate 34.77 DALYs in 
9% of cases and 0.31 DALYs in 91% of cases, or a weighted average of 3.41 DALYs 
per depressive disorder.   
For teen pregnancies, we estimated DALY equivalents from the second edition of the Disease 
Control Priorities Project. We used the figures reported for family planning, with a US$ 131 per 
birth averted in sub-Saharan Africa corresponding to US$ 34 per DALY averted [15], or 3.8 
DALYs per birth averted. This does not appear unreasonable given Malawi’s high maternal and 
infant mortality rates, as well as increased risks among young adolescent women [16, 17].  
In terms of HSV-2 infections averted, we decided to use a very conservative estimate from a 
high-income setting [18], which only considers the psychosocial adult morbidity of genital 
herpes psychosocial, leading to lower mental health scores. This excludes potential sequelae 
from meningitis, erythema multiforme and neonatal herpes [19], for lack of data parameters. 
Also, to avoid double-counting, we do not take into account the cofactor effect of HSV-2 on HIV 
transmission [20]. In Canada, it was estimated that the cost per case of genital herpes averted 
through screening would be $8,200. Based on the quality of life weights derived from this study, 
authors estimate that this would correspond to $140,000 per quality-adjusted life year gained 
[18]. We consider that this corresponds to 0.06 QALYs per genital herpes infection and convert 
this directly to 0.06 DALYs per HSV-2 infection.  
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Cost-benefit modelling assumptions for the fair share approach 
The WTP estimates in the above were used as equivalents of monetised HIV benefits (HIV 
DALYs averted x WTP threshold of GDP per capita). The other long-term benefits of such an 
intervention were modelled by adopting the benefit-cost ratio from a previous study (King et al., 
2007) that estimated the costs and benefits of conditional cash transfers to young women. For 
every US$ 1 invested, between US$ 3.49 and US$ 26.12 could be generated in benefits 
through increased future earnings and DALYs averted from child mortality, under various 
discount rate assumptions (3% and 5%) and DALY value assumptions (US$ 1,000 and $5,000).  
For consistency, we monetised HIV DALYs in the base case at US$ 1,000 and included the 
higher valuation of $5,000 in the sensitivity analysis.  
In addition, on the cost side, we deducted the cost savings from averted antiretroviral treatment. 
The discounted lifetime ART costs of 2002 US$9,435 or 2009 US$11,303 were taken from a 
South African study [21]. Fifty percent of the costs were considered drug-related and therefore 
internationally comparable (not adjusted) and the other 50% were adjusted to Malawian prices, 
based on the ratio of Malawi's GDP per capita to South Africa's GDP per capita (i.e. US$ 5,511 
per person on treatment or US$ 35,966 for the 6 HIV infections averted by the trial). 
 
Welfare Loss Calculation 
Welfare loss was calculated for the silo approach as the net benefit that could be achieved from 
implementing the intervention. The total benefits were the net intervention benefits of US$ 
478,373 plus the HIV treatment cost savings (US$ 35,966). The implementation costs (US$ 
110,250) were deducted from this total of US$ 514,338 to estimate the net benefit of 
US$404,088. 
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Table S3. Detailed inputs and data sources 
(Sub-
)Sector 
Outcome metric 
Impacted 
group 
Control Treatment Gain Source 
DALYs 
per unit 
(health) 
Source 
Conversion 
to DALYs 
averted 
WTP per 
unit 
(min) 
Source 
WTP 
per unit 
(max) 
Source 
Education 
Drop-outs re-
enrolled (additional 
student enrolled) 
All baseline 
drop-outs 
12.3% 56.6% 193 [1] 
Not applicable 
16.81 [22] 220.42 [23] 
Years of full school 
attendance Baseline 
schoolgirls 
conditional 
arm 
80.1% 90.2% 772 [24] 3.91 [25] 163.33 [25] 
English test scores 
0.1 standard 
deviations gained 
n.a. 
0.14 higher 
than control  
708 [24] 1.54 [7] 3.29 [7] 
Drop-outs averted 
All baseline 
schoolgirls 
83.5% 86.6% 24 [26] 16.81 [22] 204.45 [27] 
HIV 
HIV infections 
averted 
All baseline 
schoolgirls 
2.13% 1.43% 6 [1] 15.6 
See 
above 
83 339* [6] 1,017† [6] 
Mental 
health 
Depression cases 
averted 
All baseline 
schoolgirls 
24.5% 18.7% 46 [28] 3.41 
See 
above 
10 339* [6] 1,017† [6] 
Sexual & 
Reproducti
ve Health 
Teen pregnancies 
averted 
Baseline 
schoolgirls 
unconditiona
l arm 
4.23% 0.75% 10 [1] 3.8 
See 
above 
38 339* [6] 1,017† [6] 
HSV-2 infections 
averted 
All baseline 
schoolgirls 
3.00% 1.02% 16 [1] 0.06 
See 
above 
78 339* [6] 1,017† [6] 
Health sub-total     208     
* Malawi GDP per capita in 2009 (adjusted to 2009 US$ with United States inflation measured by GDP deflator) from World Bank’s World Development Indicator. †3 times 
Malawi’s 2009 GDP per capita 
                                                     
2 51 additional full years of schooling in conditional arm (506*0.902-506*0.801) over 18 months of implementation (1.5 years) = 77 additional years of schooling.  
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1 Data Sources 
Table S1.1. Data description 
Indicator name Definition Date Extracted Year  Source 
Gross domestic 
product per capita, 
current prices (U.S. 
dollars) 
GDP is expressed in current U.S. dollars per person. Data are derived by first 
converting GDP in national currency to U.S. dollars and then dividing it by 
total population. 
2014-05-15 2008-2012 IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) 
Adult HIV Prevalence 
(%) 
 Percentage of the population aged 15 and above living with HIV. 2014-06-10 2008-2012 AIDS Info Online Database 
Total HIV spending by 
funding source (U.S. 
dollars) 
Sum of Domestic Public, International and Private Spending. 2014-12-09 2008-2012 AIDS Info Online Database 
Domestic Public HIV 
spending (U.S. dollars) 
Expenditures in-country that originated from public sources (authors’ 
definition for lack of definition on AIDSinfo) 
Note: countries may be reporting expenditures made by public agents 
2014-12-09 2008-2012 AIDS Info Online Database 
United Republic of 
Tanzania: PER 2012 and then 
inflated to 2013 
Domestic International 
HIV spending (U.S. 
dollars) 
Expenditures in-country that originated from international sources (authors’ 
definition for lack of definition on AIDSinfo) 
Note: countries may be reporting expenditures by international actors 
2014-12-09 2008-2012 AIDS Info Online Database 
 
United Republic of 
Tanzania: PER 2012 and then 
inflated to 2013 
Domestic Private HIV 
spending (U.S. dollars) 
Expenditures in-country that originated from public sources (authors’ 
definition for lack of definition on AIDSinfo) 
2014-12-09 2008-2012 AIDS Info Online Database 
Control of corruption Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance). Re-scaled to [2.5; 7.5]. 
2014-05-14 2012 The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI)  
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Indicator name Definition Date Extracted Year  Source 
Number of people 
living with HIV 
Total number of people living with HIV (adults and children) 2014-09-06 2010-2012 AIDS Info Online Database 
Revenue excluding 
Grants (% GDP) 
Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, and other revenues 
such as fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales. Grants are also 
considered as revenue but are excluded here. 
2014-05-12 2010-2012 International Monetary Fund, 
Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook and data files, and 
World Bank and OECD GDP 
estimates. Catalog Sources World 
Development Indicators. 
IMF regional economic outlook 
reports or IMF staff review 
reports  
CIA Fact book (Cuba, Venezuela) 
General government 
gross debt (% GDP) 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of 
interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the 
future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and 
deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized 
guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable. Thus, all liabilities in the 
GFSM 2001 system are debt, except for equity and investment fund shares 
and financial derivatives and employee stock options. Debt can be valued at 
current market, nominal, or face values  
2014-07-01 2012 International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic and Financial 
Surveys, World Economic 
Outlook Database, October 2012. 
General Government 
Health Expenditure (% 
General Government 
Expenditure) 
General government expenditure includes consolidated direct outlays and 
indirect outlays (e.g. subsidies to producers, transfers to households), 
including capital of all levels of government, social security institutions, 
autonomous bodies, and other extra budgetary funds.  
General government expenditure on health comprises the direct outlays 
earmarked for the enhancement of the health status of the population and/or 
the distribution of medical care goods and services among population by the 
following financing agents: central/federal, state/provincial/regional, and 
local/municipal authorities; extra budgetary agencies, social security 
schemes; parastatals. All can be financed through domestic funds or through 
external resources. 
2014-05-12 2012 WHO (World Health 
Organisation) -Global Health 
Expenditure Database 
  
Zimbabwe:  MoF "Estimates of 
Expenditure for the year ending 
December 31, 2012"  
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Indicator name Definition Date Extracted Year  Source 
General Government 
Expenditure (% GDP) 
General government expenditure (GGE) includes consolidated direct outlays 
and indirect outlays, such as subsidies and transfers, including capital, of all 
levels of government social security institutions, autonomous bodies, and 
other extra budgetary funds. 
2014-05-12 2012 WHO (World Health 
Organisation) -Global Health 
Expenditure Database 
Out of pocket per 
capita  
Household out-of-pocket spending (OOPs): the direct outlays of households, 
including gratuities and in-kind payments made to health practitioners and 
to suppliers of pharmaceuticals, therapeutic appliances and other goods and 
services. This includes household direct payments to public and private 
providers of health care services, non-profit institutions, and non-
reimbursable cost sharing, such as deductibles, copayments and fee for 
services 
2014-05-12 2012 WHO (World Health 
Organisation) -Global Health 
Expenditure Database 
Zimbabwe: Health Systems 2020 
report (2010): 
https://www.hfgproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Zimbab
we_Health_System_Assessment2
0101.pdf 
Excise tax as a per cent 
of the retail price of 
alcoholic beverages 
(Beer) 
The alcohol excise tax is indicated as a % of the retail price of beer.  2015-12-22 2012 WHO (World Health 
Organisation) Global Health 
Observatory data repository 
Nigeria:from government source: 
https://www.customs.gov.ng/Gui
delines/Excise/ 
Domestic Public  and  
International HIV 
spending on Care and 
Treatment (U.S. 
Dollars) 
 2012-09-03 2008-2012 AIDS Info Online Database 
Non-drug cost per 
person on treatment 
(minus average drug 
costs from literature) 
Cost per Person on Treatment minus 2012 USD 132, from Tagar et al 
(2014)1. 
2014-09-14 2008-2012 Calculated using the following 
indicators 
Cost per person on treatment 
(calculated using International 
HIV spending by programme 
area-US$ Care & Treatment and 
Population) 
People receiving 
antiretroviral therapy 
(Number) 
Estimated number of people receiving ART  2014-06-06 2008-2012 AIDS Info Online Database 
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Indicator name Definition Date Extracted Year  Source 
Proportion of Public 
HIV Spending to  
GGHE in US dollars 
Domestic Public HIV spending (U.S. dollars) divided by General 
Government Health Expenditure (U.S dollars) 
 
 
2014-05-12 2012 Calculated using the following 
indicators 
Domestic Public HIV spending 
(U.S. dollars) 
General Government Health 
Expenditure (U.S dollars)  
Nurse density Number of nursing and midwifery personnel per 1000 population 2014-05-12  
2014-10-07 
2007-2012 
 
Global Health Observatory of the 
World Health Organization  
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
Africa Health Workforce 
Observatory 
http://www.who.int/whosis/whost
at/EN_WHS09_Table6.pdf 
Pregnant women tested 
for HIV, estimated 
coverage (%) 
Percentage of pregnant women who were tested for HIV during the last 12 
months. 
2014-11-18 2010 Global Health Observatory of the 
World Health Organization 
Adult literacy rate, 
population 15+ years, 
female (%) 
Percentage of female population aged 15 years and over who can both read 
and write with understanding a short simple statement on his/her everyday 
life 
2014-11-18 
15:28 
2008-2012 
2007 
 
UNESCO 
UIS INFORMATION PAPER-
June 2013 for Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Liberia, Namibia and 
Zambia 
Undernourished (% of 
total population) 
A state, lasting for at least one year, of inability to acquire enough food, 
defined as a level of food intake insufficient to meet dietary energy 
requirements. 
2014-10-28 2010-2012 FAOSTAT (Food Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations) 
 FOO 
Inflation, GDP deflator 
(annual %) 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit 
deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency. 
2014-02-09 2008-2012 World Bank national accounts 
data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
Catalog Sources World 
Development Indicators 
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Indicator name Definition Date Extracted Year  Source 
Population (Total) Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship -- except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally 
considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values 
shown are midyear estimates. 
2014-05-14 2008-2012 
 
World Bank national accounts 
data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
Catalog Sources World 
Development Indicators 
Urban population (% 
of total) 
Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national 
statistical offices. 
2014-06-20 2012 World Bank national accounts 
data, and OECD National 
Accounts data. Catalog 
Sources World Development 
Indicators 
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2 Financing Data for 14 focus SSA countries 
Table S2.1. Financing Data for 14 focus SSA countries  
Variable 
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Public HIV Spending per PLHIV 923 33 85 148 2 9 799 35 337 155 31 5 14 25 
GDP per person 9,407 471 994 1,340 270 652 5,635 1,654 7,636 3,119 574 650 1,486 858 
HIV Prevalence 23.0% 1.3% 6.1% 23.1% 10.8% 11.1% 13.3% 3.1% 17.9% 26.5% 7.2% 5.1% 12.7% 14.7% 
Control of Corruption 5.94 4.4 3.9 5.11 4.55 4.41 5.32 3.87 4.85 4.67 4.05 4.15 4.64 3.73 
International HIV spending per person 281 254 334 112 103 161 517 128 48 223 207 187 235 161 
Year of spending data 2011 2008 2012 2008 2008 2012 2010 2012 2009 2009 2008 2011 2012 2012 
Government revenue, excl. grants as % 
GDP 
35.8% 14.0% 23.2% 57.5% 26.0% 23.3% 32.5% 25.3% 28.3% 36.4% 13.4% 17.5% 21.0% 28.0% 
Gross government debt as % GDP 15.0% 22.2% 47.2% 41.6% 49.0% 42.0% 27.2% 14.7% 41.2% 22.0% 36.2% 46.8% 28.0% 61.5% 
Government Health Expenditure as % 
Government Expenditure 
8.0% 11.1% 5.9% 14.5% 17.8% 8.8% 13.9% 6.7% 12.9% 18.1% 10.2% 10.2% 16.4% 8.6% 
Out-of-pocket expenditure per person 21 7 21 20 3 2 32 62 47 28 22 13 23 n.a. 
Alcohol excise tax, as % retail price 
(beer) 
40% 50% n.a. n.a. 9% n.a. n.a. 20% 35% 24% 60% 7.75% n.a. n.a. 
Non-drug cost per person on ART 1,394 559 571 1,154 70 422 1,581 395 2,009 431 1,346 737 131 137 
Public HIV spending as % of GHE 69.0% 3.4% 18.2% 19.2% 0.7% 2.5% 25.5% 2.4% 12.0% 12.1% 9.2% 0.8% 1.8% 9.7% 
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3 Normative approach to estimating Fiscal space 
We follow similar methods as other fiscal space assessments, modelling normative assumptions through 
for each of the sources of fiscal space to estimate the public finance that could be generated and allocated 
to HIV, other things held constant (ceteris paribus).  
We estimate the potential increase in public spending for HIV in selected countries from a conducive 
macroeconomic environment based on the IMF projected GDP growth between 2014 and 2018, 
assuming that this will lead to an equivalent percentage increase in HIV spending. Next, we estimate the 
same potential increase from increased government revenues (excluding grants) as a share of GDP to an 
empirical average of 25%2.  
In terms of reprioritisation, we estimate how much additional HIV financing would result from 
increasing the prioritisation of health in the government budget to the Abuja target of 15% (assuming a 
pro rata increase for HIV spending, even though it is not all health-related). In addition, we consider how 
much more public spending would be if its share of government health expenditure would increase to 
0.5 times the ratio of HIV Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) in total DALYs3. 
To account for the option of deficit financing, we consider an increase of the debt to GDP ratio to the 
40% ‘prudent’ level, according to the IMF, and estimate the equivalent increase in HIV spending.  
In terms of sector-specific resources, we use out-of-pocket expenditure as a proxy of the potential to 
improve revenue generation through risk-pooling of private resources for health under a tax-based or 
social health insurance scheme, and estimate how much could potentially be mobilised if OOP were 
reduced to an acceptable level of 20%, which minimises catastrophic health expenditures4 and 50% of 
the rest would be redirected from the private sector to a government-managed risk-pooling social health 
insurance scheme. We deducted USD 1.77 as the estimated per capita cost of administrating a national 
risk-pooling scheme5. The current share of HIV spending in total health spending is used to apportion 
those resources to HIV.  
We also consider potential fiscal space for HIV if an earmarked alcohol tax were to be added to the 
existing tax, bringing it up to the 50% maximum stipulated by a directive by the West and Central African 
Monetary Union6. Reduced sales from the price increase are deducted from the total additional revenue 
using a -0.3 price elasticity of demand7-8. No incremental administrative costs were factored in, since it 
would just be an increased amount taxed on existing sales that are already taxed.   
Finally, we estimate potential efficiency gains in treatment and care programmes, by calculating the 
approximate cost per person receiving ARVs and retained in care (total treatment and care spending / 
(number of people receiving ARVs x retention rate)) as a ratio of GDP per capita, after deducting 
internationally priced (first-line) drug costs of USD 132 per person on treatment (2012 USD)1. We use 
this measure to identify the best performing country per income category (low income; lower middle 
income; upper middle income). Combined with the results from the empirical study by Menzies et al 
(2012) that found a logarithmic relationship between non-drug ART unit costs and per capita GDP, and 
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an average increase of 22% in non-drug unit costs for each doubling in per capita GDP9, we estimate 
logarithmic functions as the ‘efficiency frontier’ functions for each income category. The ‘optimal’ non-
drug ART unit cost per country is then used to estimate potential savings in the ART programme, and 
that proportion of savings is applied to public HIV spending. We used constant number of people on 
ARVs in the next 5 years as a conservative estimate.  
All estimates in total US$ were divided by the average number of adults living with HIV (above 15 years) 
per country in 2013 (for current) and over the next 5 years to yield public spending per adult living HIV. 
We used estimates of the number of PLHIV per country over the period 2014-2018 produced from 
STDSIM under a scenario of continued current coverage rates and treatment eligibility of CD4 count 
below 500 mm10. We could not do this for Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, as they were not 
included in the STDSIM modelling, so we used a constant number of total people living with HIV from 
UNAIDS Aidsinfo (2013).  
All estimates were calculated in Excel spreadsheets. 
Sensitivity Analyses for Technical Efficiency gains 
Given the complexity of measuring HIV programme technical efficiency and the relatively simple 
measure used, we conducted three sensitivity analyses to explore the sensitivity of the results to (a) the 
pace at which the efficiencies can be realised; (b) the choice of the best performers, i.e. the efficiency 
frontier; and (c) the functional form (see Table S4).  
a) To take into account a more gradual realisation of efficiency gains over the 5 year period, we used 
empirical site-level data to spread the efficiency gains over the 5 year period. Menzies et al (2012) 
find that ART programme maturity drives non-drug costs, with large drops seen in the first year 
(41%), followed by considerable reductions in the second year (25%)9. Given our 5 year timeframe 
and assuming that the reduction from the third year on drops to a further 10% (our assumption), we 
could expect an overall reduction of 68% between year 5 and year 1. The first year reduction in 
total treatment and care costs in our sample ranges from 13% (Malawi) to 85% (Uganda), with an 
average of 47%. However, in our base case analysis, we estimate that these reductions are achieved 
in the first year and sustained for 4 more years. Here we spread the first year reduction in costs over 
the 5 year period, based on the empirical figures above. Hence, 60% of the savings are achieved in 
the first year, another 22% in the second year, followed by an additional 6% for years 3-5. With 
this approach, we estimate 15% lower annual average efficiency gains per country.         
b) We changed the best performers to the best performer of all low-income, lower-middle income and 
upper-middle income sub-Saharan African countries, rather than countries within the subset of 14 
countries. For the low-income countries, the best performer became Chad, for lower-middle-income 
countries it remained Zambia, and for upper-middle-income countries it became Gabon. In this 
case, total average efficiency gains would double, driven by the much larger potential for the 3 
upper-middle-income countries. 
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c) We assume a linear relationship between the ratio of non-drug ART unit costs to GDP per capita, 
instead of a logarithmic one. This would mean that a given country could achieve the same ratio as 
the best performer in their income category. With this approach, average efficiency gains would be 
27% higher.   
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Table S3.1. Potential sources of domestic financing in selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa based on the normative approach 
 
Current 
Public HIV 
spending per 
adult living 
with HIV 
(US$) 
Average Additional Public HIV Spending per adult living with HIV (2014-2018 annualised, US$) Maximum 
potential 
Public HIV 
Spending per 
adult living 
with HIV 
(US$) 
Average HIV savings from 
non-HIV spending per adult 
living with HIV  
(2014-18, annualised, US$) 
Economic 
growth 
Govt 
revenue 
generation 
External 
borrowing 
Reprioritisation Health-earmarked sources 
Technical 
efficiency gains 
Health HIV 
Health 
risk-
pooling 
mechanism 
Alcohol tax 
Reduced ART 
non-drug unit 
cost 
Expansion 
of HRH 
Reduced 
undernourish
ment 
Low-Income Countries 
 
 
Ethiopia 48 4 39 40 18 0 3 0 31             364  182 53 
Malawi 2 0.2 0 0 0 33 0 13 0                56  7 1 
Mozambique 10 1 1 0 6 25 0 n.a. 5             106  23 10 
Uganda 31 2 22 3 12 0 26 0 20             135  16 28 
Tanzania 6 0.5 2 0 3 53 4 n.a. 4             192  27 6 
Zimbabwe 30 1 0 0 n.a. 9 n.a. n.a. 0                42  15 25 
Lower-Middle-Income Countries   
Kenya 110 8 8 0 165 0 65 n.a. 66             493  111 85 
Lesotho 141 9 0 0 5 0 0 n.a. 111          285  n.a. n.a. 
Nigeria 42 3 0 68 50 21 43 13 19             537  5 0 
Swaziland 151 3 0 123 0 79 0 7 71             536  n.a. n.a. 
Zambia 17 1 3 7 0 69 0 n.a. 0             221  19 22 
Upper-Middle-Income Countries   
Botswana 936 42 0 1,561 809 0 0 43 0          5,270  0 641 
Namibia 823 41 0 389 68 0 0 n.a. 143          1,645  0 736 
South Africa 340 10 0 0 54 222 0 16 100             797  0 0 
Total LICs 19 1 (7%) 9 (46%) 4 (20%) 6 (31%) 21 (106%) 7 (37%) 2 (8%) 9 (47%)             148  32 (164%) 19 (97%) 
Total LMICs 63 4 (7%) 2 (4%) 41 (64%) 63 (100%) 25 (40%) 37 (58%) 7 (12%) 34 (55%)             419  31 (49%) 23 (36%) 
Total UMICs 387 12 (3%) 0 (0%) 90 (23%) 92 (24%) 204 (53%) 0 (0%) 17 (4%) 96 (25%)          1,115  0 (0%) 56 (14%) 
OVERALL 159 6 (4%) 4 (2%) 44 (28%) 52 (33%) 84 (53%) 14 (9%) 9 (5%) 46 (29%)            433  21 (13%) 32 (20%) 
Note: All monetary figures are in 2014US$. Maximum potential public spending per adult living with HIV is a cumulative value if all the sources are increased simultaneously, 
which is why it is more than the sum of each source.
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Table S3.2. Technical Efficiency Gains Data and Sensitivity Analyses 
Country Treatment 
and care 
spending 
per person 
receiving  
ARVs 
(2012 USD) 
Year of 
spending 
and no 
of 
people 
on ART 
data 
Adjusted 
spending 
per person 
retained 
(2012 
USD) 
Non-drug 
cost per 
person 
retained 
(2012 
USD) 
 
Ratio to 
GDP per 
capita 
(2012) 
Potential 
savings as % 
of total 
treatment 
and care 
spending  
Base case - 
Average 
annual 
efficiency 
savings from 
2014-2018 
(2014 USD) 
Sensitivity analyses 
Average 
annual 
efficiency 
savings with 
gradual gains 
(2014 USD) 
Average 
annual 
efficiency 
savings based 
on SSA best 
performer 
per income 
category  
(2014 USD) 
Average 
annual 
efficiency 
savings based 
on linear 
relationship to 
per-capita 
GDP 
(2014 USD) 
LIC           
Ethiopia 500 2011 691 559 119% 63% 18,799,533 15,979,603 19,188,860 20,922,376 
Malawi 162 2011 202 70 26% 0% 0 0 0 278,316 
Mozambique 410 2011 554 422 65% 53% 7,267,865 6,177,685 7,517,512 7,949,714 
Uganda 1,035 2008 1,478 1,346 235% 82% 34,919,679 29,681,727 35,177,644 35,971,769 
Tanzania 615 2011 869 737 113% 70% 5,169,052 4,393,694 5,254,330 5,404,20 
Zimbabwe 212 2012 269 137 16% 0% 0 0 1,266,901 0 
LMIC           
Kenya 513 2012 703 571 57% 64% 92,154,809 78,331,588 92,154,809 99,403,821 
Lesotho 965 2008 1,286 1,154 86% 80% 40,404,416 34,343,753 40,404,416 40,823,736 
Nigeria 387 2012 527 395 24% 49% 61,196,796 52,017,276 61,196,796 58,587,579 
Swaziland 462 2012 563 431 14% 48% 15,356,386 13,052,928 15,356,386 8,885,414 
Zambia 208 2012 263 131 9% 0% 0 0 0 0 
UMIC           
Botswana 1,312 2011 1,526 1,394 15% 0% 0 0 171,028,361 0 
Namibia 1,396 2010 1,713 1,581 28% 18% 31,841,130 27,064,960 112,128,736 78,914,208 
South Africa 1,713 2009 2,141 2,009 26% 31% 629,861,977 535,382,680 1,391,572,657 836,232,171 
Total 936,971,643 796,425,896 1,952,247,408 1,193,373,308 
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4 Empirical approach to estimating Fiscal space using 
econometric analyses 
4.1 Model specification 
Cross-sectional econometric methods were used to estimate multivariate regression models investigating 
how much the different sources of fiscal space explain cross-country variance in public HIV spending. 
The specification of the main models was:  
Yj = θi Cij + βi Xi + α 
where Y is public HIV spending per PLHIV for country i; Cij is a vector of control variables ci with θi 
vector of mean coefficients; Xi is a vector of explanatory variables xi with βi mean coefficient; and εj is 
an error term. We considered several explanatory variables that may influence each other, based on the 
fiscal space framework11. Table S4.1 summarises the control and explanatory variables, the indicators 
used and their expected relationship with the dependent variable. 
 
Table S4.1. Summary of the independent variables in the regression models for Public HIV 
spending per PLHIV (PHIVSP) 
Category Indicator  
(Variable) 
Source Expected relationship 
Control variables 
HIV disease burden Adult HIV prevalence 
(PREV) 
UNAIDS + greater need and prioritisation of 
HIV 
-economies of scale reduce 
expenditure per PLHIV  
Governance Control of corruption 
(CORR) 
World 
Bank 
+ greater prioritisation of HIV 
-more efficient spending 
External financing International HIV 
spending per PLHIV 
(INTHIVSP) 
UNAIDS + crowding in  
-fungibility 
Time Year of HIV spending 
data 
(YR) 
UNAIDS + technological change/ new 
technologies requiring larger 
investments 
Regional 
characteristics 
Regional dummies 
(REG1...6) 
UNAIDS +/- depending on the region, access to 
generic drugs, type of 
epidemic/MARPs, political will 
Conducive macroeconomic environment 
National income and 
price levels 
GDP per capita 
(GDPpc) 
IMF + HIV spending = normal good  
And tendency for citizens with 
growing income and education levels 
to demand more public spending on 
social services 
Size  and 
effectiveness of 
government 
Government revenue, 
excluding grants (% of 
GDP) 
(REV/GDP) 
IMF + more resources to allocate to 
meritorious investments 
 
Borrowing 
Propensity to borrow Gross debt to GDP ratio 
(DEBT/GDP) 
IMF 
 
+ if borrowing used for HIV or frees up 
other resource for HIV (MICs) 
- if borrowing is unsustainable & 
crowds out other government 
expenditure (more likely in LICs) 
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Category Indicator  
(Variable) 
Source Expected relationship 
Reprioritisation  
Prioritisation of 
health 
Government health 
expenditure (% total 
government expenditure) 
(GHE/GE) 
WHO + if HIV spending is largely channelled 
through government 
- if an increase in public health 
spending reflects an off-budget 
increase in donor HIV spending 
(fungibility)   
Prioritisation of HIV Public HIV spending (% 
of Government health 
expenditure) 
(PHIVSP/GHE) 
UNAIDS/ 
WHO 
+ if HIV spending is largely channelled 
through government 
 
Earmarked HIV resources 
Risk-pooling or 
social health 
insurance mechanism 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure per capita  
(OOPpc) 
WHO - lack of public investment in 
health/HIV is being compensated by 
high OOP expenditures 
+ OOP are financing public HIV 
services through user fees (problem = 
regressive) 
Efficiency gains 
ART service 
efficiency 
Non-drug cost per person 
on ART  
(ARTCOSTpp) 
UNAIDS/ 
WHO 
- given efficiency gains from 
economies of scale 
+ if higher HIV spending to 
compensate for lower efficiency 
 
The detailed linear form models that were estimated through regression were:  
Ln PHIVSP= β1 +β2 Ln PREV + β3CORR +β4 Ln INTHIVSP +βk REGn + β11YR + β12 Ln GDPpc               (1) 
Ln PHIVSP= β1 +β2 Ln PREV +β3CORR +β4 Ln INTHIVSP + βk REGn + β11YR + β12 Ln GDPpc +β13 Ln (REV/GDP)      (2) 
Ln PHIVSP = β1 +β2 Ln PREV + β3CORR + β4 Ln INTHIVSP +βk REGn +β11YR + β12 Ln GDPpc + β13 Ln (DEBT/GDP)   (3) 
Ln PHIVSP = β1 +β2 Ln PREV + β3CORR +β4 Ln INTHIVSP +βk REGn +β11YR + β12 Ln GDPpc + β13 Ln (GHE/GE)       (4) 
Ln PHIVSP = β1 +β2 Ln PREV +β3CORR + β4 Ln INTHIVSP + βk REGn + β11YR + β12 Ln GDPpc + β13 Ln (OOPpc)       (5) 
Ln PHIVSP = β1 +β2 Ln PREV + β3CORR +β4 Ln INTHIVSP + βk REGn +β11YR +β12 Ln GDPpc +β13 Ln (ARTCOSTpp)  (6)   
Ln PHIVSP = β1 +β2 Ln PREV + β3CORR + β4 Ln INTHIVSP +βk REGn +β11YR +β12 Ln GDPpc +β13 Ln (PHIVSP/GHE) (7) 
Where k = 5, 6, ..., 10; n = 1, 2, ...6, and REG1 = East & Southern Africa, REG2 = Asia & Pacific region, 
REG3 = Latin America region, REG4 = Caribbean region; REG5 = Easter Europe & Central Asia region; 
REG6 = North Africa & Middle East region.   
We explored various functional forms for the dependent and independent variables (linear, natural 
logarithms, and squared), and retained a natural logarithmic functional form for all expenditure data and 
proportion data, as they generally provided the best model fit and also allow us to interpret the model 
coefficients as elasticities.  
Relevant interaction terms were also tested, such as the interacted effect of debt for middle-income 
countries, or the size of government and the quality of governance. Based on the higher Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) for these models, and in the interest of parsimony, we did not include them.    
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4.2 Model estimation  
Since we were interested in the interdependence between fiscal space sources and the possibility that a 
change in one was likely to change another, we estimated independent models for each independent 
variable, using the same control variables. We estimated these models through Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), quantile regressions and neighbourhood fixed effects estimation methods, as presented below. 
More details on the methods, assumptions and results for each analytical approach are presented in 
sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. All analyses were done in Stata version 12.0. 
We used OLS regression to initially detect the indicators that drive costs assuming a linear relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables. An important characteristic of OLS is that it gives the 
mean prediction of the dependent variable and this can easily be affected by an extreme value or potential 
outliers. Quantile regression gives a more comprehensive picture of the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, especially in the presence of extreme values. Quantile 
regression can be used to further examine and assess these relationships at specific percentiles (e.g. 25th, 
50th, 75th, interquartile range). Neighbourhood fixed effects models were used to address the omitted 
variable bias that might be present in cross-sectional regression analyses. Detailed results for the quantile 
and neighbourhood effects models are presented in the following sections.  
It is worth noting that results from OLS and quantile regressions were consistent in terms of statistical 
(in)significance for all predictors except for gross government debt as of % GDP and government health 
expenditure as % of government expenditure. These two predictors were statistically significant for 
specific quintiles. The neighbour and neighbourhood fixed effects models, on the other hand, found that 
the general government revenue (as % of GDP) and alcohol tax levels were significant predictors of 
public HIV spending, while health prioritisation was not. For all predictors, only GDP per person and 
public HIV spending as % of GHE were found to be statistically significant predictors of spending across 
different quintiles and in OLS.  
 
4.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares Method 
We ran regression diagnostics to verify that the data met the assumptions underlying OLS regression 
modelling. These assumptions, summarised elsewhere 
(http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter2/statareg2.htm), include: linearity, normality of 
residuals, homoscedasticity, well specified models, and the absence of multicollinearity.  
We checked for the linearity assumption, i.e. the relationships between the predictors and the outcome 
variable should be linear, by producing plots of the standardised residuals against each of the predictor 
variables in the regression model. A nonlinear pattern would raise concerns regarding the linearity 
assumption. We also used the acprplot command in Stata, which produces an augmented component-
plus-residual plot, for detecting non-linearity. We conclude that Model 7 has a smoothed line very close 
to the ordinary regression line, and the entire pattern seems quite uniform. For Models 1-6 the plots 
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appeared somewhat problematic either at the left or right end, which may be due to some potential 
influential points. But overall, they did not indicate any substantial concerns of non-linearity in the data. 
To check for the normality of residuals (i.e. that the errors are normally distributed), we estimated kernel 
density and generated a kernel density and a normal density plot for each model (using the 
kdensity command with the normal option in Stata). We also generated standardised normal probability 
and quintile plots using the pnorm and qnorm commands in Stata. For all eight OLS models, the kernel 
density graphs were sensitive to non-normality near the tails. Moreover, the normal probability graphs 
were sensitive to non-normality in the middle range of the data and the quintile graph was sensitive to 
non-normality near the tails. However, this evidence was still not enough to seriously question the 
normality of our models. 
To check for the homoscedasticity of residuals, we plotted the residuals versus fitted (predicted) values, 
using the rvfplot command in Stata with the yline(0) option. Signs of heteroscedasticity may be present 
if the residuals do not have an average value of zero and the spread is not the same in any thin vertical 
strip. In addition, we computed the White general test (using the imest command in Stata). Both 
commands test the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous. A small p-value 
(p<0.05) for the White test would indicate that variance is not homogeneous. We observed that in some 
of the models there may be a slight pattern in the plotted data, but the problem was too limited to raise 
concerns of heteroscedasticity. Given that the results from the White test yielded p-values in our models 
of more than 0.05, we failed to reject the null hypothesis of no constant variance, and therefore we accept 
that there are no heteroscedasticity issues. 
We checked model specification using the results of two tests: a model specification link test for single-
equation models (using the linktest command in Stata), and a regression equation specification error test 
for omitted variables, or the so-called Ramsey RESET test (using the ovtest command in Stata).  For the 
former, none of the the estimated prediction squared had any explanatory power, suggesting that our 
models appear to be correctly specified. Regarding the latter, the p-values were not small enough 
(p<0.05) to reject the null hypothesis, which states that the model has no omitted variables, hence there 
is no indication that our models suffer from endogeneity.  
To diagnose whether our models suffer from multicollinearity, we first inspected the correlation matrix 
(Table S6) for high pairwise correlations among regressors. Only HIV prevalence and HIV prioritisation 
in the health budget had a correlation factor above 0.7 (0.73). Given the high correlation between HIV 
prevalence and HIV prioritisation in the health budget (0.73), we also re-ran model 7 without HIV 
prevalence. The signs and significance levels of all coefficients remained the same, with the exception 
of the regional dummies that unsurprisingly absorbed some of the HIV prevalence data.    
We further assessed multicollinearity by using the variance inflation factor (VIF), which is implemented 
with the vif post estimation command in Stata. In all our models, the VIF was less than 10, which is 
considered acceptable, and implies that it is reasonable to assume that we do not have issues of 
multicollinearity. 
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Table S4.2. Correlation Matrix 
 
  
 
Public HIV 
spending 
per PLHIV 
HIV 
prevalence 
Control of 
corruption 
Internatio
nal HIV 
spending 
PLHIV 
Year of 
spending 
data 
GDP per 
person 
Govt 
revenue, 
excl. grants 
as % GDP 
Gross 
central 
govt debt 
as % 
GDP 
Govt Health 
Expenditure 
as % Govt 
Expenditure 
Out-of-
pocket 
expenditure 
per person 
Non-drug 
cost per 
person on 
ART 
Public HIV 
spending 
as % of 
GHE 
Public HIV spending 
per PLHIV 
1.00            
HIV prevalence -0.30 1.00           
Control of corruption 0.43 0.02 1.00          
International HIV 
spending per person 
-0.03 -0.17 0.02 1.00         
Year of spending data 0.14 -0.19 -0.07 0.06 1.00        
GDP per person 0.78 -0.19 0.48 -0.31 0.02 1.00       
Government revenue, 
excl. grants as % GDP 
0.44 0.13 0.07 -0.11 -0.05 0.23 1.00      
Gross central 
government debt as % 
GDP 
-0.18 -0.20 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.18 1.00     
Government Health 
Expenditure as % 
Government 
Expenditure 
0.25 0.13 0.36 0.01 -0.06 0.11 0.01 -0.13 1.00    
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure per 
person 
0.64 -0.38 0.21 -0.24 0.13 0.74 0.24 0.07    0.11    1.00   
Non-drug cost per 
person on ART 
0.57 -0.41 0.28 0.05 -0.13 0.54 0.14 -0.03 0.04    0.44    1.00  
Public HIV spending 
as % of GHE 
0.20 0.73 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13 0.07 -0.18 -0.01 -0.17 -0.20 1.00 
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4.2.2 Quantile regressions 
Quantile regression is used to provide a more comprehensive picture of the effect of the predictors on 
the dependent variable by modelling the relationship between a set of independent variables and specific 
percentiles (or quantiles) of the dependent variable12. For example, a median regression specifies the 
changes in the median value of the dependent variable as a function of the predictors. The effects of the 
independent variables may vary over quantiles of the conditional distribution, which is an important 
advantage of quantile regression over mean regression. The sensitivity of standard OLS regression to 
outliers was another reason to additionally estimate and analyse quantile regressions.  
We used the qreg and iqreg commands in Stata to fit the regression models. The qreg command estimates 
quantile regression and reports standard errors and t-statistics that are asymptotically valid under 
heteroskedasticity and misspecification. We performed median, 25th and the 75th quintiles as well as 
interquantile regression. The command iqreg reports coefficients that are the difference in coefficients 
of two qreg models and standard errors obtained through bootstrapping. 
In the median regression the constant is the median of the sample while in the 25th or 75th quantile 
regression the constant is the 25th or 75th percentile for the sample, respectively. For example, the 
interpretation of the median regression of public HIV spending per PLHIV on GDP per capita in model 
1 specifies the changes in the median public HIV spending per PLHIV as a function of the predictors. 
The effect of all predictors in the model on public HIV spending per PLHIV can be compared to its effect 
on other quantiles of public HIV spending per PLHIV. As we observed in the normal quantile plots vs 
residuals in OLS, there was a different behaviour of the observations close to the tails. The quantile 
regressions allowed us to look into more detail at the behaviours of the models at the tails. 
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Table S7. Dependent variable Logged Public HIV Spending PLHIV (50th Quintile – Median) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Control variables        
HIV prevalence 
-0.311** 
(0.147) 
-0.342** 
(0.166) 
-0.280 
(0.202) 
-0.218* 
(0.166) 
-0.203** 
(0.155) 
-0.294* 
(0.175) 
-0.797*** 
(0.107) 
Control of corruption 
0.387** 
(0.299) 
0.379 
(0.321) 
0.346 
(0.371) 
0.232 
(0.356) 
0.271* 
(0.310) 
0.439* 
(0.351) 
0.330** 
(0.181) 
International HIV 
spending per PLHIV 
0.165*** 
(0.112) 
0.166** 
(0.120) 
0.150 
(0.142) 
0.157** 
(0.125) 
0.187*** 
(0.115) 
0.178** 
(0.133) 
0.048 
(0.068) 
Year of spending data 
0.090 
(0.104) 
0.088 
(0.113) 
0.072 
(0.135) 
0.126 
(0.117) 
0.123 
(0.109) 
0.020 
(0.118) 
-0.040 
(0.063) 
Reference:  
West & Central Africa 
East & Southern 
Africa 
1.050** 
(0.424) 
1.057** 
(0.458) 
1.046* 
(0.589) 
0.868** 
(0.473) 
1.007** 
(0.452) 
0.831* 
(0.470) 
0.178 
(0.257) 
Asia & Pacific region 
0.027 
(0.482) 
-0.083 
(0.524) 
0.076 
(0.642) 
0.315 
(0.535) 
0.201 
(0.504) 
-0.083 
(0.546) 
0.060 
(0.291) 
Latin America region 
1.087*** 
(0.512) 
1.040** 
(0.551) 
1.127* 
(0.649) 
1.087*** 
(0.598) 
1.322*** 
(0.532) 
1.160** 
(0.606) 
0.728*** 
(0.315) 
Caribbean region 
-0.484 
(0.649) 
-0.392 
(0.699) 
-0.374 
(0.826) 
-0.500 
(0.720) 
-0.498 
(0.532) 
-0.493 
(0.710) 
0.167 
(0.393) 
Easter Europe & 
Central Asia region 
0.371 
(0.580) 
0.167 
(0.646) 
0.421 
(0.782) 
0.876 
(0.644) 
0.485 
(0.601) 
0.376 
(0.661) 
0.584 
(0.352) 
North Africa & Middle 
East region 
-0.927 
(0.645) 
-1.064 
(0.706) 
-0.036 
(0.867) 
-0.445 
(0.718) 
-0.788 
(0.672) 
-0.157 
(0.778) 
0.539 
(0.396) 
Explanatory variables 
 
  
 
 
GDP per person 
1.102*** 
(0.183) 
1.073*** 
(0.215) 
1.077*** 
(0.234) 
1.082*** 
(0.205) 
1.022*** 
(0.262) 
1.145*** 
(0.211) 
0.976*** 
(0.111) 
Government revenue, 
excl. grants as % GDP 
 
0.242 
(0.452) 
 
  
 
 
Gross government 
debt as % GDP 
  
-0.065 
(0.301) 
  
 
 
Government Health 
Expenditure as % 
Government 
Expenditure 
   
0.419*** 
(0.337) 
 
 
 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure per person 
    
0.035 
(0.220) 
 
 
Alcohol Excise Tax        
Non-drug cost per 
person on ART 
     
-0.024 
(0.166) 
 
Public HIV spending 
as % of GHE 
     
 0.783*** 
(0.074) 
Constant 
-189.623 
(210.000) 
-183.799 
(227.773) 
-151.828 
(270.839) 
-259.692 
(235.205) 
-254.350 
(219.284) 
-48.515 
(237.491) 
75.559 
(127.702) 
Observations 92 92 87 91 90 86 92 
Pseudo R2 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.74 
df_m 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 
df_r 80 79 74 79 78 73 79 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table S8. Dependent variable Logged Public HIV Spending PLHIV (25th Quintile) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Control variables        
HIV prevalence 
-0.361* 
(0.233) 
-0.330 
(0.248) 
-0.308 
(0.203) 
-0.274 
(0.230) 
-0.363* 
(0.233) 
-0.349** 
(0.174) 
-0.761*** 
(0.099) 
Control of corruption 
0.319 
(0.474) 
0.249 
(0.481) 
0.005 
(0.544) 
0.248 
(0.492) 
0.316 
(0.467) 
0.366 
(0.350) 
0.364*** 
(0.166) 
International HIV 
spending per PLHIV 
0.127 
(0.177) 
0.179 
(0.180) 
0.169 
(0.180) 
0.146 
(0.172) 
0.127 
(0.173) 
0.111 
(0.132) 
0.027 
(0.063) 
Year of spending data 
0.032 
(0.166) 
0.018 
(0.170) 
0.045 
(0.161) 
0.062 
(0.162) 
0.030 
(0.165) 
0.027 
(0.118) 
-0.032 
(0.058) 
Reference:  
West & Central Africa 
    
   
East & Southern 
Africa 
-0.263 
(0.672) 
-0.084 
(0.686) 
0.157 
(0.681) 
-0.202 
(0.655) 
-0.262 
(0.682) 
-0.263 
(0.468) 
0.013 
(0.237) 
Asia & Pacific region 
-0.284 
(0.765) 
-0.090 
(0.783) 
-0.236 
(0.847) 
0.122 
(0.740) 
-0.293 
(0.761) 
-0.291 
(0.544) 
-0.029 
(0.269) 
Latin America region 
0.883 
(0.813) 
0.786 
(0.824) 
1.024 
(0.842) 
0.964 
(0.827) 
0.880 
(0.803) 
0.768* 
(0.604) 
0.793*** 
(0.290) 
Caribbean region 
-0.515 
(1.030) 
-0.639 
(1.045) 
-0.478 
(1.127) 
-0.483 
(0.996) 
-0.518 
(1.030) 
-0.538* 
(0.707) 
0.387 
(0.362) 
Easter Europe & 
Central Asia region 
0.184 
(0.919) 
0.031 
(0.966) 
0.171 
(0.867) 
0.226 
(0.892) 
0.180 
(0.906) 
0.151 
(0.658) 
0.410 
(0.324) 
North Africa & 
Middle East region 
-2.047** 
(1.023) 
-1.855* 
(1.056) 
-0.858 
(0.996) 
-1.866* 
(0.994) 
-2.046** 
(1.013) 
-0.222 
(0.775) 
0.128 
(0.365) 
Explanatory 
variables 
     
 
 
GDP per person 
1.207*** 
(0.290) 
1.207*** 
(0.321) 
1.271**
* 
(0.333) 
1.205*** 
(0.283) 
1.211*** 
(0.395) 
1.186*** 
(0.210) 
0.904*** 
(0.102) 
Government revenue, 
excl. grants as % GDP 
 
0.312 
(0.677) 
   
 
 
Gross government 
debt as % GDP 
  
-0.022 
(0.358) 
  
 
 
Government Health 
Expenditure as % 
Government 
Expenditure 
   
0.189 
(0.466) 
 
 
 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure per 
person 
    
-0.002 
(0.332) 
 
 
Alcohol Excise Tax        
Non-drug cost per 
person on ART 
     
0.045 
(0.165) 
 
Public HIV spending 
as % of GHE 
     
 0.851*** 
(0.068) 
Constant 
-72.032 
(333.171
) 
-44.667 
(340.697
) 
-98.305 
(323.869
) 
-132.517 
(325.596
) 
-68.406 
(330.818
) 
-62.538 
(236.495
) 
60.002 
(117.650) 
Observations 92 92 87 91 90 86 92 
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.76 
df_m 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 
df_r 80 79 74 79 77 73 79 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table S9. Dependent variable Logged Public HIV Spending PLHIV (75th Quintile) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Control variables        
HIV prevalence 
-0.181* 
(0.138) 
-0.241* 
(0.151) 
-0.194 
(0.235) 
-0.156* 
(0.110) 
-0.160 
(0.138) 
-0.191 
(0.134) 
-0.849*** 
(0.127) 
Control of corruption 
0.751*** 
(0.281) 
0.628** 
(0.292) 
0.561 
(0.463) 
0.439** 
(0.236) 
0.426 
(0.277) 
0.757*** 
(0.269) 
0.155 
(0.215) 
International HIV 
spending per PLHIV 
0.110* 
(0.105) 
0.138** 
(0.109) 
0.133 
(0.186) 
0.116* 
(0.083) 
0.167 
(0.103) 
0.092 
(0.101) 
0.081 
(0.082) 
Year of spending data 
0.073 
(0.098) 
0.092 
(0.103) 
0.121 
(0.180) 
0.006 
(0.078) 
0.111 
(0.098) 
-0.054 
(0.090) 
-0.150* 
(0.076) 
Reference:  
West & Central Africa 
       
East & Southern Africa 
0.203 
(0.399) 
0.408 
(0.416) 
0.310 
(0.633) 
0.277 
(0.314) 
0.422 
(0.404) 
-0.028 
(0.360) 
0.009 
(0.306) 
Asia & Pacific region 
0.120 
(0.454) 
0.103 
(0.476) 
-0.213 
(0.729) 
0.062 
(0.355) 
0.021 
(0.451) 
0.049 
(0.418) 
0.242 
(0.347) 
Latin America region 
1.210*** 
(0.482) 
1.343*** 
(0.501) 
1.035 
(0.826) 
1.155*** 
(0.396) 
1.506*** 
(0.476) 
1.190** 
(0.463)  
0.525 
(0.375) 
Caribbean region 
-0.150 
(0.611) 
-0.017 
(0.635) 
-0.353 
(1.031) 
-0.313 
(0.477) 
-0.185 
(0.611) 
-0.172 
(0.543)  
-0.198 
(0.468) 
Easter Europe & Central 
Asia region 
0.854 
(0.545) 
0.646 
(0.587) 
0.695 
(0.893) 
1.013*** 
(0.427) 
0.898* 
(0.537) 
0.641(0.0
6)  
0.359 
(0.419) 
North Africa & Middle 
East region 
-0.466 
(0.607) 
-0.530 
(0.642) 
-0.464 
(0.963) 
-0.014 
(0.476) 
-0.186 
(0.601) 
-0.447 
(0.595) 
0.239 
(0.472) 
Explanatory variables        
GDP per person 
0.754*** 
(0.172) 
0.652*** 
(0.195) 
0.848**
* 
(0.264) 
0.841*** 
(0.136) 
0.941*** 
(0.234) 
0.631*** 
(0.161) 
0.945*** 
(0.132) 
Government revenue, 
excl. grants as % GDP 
 
0.486 
(0.411) 
     
Gross government debt 
as % GDP 
  
-0.074 
(0.436) 
    
Government Health 
Expenditure as % 
Government 
Expenditure 
   
0.675*** 
(0.223) 
   
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure per person 
    
-0.144 
(0.197) 
  
Alcohol Excise Tax        
Non-drug cost per person 
on ART 
     
0.146 
(0.127) 
 
Public HIV spending as 
% of GHE 
      
0.812*** 
(0.088) 
Constant 
-152.102 
(197.659
) 
-188.038 
(206.948) 
-247.998 
(361.575
) 
-14.798 
(155.950) 
-227.866 
(196.233
)  
103.585 
(181.644) 
297.993** 
(152.160) 
Observations 92 92 87 91 90 86 92 
Pseudo R2 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.58 0.53 0.57 0.72 
df_m 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 
df_r 80 79 74 78 77 73 79 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table S10. Dependent variable Logged Public HIV Spending PLHIV (25th-75th ) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Control variables        
HIV prevalence 
0.180 
(0.233) 
0.089 
(0.386) 
0.014 
(0.273) 
0.118 
(0.220) 
0.203 
(0.208) 
0.157 
(0.226)  
-0.088 
(0.179) 
Control of corruption 
0.432 
(0.579) 
0.379 
(0.538) 
0.556 
(0.530) 
0.192 
(0.538) 
0.110 
(0.601) 
0.391 
(0.380) 
-0.209 
(0.230) 
International HIV 
spending per person 
-0.017 
(0.176) 
-0.041 
(0.197) 
-0.036 
(0.216) 
-0.031 
(0.191) 
0.040 
(0.230) 
-0.019 
(0.119) 
0.054 
(0.099) 
Year of spending data 
0.041 
(0.171) 
0.073 
(0.178) 
0.076 
(0.131) 
-0.056 
(0.148) 
0.081 
(0.129) 
-0.081 
(0.136) 
-0.118 
(0.085) 
Reference:  
West & Central Africa 
       
East & Southern Africa 
0.466 
(0.661) 
0.492 
(0.953) 
0.153 
(0.508) 
0.479 
(0.815) 
0.684 
(0.910) 
0.235 
(0.480) 
-0.004 
(0.345) 
Asia & Pacific region 
0.404 
(0.674) 
0.192 
(0.727) 
0.023 
(0.938) 
-0.060 
(0.994) 
0.314 
(0.771) 
0.340 
(0.651) 
0.271 
(0.509) 
Latin America region 
0.328 
(0.598) 
0.557 
(0.713) 
0.011 
(0.885) 
0.191 
(0.592) 
0.626 
(0.590) 
0.422 
(0.645) 
-0.267 
(0.442) 
Caribbean region 
0.365 
(0.751) 
0.622 
(0.694) 
0.125 
(0.667) 
0.170 
(0.607) 
0.332 
(0.775) 
0.366 
(0.516) 
-0.584 
(0.389) 
Easter Europe & Central 
Asia region 
0.670 
(0.692) 
0.615 
(0.946) 
0.525 
(0.728) 
0.787 
(0.897) 
0.717 
(0.697) 
0.490 
(0.744) 
-0.051 
(0.492) 
North Africa & Middle 
East region 
1.581 
(1.093) 
1.325 
(1.681) 
0.395 
(1.074) 
1.852 
(1.346) 
1.860 
(1.423) 
-0.225 
(1.236) 
0.112 
(0.523) 
Explanatory variables        
GDP per person 
-0.453* 
(0.235) 
-0.555 
(0.335) 
-0.423 
(0.298) 
-0.363 
(0.238) 
-0.270 
(0.304) 
-0.555*** 
(0.192)  
0.041 
(0.145) 
Government revenue, 
excl. grants as % GDP 
 
0.173 
(0.820) 
     
Gross government debt as 
% GDP 
  
-0.052 
(0.390) 
    
Government Health 
Expenditure as % 
Government Expenditure 
   
0.486 
(0.449) 
   
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure per person 
    
-0.142 
(0.247) 
  
Alcohol Excise Tax        
Non-drug cost per person 
on ART 
     
0.100 
(0.235) 
 
Public HIV spending as 
% of GHE 
      
-0.039 
(0.093) 
Constant 
-80.069 
(344.186) 
-143.371 
(358.550) 
-149.694 
(264.357) 
117.719 
(296.967) 
-159.459 
(259.907) 
166.123 
(274.703) 
237.991 
(170.436) 
Observations 92 92 87 91 90 86 92 
0.75 Pseudo R2 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.53 0.57 0.71 
0.25 Pseudo R2 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.76 
df_r 80 79 74 78 77 73 79 
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4.2.3 Neighbour and Neighbourhood Fixed Effects  
Cross-sectional regressions are vulnerable to omitted variable bias as they seek to compare countries that 
are different in many dimensions. In order to reduce this risk, we undertook a matching exercise between 
neighbouring countries13. The underlying assumption of the approach is that neighbouring countries are 
likely to be more similar. Therefore, by comparing neighbouring countries, the matching strategy aims 
at controlling for unobserved characteristics that are similar between neighbouring countries.  
We used three matching strategies. First, we reshaped our dataset to identify each pair of neighbouring 
country by a dummy. We then included these dummies as “geographical” fixed effects in the regressions. 
As countries may have several neighbours and be the neighbours of several countries, some lines will be 
duplicated in this new dataset. Standard errors are therefore clustered at multiple levels13-14.  
Instead of considering all pairs of neighbouring countries, the second approach proposes to randomly 
match each country with one of its neighbour. To avoid selection bias, the random matching procedure 
is repeated 200 times, and the average of estimated coefficients and standard errors are reported. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level to account for the fact that the same country can appear in multiple 
pairs.  
In the last method, we reshape the dataset to identify each neighbourhood of countries by a dummy. The 
neighbourhood of a country includes the country plus all its neighbours. Standard errors are clustered at 
multiple levels to account for the fact that countries may have multiple neighbours and may be the 
neighbour of multiple countries.  
 
Table S11. Neighbourhood, pair and random fixed effects models for each explanatory variable  
 1 2 3 
Control variables    
HIV prevalence 
-0.363** 
(0.162) 
-0.391** 
(0.176) 
-0.334** 
(0.148) 
Control of corruption 
0.505** 
(0.204) 
0.412* 
(0.217) 
0.473** 
(0.217) 
International HIV spending per 
PLHIV 
0.0928 
(0.159) 
0.138 
(0.141) 
0.154 
(0.128) 
Year of spending data 
-0.0266 
(0.0817) 
-0.0156 
(0.0737) 
-0.00447 
(0.0832) 
Explanatory variables    
GDP per person                           
1.168*** 
(0.174) 
1.190*** 
(0.170) 
1.246*** 
(0.150) 
Observations 542 162 352 
Fixed Effects Pair Random Pair Neighbourhood 
 
 1 2 3 
Control variables    
HIV prevalence 
-0.411** 
(0.163) 
-0.464** 
(0.180) 
-0.378** 
(0.147) 
Control of corruption 
0.558** 
(0.230) 
0.426* 
(0.231) 
0.549** 
(0.238) 
International HIV spending per 
PLHIV 
0.0731 
(0.146) 
0.126 
(0.127) 
0.123 
(0.122) 
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Year of spending data 
-0.00653 
(0.0876) 
-0.00415 
(0.0758) 
0.0134 
(0.0886) 
Explanatory variables    
GDP per person                           
1.039*** 
(0.191) 
1.086*** 
(0.169) 
1.090*** 
(0.173) 
Government revenue, excl. grants as 
% GDP 
0.850** 
(0.421) 
0.845** 
(0.355) 
0.825** 
(0.395) 
Observations 542 162 352 
Fixed Effects Pair Random Pair Neighbourhood  
 
 1 2 3 
Control variables    
HIV prevalence 
-0.367*** 
(0.136) 
-0.353** 
(0.159) 
-0.359*** 
(0.135) 
Control of corruption 
0.431** 
(0.202) 
0.412* 
(0.211) 
0.389* 
(0.225) 
International HIV spending per 
PLHIV 
0.104 
(0.135) 
0.0653 
(0.0998) 
0.149 
(0.123) 
Year of spending data 
0.0106 
(0.0818) 
0.0267 
(0.0698) 
0.0191 
(0.0868) 
Explanatory variables    
GDP per person                           
1.108*** 
(0.161) 
1.063*** 
(0.153) 
1.189*** 
(0.151) 
Gross government debt as % GDP 
-0.0758 
(0.194) 
-0.00471 
(0.162) 
-0.145 
(0.182) 
Observations 496 152 324 
Fixed Effects Pair Random Pair Neighbourhood  
 
 1 2 3 
Control variables    
HIV prevalence 
-0.304* 
(0.165) 
-0.306* 
(0.174) 
-0.284* 
(0.157) 
Control of corruption 
0.429** 
(0.216) 
0.332 
(0.243) 
0.377* 
(0.225) 
International HIV spending per 
PLHIV 
0.0672 
(0.146) 
0.0862 
(0.121) 
0.137 
(0.122) 
Year of spending data 
-0.0179 
(0.0800) 
-0.00540 
(0.0728) 
0.00585 
(0.0859) 
Explanatory variables    
GDP per person                           
1.141*** 
(0.154) 
1.122*** 
(0.155) 
1.236*** 
(0.142) 
Government Health Expenditure as 
% Government Expenditure 
0.199 
(0.206) 
0.284 
(0.222) 
0.229 
(0.197) 
Observations 538 160 349 
Fixed Effects Pair Random Pair Neighbourhood  
 
 1 2 3 
Control variables    
HIV prevalence -0.329** -0.361** -0.328** 
 (0.158) (0.173) (0.147) 
Control of corruption 0.554*** 0.455* 0.505** 
 (0.186) (0.233) (0.210) 
International HIV spending per 
PLHIV 
0.0587 0.0782 0.130 
 (0.140) (0.120) (0.122) 
Year of spending data -0.0285 
(0.0838) 
-0.0145 
(0.0746) 
-0.00724 
(0.0859) 
Explanatory variables    
GDP per person                           1.269*** 1.231*** 1.304*** 
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 (0.248) (0.250) (0.220) 
Out-of-pocket expenditure per 
person 
-0.157 -0.107 -0.107 
 (0.165) (0.159) (0.168) 
Observations 522 158 340 
Fixed Effects Pair Random Pair Neighbourhood  
 
 1 2 3 
Control variables    
HIV prevalence -0.286* -0.320* -0.270* 
 (0.168) (0.173) (0.151) 
Control of corruption 0.531*** 0.472** 0.500** 
 (0.204) (0.206) (0.207) 
International HIV spending per 
PLHIV 
0.0612 0.0936 0.107 
 (0.151) (0.118) (0.116) 
Year of spending data -0.0742 -0.0544 -0.0482 
 (0.0624) (0.0644) (0.0660) 
Explanatory variables    
GDP per person                           1.021*** 1.075*** 1.062*** 
 (0.138) (0.153) (0.131) 
Non-drug cost per person on ART 0.182 0.124 0.233** 
 (0.127) (0.108) (0.116) 
Observations 480 152 316 
Fixed Effects Pair Random Pair Neighbourhood 
 
 1 2 3 
Control variables    
HIV prevalence 
-1.006*** 
(0.110) 
-1.028*** 
(0.124) 
-1.022*** 
(0.0781) 
Control of corruption 
0.383*** 
(0.136) 
0.337** 
(0.144) 
0.341*** 
(0.111) 
International HIV spending per 
PLHIV 
0.0503 
(0.0879) 
0.0842 
(0.0989) 
0.0725 
(0.0732) 
Year of spending data 
-0.0424 
(0.0492) 
-0.0482 
(0.0538) 
-0.0372 
(0.0412) 
Explanatory variables    
GDP per person                           
1.056*** 
(0.142) 
1.076*** 
(0.121) 
1.047*** 
(0.100) 
Public HIV spending as % of 
Government Health Expenditure 
0.715*** 
(0.111) 
0.688*** 
(0.117) 
0.758*** 
(0.0767) 
Observations 542 162 352 
Fixed Effects Pair Random Pair Neighbourhood 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5 HIV prioritisation model 
To explore what is driving HIV prioritisation, as the final step in the government resource allocation 
process, we estimate a model for Public HIV spending as a % of Government Health Expenditure. We 
log transformed the dependent and the independent variables (except the dummies) and estimated the 
model with OLS. We included the robust option to obtain robust standard errors, in case we misspecified 
the distribution function. 
 
Table S12. Dependent variable Logged Proportion of Public HIV Spending in Government Health 
Expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
Control variables Coefficient SE 
HIV prevalence 0.671*** (0.114) 
Control of corruption 0.423* (0.231) 
International HIV spending per person living with HIV 0.141* (0.073) 
Year of spending data 0.067 (0.089) 
Reference: West & Central Africa   
East & Southern Africa 0.204 (0.397) 
Asia & Pacific region -0.339 (0.430) 
Latin America region 0.881* (0.448) 
Caribbean region -0.401 (0.475) 
Easter Europe & Central Asia region 0.139 (0.520) 
North Africa & Middle East region 0.068 (0.458) 
Explanatory variables   
GDP per person 0.138 (0.220) 
Government revenue, excl. grants as % GDP -0.506 (0.315) 
Gross government debt as % GDP -0.330* (0.168) 
Government Health Expenditure as % Government 
Expenditure 
-0.737*** (0.243) 
Out-of-pocket expenditure per person -0.102 (0.202) 
Non-drug cost per person on ART 0.079 (0.130) 
Constant -143.063 (178.935) 
Observations 80  
R2 0.607  
AIC 219  
BIC 260  
F 11.986  
df_m 16  
df_r 63  
White test (p-value)                                                                80 (0.447)  
Ramsey RESET test(p-value)                                     1.43 (0.244)  
VIF                                                                      2.70  
Linktest (_hatsq p value)                           0.566  
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6 PMTCT screening model 
Our theoretical model is a standard economic Cobb-Douglas production function for the technological 
relationship between HIV programme output and factor inputs15, namely:   
Y = A Lβ Kα 
Where Y is total HIV service outputs (production), L is labour inputs (health personnel), K is capital 
input (HIV spending), A is total factor productivity, and α and β are the output elasticities of capital and 
labour.    
This area of our exploration was particularly constrained by data availability, and our measures were 
limited. We chose to analyse the production of Prevent Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) 
screening services, using selected HIV-specific and non-HIV inputs. These choices were largely driven 
by data availability, as well as the health system constraints framework developed by Hanson et al16. The 
latter describes the constraints of scaling up priority health interventions and distinguishes between five 
levels of constraints, starting with the community and household level (i.e. the demand side), followed 
by a health service delivery level and a health sector governance level of constraints (i.e. the supply side); 
and finally broader public sector and environmental levels of constraints. Ranson et al use this framework 
to develop a typology of countries, using empirical data17. We build on the indicators they selected to 
include for each level of constraint, as well as previous work on health worker density and health service 
coverage18, to construct our model below.  
With an increasing reliance on provider-initiated HIV testing and counselling and the importance of 
antenatal care services as an entry point into ART and PMTCT services, it is clear that the demand and 
therefore scale up of core HIV services depends on the capacity of other health services in the health 
system. There is evidence that the availability of qualified medical personnel is particularly critical for 
effective maternal health services and outcomes19-20. We therefore selected a measure of health worker 
density as a non-HIV policy lever that could enable increased HIV (PMTCT) programme efficiency, 
among others. The other two non-HIV areas of investment we explored were female education and food 
insecurity, given their expected and identified role in the uptake of maternal health and PMTCT 
services21.   
In our model (see Table S13), the dependent variable was PMTCT screening coverage, namely the 
proportion of pregnant women tested for HIV (from the UNAIDS Aidsinfo database). The explanatory 
variables of interest were financial HIV inputs (total HIV spending per PLHIV) and human resource 
inputs (nurse density). We also considered demand-side inputs or constraints, namely female education 
(adult female literacy)16, 18 and food insecurity (proportion of people malnourished in the total 
population). Additionally, we controlled for GDP per capita22, disease burden (adult HIV prevalence), 
and environmental factors that may affect accessibility and efficiency, namely urbanisation rate and 
governance (control of corruption)16-17. All independent variables were transformed into natural 
logarithms in the estimated regression equation, in line with the exponential Cobb-Douglas function.  
Appendix 2 
277 
 
Since the dependent variable is bounded (0-100 %), we used a generalised linear model with logit link 
function23 and the binomial family. We also tried the censored Tobit model to test the robustness of the 
linear approximation. 
The model suggests that countries with higher HIV prevalence, higher HIV spending, higher nurse 
density and lower undernourishment, achieved higher PMTCT screening coverage. While female 
education and urbanisation rates had the expected signs, they were not statistically significant (at p<0.10). 
As has been found in similar research on health worker density and health service coverage, GDP per 
capita did not enter significantly in the model18. However, surprisingly, the same underlying relationships 
were not found for ART coverage (analyses not shown), which has been scaled up at a remarkable pace, 
in spite of human resource shortages24. 
Besides the specification issues mentioned above, one major limitation of this model is the use of total 
HIV spending instead of PMTCT spending, due to data availability. The latter would have been a more 
accurate reflection of the production function. However, if we assume a relatively constant proportion of 
PMTCT spending in total spending, the modelled relationship would still hold.  
Table S13. Dependent variable PMTCT screening coverage among pregnant women (GLM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In microeconomic theory, production functions are characterised by a combination of complementary 
inputs that are used to produce a final good or service. In terms of PMTCT screening, we could think of 
HIV testing kits (captured by HIV spending) and nurses being complementary inputs required to provide 
screening services to pregnant women18. Depending on the malleability of capital and adaptability of 
Variables Coefficient (SE) 
Log HIV prevalence 
0.796***  
(0.139) 
Log GDP per person 
-0.411* 
(0.247) 
Log Total HIV spending per PLHIV 
0.752*** 
(0.212) 
Log Control of corruption 
1.964  
(2.021) 
Log Nurses & Midwives density 
0.535***  
(0.204) 
Log Urbanisation 
0.314  
(0.431) 
Log Adult Female Literacy Rate  
0.548  
(0.566) 
Log Proportion undernourished 
-0.451** 
(0.224) 
Constant 
-1.729  
(3.802) 
Observations 60 
AIC 67 
BIC 85 
df_m 8 
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labour in the short-term, there is likely to be some degree of substitution between such imperfect 
complements25. Based on this, we considered that increasing one of the HIV or non-HIV inputs in the 
production function could increase HIV service production, as suggested by the model.    
Thus, using the above model, we estimated how much more PMTCT screening coverage could be 
achieved if countries were to reach the WHO minimum norm of having 2.3 health workers per 1000 
population26, and then estimated how much more a country would have had to spend from the HIV budget 
to achieve that same increase – as a measure of potential HIV budget saving (see Table S14). In economic 
terms, we calculated the rate of technical substitution between labour and financial inputs, to get to a 
monetary valuation of reaching the norm of health worker density, for the HIV budget constraint27. This 
monetary value is equivalent to the extra HIV spending that would be required to reach the same level 
of PMTCT screening coverage (a proxy of HIV service outputs), as would have been achieved from 
increasing the number of health workers to the norm (through another budget). We then apply that 
percentage increase in total spending to the public HIV spending figure.  
Similarly, we estimate how a reduction in undernourishment to the MDG target of 11.7% (half of 1990 
level in developing countries of 23.4%)28, could produce HIV pay-offs in terms of increased PMTCT 
screening coverage. We then estimate how much extra HIV spending would have been required to get 
the same increase (see Table S15).  
In mathematical terms, the logarithmic transformation of the production function above provides a log-
linear form that can be used within a regression framework. A more general form of the function allows 
for the estimation of the exponentiated coefficient values and hypothesis testing: 
 
ln Y = ln A + β × ln L + α × ln K        
 
The derivative of this log-linear form can be taken while taking into account changes of Y, A, L and K 
over time. This derivative can be interpreted as the percentage change in Y: 
dY / Y = dA / A + β × dL / L + α × dK / K   
or 
∆ Y = ∆ A + β × ∆ L + α × ∆ K 
The above formula can be used to illustrate the proportion of real output growth in relation to increases 
in L or K inputs and total factor productivity. 
 
The linear form model that was estimated through GLM regression was:  
 
Ln PMTCT_SCREENCOV= β1 +β2 Ln PREV + β3 GDPpc + β4 Ln TOTHIVSP + β5 Ln CORR + β6 Ln 
NURS + β7 Ln URBAN + β8 Ln LITERATE + β9 Ln UNDERNOUR 
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The formula used to calculate the predicted values was: 
 
Predicted PMTCT SCREENCOV = 1/(1+ EXP(-(β2 Ln PREV + β3GDPpp + β4 Ln TOTHIVSP + β5 Ln 
CORR + β6 Ln NURS + β7 Ln URBAN + β8 Ln LITTERATE + β9 Ln UNDERNOUR))) 
 
Table S14. Potential returns from expanding health worker density for PMTCT programme 
Variable 
Nurse density 
(target= 2.3 per 
1000 minus 
physician 
density) 
Predicted 
PMTCT 
screening 
coverage 
New 
calculated 
PMTCT 
screening  
coverage 
with target 
Calculated 
Total HIV 
spending 
per PLHIV 
(2012USD) 
Original 
Total HIV 
spending 
per PLHIV 
(2012USD) 
Percentage 
increase in 
spending 
Botswana 2.8 - - - - 0% 
Ethiopia 0.25 23% 50% 1,445 303 380% 
Kenya 0.79 78% 85% 965 479 100% 
Lesotho 0.6 n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Malawi 0.34 66% 84% 406 106 290% 
Mozambique 0.4 63% 81% 569 170 240% 
Namibia 2.8 - - - - 0% 
Nigeria 1.6 65% 67% 187 166 10% 
South Africa 4.9 - - - - 0% 
Swaziland 1.6 n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Uganda 1.3 76% 81% 358 239 50% 
Tanzania 0.2 45% 75% 1,114 196 470% 
Zambia 0.78 77% 85% 531 252 110% 
Zimbabwe 1.25 86% 90% 343 227 50% 
 
Table S15. Potential returns from reduced undernourishment for PMTCT programme 
Variable 
Undernourished 
in total 
population 
(target= 11.7%) 
Predicted 
PMTCT 
screening 
coverage 
New 
calculated 
PMTCT 
screening  
coverage 
with target 
Calculated 
Total HIV 
spending 
per PLHIV 
(2012USD) 
Original 
Total HIV 
spending 
per PLHIV 
(2012USD) 
Percentage 
increase in 
spending 
Botswana 27.9% 98% 98% 2,031 1,205 68% 
Ethiopia 40.2% 23% 35% 635 303 110% 
Kenya 30.4% 78% 84% 850 479 77% 
Lesotho n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Malawi 23.1% 66% 73% 159 106 50% 
Mozambique 39.2% 63% 75% 350 170 107% 
Namibia 33.9% 96% 97% 2,496 1,318 89% 
Nigeria 8.5% - - - - 0% 
South Africa 5.0% - - - - 0% 
Swaziland n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Uganda 34.6% 76% 84% 457 239 92% 
Tanzania 38.8% 45% 59% 402 196 105% 
Zambia 47.4% 77% 86% 584 252 132% 
Zimbabwe 32.8% 86% 91% 421 227 86% 
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1. Literature review of effectiveness studies 
 
Table S1. Overview of studies that assessed the effectiveness of food assistance for people on ART in low and middle-income countries on measures 
of treatment adherence and attrition 
Study Country & Study 
population 
Study design & Food basket Outcome 
indicators 
Findings 
Cantrell et al 
2008 
Zambia  
 
PLHIV on ART recruited 
based on food insecurity 
status 
Partly retrospective study, comparing 
data from PLHIV on ART at clinics with 
food assistance to PLHIV at clinics 
without food assistance (145 vs 147 
PLHIV) 
Analysis used Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM)  
 
Food basket: 25 kg maize, 6 kg corn 
soya blend (CSB), 4.5 kg peas, 1.8 L 
vegetable oil per month (household 
ration)  
Adherence to 
ART, using 
pharmacy refill 
records 
Weight gain 
CD4 count 
Food assistance recipients had higher ART 
adherence compared to non-recipients at 12 
months after ART initiation: 
98.3% vs 88.8 % (p<0.01) 
Greater improvement in adherence among 
participants on ART<230 days and with BMI<18.5 
kg/m2, a higher HIV disease stage or a CD4 
count<350 cells/µL  
No significant effects observed for weight or CD4 
count change. 
Serrano et al 
2010 
Niger  
 
PLHIV receiving ART, 
CD4≤200/ mm3, WHO 
stage III or IV and/or 
BMI<18.5 kg/m2 (all 
PLHIV had been on ART 
for <12 months)  
 
Intervention group (n=62) compared to 
historical control group of patients 
meeting the same eligibility criteria, but 
who did not receive food assistance 
(n=118)  
 
Food basket: 2,250 kcal/person/day 
per family 
ART adherence 
Survival 
CD4 count 
Nutritional status 
ART adherence at 6 months (food group vs non 
food group):  
98% vs 77.4% (p<0.05) 
Increase in CD4 count:  
+114 vs +68 CD4 cells/mm3 (p<0.05) 
Survival:  
1 death vs 12 deaths (p<0.05) 
No difference of changes of WHO stage or BMI 
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Study Country & Study 
population 
Study design & Food basket Outcome 
indicators 
Findings 
Ivers et al 
2010 
Haiti  
 
PLHIV in care 
Eligibility based on also 
having TB, low BMI, low 
CD4 count (≤350/mm3) 
and/or severe socio-
economic conditions 
Prospective observational cohort 
study, comparing PLHIV (most but not 
all on ART) eligible for food assistance 
(n = 300) to those not eligible (n = 300) 
 
Food basket: 100 g CSB, 50 g cereal, 
50 g dried legumes, 25 g vegetable oil, 
5 g iodized salt per day per family 
member, for maximum of three 
members 
Number of 
monthly visits 
attended 
Food security 
score 
BMI 
Mean number of scheduled monthly visits attended 
(food-assisted vs non food-assisted): 
5.49 vs 2.82 (p<0.0001) (at 6 months) 
9.73 vs 8.34 (p= 0.007) (at 12 months)  
Change in food insecurity score:  
-3.55 vs -0.16 (p<0.0001) (at 6 months) 
-3.49 vs -1.89 (p= 0.01) (at 12 months) 
Change in BMI: 
-0.20 vs -0.66 (p=0.02) (at 6 months) 
0.22 vs -0.67 (p= 0.04) (at 12 months) 
Tirivayi et al 
2012 
Zambia  
Food-insecure PLHIV on 
ART 
 
Prospective controlled design: 
- 4 clinics assigned to food 
assistance (n=442 PLHIV) 
- 4 clinics without food assistance 
(n=194 PLHIV)  
 
Food basket: amount and type of food 
varied by family size and income 
owner status of PLHIV—all received 
CSB and oil, some also maize meal 
and beans 
MPR from 
pharmacy refill 
records 
Weight gain 
CD4 count 
MPR≥95% among patients in food-assisted clinics 
vs non food-assisted:  
70% vs 48%  
(RR= 1.5; 95%CI 1.2–1.8) 
 
No significant effect on weight gain or CD4 cell 
response was observed 
Posse et al 
2013 
Mozambique  
PLHIV with low BMI (\18.5 
kg/m2) and no or low 
income  
Eligibility reviewed every 3 
months 
Retrospective study, comparing 
records from PLHIV on ART in 2 
provinces (one with and one without 
food assistance) 
Analysis used PSM 
 
Food basket: monthly, consisting of 
25 kg maize, 10 kg soya, 5 kg cowpeas  
Adherence to 
ART, using 
pharmacy refill 
records  
(measured as 
periods of time 
during which 
patient’s 
Adherence among food recipients vs non food 
recipients: 
0.137 vs 0.182 (p = 0.029) (during food 
assistance period) 
0.129 vs 0.199 (p=0.001) (post food 
assistance) 
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Study Country & Study 
population 
Study design & Food basket Outcome 
indicators 
Findings 
medication 
supply was 
exhausted) 
Martinez et 
al 2014 
Honduras  
Locally resident adult 
PLHIV on ART for >6 
months, with indications of 
suboptimal adherence, 
being underweight 
(BMI<18.5 kg/m2) and/or 
household food insecurity 
Prospective clinical trial in four clinics, 
comparing:  
(i) Nutrition education (NE) alone 
(n=197); to  
(ii) NE + monthly household food 
basket (FB) (n=203) 
 
Food basket: calculated for a 
household of five people for 30 days, 
with the following daily portions: 1,000 
g of maize, 240 g of rice, 370 g of 
beans, 500 g of fortified CSB, 90 g of 
vegetable oil (valued at ~USD 46) and 
provided monthly for 12 months.  
Missed clinic 
appointments 
Delayed 
prescription 
refills 
Self-reported 
missed doses of 
ART 
Missing an appointment in the last 6 months: 
FB: 63.5 % to 18.8 % (p<0.01) (at 6 mo) 
NE: 53.4% to 14.9% (p<0.01) (at 6 mo) 
FB had no significant additional effect at 6 
or 12 months 
Refill delays: 
FB: 62.5% to 22.6% (p<0.01) (at 6 mo) 
NE: 33.3% to 16.7% (p<0.01) (at 6 mo) 
FB had 19.6 % larger improvement at 
month 6 (p<0.01) and 11.1 % larger 
improvement at month 12 (p<0.10) 
Self-reported missed doses in last month: 
FB: 40.4% to 6.6% (p<0.01) (at 6 mo) 
NE: 45.0% to 9.2% (p<0.01) (at 6 mo) 
FB had no significant additional effect at 6 
or 12 months 
McCoy et al 
2017 
Tanzania  
Adult PLHIV newly 
initiated on ART (≤90 
days) and food insecure, 
as measured with the 
Household Hunger Scale 
Individually randomised controlled trial 
at 3 clinics, comparing (i) Nutritional 
Assessment and Counselling 
(standard of care); and (ii) NAC + Food 
Food receipt was conditional on 
attending scheduled visits  
 
Food basket: whole maize meal (12 
kg), groundnuts (3 kg), and beans (3 
kg) per month (valued at ~USD 11)  
Medication 
Possession 
Ratio 
(MPR)≥95% 
MPR 
Loss to follow up 
(LTFU) 
Appointment 
attendance 
MPR≥95% among food group vs NAC (standard of 
care):  
79.2% vs 63.4% (p<0.01) (6 months) 
64.0% vs 55.4% (p>0.05) (12 months) 
MPR: 
92.9% vs 85.4% (p<0.01) (6 months) 
89.5% vs 83.3% (p<0.01) (12 months) 
LTFU: 
1.5% vs 10.9% (p<0.01) (6 months) 
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Study Country & Study 
population 
Study design & Food basket Outcome 
indicators 
Findings 
 
(There was a second intervention arm 
with NAC + cash, but we only focus on 
the NAC + food findings here.) 
9.7% vs 17.3% (p>0.05) (12 months) 
Appointment attendance: 
94.5% vs 82.6% (p<0.01) (6 months) 
92.3% vs 83.4% (p<0.01) (12 months) 
Lamb et al 
2012 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Zambia 
 
232,389 PLHIV initiating 
ART during 2004–2008 at 
349 clinics supported by 
PEPFAR 
 
Ecologic study comparing clinics with 
and without adherence support and 
outreach services 
Clinics self-reported whether they 
provided food rations to support ART 
adherence 
Food basket: no details provided 
Clinic attrition 
(Total attrition, 
LTFU, Death) 
Cohort attrition 
Total attrition:  
Adjusted RR= 0.72 (95%CI: 0.58–0.90) 
LTFU:  
Adjusted RR= 0.65 (95%CI: 0.47–0.88) 
Death:  
Adjusted RR= 0.83 (95%CI: 0.69–1.0) 
Cohort attrition:  
Adj RR=0.82 (95%CI: 0.64-1.05) (6 mo) 
Adj RR=0.98 (95%CI: 0.78-1.21) (12 mo) 
Source: adapted from de Pee et al (2014)(1) and updated.   
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2. Markov Model 
 
The Markov model consists of the following 6 states:  
 In first-line ART Care and virally Suppressed (ICS1) 
 In first-line ART Care and virally Unsuppressed (ICU1) 
 In second-line ART Care and virally Suppressed (ICS2) 
 First state of being Out Of Care with the possibility to return into care (OOC1)  
 Second state of being Out Of Care without the possibility to transition back to care 
(OOC2) 
 Death 
 
Figure S1. Markov Model 
 
The transition equations between states are as follows:  
ICS1t = (1 – a – b – e) ∙ ICS1t-1 + i ∙ ICU1t-1 
ICU1 t = (1 – c – f – d – i) ∙ ICU1t-1  + a ∙ ICS1t-1 + h ∙ OOC1 t-1 
ICS2t = (1 – e) ∙ ICS2t-1 + d ∙ ICU1t-1 
OOC1t = (1 – g – h – j) ∙ OOC1 t-1 + b ∙ ICS1t-1 + c ∙ ICU1t-1 
OOC2t = (1 – k) ∙ OOC2 t-1 + j ∙ OOC1 t-1  
Dt = e ∙ ICS1t-1 + f ∙ ICU1t-1 + e ∙ ICS2t-1 + g ∙ OOC1 t-1 + k ∙ OOC2 t-1 
 
ICS2ICS1 ICU1
OOC1 OOC2
D
a
b
e
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
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Table S2. Description of Transition Probabilities  
Transition 
probability 
Description 
a Probability of virologic failure when in care (first and second-line ART) and 
virally suppressed 
b Probability of disengaging from care when in first-line ART care and virally 
suppressed  
c Probability of disengaging from care when in first-line ART care and 
unsuppressed 
d Probability of switching to second-line care if in first-line ART care and 
unsuppressed 
e Probability of dying if in care and virally suppressed 
f Probability of dying if in care and unsuppressed 
g Probability of dying if out of care for one cycle 
h Probability of re-entering first-line care after disengaging for one cycle 
i Probability of achieving viral suppression after being in care but unsuppressed 
for one cycle 
j Probability of remaining out of care after being disengaged for one cycle 
k Probability of dying if out of care for more than one consecutive cycle 
 
 
3. Modelling Secondary Sexual HIV Transmission 
 
We developed a simple static HIV transmission model to estimate new sexually transmitted 
secondary infections from the cohort of patients to their sex partners over their lifetime, in the 
five countries. New sexually transmitted infections were estimated for each cycle by multiplying 
the susceptible population by the probability of becoming infected. We did not consider non-
sexual transmission.  
The susceptible population for secondary HIV infection was the average number of HIV-
negative sexual partners per person in the cohort population, multiplied by the number of people 
in the cohort that was alive in each cycle (and aged <60 years). Since the cycles are half a 
year, we conservatively assumed half of the annual number of partners per cycle.  
We estimated new infections among the sexual partners of people in the virally suppressed 
states (IC1 and IC2) on the one hand, and new infections among the sexual partners of people 
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in the unsuppressed states (ICU1, OOC1 and OOC2) on the other. Those who died in a given 
cycle were assumed to not have been sexually active during that cycle.  
We used a similar risk equation to the one used in other models (2, 3) to calculate the probability 
of transmission to an uninfected partner during one year, given by:  
1 – [ P× (1 – r × R × MMC × MC)a + (1 – P)]n 
Where 
P= HIV prevalence in the partner population 
r = Base probability of HIV transmission per act 
R = Multiplier for the effect of stage of infection 
MMC = Multiplier for the effect of male circumcision 
MC = Multiplier for the effect of condom use 
𝑎 = Number of acts per partner per year 
𝑛 = Number of partners per year 
We estimated one average probability for those mixing with the virally suppressed populations, 
and another for those mixing with the unsuppressed. This assumes that the cohort and their 
sexual partners are representative of the entire population in terms of risk characteristics. We 
calculated the weighted average of the number of acts per partner per year and the number of 
partners per year, assuming an equal mix of males and females.  
For example, the average number of partners per year, 𝑛, is given by:  
𝑛 = ∑ 𝑠𝑘
𝑘=𝑙,𝑚,ℎ
𝑛𝑘
̇
 
 
Where 
𝑛𝑘= the number of partners in each risk group k (low, medium, high)  
𝑠𝑘 = the share/proportion of the population in risk group k 
 
We included the effect of exogenous protective interventions, namely treatment, male 
circumcision and condom use. For these interventions, x, we assume the multiplier effect, Mx, 
is 1 minus the average HIV protection, which is a function of its efficacy, Ex, and coverage Cx: 
 
𝑀𝑥 = 1 −  𝐸𝑥𝐶𝑥  
For those mixing with the virally suppressed group, the multiplier for the effect of stage of 
infection, R, was equivalent to the multiplier effect of effective ART, MT. For those mixing with 
the unsuppressed group, R was equivalent to that used for symptomatic patients.  
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Table S3. Country parameters and estimates of the probability of transmission 
  Tanzania Zambia Ethiopia Lesotho South 
Africa 
Underlying variables1      
Male circumcision coverage 0.84 0.37 0.76 0.69 0.56 
Condom use 0.27 0.17 0.08 0.29 0.52 
Proportion of sexually active population categorized 
as low risk heterosexual  
0.53 0.71 0.86 0.54 0.52 
Proportion of sexually active population categorized 
as medium risk heterosexual  
0.40 0.26 0.10 0.41 0.40 
Proportion of sexually active population categorized 
as high risk (heterosexual, MSM, IDU)  
0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 
Number of partners per year (low risk) 1 1 1 1 1 
Number of partners per year (medium risk) 4.6 2.5 1.2 2 4.5 
Number of partners per year (high risk) 87.5 54.5 76 32 105 
Number of sex acts per partner (low risk) 54 75 40 90 90 
Number of sex acts per partner (medium risk) 22 60 12 30 41 
Number of sex acts per partner (high risk) 2 3 2 3 1.5 
 Equation variables      
HIV prevalence in partner population  0.05 0.14 0.02 0.23 0.19 
Base probability of HIV transmission per act2 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 
Multiplier for the effect of stage of infection 
(symptomatic)3 
4.45 4.45 4.45 4.45 4.45 
Multiplier for the effect of condom use4 0.79 0.86 0.94 0.77 0.67 
Multiplier for the effect of male circumcision5 0.50 0.78 0.54 0.59 0.66 
Multiplier for the effect of treatment6 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Number of acts per partner per year 38 69 36 61 63 
Number of partners per year 8 3 4 3 11 
Number of susceptible partners per year 8 3 4 2 9 
Estimated Probability of transmission per person  
    
Annual probability (suppressed group) 0.001 0.003 0.0001 0.002 0.008 
Probability per 6-month cycle5 (suppressed group) 0.0004 0.0014 0.0001 0.0012 0.004 
Annual probability (unsuppressed group) 0.071 0.204 0.014 0.211 0.515 
Probability per 6-month cycle5 (unsuppressed group) 0.036 0.108 0.007 0.112 0.304 
Notes: 1All of these values are extracted from Spectrum (2); 2 Boily et al, 2009 (4); 3The efficacy of condom 
use is 0.85 (5, 6); 3The efficacy of male circumcision is 0.6 (7) and 4The efficacy of effective treatment is 
0.96 (8). The 6-month probability = 1-(1-annual probability)1/2. 
 
4. Cohort simulations and Markov Model Calibration 
The model was calibrated to: (1) retention in care data from a meta-analysis of sub-Saharan 
African ART cohorts by Fox & Rosen (2015) (9); (2) HIV-specific mortality rates for ART patients 
since initiation from Murray et al (2014) (10); and (3) on-treatment viral suppression data from 
a meta-analysis of ART cohorts in LMICs by Boender et al (2015) (11). 
Since the parameters for transition probabilities were taken from averages across sub-Saharan 
Africa, the outputs were nearly identical across countries, with some minor variation for 
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Lesotho. The only transition probabilities that varied per country were other-cause mortality 
when virally suppressed, and rates of change in mortality derived from the latter.    
Figure S2.  Comparison of model output with observed data for Retention in care 
 
Note: Observed data from IeDEA/WHO for Southern Africa (12) are included for illustration, but were not 
used for calibration.  
Figure S3.  Comparison of model output with observed data for HIV-specific mortality 
rates  
 
Note: Murray et al (2014) is averaged across sexes and for initial CD4 count between 200-249, for sub-
Saharan Africa.  
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Figure S4.  Comparison of model output with observed data for On-treatment Viral 
suppression 
 
 
Below are figures with the model outputs for each country from running the model until the 
cohort dies in the baseline scenario without the intervention and then with the intervention, as 
well as tables with the model outputs for the first 5 years after ART initiation. These consider 
the health of the cohort, and do not yet factor in secondary HIV transmission.    
Figure S5. Model simulation without intervention 
a) Tanzania 
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b) Zambia 
 
c) Ethiopia 
 
d) Lesotho 
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e) South Africa 
 
 
Table S4. Model simulation without intervention until 5 years (10 cycles) post-initiation 
a) Tanzania 
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 934 884 845 806 768 731 694 659 626 594 
Dead 66 50 39 39 38 38 36 35 33 32 
Life years 17 12 10 10 10 9 9 9 8 8 
Suppressed 685 635 645 624 596 567 539 511 486 461 
Unsuppressed 249 250 200 182 172 164 156 148 140 133 
ICS1 685 629 632 608 576 544 513 483 456 429 
ICU1 135 149 93 74 65 60 56 53 50 47 
ICS2 - 6 13 17 20 23 25 28 30 32 
Retained in care 820 784 738 698 662 627 595 564 536 508 
b) Zambia 
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 934 884 845 806 767 729 693 658 624 593 
Dead 66 50 40 39 39 38 37 35 33 32 
Life years 17 12 10 10 10 9 9 9 8 8 
Suppressed 685 635 645 624 596 567 538 511 485 461 
Unsuppressed 249 250 200 181 171 163 155 147 139 132 
ICS1 685 629 632 608 576 544 513 483 455 429 
ICU1 135 149 93 74 65 60 56 53 50 47 
ICS2 - 6 13 17 20 23 25 28 30 32 
Retained in care 820 784 738 698 661 627 594 564 535 508 
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c) Ethiopia 
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 934 884 846 808 770 732 696 661 628 596 
Dead 66 50 39 38 38 37 36 35 33 32 
Life years 17 12 10 10 10 9 9 9 8 8 
Suppressed 685 635 645 624 596 567 539 512 486 462 
Unsuppressed 249 250 201 183 173 165 157 150 142 134 
ICS1 685 629 632 608 576 544 513 484 456 430 
ICU1 135 149 93 74 66 60 57 53 50 47 
ICS2 - 6 13 17 20 23 26 28 30 33 
Retained in care 820 784 738 699 662 628 595 565 536 509 
 
d) Lesotho 
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 934 884 841 800 760 721 683 647 613 581 
Dead 66 50 43 41 40 39 37 36 34 32 
Life years 17 12 11 10 10 10 9 9 9 8 
Suppressed 685 635 645 624 596 566 536 509 482 457 
Unsuppressed 249 250 196 176 164 155 147 139 131 124 
ICS1 685 629 632 608 576 543 512 482 453 426 
ICU1 135 149 93 73 64 59 55 52 49 46 
ICS2 - 6 13 17 20 22 25 27 29 31 
Retained in care 820 784 738 697 660 625 591 560 531 503 
 
e) South Africa  
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 934 884 844 805 766 728 692 657 623 591 
Dead 66 50 40 39 39 38 37 35 34 32 
Life years 17 12 10 10 10 10 9 9 8 8 
Suppressed 685 635 645 624 596 567 538 511 485 461 
Unsuppressed 249 250 199 181 170 162 154 146 138 131 
ICS1 685 629 632 608 576 544 513 483 455 429 
ICU1 135 149 93 74 65 60 56 53 50 47 
ICS2 - 6 13 17 20 23 25 28 30 32 
Retained in care 820 784 738 698 661 627 594 563 534 507 
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Figure S6. Model simulation with Intervention 
a) Tanzania 
 
 
Table S5. Model simulation with Intervention until 5 years (10 cycles) post-initiation 
a) Tanzania 
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 991 964 942 911 876 837 799 760 722 686 
Dead 9 27 22 31 36 38 39 39 38 36 
Life years 2 7 6 8 9 10 10 10 9 9 
Suppressed 961 795 767 730 692 657 623 591 561 532 
Unsuppressed 30 169 175 182 183 181 176 169 162 154 
ICS1 961 795 761 720 679 640 603 568 536 505 
ICU1 14 112 89 81 75 70 66 62 59 55 
ICS2 - 1 6 10 13 16 20 22 25 28 
Retained in care 975 907 856 810 767 727 689 653 619 587 
b) Zambia 
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 991 964 941 910 874 836 797 758 721 684 
Dead 9 27 23 31 36 38 39 39 38 36 
Life years 2 7 6 8 9 10 10 10 9 9 
Suppressed 961 795 767 730 692 657 623 590 560 532 
Unsuppressed 30 169 174 181 182 180 174 168 160 153 
ICS1 961 795 761 720 679 640 603 568 535 504 
ICU1 14 112 89 80 75 70 66 62 58 55 
ICS2 - 1 6 10 13 16 19 22 25 27 
Retained in care 975 907 856 810 767 727 688 652 619 587 
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c) Ethiopia 
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 991 964 943 913 877 840 801 762 725 689 
Dead 9 27 21 30 35 38 39 38 38 36 
Life years 2 7 5 8 9 10 10 10 9 9 
Suppressed 961 795 767 730 693 657 623 591 561 533 
Unsuppressed 30 169 176 183 185 183 178 171 164 156 
ICS1 961 795 761 720 679 640 604 569 536 505 
ICU1 14 112 89 81 75 70 66 62 59 55 
ICS2 - 1 6 10 13 16 20 22 25 28 
Retained in care 975 907 856 810 768 727 690 654 620 588 
 
d) Lesotho 
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 991 964 937 903 865 826 786 746 708 671 
Dead 9 27 27 34 38 40 40 39 38 37 
Life years 2 7 7 9 10 10 10 10 10 9 
Suppressed 961 795 767 730 692 655 621 588 557 528 
Unsuppressed 30 169 170 174 174 170 165 158 151 143 
ICS1 961 795 761 720 679 639 601 566 533 501 
ICU1 14 112 89 79 73 69 64 61 57 54 
ICS2 - 1 6 10 13 16 19 22 24 27 
Retained in care 975 907 856 809 765 724 685 648 614 581 
 
e) South Africa  
 Cycle 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alive 991 964 941 909 873 835 796 757 719 683 
Dead 9 27 23 31 36 38 39 39 38 36 
Life years 2 7 6 8 9 10 10 10 9 9 
Suppressed 961 795 767 730 692 656 622 590 560 531 
Unsuppressed 30 169 174 180 181 178 173 167 159 151 
ICS1 961 795 761 720 679 640 603 568 535 504 
ICU1 14 112 89 80 75 70 66 62 58 55 
ICS2 - 1 6 10 13 16 19 22 25 27 
Retained in care 975 907 856 810 767 726 688 652 618 586 
 
 
5. Calculation of DALYs and ART cost savings per HIV infection averted 
 
A Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) is a summary measure of disease burden that combines, 
for a specific disease or condition, the number of years of life lost due to premature mortality 
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(YLL) with that of years of life lost due to disability (YLD). We adopted the approach in the latest 
Global Burden of Disease 2010 (13), by removing age-weighting. However, DALYs were 
discounted at 3% in the main analysis, and at 0% and 6% in the sensitivity analysis. 
To estimate DALYs associated with achieving viral suppression, we used the disability weights 
from Salomon et al (2012) for the health state of HIV/AIDS receiving ART (0.053) and for those 
that were unsuppressed, we assumed less disability than not being on treatment and similar to 
being symptomatic but pre-AIDS (0.221). After death, a disability weight of one was assigned 
until individuals reached their natural death according to their expectation of life. 
Table S6. DALY Parameters 
Parameters Value Source 
Discount rate 3% Murray et al, 2012 (13) 
Disability weight pre- AIDS 0.221 
Salomon et al, 2012 (14) Disability weight AIDS – no ART 0.547 
Disability weight AIDS receiving ART 0.053 
Duration pre-AIDS 7 years Hogan et al, 2005 (15) 
Duration AIDS (no ART) 2 years Cleary et al, 2008 (16) 
Age of onset of HIV (ART) Cycle dependent Assumes cohort sexual 
partners are the same age 
as the cohort individuals in 
each cycle 
Expectation of life Cycle and country-specific WHO life tables 
 
We conservatively assume full ART coverage and no premature death due to AIDS from 
infections averted. Years of life lived in disability (YLD) were low since they only included 2 
years of symptomatic pre-AIDS disability, followed by the remaining expected years of life with 
a low disability weight associated with being on ART.  
ART cost savings 
The estimate of discounted lifetime ART costs was sourced from a study in South Africa [84]. 
It was assumed that 50% of the costs were drug costs and therefore fixed across countries. 
The remaining 50% were adjusted by log GDP per capita. This discounted lifetime ART cost 
was multiplied by the number of infections averted in each cycle in each country (until cycle 50 
or until the cohort reached 60 years of age) to estimate cost savings from any prevented 
transmission, or incremental costs from additional transmission.  
 
  
Appendix 3 
299 
 
6. Intervention Costs 
AFYA Study 
The AFYA study was an individually randomised controlled trial conducted by the University of 
California, Berkeley and the Ministry of Health & Social Welfare in the Shinyanga region in 
Tanzania (17). It assessed three delivery models for short-term food and nutrition support for 
people living with HIV: nutrition assessment and counselling (NAC) alone (the standard of care), 
NAC plus food assistance, and NAC plus cash transfers. In the latter group, food-insecure 
patients received a standard household food ration, including whole maize meal (12 kg), 
groundnuts (3kg) and beans (3kg), with a financial value of approximately US$ 11 per month.  
The study sought to compare the effect of the combined NAC and food or cash assistance 
programme (both arms) versus NAC alone on retention in care and ART adherence, measured 
as the proportion of patients with medication possession ratio ≥95% during the 0-6 month 
interval. The intervention was provided for enrolled participants from December 2013 to 
February 2016, with 345 participants enrolled in the food basket arm (18).  
Costing Methods 
A combination of standard step-down and ingredients costing was used to estimate the financial 
and economic costs of providing the food basket. Only the provider intervention costs are 
considered in this analysis, since the indirect provider costs at the health facility level from 
increased health service utilisation are included elsewhere in the modelling.  
We collected intervention cost data at the 3 study sites, namely Shinyanga Regional Hospital, 
Kahama District Hospital and Kambarage Health Centre, as well as from the research team at 
the University of California, Berkeley and at the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Data was 
collected in August-September 2015 for the start-up period (1 January 2013 to 30 November 
2013) and for the intervention period from 1 December 2013 till 29 February 2016.  
Costs were categorised as recurrent and capital costs. Capital costs were annuitized using a 
discount rate of 3%. Input prices were obtained from the project, health facilities and regional 
office financial records, as well as local suppliers. Costs were estimated in Tanzanian Shillings 
(TZS) and then converted into 2015 USD, using weighted average annual Bank of Tanzania 
Interbank Foreign exchange rates, and the United States GDP deflator for costs incurred in 
2013 and 2014.  
Research costs were excluded in both the start-up and implementation phases. To be 
conservative, start-up costs were included in full in total intervention costs, as it was not 
possible to determine whether and which of these costs would yield benefits beyond the 
duration of the study.  
All project overhead and intervention costs were allocated based on estimated use for the 
following activities: project administration and management; research; client identification; 
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monitoring conditionality; cash transfer; and food basket. Overhead costs were allocated using 
step-down allocation to support cost centres, and then to the final cost centres, namely the 
Food basket and the Cash transfer. Staff time allocation between activities was estimated from 
a combination of self-assessments, interviews and time sheets, and used to allocate 
overheads. The proportion of beneficiaries receiving food baskets was used to allocate the 
support costs of client identification and conditionality monitoring.    
Ethical clearances were received from the Tanzanian National Institute of Medical Research 
(NIMR), the University of California, Berkeley’s Institutional Review Board, and the LSHTM 
Research Ethics Committee.  
Cost estimates 
As presented in table S6 below, the total cost of the food basket intervention was estimated at 
USD 68,205. By the end of the intervention, the food basket had been provided to 345 enrolled 
patients, at a unit cost of USD 198.  
The main cost drivers were recurrent staff costs (38% for the food basket), followed by the food 
basket procurement cost (30%). Start-up implementation costs were also a major cost category, 
representing 23% of the total.  
Table S7. Estimated Economic Costs for the Food basket intervention 
Cost Category Total (USD) % of Total 
Capital     
Start-up 13,035 19% 
Building Costs 3,214 5% 
Training 530 1% 
Equipment 1,063 2% 
Total Capital Costs 17,842 26% 
Recurrent 
  
Utilities 112 0% 
Staff 25,499 37% 
Materials  2,159 3% 
Food procurement 22,563 33% 
Transport 30 0% 
Total Recurrent Costs 50,363 74% 
TOTAL COSTS 68,205 100% 
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Figure S7. Cost breakdown 
 
 
7. Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis 
The parameter ranges and distributions used in the PSA are provided in Table 1 in the 
manuscript. Below are the cost-effectiveness planes for each country from the health care 
perspective without transmission, with transmission and from the multi-sectoral perspective.  
Figure S8. Cost-effectiveness planes: Health care cohort perspective without 
transmission 
a) Tanzania 
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b) Zambia 
 
c) Ethiopia 
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d) Lesotho 
 
e) South Africa 
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Figure S9. Cost-effectiveness planes: Health care perspective with transmission 
a) Tanzania 
 
b) Zambia 
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c) Ethiopia 
 
d) Lesotho 
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e) South Africa 
 
Figure S10. Cost-effectiveness planes: Multi-sectoral perspective 
a) Tanzania 
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d) Lesotho 
 
e) South Africa 
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